Contains responses to comments by Chang, Hestein and Heuer on "From Normativity to Responsibility". The paper responds to various criticisms especially about methodology, the bearing of a secure area of competence on responsibility, the univocality of 'reasons', the relations of value and practical reasons, the scope of rational powers, the function of reasons to be rational, and most extensively about following reasons and the distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (where Heuer has pointed out some deficiencies in the discussion of the matter in the book).
Law | Law and Philosophy
Center for Law and Philosophy
On Normativity and Responsibility: Responses,
Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, Vol. 8, p. 220, 2013; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 29/2014; Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-366
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1829