Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.59
Abstract
Legal scholars are familiar with the problem of executive overreach, especially in emergencies. But sometimes, instead of being too audacious or extreme, a national executive's attempts to address a true threat prove far too limited and insubstantial. In this Essay, we seek to define and clarify the phenomenon of executive underreach, with special reference to the COVID-19 crisis; to outline ways in which such underreach may compromise constitutional governance and the international legal order; and to suggest a partial remedy.
Disciplines
Banking and Finance Law | Constitutional Law | Law | Law and Economics | President/Executive Department
Center/Program
Center for Constitutional Governance
Recommended Citation
David E. Pozen & Kim L. Scheppele,
Executive Underreach, in Pandemics and Otherwise,
114(4)
Am. J. Int'l L.
608
(2020).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2735
Included in
Banking and Finance Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, President/Executive Department Commons
Comments
© 2020 Cambridge University Press. Originally published in the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 114, p. 608, 2020.