Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
2017
Center/Program
Center for Contract and Economic Organization
Center/Program
Center for Law and Economic Studies
Abstract
We aim here for a better understanding of the Japanese keiretsu. Our essential claim is that to understand the Japanese system-banks with extensive investment in industry and industry with extensive cross-ownership-we must understand the problems of industrial organization, not just the problems of corporate governance. The Japanese system, we assert, functions not only to harmonize the relationships among the corporation, its shareholders, and its senior managers, but also to facilitate productive efficiency.
Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization,
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 102, No. 4, 1993; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper; Harvard Public Law Working Paper
(2017).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2028