Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2008

Abstract

This Essay offers some reasons why conservatives should favor giving great weight to precedent in constitutional adjudication. Let me start with some preliminary observations about the debate between originalism and precedent more generally.

First, the debate has been dominated to far too great an extent by specific cases, Roe v. Wade1 in particular. It is distressing that the only issue that has seemed to matter in recent confirmation hearings is what a nominee thinks about Roe v. Wade. Similarly, in the precedent versus originalism debate, much of the discussion- even in the law reviews-is animated by what commentators think about Roe v. Wade. So, if you think Roe v. Wade was an illegitimate usurpation of power by the judiciary, and you want to overrule it, it somehow follows that you think all constitutional law should be based on something other than precedent. On the other hand, if you like Roe v. Wade, and you want to reaffirm it, somehow all precedent must be a good thing. This is an extraordinarily myopic way of thinking about the problem. Those who regard themselves as conservatives and embrace some of the values that David Strauss mentions-the rule of law, stability and predictability in the law, judicial restraint, the belief that social policy decisions should be made by elected representatives of the people rather than by the judges2- should not have their views on precedent versus originalism driven by one case.

Second, we cannot resolve the debate by adopting the conceptual apparatus of one school or the other, and by pointing out that the rival approach has no place within the conceptual apparatus we adopt. To a large extent, originalism and precedent reside in parallel universes that do not intersect. The case for originalism starts with legal positivism, the idea that only enacted law is the law of the land.3 Starting from this assumption, it follows that when there is an ambiguity in the law, we should try to resolve it by determining the meaning of the lawgiver. Such an approach naturally leads to looking at original sources for interpreting the law. As Steven Calabresi implicitly frames the question, "Does originalism say that precedent can trump the enacted law?"4 The answer, of course, is "No, it does not." If we start from originalist premises, we do not leave much room for precedent or stare decisis.

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Please note that the copyright in the Law & Policy Review is held by the President and Fellows of Harvard College, and that the copyright in the article is held by the author.

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