Center for Law and Philosophy
Advancing an account of responsibility which is based on the functioning of our rational capacities, the paper revisits some central aspects of the moral luck puzzle. It proposes a new variant of Williams’ agent-regret, but concludes that its scope does not coincide with cases of moral luck. It then distinguishes different ways in which the factors beyond our control feature in our engagement with the world which show how the guidance principle (we are responsible for actions guided by our rational powers) recognises a narrower range of situations of moral luck than is often supposed, allowing to distinguish between responsibility for intentions, (some) attempts and actions, as well as for responsibility for thoughts and emotions. Finally, relying on the fact that for each person some actions are within his or her range of secure competence the paper argues that responsibility extends beyond the guidance principle. It concludes with a brief outline discussion of the relations between responsibility and blame.
Agency and Luck,
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 46/2009; Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 09-214
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1600