Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
2018
Abstract
In the “age of polarization” this Symposium addresses, states may introduce salutary pluralism into an executive-dominated regime. With partisan divisions sidelining Congress, states are at once principal implementers and principal opponents of presidential policies. As polarization makes states more central to national policymaking, however, it also poses new threats to their ability to act. This Essay cautions against recent efforts to preempt state control over state officials and to require states to follow other states’ policies, using sanctuary jurisdictions and the pending federal Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act as examples
Recommended Citation
Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Preemption and Commandeering Without Congress,
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 70, p. 2029, 2018; Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-592
(2018).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2312