Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2013
Abstract
The recent debate over reforming the Securities Exchange Act section 13(d) ten-day filing window demonstrates the importance of balancing the costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure. While hedge fund activism may create shareholder value, short-termism is a very real problem for firms today. Rather than a rigid mandatory rule, the duration of the blockholder disclosure window should be set through a shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws that empowers shareholders to set an optimal maximum length for each firm. To internalize the economic and moral costs to society of permitting trading on asymmetric information, the SEC should impose a filing fee on blockholders utilizing the delayed disclosure window and use the proceeds to compensate investors who sold shares while a blockholder engaged in a stealth accumulation.
Disciplines
Law | Securities Law
Recommended Citation
Joshua Mitts,
A Private Ordering Solution to Blockholder Disclosure,
35
N.C. Cent. L. Rev.
203
(2013).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3259