"Globalization and the Provision of Incentives Inside the Firm: The Eff" by Vincente Cuñat and Maria Guadalupe
 

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2009

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1086/599817

Abstract

This article studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structure of compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We find that import penetration (instrumented with exchange rates and tariffs) leads to more incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of pay to performance. Second, it increases within-firm pay differentials between executive levels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases. Finally, higher foreign competition is also associated with a higher demand for talent. These results suggest that increased foreign competition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.

Disciplines

Labor and Employment Law | Law

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

Comments

© 2009 by The University of Chicago.

Plum Print visual indicator of research metrics
PlumX Metrics
  • Citations
    • Citation Indexes: 93
    • Policy Citations: 21
  • Usage
    • Downloads: 134
    • Abstract Views: 12
  • Captures
    • Readers: 102
see details

Share

COinS