International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for Nonbinding Regimes

Authors

Anu Bradford, Columbia Law SchoolFollow

Document Type

Book Chapter

Publication Date

2011

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387704.003.0016

Abstract

Today, multinational corporations operate in increasingly international markets, yet antitrust laws regulating their competitive conduct remain national. Thus, corporations are subject to divergent antitrust regimes across the various jurisdictions in which they operate. This increases transaction costs, causes unnecessary delays, and raises the likelihood of conflicting decisions. The risks inherent in multi-jurisdictional regulatory review were prominently illustrated in the proposed GE/Honeywell acquisition, which failed following the European Union’s (“EU”) decision to prohibit the transaction despite its earlier approval in the United States. Inconsistent remedies imposed on Microsoft following parallel investigations by both the U.S. and EU authorities serve as another example of the regulatory burdens companies face when dealing with multiple antitrust investigations.

Disciplines

Antitrust and Trade Regulation | International Law | International Trade Law | Law

Recommended Citation

Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for Nonbinding Regimes, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, Andrew T. Guzman, Ed., Oxford University Press (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1965