This paper, based on a large sample of mid-sized manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, argues that the imposition of financial discipline is not sufficient to remedy ownership and governance-related deficiencies of corporate performance. The study offers three main conclusions. First, we find that state enterprises represent a higher credit risk both because of their inferior economic performance and because of their lesser willingness or propensity to meet their payment obligations. Second, the brunt of the state firms' lower creditworthiness is borne by their state creditors, as state enterprises deflect the higher risk away from private creditors. Third, this transfer of risks from private to state creditors is possible because state creditors impose significantly "softer" financial discipline on state firms. Inasmuch as such softness may reflect unwillingness to accept a likely demise of a large number of state firms that are in principle capable of successful restructuring through ownership changes, we conclude that the imposition financial of financial discipline is not sufficient to remedy ownership and governance-related deficiencies of corporate performance.
Banking and Finance Law | Law | Law and Economics
Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray, Marek P. Hessel & Andrzej Rapaczynski,
The Limits of Discipline: Ownership and Hard Budget Constraints in the Transition Economies,
Economics of Transition & Institutional Change, Vol. 8, p. 577, 2000; Columbia Law School, The Center for Law & Economic Studies Working Paper No. 165
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1203