Executive Underreach, in Pandemics and Otherwise

Authors

David E. Pozen, Columbia Law SchoolFollow
Kim Lane Scheppele, Princeton University School of Public and International AffairsFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2020

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.59

Abstract

Legal scholars are familiar with the problem of executive overreach, especially in emergencies. But sometimes, instead of being too audacious or extreme, a national executive's attempts to address a true threat prove far too limited and insubstantial. In this Essay, we seek to define and clarify the phenomenon of executive underreach, with special reference to the COVID-19 crisis; to outline ways in which such underreach may compromise constitutional governance and the international legal order; and to suggest a partial remedy.

Disciplines

Banking and Finance Law | Constitutional Law | Law | Law and Economics | President/Executive Department

Comments

© 2020 Cambridge University Press. Originally published in the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 114, p. 608, 2020.

Recommended Citation

David E. Pozen & Kim L. Scheppele, Executive Underreach, in Pandemics and Otherwise, 114(4) Am. J. Int'l L. 608 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2735