The Center for Contract and Economic Organization was created in 2006 to exploit the synergies between the University's leading scholars in contract theory and the economics of information and the faculty at the Law School, who are among the nation's most prominent legal scholars in the law and economics of contracts, commercial transactions, and business organizations.

The singular focus that links these various scholars is the study of the mechanisms of contracting both inside and outside the firm: Why do economic actors write the contracts that they do? How are these choices affected by variations in economic organization? And, how can (and do) lawyers (and the law) facilitate efforts to develop more efficient mechanisms for contract and transactional design? While several other universities have centers that focus more specifically on corporate structure and governance, the Center for Contract and Economic Organization is both unique and uniquely placed to make major contributions to existing knowledge.

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Publications from 2009

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Article: Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, and Robert E. Scott

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Article: In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, Robert E. Scott

Publications from 2008

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Article: Cleaning Up Lake River, Victor P. Goldberg

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Article: Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, Ronald J. Mann and Travis Siebeneicher

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Article: Market Damages, Efficient Contracting, and the Economic Waste Fallacy, Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott

Publications from 2007

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Article: Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractural Reliance, Robert E. Scott

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Article: Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott

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Working Paper: Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel? The GM-Fisher Body Contract, Victor P. Goldberg

Books from 2006

Book: Framing Contract Law: An Economic Perspective, Victor P. Goldberg