Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2020

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.59

Abstract

Legal scholars are familiar with the problem of executive overreach, especially in emergencies. But sometimes, instead of being too audacious or extreme, a national executive's attempts to address a true threat prove far too limited and insubstantial. In this Essay, we seek to define and clarify the phenomenon of executive underreach, with special reference to the COVID-19 crisis; to outline ways in which such underreach may compromise constitutional governance and the international legal order; and to suggest a partial remedy.

Disciplines

Banking and Finance Law | Constitutional Law | Law | Law and Economics | President/Executive Department

Comments

© 2020 Cambridge University Press. Originally published in the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 114, p. 608, 2020.

Center/Program

Center for Constitutional Governance

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