Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2021
Abstract
Appropriations lie at the core of the administrative state and are becoming increasingly important as deep partisan divides have stymied substantive legislation. Both Congress and the President exploit appropriations to control government and advance their policy agendas, with the border wall battle being just one of several recent high-profile examples. Yet in public law doctrine, appropriations are ignored, pulled out for special legal treatment, or subjected to legal frameworks ill-suited for appropriations realities. This Article documents how appropriations are marginalized in a variety of public law contexts and assesses the reasons for this unjustified treatment. Appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization does not affect the political branches equally, but instead enhances executive branch and presidential power over appropriations at the expense of Congress. Yet legal doctrines governing appropriations should have the opposite effect because constitutional text, structure, and history make clear the central importance of Congress’s appropriations power. Appropriations’ doctrinal marginalization undermines the separation of powers even further by undercutting political accountability through Congress and creating de facto presidential spending authority, with the executive branch able to violate governing statutes on appropriations with minimal legal consequences. This Article then turns to the question of what taking appropriations seriously might mean for public law doctrine. It concludes that appropriations exceptionalism is not problematic if it reflects the realities of the appropriations process and does not downplay appropriations’ significance. Doctrines should attend to the separation of powers dynamics raised by appropriations and reinforce Congress’s power of the purse. Among other consequences, this leads to jurisdictional doctrines that put primacy on congressional enforcement of appropriations limits in court.
Disciplines
Administrative Law | Constitutional Law | Law | Legislation | Litigation
Center/Program
Center for Constitutional Governance
Recommended Citation
Gillian E. Metzger,
Taking Appropriations Seriously,
121
Colum. L. Rev.
1075
(2021).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2761
Included in
Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Litigation Commons
Comments
This article originally appeared in 121 Colum. L. Rev. 1075 (2021). Reprinted by permission.