Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2016
Abstract
Assuming that the value of options (actions, activities, or omissions) constitutes the proximate reason for pursuing them, this chapter considers whether we have reason to promote or maximise value. A proper argument would require establishing a negative, but raising doubts is less demanding — explaining some aspects of the relation between values and reasons that enable us to dispense with the doubtful thesis by illustrating alternative relations between values and reasons. Theses that value should be promoted are accompanied by a way of determining the strength of reasons (the stronger reason promotes more value). This chapter develops theoretical doubts about promotion of value and argues that the disagreement is not merely terminological. Even though the value of things and activities is a reason to engage with them, there is not always reason to choose the best. The concluding section touches on the limits of the argument and its importance.
Disciplines
Law | Law and Philosophy | Metaphysics | Philosophy
Recommended Citation
Joseph Raz,
Value and The Weight of Practical Reasons,
Weighing Reasons, Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (Eds.), Oxford University Press
(2016).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1891