Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2010

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moq002

Abstract

In a recent article in I•CON, Stavros Tsakyrakis presents a passionate critique of the proportionality test. Tsakyrakis regards proportionality as an illusory attempt to infuse objectivity into rights adjudication. Moreover, he posits that it necessitates weighing public interests against individual rights. Proportionality has emerged, globally, as the leading framework for evaluating rights violations. It serves as the uniform standard of rights review in jurisdictions as diverse as Israel, Germany, Canada, and South Africa. Remarkably, recent opinions by Justice Stephen Breyer of the United States Supreme Court indicate that the approach is gaining currency within America's constitutional jurisprudence. Considering proportionality's significance, Tsakyrakis’ critique is of considerable moment and merits careful study.

In this essay I argue that, while Tsakyrakis is right to consider certain types of balancing objectionable, he is wrong to conclude that proportionality necessitates them. Rather than focusing on important philosophical questions regarding the commensurability of values, this response will be limited to providing clarity on proportionality's methodology and observing the false premises that underlie Tsakyrakis’ arguments. Examining the cases and hypothetical Tsakyrakis relies on, I demonstrate how they fail to articulate any defect in the proportionality test. Notwithstanding this, Tsakyrakis’ analysis provides a useful insight into the dangers of treating proportionality's subtests as farcical.

Disciplines

Constitutional Law | Law

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