Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2002
Abstract
Does the Establishment Clause require that educational voucher programs not be designed in a manner that encourages parents to choose religious schools over secular alternatives? If there is such an "anti-steering" principle implicit in the First Amendment, how should courts elaborate and enforce it?
In this response, I will compare how Professors Lupu and Tuttle and the Court majority in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the decision last June upholding the Cleveland voucher plan, answer these important questions. I will evaluate their analyses at three levels: (1) basic Establishment Clause values and priorities; (2) doctrinal standard for identifying impermissible favoritism toward religion; (3) detailed assessment of the specific design of the Cleveland voucher program. As will become evident, I think that Lupu and Tuttle have the better of the argument on the first and second levels but that the Court's assessment of the Cleveland voucher program is preferable to that offered by Lupu and Tuttle.
Disciplines
Constitutional Law | First Amendment | Law
Recommended Citation
Vincent A. Blasi,
Vouchers and Steering,
18
J. L. & Pol.
607
(2002).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/4583