Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2010
Center/Program
Center for Contract and Economic Organization
Center/Program
The Charles Evans Gerber Transactional Studies Center
Abstract
The world is in a bit of a mess. Oil prices soared to more than $140 per barrel and within months plummeted to below $40. The pound fell from $2 to less than $1.40. Housing and stock prices crashed. Foreclosures, bankruptcies, and bailouts became newspaper staples. When things go awry like this, inevitably many people and firms regret having entered into contracts under more favorable circumstances. Many of them will be looking for ways to limit, or better yet, avoid the consequences. A preeminent contracts scholar, Melvin Eisenberg (2009), has provided them with considerable ammunition in a recent paper, arguing for expanding the domain of the excuse doctrines. His arguments for giving the disappointed contracting party a "get out of jail (almost) free" card, however, are seriously flawed.
Recommended Citation
Victor P. Goldberg,
Excuse Doctrine: The Eisenberg Uncertainty Principle,
2
J. Legal Analysis
359
(2010).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/678