Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2003
Abstract
This Article seeks to describe the dynamics of interaction between federal prosecutors and federal enforcement agents, and to suggest how these dynamics affect the exercise of enforcement discretion. After considering the virtues and pitfalls of both hierarchical and coordinate organizational modes, the Article offers a normative model that views prosecutors and agents as members of a "working group," with each side monitoring the other. It concludes by exploring how this model can be furthered or frustrated with various procedural and structural changes.
Disciplines
Administrative Law | Criminal Procedure | Law | Law Enforcement and Corrections
Recommended Citation
Daniel C. Richman,
Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103
Colum. L. Rev.
749
(2003).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2490
Included in
Administrative Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons