Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2015
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.47
Abstract
This chapter examines the influence of tax on managerial agency costs, with particular emphasis on public companies in the United States. Focusing on “C-corporations,” this chapter first considers why tax is an imperfect vehicle for mitigating managerial agency costs. It then discusses how tax influences the compensation of managers, both in ways policy makers intended, and in ways they did not. The chapter also considers how tax affects management decisions about capital structure, hedging, and acquisitions. In addition, this chapter explores the tax system’s influence on the ability and incentives of shareholders to monitor management. This chapter then concludes with an analysis of how the tax system itself monitors managers.
Disciplines
Business Organizations Law | Commercial Law | Law
Recommended Citation
David M. Schizer,
Tax and Corporate Governance: The Influence of Tax on Managerial Agency Costs,
The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance, Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe (Eds.), Oxford University Press
(2015).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2301