Center for Law and Philosophy
The paper will unfold in 5 parts dealing with five questions: first, does the partiality of attachments present an obstacle to their being or giving practical reasons? Second, given a value-based approach to practical reasons, can universal values generate reasons that are specific to their subjects, reasons – say – towards my friends that only I have? Third, do attachments affect what we do independently of any reasons that they provide? Fourth, in what ways do attachments constitute or provide normative reasons, and briefly, how do attachment-related reasons relate to other practical reasons? Finally, I turn to the question of the nature of and justification for partiality to oneself.
Attachments and Associated Reasons,
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 59/2011; Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 11-287
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1713