Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2010
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.003.0006
Abstract
The chapter examines the main argument for, and the presuppositions of the claim that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An analysis of intentional actions, and of action for a (normative) reason, followed by a consideration of a number of objections to the thesis of the Guise of the Good force various revisions and refinements of the thesis yielding a defensible version of it. It is argued that the revised thesis is supported by the same argument that inspired the Guise of the Good from the beginning and that the thesis plays a crucial role in uniting theories of action, rationality, and normativity.
Disciplines
Law | Law and Philosophy | Philosophy
Recommended Citation
Joseph Raz,
On the Guise of the Good,
Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, Sergio Tenenbaum (Ed.), Oxford University Press
(2010).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/4353