Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
1-2025
Abstract
The preoccupation of comparative constitutional lawyers over the past decade or so has been the rise of authoritarian populism. This chapter focuses on one possible pathway that might follow our present political moment: competitive populism. This phase will involve a certain kind of institutional vacuum: the prior institutions, associated with liberal constitutional democracy, will not lend themselves to being rebooted. In reflecting on this possible future, this chapter explores the nature and form of deinstitutionalization that has occurred under authoritarian populism, and the elements that define the emerging constitutional framework. The implication here is that what will be crucial after authoritarian populism is not the nature of institutional design but the character of political contestation. The chapter closes by turning to Tushnet and Bugarič’s important work on populism, and by using their thesis as an opportunity to consider the relationship between populism, formalism, instrumentalism, and the rule of law.
Disciplines
Administrative Law | Comparative and Foreign Law | Constitutional Law | Law
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Madhav Khosla,
Competitive Populism,
Redefining Comparative Constitutional Law: Essays for Mark Tushnet, Madhav Khosla & Vicki C Jackson (Eds.), Oxford University Press
(2025).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/4872
Included in
Administrative Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons