Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2011
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0002
Abstract
‘A reason’ has two meanings: explanatory reasons are facts that contribute to an explanation (of anything explained); normative reasons are facts that favour and guide responses, in one’s emotions, beliefs, actions, etc., to how things are. The two kinds of reasons are connected by their connection to the capacity of Reason, or rationality, and by the normative/explanatory nexus, i.e. by the fact that normative reasons can explain the response that they favour. Normative reasons are — potentially — explanatory reasons, but the explanations they provide are of a special kind that presupposes their normative character. The chapter builds on ideas offered by B. Williams, and criticizes J. Broome’s view of the relations between reasons, explanations, and ‘ought-facts’, offering an alternative explanation of ought-propositions.
Disciplines
Ethics and Political Philosophy | Law | Law and Philosophy | Philosophy
Recommended Citation
Joseph Raz,
Reasons: Explanatory and Normative,
From Normativity to Responsibility, Joseph Raz, Oxford University Press
(2011).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1488