Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2002
Abstract
The Enron case plays on many different dimensions, but its prominence is not merely part of popular culture's obsession with scandal du jour. Rather, the Enron situation challenges some of the core beliefs and practices that have underpinned the academic analysis of corporate law and governance, including mergers and acquisitions, since the 1980s. These amount to an interlocking set of institutions that constitute "shareholder capitalism," American-style, 2001, that we have been aggressively promoting throughout the world. We have come to rely on a particular set of assumptions about the connection between stock market prices and underlying economic realities; the reliability of independent auditors, financial standards, and copious disclosure in protecting the integrity of financial reporting; the efficacy of corporate governance in monitoring managerial performance; the utility of stock options in aligning managerial and shareholder interests, and the value of employee ownership as both an incentive device as well as a retirement planning tool.
Disciplines
Banking and Finance Law | Bankruptcy Law | Business Organizations Law | Law
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey N. Gordon,
What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections,
69
U. Chi. L. Rev.
1233
(2002).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2999
Included in
Banking and Finance Law Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons
Comments
Originally appearing in the University of Chicago Law Review, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233 (2002). Reprinted with permission from the University of Chicago Law School.