The Value of Jury Rights

Authors

Philip A. Hamburger, Columbia Law SchoolFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

12-2025

Abstract

The right to a civil jury trial is often dismissed as an inefficient anachronism ill suited to the complexities of modern litigation, and these efficiency concerns have long overshadowed any serious defense of the Seventh Amendment. This Article argues that such skepticism profoundly misunderstands the constitutional function and enduring value of civil jury rights. The Article observes that the Seventh Amendment’s jury right was adopted with the understanding that it would come with some inefficiencies and that contemporary concerns about its inefficiencies tend to be overstated. Ultimately, the Article finds that civil juries are essential for structural reasons such as preserving the fact-law distinction and limiting government.

The Article thus defends civil jury rights on historical and structural grounds. Its argument is particularly urgent in the wake of SEC v. Jarkesy, in which the Supreme Court limited the administrative state’s evasion of jury rights. That case was only a first step toward restoring jury rights, and federal agencies are already trying to circumvent it. So, it is crucial to recognize not only the constitutional foundation of civil jury rights but also their value.

Disciplines

Civil Law | Civil Procedure | Common Law | Constitutional Law | Law

Recommended Citation

Philip A. Hamburger, The Value of Jury Rights, 93 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1267 (2025).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/4750