Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2-2026

Abstract

Halfway through oral argument in Trump v. Cook, Justice Amy Coney Barrett asked Solicitor General John Sauer when a statute authorizing an officer’s removal should be read to require process. “Why shouldn’t we do the same thing that the Shurtleff court did,” Barrett asked, “and say that, well, as we said in Shurtleff, when a statute specifies the grounds for removal, there must be notice and a hearing given?”

In response, Sauer distinguished between statutes authorizing removal for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office (INM) — which he conceded require process — and statutes using the more general phrase “for cause.” Nineteenth century precedent on the latter type, he insisted, was “all over the map,” citing in support a 1905 Michigan Law Review article by Alonzo Tuttle and “background case law,” thirteen examples of which he said were cited in the government’s brief. According to Sauer, the rule articulated in Shurtleff applies only to officers whose removal is statutorily limited to INM — a conclusion that conveniently excludes Lisa Cook, who per the Federal Reserve Act holds her office for a fourteen-year fixed term, removable sooner “for cause.

Disciplines

Administrative Law | Law

Download

Share

COinS