The Case for Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO

Authors

Kyle Bagwell, Stanford University Department of EconomicsFollow
Petros C. Mavroidis, Columbia Law SchoolFollow
Robert W. Staiger, Stanford UniversityFollow

Document Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

2004

Abstract

A major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in creating the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the introduction of new dispute settlement procedures. These procedures were intended to provide a significant step forward, relative to GATT, in the settling of trade disputes, in large part by ensuring that violations of WTO commitments would be met with swift retaliation ("suspension of concessions") by the affected trading partners. While the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO indeed represent a considerable improvement over those in GATT, nine years of experience under the new procedures suggests that significant problems of enforcement remain in the WTO.

Disciplines

Dispute Resolution and Arbitration | International Trade Law | Law | Law and Economics

Recommended Citation

Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W. Staiger, The Case for Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO, Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 0405-08 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2395