Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2011
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593170.003.0004
Abstract
This chapter leaves behind the standard accounts of federal agencies to examine the role of the presidency in fashioning regulatory outputs. It recounts — and with reference to American ‘checks and balances’ ideas — a steady accretion of power at the centre, the result of which has been to render rulemaking increasingly a political rather than ‘expert’ activity. Whether the process is reversible, or whether ongoing crises in finance and security will serve to concretize this profound constitutional development, remains to be seen.
Disciplines
Administrative Law | Constitutional Law | Law
Recommended Citation
Peter L. Strauss,
Rule-making and the American Constitution,
The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications, Dawn Oliver, Tony Prosser & Richard Rawlings (Eds.), Oxford University Press
(2011).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/4362