The Center for Contract and Economic Organization was created in 2006 to exploit the synergies between the University's leading scholars in contract theory and the economics of information and the faculty at the Law School, who are among the nation's most prominent legal scholars in the law and economics of contracts, commercial transactions, and business organizations.
The singular focus that links these various scholars is the study of the mechanisms of contracting both inside and outside the firm: Why do economic actors write the contracts that they do? How are these choices affected by variations in economic organization? And, how can (and do) lawyers (and the law) facilitate efforts to develop more efficient mechanisms for contract and transactional design? While several other universities have centers that focus more specifically on corporate structure and governance, the Center for Contract and Economic Organization is both unique and uniquely placed to make major contributions to existing knowledge.
Publications from 2009
Article: An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, C. Scott Hemphill
Article: Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, and Robert E. Scott
Article: Globalization and the Provision of Incentives Inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition, Vincente Cuñat and Maria Guadalupe
Article: In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, Robert E. Scott
Article: The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, C. Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk
Publications from 2008
Article: Cleaning Up Lake River, Victor P. Goldberg
Article: Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, Ronald J. Mann and Travis Siebeneicher
Article: Market Damages, Efficient Contracting, and the Economic Waste Fallacy, Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott
Article: Network Neutrality and the False Promise of Zero-Price Regulation, C. Scott Hemphill
Article: Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati
Publications from 2007
Article: Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance, Robert E. Scott
Article: Odious Debts or Odious Regimes?, Patrick Bolton and David Skeel
Article: Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott
Article: Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority, Patrick Bolton and Olivier Jeanne
Article: The Dilemma of Odious Debts, Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, and Robert B. Thompson
Book Chapter: Corporate Law and Governance, Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailsa Röell
Working Paper: Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel? The GM-Fisher Body Contract, Victor P. Goldberg
Publications from 2006
Article: An Introduction to the Governance and Taxation of Not-For-Profit Organizations, Patrick Bolton and Hamid Mehran
Article: Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, C. Scott Hemphill
Book: Framing Contract Law: An Economic Perspective, Victor P. Goldberg
Publications from 2005
Article: Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets, Patrick Bolton, José Scheinkman, and Wei Xiong
Article: Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel Jr.