The Center for Contract and Economic Organization was created in 2006 to exploit the synergies between the University's leading scholars in contract theory and the economics of information and the faculty at the Law School, who are among the nation's most prominent legal scholars in the law and economics of contracts, commercial transactions, and business organizations.

The singular focus that links these various scholars is the study of the mechanisms of contracting both inside and outside the firm: Why do economic actors write the contracts that they do? How are these choices affected by variations in economic organization? And, how can (and do) lawyers (and the law) facilitate efforts to develop more efficient mechanisms for contract and transactional design? While several other universities have centers that focus more specifically on corporate structure and governance, the Center for Contract and Economic Organization is both unique and uniquely placed to make major contributions to existing knowledge.

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Publications from 1980

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Article: Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation: The Problem of Finding an Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, John C. Coffee Jr.

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Article: Rebuttal: The Individual or The Firm? Focusing The Threat of Criminal Liability, John C. Coffee Jr.

Publications from 1979

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Article: Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott

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Article: Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott

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Article: The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, Victor P. Goldberg

Publications from 1977

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Article: Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, John C. Coffee Jr.

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Article: Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott

Publications from 1975

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Article: Constitutional Regulation of Provisional Creditor Remedies: The Cost of Procedural Due Process, Robert E. Scott

Publications from 1974

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Article: Abusive Debt Collection – A Model Statute for Virginia, Robert E. Scott and Diane M. Strickland

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Article: Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, Victor P. Goldberg

Publications from 1972

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Article: The Reality of Procedural Due Process – A Study of the Implementation of Fair Hearing Requirements by the Welfare Caseworker, Robert E. Scott

Publications from 1969

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Article: The Regulation and Administration of the Welfare Hearing Process – The Need for Administrative Responsibility, Robert E. Scott

Publications from 1967

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Article: Compensation for Victims of Violent Crimes: An Analysis, Robert E. Scott