Publication Date
2002
Abstract
The Youngstown holding is widely admired. One reads with pride those passages in which the Supreme Court denies to a president with whom they are in considerable political sympathy the power to enlarge executive authority by militarizing the homeland. And yet one wonders, as we confront in the 21st century a lethal foreign enemy who has demonstrated the ability to infiltrate and assault the domestic environment, precisely what restraints ought to govern a presidential response to that enemy.
Disciplines
Constitutional Law | Law | Supreme Court of the United States
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Recommended Citation
Philip C. Bobbitt,
Youngstown: Pages from the Book of Disquietude,
19
Const. Comment.
3
(2002).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1130
