Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2010
Abstract
Every quantitative forecast of Chinese emissions – save for two important exceptions – uses only national-level data, a methodological weakness that can wash out distinctions between East and West. Of the two studies that employ sub-national data, one projects higher emissions than any of the national-level studies; the other projects much higher emissions than any other study. We read this as suggesting that Chinese carbon emissions over the forthcoming several decades may be significantly greater than the standard models have anticipated, with correspondingly higher costs to China from any agreement to curb carbon emissions. In light of the importance of economic growth to the CCP, the internal structure of Chinese governance, and the need to develop Western China, the prospects for China choosing to join such an agreement in the immediate future seem slim.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I focuses on the general importance of economic growth to the CCP, the distribution of growth within China, and the social and economic difficulties generated by the CCP's hyper-growth policies. Part II analyzes the CCP's internal environmental enforcement capacity and argues that China would encounter substantial domestic challenges in implementing a climate accord, even if it chooses to sign one. Part III critiques the assumptions underlying quantitative forecasts of Chinese carbon emissions and suggests that future emissions may exceed conventional projections by substantial margins. Part IV canvasses extant potential frameworks for an international climate change agreement and argues that they are likely to be unsuitable to one or more of the relevant parties. Our conclusion is a pessimistic one: it will be difficult to convince China to join a meaningful international climate agreement in the near future under the best of circumstances. The Two Chinas, coupled with China's internal political dynamics, present circumstances that are hardly ideal.
Disciplines
Comparative and Foreign Law | Environmental Law | Law
Recommended Citation
Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur,
International Agreements, Internal Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The "Two Chinas" Problem,
50
Va. J. Int'l L.
325
(2010).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/4529