Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
2005
Abstract
Long-term contracts are designed to manage risk. After a brief discussion of why it is unhelpful to invoke risk aversion for analyzing serious commercial transactions between sophisticated entities, this paper focuses on adaptation to changed circumstances. In particular, it considers the options to abandon and the discretion to change quantity. It then analyzes a poorly designed contract between Alcoa and Essex showing how the parties misframed their problem and designed a long-term contract that was doomed to fail.
Disciplines
Business Organizations Law | Contracts | Law | Law and Economics
Center/Program
Center for Contract and Economic Organization
Center/Program
Center for Law and Economic Studies
Recommended Citation
Victor P. Goldberg,
Risk Management in Long-Term Contracts,
Columbia Law & Economics Working Paper No. 282
(2005).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1382