Richard Paul Richman Center for Business, Law, and Public Policy
The Charles Evans Gerber Transactional Studies Center
Complex "derivative" financial instruments are often used in aggressive tax planning. In response, the government has implemented mark-to-market type reforms, but only partially. Considered in isolation, these incremental reforms are likely to seem well advised in measuring income more accurately. However, there is an important "second best" cost, emphasized in this Article: the ability of well-advised taxpayers either to avoid the new rule or to turn it to their advantage (here called "defensive" and "offensive" planning options, respectively). This Article uses two case studies to identify how these effects arise and to suggest ways of combating them. The first case study, Section 475, requires securities dealers to use mark-to-market accounting. Although this rule curtails tax planning by securities dealers themselves, it enables dealers to serve as accommodation parties for their clients' tax planning: Once exempted from generally applicable rules, dealers can offer clients a tax benefit (e.g., accelerated losses) without experiencing a corresponding tax cost (e.g., accelerated income). The second case study, the contingent debt regulations, requires lenders and borrowers to report pre-realization gains and losses based on assumed annual returns. Although this reform seems to accelerate the lender's interest income, the rule's narrow scope allows tax-sensitive lenders to avoid this result. Accordingly, the new rule is likely to apply only when tax-exempt entities lend to tax-sensitive borrowers, who enjoy the regulations' accelerated interest deductions. This Article offers ways to remedy these reforms, as well as general guidance about how to implement incremental mark-to-market reforms without exacerbating the planning option.
David M. Schizer,
Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax Planning,
Southern California Law Review, Vol. 73, p. 1339, 2000; Columbia Law School, The Center for Law & Economic Studies Working Paper No. 173
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2483