Global efforts by states to cooperate through international rules in combating cyber threats have generated mixed results, at best. In this paper, we examine the architecture of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a possible model for future cybersecurity cooperation among interested states. We identify several features of PSI’s architecture (rather than its substantive focus on non-proliferation) for further analysis, including PSI’s low entry costs, tiered structure, and flexibility, as well as its leveraging of both territorial jurisdiction and state consent. We conclude that, despite several hurdles visible in the scope of its membership and its legal framework, PSI still offers worthwhile parallels to draw upon, suggesting a new framework that could allow interested states to further cooperate in addressing current cyber threats.
Computer Law | International Law | Law | National Security Law
National Security Law Program
Center on Global Governance
Duncan B. Hollis & Matthew C. Waxman,
Promoting International Cybersecurity Cooperation: Lessons from the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
Temp. Int'l & Comp. L. J.
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