Public Primacy in Corporate Law

Authors

Dorothy S. Lund, Columbia Law SchoolFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2024

Abstract

This Article explores the malleability of agency theory by showing that it could be used to justify a “public primacy” standard for corporate law that would direct fiduciaries to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of the public. Employing agency theory to describe the relationship between corporate management and the broader public sheds light on aspects of firm behavior, as well as the nature of state contracting with corporations. It also provides a lodestar for a possible future evolution of corporate law and governance: minimize the agency costs created by the divergence of interests between management and the public.

Disciplines

Business Organizations Law | Law

Comments

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Recommended Citation

Dorothy S. Lund, Public Primacy in Corporate Law, 47 Seattle U. L. Rev. 365 (2024).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/4354