Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1999
Abstract
My comments will not be so much a critique as an elaboration of the two papers, especially Professor Neuman's paper on United States (U.S.) law, since I am not an expert on German constitutional law. For those less familiar with U.S. law, my goal is to bring to light some additional elements of the U.S. constitutional tradition that impede the use of law to achieve economic equality-elements of U.S. constitutional law that reinforce the weak "general equality" principle of the Equal Protection Clause.2 I will use U.S. labor law as my vehicle for showing the variety of constitutional principles that sustain actual economic inequality in the United States.
Disciplines
Constitutional Law | Labor and Employment Law | Law
Recommended Citation
Mark Barenberg,
Constitutional Constraints on Redistribution through Class Power,
5
Colum. J. Eur. L.
313
(1999).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3438