Framing Indian Federalism
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
12-2024
DOI
https://doi.org/10.4337/ccs.2024.0035
Abstract
This article focuses on a set of historical and contemporary developments in Indian constitutionalism that implicate the question of democracy and the question of federalism. Its goal is to connect the design and application of federal powers with what many regard as an important telos of federalism, namely, the promotion of democracy. Towards this end, it holds up for consideration India’s federal model, which, it is suggested, focuses on the presence of a subnational demos rather than the political identity of subnational units. Such an understanding of federalism de-emphasizes the territorial aspect of federalism and allows federal design to accommodate different kinds of cultural and ethnic realities. This vision proceeds on the premise that the more layered the constitution of a demos, the more democratic the overall arrangement can be. Importantly, such a framework allows us to appreciate when central interventions in subnational authority might and might not be justified. The exercise of central power can occur in both pro-democracy and anti-democracy ways, as well as in pro-federal and anti-federal ways. And these sets of possibilities are related in important respects.
Disciplines
Comparative and Foreign Law | Constitutional Law | Law
Recommended Citation
Madhav Khosla,
Framing Indian Federalism,
2(2)
Comp. Const. Stud.
218
(2024).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/4595