Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1991
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1086/293296
Abstract
With the growing interest in interpretation as an activity essential in the study of the arts and of society it was inevitable that the question of the relation between morality and interpretation would attract considerable interest. Given that moral views and arguments are expressed in language, are essentially language bound, there is no doubt that the understanding of moral views and argument involves, at least at times, interpretation (of arguments and propositions, etc.). The same can be said of physics. The question is whether morality is interpretative in a way in which physics is not. Some writers have claimed that it is. I will examine the claims and arguments to that effect advanced by Michael Walzer, though much of my argument will be general and not limited to the arguments he explicitly advances.
Disciplines
Law | Law and Philosophy
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Recommended Citation
Joseph Raz,
Morality as Interpretation,
101
Ethics
392
(1991).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2232
Comments
© 1991 by The University of Chicago.