Center for Law and Economic Studies
Program in the Law and Economics of Capital Markets
This article surveys the effects of legal fee shifting on a variety of decisions arising before and during the litigation process. Section 2 provides a brief survey of the practical situations in which legal fee shifting does and does not arise. Section 3 analyzes the effects of indemnification on the incentives to expend resources in litigated cases. Section 4 examines how indemnification influences the decisions to bring and to defend against suit, and Section 5 assesses its effects on the choice between settlement and trial. Section 6 addresses the interaction between the allocation of legal fees and the parties' incentives for efficient primary behavior. Section 7 considers two important variants on simple indemnification: rules that shift costs based on the parties' settlement negotiations (such as U.S. Federal Rule 68 and the English practice of payment into court), and rules that shift costs based on the margin of victory (such as U.S. Federal Rule 11 and the common law tort of malicious prosecution). Section 8 reviews the brief but instructive empirical literature on legal cost shifting, and section 9 summarizes the discussion and offers conclusions.
Avery W. Katz,
Indemnity of Legal Fees,
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar and the University of Ghent, 1997), Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, eds.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1154