Legal Internalism as a Mode of Reasoning

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-2025

Abstract

Despite the often-repeated claim that “we are all realists now,” legal reasoning remains rule-driven, conceptual, deductive, and heavily path-dependent. Indeed, this remains true notwithstanding recognition that adjudication involves law-making and that “judge-made” law is real. In this article, we argue that legal reasoning adheres to a phenomenon that is best described as “legal internalism,” which recognizes that doctrine and rules play three critical functions: “translation,” “saliencing,” and “normativization.” In this article, we show how legal internalism operates as a method of reasoning independent of both Legal Realism and Legal Formalism, recognizing an important role for rules, while at the same time accepting the need to balance reason with authority.

Disciplines

Jurisprudence | Law | Law and Philosophy

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