Judges in Lawyerless Courts

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The typical American civil trial court is lawyerless. In response, access to justice reformers have embraced a key intervention: changing the judge’s traditional role. The prevailing vision for judicial role reform calls on trial judges to offer accommodation, information, and process simplification to people without legal representation. Until now, scholars have known little about judicial behavior in lawyerless courts, including whether and how judges are implementing role reform recommendations. Our lack of knowledge stands in stark contrast to the responsibility civil trial judges bear—and the discretionary power they wield—in dispensing justice for millions of unrepresented people each year. While today’s civil procedure scholarship focuses on documenting and analyzing growing judicial discretion in complex litigation, a much larger sphere of unexamined and largely unchecked judicial discretion has been hiding in plain sight in state civil trial courts.

At the intersection of civil procedure, judicial behavior, and access to justice, this Article presents a theoretically driven multijurisdictional study of judges’ interactions with unrepresented people in state civil trial court hearings. It examines courts in three jurisdictions at the top, above the median, and near the median in the Justice Index (a ranking of state-level access to justice efforts). Despite significant jurisdictional differences, judges’ behaviors are surprisingly homogenous in the data. Rather than offering accommodation, information, and simplification as reform models suggest, judges maintained the courts’ legal complexity and exercised strict control over evidence presentation.
The Article theorizes that a fundamental structural problem drives this unexpected finding—civil courts were not designed for unrepresented people. And judicial behavior is shaped by three factors that result: ethical ambiguity and traditional assumptions about a judge’s role in adversarial litigation, docket pressure, and systematic legal assistance provided only to petitioners. The Article concludes that judicial role failure is but one symptom of lawyerless courts’ fundamental ailment: the mismatch between courts’ adversarial, lawyer-driven dispute resolution design and the complex social, economic, and interpersonal problems they are tasked with solving for users without legal training.

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INTRODUCTION

You are both adults... You don’t come here to the court to have your little disagreement. You don’t answer my questions and you won’t get heard at all.¹

It is so hard just to be the referee but also want to get involved.²

State civil trial courts and judges have changed.³ Historically, lawyers were expected to drive litigation through adversarial procedures.⁴ Judges had a clear, specific role: passive umpire.⁵ Today, most state civil trial courts are lawyerless. We define “lawyerless” courts as those where more than three-quarters of cases involve at least one unrepresented party.⁶ In some areas of law, such as debt or eviction, imbalanced representation is the norm—plaintiffs have counsel,

¹. This quote is an excerpt from this study’s court observation data. Here, a judge, Centerville Judge 4, was speaking to two unrepresented litigants during a hearing. See infra Part II for a description of this study’s methods.
². This quote is an excerpt from this study’s interview data. The speaker is a judge, Centerville Judge 1. See infra Part II for a description of this study’s methods.
³. Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 249, 253, 273 (describing the access to justice crisis in state civil courts and offering a theoretical framework to support future research on trial judge behavior that includes four factors: disappearing adversary process, in-person interactions, an ethically ambiguous judicial role, and static written law).
⁴. See, e.g., Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 741, 751–52 (2015).
defendants do not. In other areas, such as family law, nearly all cases involve two unrepresented parties. In America’s civil justice system, millions of low- to middle-income people without counsel or legal training must protect and defend their rights and interests in courts designed by lawyers and for lawyers.

Making matters worse, the issues at stake in these courts are deeply connected to fundamental human needs such as safety, intimate relationships, housing, and financial security. Many of those who find themselves pulled into civil court for issues ranging from medical debt to guardianship of an aging parent are already suffering the consequences of America’s frayed social and economic safety nets. Too many people who represent themselves in civil trial courts are already living at or nearing the edge of any person’s capacity for self-advocacy.

Over the past two decades, legal scholars, judges, and other experts have advanced a key intervention for lawyerless courts: a revised judicial role where judges cast away traditional passivity to assist and accommodate litigants without

7. See id. at iv–v.
8. Many studies show that both parties to a case are unrepresented in eighty to ninety percent of family law matters that do not involve the government. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 4, at 751.
10. See Sandefur, What We Know, supra note 9, at 443–44.
11. Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t Solve Inequality, 148 DAEDALUS 128, 130, 133 (2019) (arguing that state civil courts have become the government institution of last resort in a system where the legislative and executive branches have either perpetuated or ignored growing economic and social inequality).


Proponents have highlighted the practicality and efficiency of judicial intervention in pro se cases, particularly when compared to the cost of providing legal assistance and services for every litigant before they enter the courtroom. As this vision has taken hold and self-representation rates have exploded, judges have been charged with new expectations, including simplifying courtroom procedures, filling information gaps for unrepresented people, actively developing the factual record in trials, identifying legal issues, and otherwise exercising vast and nearly unfettered discretion to patch the gaping holes left by the dearth of lawyers in today’s civil trial courts. In response to these calls for change, a majority of states have altered judicial ethics rules to clarify that “reasonable accommodations” for pro se litigants do not violate a judge’s duty of impartiality—a voluntary approach to judicial role reform. Such changes have spurred state court systems and think tanks to create training and guidance materials encouraging judges to assist people without counsel and offering best practices.

Though this shift in the judicial role has been unfolding across the country for years, particularly in the past decade, few studies have documented how judges interact with unrepresented people in civil trial courts. And, until now, we have lacked comparative, empirical data about changes in judicial interactions with pro se litigants.

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12. See infra Part I for a full discussion of these arguments and this scholarship.
14. For previous work describing and defining the changing judicial role and the evolution of procedural norms in courts where most cases lack lawyers, see generally Hannah Lieberman, Uncivil Procedure: How State Court Proceedings Perpetuate Inequality, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 257, 270 (2016) (critically reviewing the operation of civil procedure in consumer debt cases); Carpenter et al., supra note 3, at 254; Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, 2016 BYU L. REV. 899 (describing the breakdown of adversary procedure in ordinary, two-party cases including judges’ confusion about their proper role and calling for an affirmative duty for courts and judges to drive civil litigation in pro se courts); Colleen F. Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom: Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Access to Justice, 2018 Wis. L. REV. 215 (examining how judges can increase or decrease access to courts through pre-hearing procedures); Anna E. Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647 (2017) (offering three possible dimensions of active judging behavior to assist pro se litigants in and presenting data on the prevalence of these behaviors).
15. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (describing the results of the authors’ national survey of judicial canons and categorizing states’ approaches as either silent (eleven states), permissive (twenty-nine states), or encouraging (eleven states)); see also infra Appendix A.
16. See infra Section I.C.
pro se litigants. As we have explained and analyzed in previous work, legal scholars have historically ignored state civil trial courts.\textsuperscript{18} Today, most civil procedure and judicial behavior scholarship focuses on complex and appellate litigation in federal courts. In these courts, the bulk of case processing activity and party engagement with court procedures occurs outside the courtroom via the exchange of pleadings.\textsuperscript{19} Scholars writing about federal courts are concerned with an expanding sphere of unreviewable judicial discretion and the phenomena of ad hoc, party-driven procedural rules.\textsuperscript{20} Some critics argue these trends lack transparency, do not reflect democratic values, and ultimately damage judicial legitimacy.\textsuperscript{21} These same concerns apply to the evolving judicial role in state civil trial courts.

Trial judges’ unfettered, unchecked discretion in lawyerless courts is a pervasive and troubling phenomenon with serious potential consequences for substantive and procedural justice—and judicial legitimacy. In these courts, most parties lack representation, appeals are rare, and court records are sparse and difficult to access.\textsuperscript{22} Party engagement with judges and procedures happens in real-time, in the courtroom, with little to no discovery or exchange of pleadings.\textsuperscript{23} In many


\textsuperscript{19} Most legal scholarship that does engage with state-level civil justice focuses on state appellate courts. \textit{See, e.g.}, Marin K. Levy, \textit{Packing and Unpacking State Courts}, 61 \textit{Wm. & Mary L. Rev.} 1121 (2020).


\textsuperscript{21} Robin Effron has made the case that, in the complex litigation context, the growing sphere of judicial discretion is linked to private procedural ordering, with parties increasingly co-managing litigation in collaboration with managerial judges. \textit{See Effron, \textit{supra} note 20, at 169–74}.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{See Decker, \textit{supra} note 18, at 1968–70 (discussing factors that make appeals from lower courts unlikely); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, \textit{Market-Based Law Development}, LAW & POL. ECON. PROJECT: LPE BLOG (July 21, 2021), \url{https://lpeproject.org/blog/market-based-law-development/} [https://perma.cc/N456-QCMQ] (comparing the experiences of litigants in federal and state courts, and noting the lack of representation in state trial courts and the near-absence of appeals by people without counsel); Shanahan et al., \textit{supra} note 9 (discussing the importance of law reform activity, including appeals, in state civil courts, and arguing that such activity is rare where parties lack full lawyer representation). For related methodological discussions, see Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, \textit{Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice}, 2013 \textit{Wis. L. Rev.} 101 (setting out an expansive agenda for access to justice research and calling for scholars to make a range of theoretical and empirical contributions to better understand the operation of the civil justice system, including how everyday Americans experience law and the justice system); Carpenter et al., \textit{supra} note 3}.

cases, no lawyer other than the judge is involved in observing, let alone driving, the litigation process.\textsuperscript{24} The oversight and advocacy functions normally performed by lawyers are largely absent or one-sided.\textsuperscript{25} In lawyerless courts, a lack of party control over procedure collides with nearly unfettered and unreviewed judicial discretion.\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, civil defendants are disproportionately women and people of color, which may influence how judicial discretion is implemented in these courts.\textsuperscript{27}

This Article presents findings from a study investigating judicial behavior in lawyerless courts through a comparative, multijurisdictional research design. The study leverages key similarities and distinctions among jurisdictions to examine our assumptions about judicial behavior. The jurisdictions are geographically, demographically, and politically varied and rank at the top, above the median, and near the median of the Justice Index—a measure of access to justice reform.\textsuperscript{28} The data show how judges from different parts of the country use their discretion and responsibility as they manage civil litigation in live hearings, including whether and how they alter the traditional judicial role to assist or accommodate people without counsel.

The study captures judges’ courtroom behavior and perspectives in three U.S. jurisdictions while holding the law, in effect, constant.\textsuperscript{29} The study focuses on a single area of law that varies relatively little across jurisdictions—protective orders—and includes more than 200 hours of live court observation, hand-collected transcripts of 357 hearings where at least one person lacked counsel, and interviews with observed judges.\textsuperscript{30} With these data, we consider how geographic,

\textsuperscript{24} Id. at 8.
\textsuperscript{25} For example, see Wilf-Townsend, supra note 9, for an original study and critique of the one-sided power dynamics in state civil trial courts. Wilf-Townsend outlines the structure of what he calls “assembly-line” litigation, noting, for example:

Examining the cases filed by the most common plaintiffs in our nation’s civil justice systems paints a picture in which state courts appear to frequently act as ministerial claims processors for large corporations, advancing their claims from filing to judgment to collection without much, if any, significant probing or analysis.

\textsuperscript{26} See, e.g., Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 55, 78–79 (2018) (describing unrepresented tenants’ lack of power in eviction matters and judges’ routine misapplication of procedural rules in eviction cases).

\textsuperscript{27} See generally Kathryn A. Sabbeth & Jessica K. Steinberg, The Gender of Gideon, 69 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (showing that women’s encounters with the legal system disproportionately occur in civil court).

\textsuperscript{28} Our assessment of each jurisdiction is based on our own original research, which we describe in Part II, as well as aggregating sources, such as the Justice Index, which ranks states’ access to justice reform efforts, including reform of the judicial role. See, e.g., Justice Index - 2020, NAT’L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUST., https://ncaj.org/state-rankings/2021/justice-index [https://perma.cc/T6FX-4T73] (last visited Jan. 7, 2022).

\textsuperscript{29} For a detailed discussion of this study’s design and methodology, see infra Part II. To protect the confidentiality of study sites and research subjects, this Article reports no identifying information about the three jurisdictions, which we call Centerville, Townville, and Plainville. We describe the jurisdictions infra Section II.A.

\textsuperscript{30} For more about protective order cases and law, see infra Section II.B.
political, and demographic variations across jurisdictions—as well as variations in their purported levels of commitment to ethics rules reform and judicial training—may or may not contribute to inter-jurisdictional differences in judicial behavior.

We expected to find significant differences in judges’ behavior across study sites based on jurisdictional differences in formal law and guidance and the effects of judicial discretion in state civil trial courts. Instead, we found surprising homogeneity and a shared approach characterized not by simplicity and accommodation but by complexity and control. Judges maintained legal and procedural complexity in their courtrooms by offering only the most limited explanations of court procedures and legal terms and refusing to answer litigants’ questions. Judges exercised control by tightly managing evidence presentation, relying heavily on petitioners’ pleadings to shape fact development, and limiting the evidence they were willing to hear from either party, particularly from defendants.

Drawing on our data, we provide possible explanations for these results. Explanations include judges’ self-reported confusion about ethical boundaries and assumptions about a judge’s traditional role in adversarial litigation, the pressure judges face to clear cases in crowded dockets, and pre-hearing case development assistance that court-connected nonprofit organizations offer to petitioners only. These results suggest that judicial role reform, currently a widely accepted access to justice intervention, is not being implemented in the way its proponents envision. The courts in this study may have been lawyerless, but they were still fundamentally lawyer-centric.

The Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the evolution of judicial role reform over the past few decades, including the formal law and judicial ethics rules governing judges’ interactions with unrepresented litigants. This Part offers a novel categorization of state-level judicial ethics rules related to pro se assistance. States’ judicial ethics rules are either silent on the topic (eleven states), permit such assistance (twenty-nine states), or encourage it (eleven states). Part I also synthesizes a body of advisory materials on judicial role reform developed by scholars, courts, and access to justice think tanks. This guidance asks judges to help pro se parties in two key ways: offering explanations and information about legal standards, procedures, and technical terms and gathering information to develop a full factual record through party testimony and judicial questioning. Part II presents our research design and methods and describes the cases and jurisdictions in the study sample. Importantly, this Part describes why understanding judicial behavior in civil trial courts requires a methodological approach specifically designed for a setting where live, in-person interactions between judges and litigants are common, written records are sparse or non-existent, and appeals are vanishingly rare. Part III presents the results of our study. Instead of observing expected variations in judicial behavior, we show how judges in the sample behaved similarly across jurisdictions and offered litigants little support.
assistance. We draw on interviews and court observations to analyze how judges maintained legal and procedural complexity and tightly controlled case presentation. In Part IV, we discuss three possible factors that might shape the behavior we observed: judges’ ethical confusion and traditional assumptions, docket pressure, and robust pre-hearing assistance that court-connected nonprofit organizations provide to only one party. The Article concludes by theorizing that the judicial role failure this study reveals is one of many signs of the core structural flaw in state civil courts: these institutions were designed for lawyer-driven adversarial dispute resolution and not for unrepresented, untrained users who are managing a range of complex social, economic, and interpersonal challenges.

I. JUDICIAL ROLE REFORM

In this Part, we offer historical, conceptual, and legal context for the changing judicial role in lawyerless courts. We first briefly review the history of scholarship and expert commentary advocating for a changed judicial role as an access to justice intervention. We show how, for more than twenty years, legal scholars, judicial and court associations, court administrators, and other civil justice stakeholders have called for judges to let go of the traditional, passive judicial stance and actively assist people without counsel.

Second, we survey the status of formal law, including ethics rules, on the judicial role in lawyerless courts and find that judges are authorized to accommodate and assist pro se litigants in limited ways. However, formal law remains largely silent on the appropriate scope and depth of judicial interventions. Case law in this area is notably underdeveloped and sometimes contradictory. Reported cases include admonitions for judges to adhere to traditional roles while also carving out ambiguous terrain within which judges can make discretionary accommodations for pro se parties. Based on a national review of judicial ethics rules, we categorize states’ judicial canons as taking one of three approaches to judicial assistance for pro se litigants: silent, permissive, or encouraging.

Third, we review guidance on judging in lawyerless courts developed by scholars, state court systems, and nonprofit access to justice organizations. We find that a significant body of informal, advisory guidance stands in the gulf between strong scholarly support for judicial role reform and anemic formal law, offering judges suggestions about how to perform their roles in lawyerless courts. In the past five years, state court administrative bodies and think tanks have accelerated the production of such guidance, reflecting a growing conventional wisdom that reforming the judicial role is a key access to justice intervention. Drawing on this guidance, we surface two core features of the role reform vision. First, judges are encouraged to offer transparent, accessible explanations of law and procedure throughout the litigation process. Second, judges are urged to elicit information, including narrative testimony, to build the factual record and ensure parties are fully heard. Ultimately, however, without formal law and ethical principles that require reform, individual judges are left with near-complete discretion and responsibility to implement this new role.
A. CALLS FOR REFORM

More than twenty years ago, when rates of pro se litigation were on the rise, legal scholars began calling for and describing a new judicial role in trial courts. Since then, civil trial courts have become lawyerless. Legal scholars concerned with access to justice have consistently argued for an end to traditional judicial passivity in favor of an active, interventionist role in lawyerless dockets. Many supporters have praised role reform as an efficient and pragmatic access to justice intervention. Most scholars speaking on this topic have advocated for retraining, guidance, and voluntary action by individual judges, including encouraging judges to ask questions, offer information, and adjust procedural rules. At least two commentators have pushed for a mandatory approach that requires judges to offer certain types of assistance. Today, the permissive, voluntary approach prevails.


33. For recent work on this subject, see generally Barton, supra note 13 (arguing an active role for judges is a key solution to the crisis facing state trial courts); Barton & Bibas, supra note 13, at 985 (arguing for pro se court reform, including judicial assistance, rather than civil Gideon); Gene R. Nichol Jr., Judicial Abidication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 Case W. Resrv. L. Rev. 325 (2010) (charging judges with the responsibility to modify rigid roles); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1987 (1999) [hereinafter Engler, And Justice for All] (calling for judicial intervention and assistance as a key element of access to justice court reform); Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22 Notre Dame J.L., Ethics & Pub. Pol’y, 367, 368, 376 (2008) [hereinafter Engler, Ethics in Transition]; Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 869 (2009) (asserting that closing the justice gap calls for concerted efforts from all stakeholders, including courts, and calling for pro se court reform); Steinberg, supra note 4.

34. See infra Section I.A.; cf. Sabbeth, supra note 9 (arguing against remaking the courts via simplification reforms).


36. Sabbeth, supra note 9, at 304 n.92.
Criticisms of the traditional, passive judicial role in pro se cases appeared in legal scholarship in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At that time, formal law, including judicial ethics rules, generally required judges to be “impartial” in their interactions with all parties, with the underlying assumption that most parties would be represented. Until 2010, judicial canons were silent about judicial behavior in pro se cases. Thus, early critics of judicial passivity focused on arguing that judges could, as a matter of ethics, actively engage with litigants—such as asking questions to develop the record or explaining a procedural step—while still maintaining their impartiality and neutrality under then-existing ethical rules.

One of the first legal scholars to advocate for changes to the judge’s role, Russell Engler, began writing on the topic as early as 1999. Engler’s seminal work highlighted the then-increasing rates of unrepresented people in state courts, articulated the challenges they faced in navigating court processes, and argued that judges, with the support of ethical guidance and retraining, could offer assistance and support to those without counsel. Engler documented uncertainty among judges and other court staff about the permissible boundaries for their interactions with unrepresented people and noted the lack of guidelines to help judges “redefine[their] roles.” He emphasized that, at the time, many trial judges assumed that appearing in court without counsel was a rational, considered choice as opposed to something forced upon some litigants by the unavailability or unaffordability of legal assistance. As a result, some judges believed that people without counsel should “live with the consequences” of their decisions. However, Engler also documented signs of shifts in judicial attitudes, including directives from some state courts instructing their trial judges to “set up different procedures” in pro se cases.

In response to these dynamics, Engler and others writing at the time argued that being impartial does not inherently require judges to be passive. Engler suggested that judicial assistance for people without counsel in trial courts could be modeled after the practices of small claims and administrative judges who, at the time, were more commonly expected to deal with unrepresented people and
help them advance their cases while also maintaining impartiality. Ultimately, Engler’s work asserted that judges could and should assist unrepresented people in a range of ways, including developing facts, identifying claims and defenses, assessing what sort of assistance or information the litigant might have received prior to coming to the courtroom, and correcting any misunderstandings, particularly in the context of settlement agreements with a represented opposing party.

Following Engler’s early work, Deborah Rhode’s seminal book, *Access to Justice*, was published in 2004 and sparked a broader conversation about the growth of pro se parties in state courts, the lack of legal assistance for the public more broadly, and the legal profession’s responsibility for these systemic challenges. Russell Pearce explicitly cited Rhode’s book as the inspiration for his argument that judges should be affirmatively required to assist unrepresented people, particularly by ensuring that procedural errors do not block people without counsel from presenting relevant evidence and arguments. In Pearce’s words, “the paradigm of judge as passive umpire” should be replaced with “the paradigm of judge as active umpire.”

Around the same time, Richard Zorza wrote a series of papers calling for judges to take an active role in cases involving unrepresented people. This work emphasized the importance of transparency and judicial “engagement” with parties and detailed the downsides of judicial passivity with a strong emphasis on the risk that party confusion, intimidation, or lack of understanding would result in judges missing the chance to hear relevant evidence or legal arguments. Zorza, like others writing at the time, also argued that passive judging created risks for courts as institutions, potentially threatening their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. To minimize risks to substantive justice and court legitimacy, Zorza asserted that judges should explain legal standards and the steps of the litigation process, regularly confirm understanding with litigants, ask questions of litigants to elicit relevant facts, and clearly explain the judge’s decision and its consequences.

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47. Engler, *And Justice for All*, supra note 33, at 2017–19, 2028–29 (“Far from offending notions of impartiality, the call for judges to provide vigorous assistance to unrepresented litigants is consistent with the need for impartiality.”).
48. Id. at 2028–30. Engler states:

> Judges should conduct trials in the manner “best suited to discover the facts and do justice in the case.” “In an effort to . . . secure[e] substantial justice,” the court must assist the unrepresented litigant on procedure to be followed, presentation of evidence, and questions of law. Further, the court may call witnesses and conduct direct or cross examinations. The court has a “basic obligation to develop a full and fair record . . . .” Each of these duties is not only wholly consistent with the notion of impartiality, but also necessary for the system to maintain its impartiality.

50. Pearce, supra note 32, at 970–72.
51. Id. at 970.
53. See generally Zorza, supra note 32.
54. See id. at 438–39.
55. See id.; Zorza, supra note 52, at 34.
In a paper comparing the possibility of pro se court reform to the alternative of a legal right to counsel for all civil litigants, Benjamin Barton called for retraining judges to assist people without counsel and asked readers to “imagine a world where the courts that deal with the poor are so simple, efficient, transparent, and pleasant that for once the justice system of the poor was the envy of the rich. Pro se court reform actually offers this possibility.” Barton criticized calls for an expanded right to counsel in civil cases, comparing the promise of “civil Gideon” to the pragmatic reality of how the right to counsel operates in the criminal context. He further argued that the need for lawyers in civil courts could be eliminated in the first place if those courts became systematically more accessible to people without counsel, including through a re-thinking of the judicial role. Barton also asserted the pragmatic value of judicial role reform, a view that other scholars and advocates for role reform share. As the National Center for State Courts says in its Justice for All Initiative Guidance Materials, “It is more effective to train one judge on how to assist a self-represented litigant than to teach hundreds of [self-represented litigants] how to be lawyers.”

A more recent proposal advanced by one of the authors of this Article, Jessica Steinberg, makes a more expansive argument about the type of judicial role reform needed to solve the crisis of lawyerless courts. Steinberg’s ambitious proposal calls for fundamental changes to the role of judges and judicial ethics but, critically, also calls for removing the norm of party-driven litigation in civil courts. Drawing on the model of the Social Security Administration’s disability claim adjudication, where judges have affirmative case development duties, Steinberg proposes a new set of procedural and evidentiary rules that require courts and judges to bear the burden of moving cases through the litigation process, including providing form pleadings, serving process, scheduling hearings, developing the factual record, raising potential legal claims, and drafting orders. To date, courts have not created affirmative requirements of judicial assistance like those advocated by Pearce and Steinberg.

B. UNDERDEVELOPED FORMAL LAW

Today, formal law, including case law and judicial ethics, tends to be vague and underdeveloped and is sometimes contradictory. In this Section, we review the state of the law, categorize states’ approaches to judicial ethics rules related to judicial assistance for people without counsel as silent, permissive, or

56. Barton, supra note 13, at 1228.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1227–28, 1233 (“If a systematic effort were made to simplify the law and procedure in courts with large pro se dockets, it could improve outcomes in those courts and do more for the poor than a guarantee of counsel, all at less cost.”).
59. See, e.g., id. at 1228; Barton & Bibas, supra note 13.
60. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 13.
61. See generally Steinberg, supra note 14.
62. See id. at 905–07.
63. See id. at 947–65.
encouraging, and conclude that formal law offers judges little purchase in understanding what they should and should not be doing in their interactions with unrepresented people.

Early advocates of judicial role reform developed persuasive arguments that judges who affirmatively accommodated and assisted pro se litigants by asking questions, explaining legal standards, or modifying procedural rules, for example, were not violating ethical duties of impartiality and neutrality. Such arguments, along with the pragmatic reality of the growing pro se crisis, influenced the American Bar Association (ABA) and many states to alter judicial ethics rules to reflect this new understanding of the legally permissible scope of judicial assistance.

In 2010, the ABA modified Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.2 to explicitly permit judges to make "reasonable accommodations" for unrepresented people, clarifying that doing so is not a violation of the duty of impartiality. Rule 2.2 states, "A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially." The revision appears in Comment 4 to Rule 2.2: "It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard." Many states, though not all, have followed suit.

Our original, national review of judicial canons reveals states have taken one of three approaches in the context of judicial assistance for people without counsel: judicial canons are either silent, permissive, or encouraging of such assistance. No state currently requires judicial assistance for people without counsel. Eleven states have taken the approach we label "silent." In these states, judicial ethics rules or comments to the rules do not include any language clarifying that assisting or accommodating people without counsel is not a violation of a judge’s duty of impartiality. Most states, twenty-nine, have followed the ABA and added language clarifying that "reasonable accommodations" do not violate impartiality. We call this approach "permissive." Finally, eleven states, including one of those in our study, have adopted ethical rules that go a step further and ask judges to consider offering accommodations and assistance. These states outline specific

64. See Engler, Ethics in Transition, supra note 33, at 372–73, 385; see also Zorza, supra note 32.
65. Model Code of Jud. Conduct r. 2.2 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’n 2020).
66. Id. at r. 2.2.
67. Id. at r. 2.2 cmt. 4. Also in 2010, the ABA revised Rule 2.6, which states, "A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law." Id. at r. 2.6(A). The update appears in Comment 2 and states, "Among the factors that a judge should consider when deciding upon an appropriate settlement practice for a case are . . . whether the parties and their counsel are relatively sophisticated in legal matters . . . [or] whether any parties are unrepresented by counsel . . . ." Id. at r. 2.6 cmt. 2.
68. Data from original, national survey of judicial canons on file with authors. See infra Appendix A.
actions a judge may take and explicitly urge judges to consider taking such actions.\textsuperscript{69} We label this approach “encouraging.”

While most jurisdictions now explicitly permit judges to accommodate pro se litigants, formal law largely leaves the task of operationalizing this role up to individual trial judges. Appellate opinions discussing pro se assistance are limited, vague, and often contradictory, particularly considering the huge numbers of civil cases and massive amount of trial court work that touches unrepresented people.\textsuperscript{70} A recent analysis found that appellate courts “often issue opinions laden with stock language advising judges to adhere to adversary procedure but also to ensure substantive justice is achieved,” while providing little or no “instruction on how to strike this balance” in practice.\textsuperscript{71} Courts consistently decline to require judges to affirmatively assist pro se parties and often make a point of explicitly stating that judges have no such duty.\textsuperscript{72} The most common framework that emerges from case law around the country has two components. First, pro se litigants are held to the same procedural and evidentiary standards as lawyers. Second, trial judges may in some circumstances waive or explain technical requirements, liberally construe pleadings, or give multiple opportunities to amend where such steps would not affect substantive justice or violate due process.\textsuperscript{73}

As a matter of law, American civil trial judges generally have the discretion to accommodate and assist pro se litigants, including waiving procedural

\textsuperscript{69} The jurisdiction in this study that has adopted “encouraging” ethical rules is Centerville, as we describe in greater detail infra Section II.A. Here is an example of such language from Maine:

\begin{quote}
A judge may take affirmative steps, consistent with the law, as the judge deems appropriate to enable an unrepresented litigant to be heard. A judge may explain the requirements of applicable rules and statutes so that a person appearing before the judge understands the process to be employed. A judge may also inform unrepresented individuals of free or reduced cost legal or other assistance that is available in the courthouse or elsewhere.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{70} See Steinberg, supra note 14, at 904–05. This dearth of appellate treatment is related to a topic of the authors’ future work: the phenomenon of generally limited law development in substantive legal areas with pro se majorities.

\textsuperscript{71} Id.

\textsuperscript{72} See, e.g., Austin v. Ellis, 408 A.2d 784, 785 (N.H. 1979); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094–95 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987); see also Steinberg, supra note 14, at 927 (citing Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119–20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), as “an example of the courts’ emphasis on the norm of party control,” where parties are expected to act like lawyers). The California Judicial Council offers this summary of California appellate cases on unrepresented litigant assistance:

\begin{enumerate}
\item The trial judge has broad discretion to adjust procedures to make sure a self-represented litigant is heard;
\item Judges will always be affirmed if they make these adjustments without prejudicing the rights of the opposing party to have the case decided on the facts and the law.
\item Judges will usually be affirmed if they refuse to make a specific adjustment, unless such refusal is manifestly unreasonable and unfair.
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{73} CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THECTS., JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., HANDLING CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: A BENCHGUIDE FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS 3-12 (2019).
technicalities if they choose. In most jurisdictions, formal law offers little beyond this broad and vague authorization. As a result, most judges cannot look to formal law to identify the permissible bounds of any assistance they might offer. In the absence of formal law to guide individual judge behavior, civil justice reform experts, think tanks, and court administrative bodies have developed informal guidance aimed at shaping judges’ behavior.74

C. GUIDANCE FOR JUDGES

As trial judges have wrestled with the challenge of pro se majorities filling their courtrooms—and absent much guidance from formal law—scholars, courts, judges, and other legal experts have produced a large body of guidance, best practices, and training materials aimed at shaping and influencing judges’ behavior. Sources of these materials include the Conference of Chief Justices, state supreme courts, judicial leaders,75 legal scholars, and think tanks such as the National Center for State Courts and the Self-Represented Litigation Network.76

74. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, supra note 35; JOHN M. GREACEN & MICHAEL HOULBERG, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., ENSURING THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD:
Over the past few decades, such sources have issued a range of articles, reports, bench guides, and training materials that recommend and define an accommodating, helpful, and interventionist role for judges in lawyerless courts.

This Section reviews existing guidance and draws out two cross-cutting recommendations for how judges should alter traditional passivity and adversary procedures in pro se hearings.77 First, guidance materials instruct judges to offer information and explanations to help pro se litigants understand the law, court process, and legal terms. Second, guidance emphasizes a judge’s role in ensuring parties have their matters fairly and fully heard and urges judges to actively elicit factual information during hearings to develop a complete record.

1. Offering Information and Explanations

According to guidance literature, one of the most critical roles a judge plays in cases without lawyers involves promoting transparency through information sharing and explanations.78 The need for explanations is obvious from the perspective of an unrepresented person: most people do not have legal training and likely will not know what facts might be relevant, what legal claims they can assert, how to introduce evidence, or the procedural posture of a case.79 In addition, as guidance from California notes, legal language is a “foreign language” for most people.80

77. See Carpenter et al., supra note 3 (reviewing guidance and identifying a range of possible judicial behavior, including explaining, eliciting, adjusting procedures, referring to litigants to resources, and facilitating negotiation); Steinberg, supra note 14 (discussing judges adjusting procedures and raising legal issues); Carpenter, supra note 14 (discussing eliciting, explaining, and adjusting procedures).

78. See Steinberg, supra note 14, at 931; Carpenter, supra note 14, at 669–70; see, e.g., ILL. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 75; CTR. ON CT. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 14; or Richard Zorza, A New Day for Judges and the Self-Represented: The Implications of Turner v. Rogers, 50 JUDGES’ J. 16, 17–18 (2011); GREACEN & HOULBERG, supra note 76, at 14; CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., supra note 72, at 2–4; COLO. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, supra note 75, at 21; Zorza, supra note 32, at 443 (“Throughout the process, the judge should have in place protective processes to make sure that the parties do understand what is going on and why. This should include asking if they understand, and seeking confirmation of understanding at critical points.”). For a robust discussion of how people without lawyers engage with legal information, see generally D. James Greiner, Dalie Jiménez & Lois R. Lupica, Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119 (2017).

79. See, e.g., CTR. ON CT. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 14; Steinberg, supra note 14, at 931; Carpenter, supra note 14, at 669–70; see, e.g., ILL. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 75; CTR. ON CT. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 14; or Richard Zorza, A New Day for Judges and the Self-Represented: The Implications of Turner v. Rogers, 50 JUDGES’ J. 16, 17–18 (2011); GREACEN & HOULBERG, supra note 76, at 14; CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., supra note 72, at 2–4; COLO. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, supra note 75, at 21; Zorza, supra note 32, at 443 (“Throughout the process, the judge should have in place protective processes to make sure that the parties do understand what is going on and why. This should include asking if they understand, and seeking confirmation of understanding at critical points.”). For a robust discussion of how people without lawyers engage with legal information, see generally D. James Greiner, Dalie Jiménez & Lois R. Lupica, Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. 1119 (2017).

80. See CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., supra note 72, at 1–4. In fact, California’s guide notes that legal terms are, quite literally, sometimes a “mash up” of foreign languages including Latin and French. Id.
From a court or judge’s perspective, guidance materials offer three common reasons why judges should serve in an explanatory role. First, a litigant who understands the legal standards, procedural steps, and court processes will, in turn, be more helpful to the judge, for example, by offering facts that help the judge render a decision. Second, psychological research on the concept of procedural justice suggests parties who believe they understand the reasons for a judge’s decision will be more likely to accept and follow the decision. And third, a number of guidance sources stress that courts, as institutions, should be articulating the reasons for their decisions systematically to the people who bring their problems to courts for resolution, a principle also rooted in procedural justice research, which suggests that people are more likely to perceive courts and their decisions as legitimate when they understand the bases of those decisions.

With these goals in mind, guidance pushes judges to take responsibility for explaining a wide range of information and confirming that litigants understand the information the judge has attempted to convey. Judges are encouraged to offer clear, accessible explanations of court processes and procedures (such as the order of trial or how evidence should be offered), legal information (such as what elements must be proven in a case), and language (including translating legal terms and avoiding the use of jargon in the first place).

Guidance materials suggest judges offer information at the beginning of a docket to explain the process litigants can expect, such as why a judge might hear certain cases first. Judges are also encouraged to begin every hearing with a brief statement of the purpose of the hearing, the process that will be followed, and the legal issues that will be heard or decided. During hearings, judges are instructed to explain the applicable law or legal standards when needed and offer sufficient explanations to help litigants understand what kind of factual information the court needs to render a decision, such as explaining why a judge might need testimony on an issue. At the end of hearings, judges are urged to explain the content, meaning, and enforcement process of court orders.

81. As a number of sources note, research suggests that perceptions of a decisionmaker’s trustworthiness are directly tied to whether a judge can justify, via explanation, the decisions she makes. See, e.g., CTR. ON CT. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, supra note 79, at 15; see also Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCH. 117, 122 (2000); Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (2006).

82. SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, supra note 35; GREACEN & HOULBERG, supra note 76.

83. For examples, see Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4, 18 (2007); CTR. ON CT. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, supra note 79, at 7.

84. See, e.g., SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, supra note 35.

85. Id.


87. SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, supra note 35; CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., supra note 72, at 2-7.

88. For examples, see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 13, at 8 (“At the hearing, the judge grants [the] emergency protective order and explains the consequences of it as well as possible next steps [the litigant] might take to ensure her family’s safety.”) and Burke & Leben, supra note 83.
2. Fully Developing the Factual Record

According to guidance materials, judges should actively elicit facts from litigants to ensure a complete factual record and accurate legal decisions while increasing the likelihood that litigants perceive the court has heard them. Recommended behavior includes asking “neutral” questions to develop facts, listening patiently to narrative testimony, and modifying evidentiary and procedural rules to ensure relevant evidence is introduced. Pro se guidance stresses the importance of this role because judges need legally relevant facts to render decisions. Obtaining such information in hearings involving unrepresented people is a persistent challenge given that litigants may have only a loose sense of what matters under the law and a strong sense of what matters in their own lives.

State court systems tend to offer general guidance that judges may ask questions and adjust hearing procedures to elicit information but vary in the strength of their recommendations that judges actively intervene. Montana and California exemplify two approaches. Official guidance in Montana pushes judges to intervene as little as possible, stepping in only when necessary to clarify testimony, while California encourages judges to elicit information and ask questions.

Guidance language encouraging judges to help litigants develop the factual record is typically stated in broad terms. For example, one judicial training

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89. See, e.g., CTR. ON CT. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, supra note 86, at 8; CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., supra note 72, at 6-28; ILL. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 75; Judicial Guidelines for Civil Hearings Involving Self-Represented Litigants (with Commentary), supra note 75; COLO. ACCESS TO JUST. COMM’N, supra note 75, at 21.

90. See, e.g., Judicial Guidelines for Civil Hearings Involving Self-Represented Litigants (with Commentary), supra note 75; CTR. ON CT. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, supra note 79, at 7; SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, supra note 35, at 54, 59; Zorza, supra note 78; GREACEN & HOULBERG, supra note 76, at 14.

To decide cases fairly, judges need facts, and to get those facts, judges often have to ask questions, modify procedure, and apply their common sense in the courtroom to create an environment in which all the relevant facts are brought out. Without a full understanding of the facts, judicial officers are at risk to either mis-apply the applicable law or apply the wrong law.

91. See CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., supra note 72; MONTANA JUDGES’ DESKBOOK: MUNICIPAL, JUSTICE, & CITY COURTS, supra note 75, at 6.

92. The following language comes from a two-page “Bench Card” from Illinois. The document offers a paragraph expanding on each of the points below:

Tips for ensuring SRLs are fairly heard:

1. Use simple, plain language; avoid legal jargon; and explain legal concepts.
2. Explain overall court processes (including evidentiary and foundational requirements) and what will happen in court.
3. Ask the SRL what questions they have and check for understanding throughout proceedings.
5. Ask neutral questions for clarification or to focus the proceedings and consider modifying the traditional order of taking evidence.
6. Explain why you are doing something and your basis for rulings.
7. Recognize that most SRLs may be scared and nervous.
curriculum urges judges to “focus on what the litigants need,” which typically is “a process in which they feel the courts are engaged and in which they can tell their stories in meaningful ways.”

The curriculum goes on to say, “Active listening by the court assists in building the confidence of the litigants and permits the court to guide the proceedings without the litigants feeling frustrated by being limited in their presentations.”

Most guidance materials steer clear of offering granular protocols, substantive legal context, or step-by-step recommendations.

Yet, all of this guidance is merely advisory. Absent more detailed, context-specific advice or clear legal standards, let alone an affirmative obligation to assist pro se litigants in some way, individual judges ultimately have vast responsibility and discretion in operationalizing reform of the traditional, passive role. Many guidance sources explicitly note judges’ vast discretion in determining how best to interact with unrepresented people, and some even take pains to assure judges that they can reject any suggestions that make them “uncomfortable.”

Some sources seem to acknowledge where recommendations will inevitably fall short. For example, one judicial training curriculum presents “Ten Key Techniques” for pro se cases, but before listing the techniques, includes this caveat: “[E]very case is different, and every litigant is different. In a particular case, some techniques may apply, some may not, and others may need modifying . . . . The techniques

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8. Be courteous, patient, and an active listener to ease tension.
9. Remember procedural fairness principles: voice, neutrality, respect, trust, understanding, and helpfulness.
10. Appreciate your unconscious biases and increase cultural competencies.
11. Use certified interpreters for limited English proficient or hearing impaired litigants.
12. Provide SRLs with checklists, handouts, and other resources or referrals.

ILL. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 75. A statewide guide to handling pro se cases developed by the Judicial Council of California and released in 2019 is an exception and stands out among all the guidance documents we reviewed as by far the most comprehensive and detailed, clocking in at 280 pages. See generally CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., supra note 72. The first four chapters address judges’ behavior in evidentiary hearings, one chapter reviews California appellate decisions related to pro se assistance, another chapter explains the implications of procedural justice research, and another suggests a range of courtroom and hearing management techniques, including sample scripts for a range of situations. This guide offers more in-depth information about the challenges pro se litigants face when compared to other states. It also offers many more concrete steps judges can take, such as check-in procedures, organizing the order in which cases are called, clustering issues during evidentiary hearings, outlining which legal issues the court will be deciding in a hearing, and explaining which party has the burden of proof for each hearing. See id. at ch. 6. However, it is an open question whether this level of guidance, absent formal legal requirements for judges to help pro se litigants, will alter judges’ approach.

93. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE JUST. INST., CURRICULA ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE SELF REPRESENTED, CURRICULUM TWO: AN OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR THE SELF REPRESENTED 6 (2008), https://perma.cc/N938-9QUL.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., ILL. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 75. California is an exception in offering more detailed guidance. See generally CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., supra note 72 (providing in-depth judicial guidance on how to develop the factual record).
96. See, e.g., CTR. ON CT. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, supra note 86, at 7, 14; CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., supra note 72, at 3-22.
are offered as tools to judges, not explicit directions. Every judge has to develop his or her style.”

As this Section has shown, the backdrop of this study is one of formal law with general admonitions and limited requirements, informal guidance with more specific suggestions, and ultimately reliance on individual judicial behavior to improve access to justice in lawyerless courts. We turn next to the study itself.

II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

This Part describes the study’s research design, including methods, data collection processes, and study sites.

This study was designed to offer a theoretically driven and rigorous comparative description of how judges who preside in America’s lawyerless courts operationalize and conceive of their role, including whether and how they assist pro se litigants and implement role reform recommendations. We approached this empirical project by selecting study sites that allowed us to control substantive law effects while varying other contextual factors that may relate to how judges behave. We considered factors including geographical area, political culture, court administrative structure, judicial ethics rules, availability of pro se training for judges, and other investments in civil justice infrastructure aimed at increasing access to justice, and we assessed how jurisdictions varied through a review of primary documents and aggregating sources. This approach allowed us to examine environments where the universe of judicial behavior was constrained.

97. CTR. ON CTS. ACCESS TO JUST. FOR ALL, supra note 86, at 3–4. The ten key techniques are:

1. Frame subject matter of hearing
2. Explain process that will be followed
3. Elicit needed information from litigants
4. Involve litigants in decision making
5. Articulate decision from bench
6. Explain decision and summarize terms of the order
7. Anticipate and resolve issues with compliance
8. Provide a written order at close of hearing
9. Set litigant expectations for next steps
10. Use nonverbal communications effectively

Id. at 4–5.

98. One self-published study by the Self-Represented Litigation Network and John Greacen offers some data on judicial behavior in pro se family law cases. However, the study design has important limitations worth noting. For example, the study included only fifteen hearings and the researchers chose to study only courts that had reputations for providing high-levels of assistance to pro se litigants. See GREACEN ASSOC., LLC, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, EFFECTIVENESS OF COURTRoom COMMUNICATION IN HEARINGS INVOLVING TWO SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 3 (2008), https://www.srln.org/system/files/attachments/Effectiveness%20in%20Courtroom%20Communication%20In%20Hearings%20Involving%20Two%20Self-Represented%20Litigants_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5EW-HVYR].
by relatively fixed legal structures while varying the level of guidance and support for judges actively providing pro se assistance.99

Our methodological approach acknowledges that studying complex social phenomena requires researchers to describe and understand the conditions that underlie the phenomena they wish to analyze.100 To engage in this type of research process, we needed to diverge from the typical empirical approach to the study of judicial behavior in legal scholarship, which tends to rely on case outcomes and written opinions to explore the factors that might shape judges’ decisions in appellate cases.101 While existing studies on judicial behavior provide valuable contributions to the scholarly understanding of how judges decide cases in appeals courts, the data such studies rely upon, and their resulting quantitative empirical approaches, cannot be a starting place for studying trial judges and their courts where written decisions are nearly non-existent and appeals are rare.102 Even if written decisions were widely available, our interest does not lie in predicting or explaining case outcomes but instead in examining the myriad within-case decisions judges make that primarily go unrecorded, such as whether to allow lengthy, narrative testimony or whether to ask questions to affirmatively develop the factual record. Understanding how judges are implementing their role and enforcing procedural rules in civil trials thus requires recording judges’ live, in-person interactions with litigants, including contextual, environmental, and non-verbal information that a court transcript alone could not capture.

In addition to the value of our novel descriptive effort, our approach also allows us to generate theoretical propositions about the causes and consequences of judicial behavior for future analytical research. Because civil trial courts lack lawyers to mediate and influence judge behavior, understanding judges’ within-case decisions about role implementation, procedure, and offers of assistance to pro se litigants is a critical contribution to the study of the factors which influence judicial behavior and its consequences for litigants, case outcomes, the legitimacy of courts, and the rule of law.

Given that our research questions focus on examining judicial behavior, we collected observational data from hearings and interview data from conversations with judges. Our study sample—eleven judges across three jurisdictions that vary in their level of guidance and support for pro se judicial assistance—facilitates


100. See generally ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY AND METHODS (Naomi Creutzfeldt et al. eds., 2020); Howard Erlanger, Bryant Garth, Jane Larson, Elizabeth Mertz, Victoria Nourse & David Wilkins, Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 335, 345–46; Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to Justice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MODERN LEGAL REALISM 324 (Shaunin Taleshed et al. eds., 2021).


comparisons of behaviors of interest at the judge and jurisdiction level. The jurisdictions include Centerville, a large, prosperous, coastal urban center; Townville, a small, economically depressed coastal city; and Plainville, a midsize city located in the middle of the country.

To focus our comparative efforts, we sought to minimize the influence of factors that would interfere with our ability to discuss judges’ approaches across jurisdictions. As such, we chose an area of law that varies relatively little from state to state in substantive law and process: protective orders for victims of intimate partner abuse and stalking. Further, in this area of law, most parties are unrepresented and the cases require in-person testimony. Therefore, the data we gathered on judges’ in-person interactions with pro se parties were drawn from an area of law that affords similar opportunities for judges to perform recommended behaviors and offer pro se assistance in dockets where unrepresented parties are the norm. We also sought to minimize the possibility that our sample would include judges who were systematically more likely than other judges to be outlier examples of poor or uncommon judicial behavior in lawyerless courts.

We discuss our study sites, case selection methods, and data collection and analysis approach in more detail below.

A. THE JURISDICTIONS

The three jurisdictions in our study vary economically, demographically, and politically. Centerville is a relatively wealthy, politically liberal, and diverse urban center with appointed judges. Townville is also urban, politically liberal, and diverse, with a very high poverty rate, a history of economic stagnation, and appointed judges. Plainville is majority white, politically moderate, and sits in a fiscally and socially conservative state where social and government services of all kinds are under-funded, including the courts. Most Plainville judges are elected. As illustrated in Table 1, the jurisdictions also vary in their institutional commitments to, and history of, civil access to justice reform, including court funding, ethics rules, and guidance and training for judges. We conducted an independent review of each jurisdiction’s access to justice reform history and civil justice context, including reviewing primary documents and aggregating

103. For a discussion of this approach, purposive sampling, see John Gerring, Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL METHODOLOGY 645 (Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier et al. eds., 2008); Jason Seawright & John Gerring, Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options, 61 POL. RSCH. Q. 294, 295–96 (2008).

104. To protect the confidentiality of our study sites and research subjects and to comply with Institutional Review Board requirements, this Article reports no identifying information, including omitting any identifiable language or direct references to jurisdiction-specific substantive or procedural rules.

105. See Steinberg, supra note 4, at 743.

106. See discussion infra Section II.B.3.

107. Some Plainville judges are appointed to limited roles by the elected bench.
One of the aggregating sources, the Justice Index, regularly surveys and ranks U.S. states based on the strength of their access to justice reform efforts. The paragraphs that follow present the results of this review.

**Table 1: Jurisdiction-Level Variation in Judges’ Environments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Justice Index</th>
<th>Ethics Rules</th>
<th>Guidance</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centerville</td>
<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>Encouraging</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Townville</td>
<td>Above Median</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plainville</td>
<td>Near Median</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Local Control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the most recent Justice Index report, Centerville sits in the top ten percent of national rankings. The jurisdiction is a recognized national leader in access to justice reform, including reform of the judicial role. Centerville has relatively robust legal scaffolding for judicial role reform that permits judges to assist people without counsel, encourages them to do so in limited ways, and requires them to assist in some circumstances. In addition, Centerville’s court administration has issued recommendations that encourage judges to offer assistance and accommodation to people without counsel voluntarily. Trial judges receive regular training on how to handle pro se cases.

Centerville is one of only a handful of jurisdictions in the country whose judicial ethics rules not only permit reasonable accommodations for pro se litigants and clarify that such accommodations do not violate impartiality but also offer a list of possible tactics judges may—but are not required to—employ, which we call the encouraging approach. Only a handful of other states have judicial canons with language that similarly encourages pro se assistance instead of merely stating a general rule that it is permitted. Specifically, Centerville’s ethical canons encourage judges to consider explaining their decisions, court process, and procedural rules. However, this encouragement is bounded by the suggestion that judges’ explanations should be brief, revealing some of the contradictions and tensions inherent in judicial role reform. The rules also encourage judges to consider asking questions, eliciting facts, altering traditional trial procedures, and referring litigants to legal services.

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108. As we have noted, to preserve anonymity, we have omitted identifying details, which sometimes requires us to speak at a level of abstraction about certain issues and prevents us from quoting or citing law or primary documents directly.

109. Our assessment of each jurisdiction is based on our own original research, as well as aggregating sources, such as the Justice Index. See Justice Index - 2020, supra note 28.
Centerville’s case law on pro se litigation goes two steps farther than the most common legal framework that shapes trial judge behavior in pro se cases. The common framework is that pro se litigants should generally be held to the same procedural and evidentiary standards as lawyers but that trial judges may, in some circumstances, waive or explain technical requirements, liberally construe pleadings, or give additional opportunities to amend. First, Centerville’s case law carves out a zone of special circumstances where judges may have a duty to inform a pro se litigant of the fact of a given procedural rule and the potential consequences of violating it. At the same time, case law clarifies that pro se parties do not have free rein to ignore procedural requirements. Second, Centerville’s case law recognizes the importance of protecting trial judge discretion while also recognizing some situations, including cases such as protective orders that commonly involved unrepresented people, where trial judges may have additional duties. In some factual circumstances involving unrepresented litigants, Centerville judges have a duty to take affirmative steps, such as asking questions of witnesses, to ensure that all material facts are raised at a trial.

Centerville’s court administration has issued additional guidance encouraging judges to take an active role in assisting pro se litigants. The guidance instructs judges to ensure litigants have an opportunity to be heard, understand court processes, decisions, and orders, and are treated with respect. Judges appointed to the bench receive regular training on handling pro se cases. In our experience studying civil courts, these judges receive more training on pro se assistance than most judges across the country. This training includes learning from peer judges. Centerville also has a unified court administration that exercises significant control over court processes and logistics, including judicial training and appointments.

According to the Justice Index, Townville falls above the median in national access to justice reform rankings. Townville’s court administration is relatively strong, particularly compared to localized court control in Plainville. Its judicial canons permit judges to make reasonable accommodations for pro se litigants but without the additional encouraging language Centerville and a few other jurisdictions offer. Case law is consistent with the general rule that preserves trial judge discretion to waive technical requirements while noting that all parties, regardless of representation, are held to the same procedural and evidentiary standards. State court administrators have issued additional advisory materials urging judges to explain procedures and court orders and make necessary referrals. Judges are appointed and receive ongoing training on handling pro se cases.

Our final jurisdiction, Plainville, sits near the median of the Justice Index rankings, having made only limited efforts at the time of our study to reform its civil justice system or the judicial role in that system in response to the rise of lawyerless courts. Its judicial canons permit reasonable accommodations. Case law is consistent with the common legal framework that holds pro se parties to the same standards as lawyers while preserving trial judges’ discretion to waive procedural and evidentiary technicalities.
At the time of our study, Plainville’s access to justice reforms consisted of standardized forms for some pro se litigants, including petitioners in protective order cases. There was no statewide guidance for judges in lawyerless courts at the time of our study and judges did not receive court-provided training on handling pro se cases. In contrast to the other two jurisdictions, Plainville’s court administration is among the weakest in the country in terms of its power to influence trial court management. Trial courts are controlled at the local level by elected judges who are functionally unaccountable to state court administration and do not rely on the state to fund local court operations.

In sum, we selected these jurisdictions based on our expectations of finding significant cross-jurisdictional variation in whether and how judges assist pro se litigants. In Centerville and Townville, where judges receive training and strong court administrative bodies have signaled their support for pro se assistance, we expected judges to behave more consistently with the judicial role reform recommendations described in Section I.C. We particularly expected to see more of the recommended pro se assistance behaviors from judges in Centerville given the jurisdiction’s long history of investments in access to justice reform and judicial canons that permit and encourage such assistance, relatively supportive case law, and strong judicial training programs. Our expectations were much different for Plainville, which lacks statewide guidance and training for judges and where the canons are merely permissive. We expected Plainville judges to offer far less help for pro se litigants than those in other jurisdictions.110

B. PROTECTIVE ORDER CASES

We chose to study judicial behavior in a single area of law—protective orders for situations involving domestic abuse, harassment, stalking, or sexual assault. Three features of protective order cases make them a particularly useful site to explore our research questions. These features, which we describe below, include consistent substantive law, the opportunity for transferrable analysis, and a history of access to justice reforms.

1. Consistent Substantive Law

Protective order law is relatively straightforward and consistent across jurisdictions. Protective order statutes first originated in the 1970s and were originally designed as a remedy to protect victims of intimate partner violence.111 These laws directly responded to advocates for women who initially criticized the police response to domestic violence and sought to have it treated like any other

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110. We also note that, while we are principally seeking to explore the relationship between jurisdiction-level commitments to civil justice reform and the utilization of active judging tactics, we do not foreclose the possibility that intra-jurisdictional differences may also inform judges’ behavior. Future studies would do well to consider how these differences may manifest across a sample of judges that allow for such subset analyses.

Later, advocates grew critical of states’ responses under criminal law and successfully advocated for the creation of a civil law remedy that would protect victims from abuse, empower them to leave dangerous relationships, and most importantly, give them a measure of autonomy.

Protective orders are a form of injunctive relief paired with discretionary court fees and monetary awards and the potential for criminal enforcement. Relief ranges from “no contact” or “stay away” provisions to property possession and child custody. In protective order cases, the core question is typically whether the defendant engaged in a particular behavior targeted toward the petitioner that either harmed the petitioner directly or threatened harm. There is a relationship test in most jurisdictions, usually looking at whether the parties are related through a dating relationship, marriage, or blood. Protective orders are also available for victims of stalking.

2. Transferrable Analysis

Our choice to study protective orders offers lessons that transfer to other types of civil cases in two notable ways. First, protective order cases reflect the racial, class, and gender inequalities that permeate our society and are an inescapable feature of state civil courts’ work. As others have engaged more directly, we know that people without representation in civil court are disproportionately likely to be women and people of color. And although existing data are woefully insufficient to understand the myriad ways that social inequality relates to courts’ work, it is also critical to name these realities and seek to understand them more fully.

Second, we acknowledge the reflexive critique that cases involving human relationships, including protective order cases and other family matters, are somehow different from “regular” civil cases. This critique rests on a set of assumptions that are inconsistent with empirical reality. National data tell us that relational and family cases are a huge proportion of state civil court business. Theoretically and structurally, protective order cases are analogous to much of state civil courts’ other work, including contract matters like eviction, consumer debt, and medical debt. In both protective order cases and contract cases, legal

112. See id.
115. See Stoever, supra note 113, at 199.
118. For the most recent national data, see HANNAFORD-AGOR et al., supra note 6.
services are either absent for both parties or imbalanced, existing formal law ignores the complexity of the social problems driving litigants to court, appeals are rare, dockets are voluminous, and courts are under-resourced.119

There is a meaningful difference in the rates of formal legal representation for parties in contract and protective order matters. In contract cases, plaintiffs are typically represented and defendants are not.120 In protective orders, both parties tend to lack counsel.121 However, as we discuss in more detail in Section II.B.3 and in Part III, the lack of formal representation for petitioners in protective order cases is not the whole story. Focusing on differences in formal representation rates conceals a robust system of legal assistance—short of full lawyer representation—for protective order petitioners. Petitioners in the jurisdictions we studied have reliable access to pre-hearing case development assistance provided by non-profit domestic violence agencies. In addition, across protective order, debt, and eviction matters it is common for only one party to the case, the petitioner, to file any pleadings with the court.122 Finally, we note a much less discussed dynamic: conventional stories about eviction, debt, and protective order cases typically feature the notion that there is a “good” party and a “bad” party. Of course, the factual and legal realities of each case type is often more complex than this dualistic narrative suggests. Thus, despite what initial assumptions might suggest, the generalizability of these data is strong.

3. Access to Justice Reform History

Protective order cases are an area of civil court operations that have seen significant investments in access to justice reform in recent years, including self-help, limited legal services, and judicial training. In many jurisdictions, including the three in our study at the time we were collecting data, courts and outside agencies have invested far more in improving how courts and judges process protective orders than other common civil court case types such as eviction and debt.123 Thus, at a minimum, there is little reason to think that judges in protective order cases are in some systematic way performing their roles in lawyerless courts differently, or more importantly “worse,” than other civil judges in these courts. In fact, protective orders are an area of law where judges are likely to have been exposed to information about unrepresented people’s needs and the potential for judicial assistance to meet those needs.

119. See id.; Stoever, supra note 114, at 356, 367, 372.
120. See Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 6, at 31.
121. See generally Steinberg, supra note 4, at 743.
122. Carpenter et al., supra note 3, at 255, 277.
Petitioners are the primary focus of service-based reforms connected to protective order dockets. At the time of our study, there were no court-based or court-adjacent free legal services for defendants in our study jurisdictions. In each study jurisdiction, courts have developed and made available a set of court forms, including petitions, draft orders, and returns of service. And at least one domestic violence agency works collaboratively with the court to offer a broad menu of social and legal services, both inside and outside the courthouse. Domestic violence advocates who worked for or were trained by these agencies sat in the courtroom during dockets and assisted petitioners. Providers help people decide whether to pursue a protective order, offer legal advice and information, and assist in completing and filing all necessary forms. In all three jurisdictions, petitioners file form pleadings with the court, but defendants do not. Instead, in these proceedings, a defendant’s only opportunity to respond happens live, in-court, during a hearing on the merits.

C. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

We observed approximately 200 hours of live court proceedings across the three sites. These proceedings included 357 protective order hearings involving at least one person without counsel. While in court, the research team took verbatim notes on everything judges and litigants said. Wherever possible, we made notes about the court environment beyond the case being heard at any given moment. We recorded everything we heard and saw in courtrooms, including interactions involving litigants in the audience, court clerks, domestic violence advocates, law students, and bailiffs, to name a few. We also conducted semi-structured interviews with the Centerville and Plainville judges, which revealed the justifications and processes underlying their courtroom behavior. These

124. See Stoever, supra note 114, at 305, 307. This has been supported in large part by the 1994 initial enactment, subsequent revisions, and related funding of the Violence Against Women Act.

125. For a fuller discussion of findings about the role of domestic violence advocates in our study, including the relationship between these advocates’ work and deregulation of the legal profession and practice of law, see generally Jessica K. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Judges and Deregulation of the Lawyers’ Monopoly, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 (2021).

126. We sought and received Institutional Review Board approval to conduct this study (Protocol 17-28), which was found to be exempt. Throughout our data collection and analysis process, including drafting this Article, we seek to preserve the confidentiality of our study sites. We sought permission to conduct court observations and interviews and were able to observe all judges working in each jurisdiction at time of data collection, including five judges in Centerville, four in Townville, and two in Plainville. Of these, two judges in Centerville and two in Plainville consented to be interviewed. Unfortunately, none of the judges in Townville consented to an interview. Judge and court resistance to our research manifested in different ways as we conducted our research. In Townville, though individual judges directly expressed varied willingness to be interviewed and some spoke “unofficially” to researchers, the administrative judge of the court instructed all of the observed judges that they may not be officially interviewed. In addition, a fourth jurisdiction was originally intended to be a site of research and while individual judges directly expressed varied willingness to be interviewed and some spoke “unofficially” to researchers, the administrative judge of the relevant docket refused to allow either. Despite clear law in the jurisdiction that the court could not prohibit observation, we decided not to pursue data collection in that jurisdiction. In any situation where a case was called and at least one party was present and had an interaction with a judge, we counted it as a hearing.
interviews included questions about the proper role of a judge, how that role has evolved, and how it has adapted to accommodate a majority pro se docket.

Due to the dearth of empirical scholarship and theory development on state civil trial judge behavior in state civil courts, we recognized that we needed to be flexible as we reviewed and defined the themes and phenomena we constructed from the data. For example, at the beginning of data collection, we anticipated we would code a category of judicial behavior as “eliciting” when judges asked questions to elicit testimony. During observations, it became clear that the category was not sufficiently nuanced—there were two distinct forms of eliciting: leading and non-leading. As we explain in Part III, this difference has important consequences for how we think about the different ways judges elicit information from litigants and how these differences might alter development of the factual record.

After we completed data collection, we converted our raw observation and interview notes to text files and used a qualitative coding platform, ATLAS.ti, for thematic analyses. Based on our review of existing literature and recommendations for judicial role reform, we then followed a theoretically informed qualitative coding protocol and analysis process. All researchers reviewed the raw data files across study sites and identified a range of potential codes and broader themes. The researchers shared their initial codes and themes and refined them through an iterative process. Next, a researcher coded the full dataset, showing the utilization of active judging tactics and the nuances within these tactics from our field observations and interviews. In this process, we coded for both judicial behaviors that appeared in hearing transcripts and for the explanations judges gave about their approach during interviews. Through this process, we also recognized the importance of capturing missed opportunities for judges to assist pro se litigants and identifying mismatches between a judge’s expressed interests and their courtroom behaviors. For example, in interviews, judges identified fairness as a principle guiding their work. But during hearing observations, we noted missed opportunities to advance that principle, such as refusing to answer basic questions or using jargon. We contend that these missed or even overtly rejected opportunities have consequences for substantive and procedural justice.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This Part presents data and discusses results from our comparative study of state civil trial court judges in lawyerless courts. This discussion explores

128. See infra Section III.A.2 for a discussion of judges’ approaches to eliciting information from litigants.
130. Some statements have been edited for brevity and readability.
whether and how judges have altered the traditional judicial role to assist pro se litigants in hearings. Our reporting and analysis of the key themes of judicial behavior in state civil courts reflects the pervasive, patterned behaviors we observed and categorized across judges and jurisdictions, highlighting the relevance of the themes to our central research questions. Importantly, it does not foreclose the possibility that other researchers would identify additional or alternative themes in observations of these courts or of other courts and judges.

As we described in Part I, scholars and reformers have painted a hopeful vision for judicial role reform as an access to justice intervention while courts and think tanks have developed and disseminated guidance and best practices. But although law generally permits pro se assistance from judges, formal law on the scope and nature of such assistance remains underdeveloped, leaving individual judges with both the discretion and the responsibility to decide whether and how to assist people without counsel.

Our primary finding is surprising—we did not observe meaningful variation across judges or jurisdictions. Judges in the sample approached pro se hearings similarly, consistently offering little assistance to pro se litigants. Our court observation data show two categories of similar behavior, which we describe in detail and illustrate with examples from the data in this Part. First, judges maintained legal and procedural complexity. Judges rarely explained court processes, legal concepts, and language, despite recommendations from role reform advocates. Instead, they used legal jargon consistently, often refused to answer litigants’ questions, and sometimes criticized litigants for asking questions or expressing confusion. Second, in contrast to the vision of a judge who listens patiently to narrative testimony and asks questions to gather as much information as possible, judges tightly controlled the presentation of evidence, which prevented parties from offering narratives or shaping the order and substance of their testimony. Judges also leaned heavily on one party’s pleading, the petition, to guide their questioning.

A. SIMILARITIES IN JUDGES’ COURTROOM BEHAVIOR

1. Maintaining Legal and Procedural Complexity

Across our observations, judges exercised process control and wielded legal jargon in ways that maintained legal and procedural complexity in their courtrooms. The judicial reform vision championed by scholars, court guidance, and access to justice advocates emphasizes the judges’ role in providing explanations and sharing information with litigants. However, such behavior was uncommon in our data.

In this Section, we illustrate how judges maintained legal and procedural complexity in their courtrooms. We first discuss the role of opening speeches as explanations. Rather than offering accessible, plain-language explanations to individual litigants and regularly checking in to confirm understanding as
guidance recommends, we rarely observed judges offering information about substantive law, procedures, or legal terms beyond prepared opening speeches for the entire courtroom. We next show how, when we did observe judges giving explanations, the explanations were brief and judges consistently used legal jargon rather than accessible language. Finally, we show that when parties asked questions or sought explanations, judges often refused to answer. We observed seemingly frustrated judges criticizing or mocking litigants for their lack of legal expertise in some extreme examples.

a. Opening Speeches as Explanations

Judges across our study jurisdictions consistently began the court session with brief opening speeches to the entire courtroom. In some cases, judges gave live speeches; in others, the speeches were pre-recorded. Opening speeches had an efficient, check-the-box quality, consistent with some judges telling us they worked from a script received in training. In most hearings, judges did not repeat their opening speeches, although court sessions involved multiple cases and many minutes or hours may have passed between the speech and a case being called.

Inevitably, some litigants were not present in the courtroom during opening speeches. In the busy courtrooms we observed, parties sometimes arrived late or moved in and out of the courtroom. Despite this, the judges seemed to assume that one opening speech was sufficient to convey the desired information to every litigant.

For example, Plainville Judge 1’s opening speech emphasized how the judge expected litigants to behave in the courtroom and did not explain legal or procedural issues other than noting that protective order consequences include a $200 fine and a firearms prohibition. These are just two of many possible consequences of a protective order, such as loss of physical liberty for the defendant. Plainville Judge 1’s opening speech did not describe what a protective order is, either functionally or as a matter of law, and did not mention that criminal charges can result from a violation of an order:

I’ll . . . call cases in order they are listed. When I call your case, please stand, stay where you are, and remain standing until I address you. I’ll ask plaintiffs if they want to proceed, are ready to proceed, and for defendants, I’ll ask if you object. If you object, we will need to have a hearing. If defendants don’t object or if we have a hearing, there’s a court fee of about $200 if there’s a permanent protective order, and there is a prohibition on having firearms. There’s a federal law. So, there are consequences to a protective order.

This is a court of law, so no eyerolling, no gestures to the opposing party. I expect and demand civility for everyone. We have resources for both parties in the courtroom. Domestic violence representatives . . . are here to help you with resources or services.132

132. Court Observation with Plainville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
In the example above, which varied little from day-to-day, the judge opens by stating the judge will call cases in the “order they are listed.” However, litigants did not have access to a list of cases and thus had no way to know when their case would be called. Some litigants waited up to an hour or more for the judge to call their case.

The judge also refers litigants to staff from a domestic violence agency. Two of the agency’s staff were always seated at the front of the courtroom near the judge’s dais. Despite this, the judge’s referral to these advocates was both substantively inaccurate and impossible for most litigants to operationalize without more specific guidance. The referral is inaccurate because the judge states that the agency can “help everyone” but the agency primarily serves petitioners and does not serve parties on two sides of the same case. Functionally, litigants had almost no way to access or communicate with the domestic violence agency staff given where they were seated in the courtroom. A person who wanted to speak to one of the agency staff would have to walk up to the front of the courtroom and pass directly in front of the judge and any litigants whose cases were being heard. Unsurprisingly, litigants generally did not approach the domestic violence agency staff.

In Townville, judges’ opening speeches focused on describing protective order cases’ legal and procedural framework. In these speeches, judges consistently used technical, inaccessible language. Townville judges’ opening speeches usually included a vague reference to the controlling statute (“the [A]ct”) and legal jargon about the standard of proof, as in this example from Townville Judge 1:

Today, domestic violence cases will be heard. I will decide whether to issue a protective order where there has been an act of domestic violence. The applicable relationships are defined by the [A]ct. This is a civil court.

First, we apply the civil standard of proof, which is a preponderance of the evidence, not the criminal standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt. Preponderance of the evidence just means more likely than not.

Additional language from Townville judges’ opening speeches included a robust warning about various civil and criminal consequences of a protective order. Unfortunately, like the statement above, the speech was rife with other jargon, such as, “The defendant may stipulate to the complaint and the court will issue a protective order.” Notably, each of the Townville judges used variations of a
statement provided to judges in their initial training program, suggesting that judges are willing to implement such guidance.

b. Limited Explanations and Frequent Use of Jargon

Judicial role reform guidance emphasizes that the language of law and courts is unfamiliar for unrepresented people and urges judges to explain law, procedure, and language throughout the litigation process. In interviews, most of the judges in our study discussed the importance of offering information. But in court observations, explanations were rare. Outside of the routine opening speeches described above, judges typically offered litigants only the most limited explanations, commonly used legal jargon, and often seemed to ignore or dismiss litigants’ obvious confusion.

The following is a small sample of the jargon and technical terms we observed:

Centerville Judge 1

Judge: When she files a protective order, the judge listens and if she makes a prima facie case, the judge issues it.138

Judge: You have the burden of proof . . . . Provide me with the factual predicate for the relief you seek in this case, so, what happened and when, how it affected you, and what relief you’re seeking.139

Centerville Judge 2

Judge: The defendant can file a motion to set aside the default, but just filing the motion doesn’t automatically set it aside.140

Petitioner: My son was present when the defendant choked me. What is the appropriate age to be a witness? He’s 9.

Judge: The Court will do voir dire to determine if the child knows the difference between truth and a lie and is competent.141

Judge: You may file a motion to set aside stating your reason for not appearing and meritorious defenses or reasons the court should vacate the order. That’s it you’ve been served; you are free to go.

Defendant: So, now do I do the motion?

138. Court Observation with Centerville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
139. Id.
140. Court Observation with Centerville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
141. Id.
Judge: No, you have to file that.
Defendant: She told me to come down and ask and say I had filled out the paper, but it was wrong.
Judge: If you filed something today it will be calendared by the clerk’s office, not today.
Defendant: She also told me that I should tell you I never received any-
thing.
Judge: Well, if you have grounds to vacate the judgment, you need to file a motion. We have a full calendar.142

Plainville Judge 1

Judge: So, you object because these are different days? So, you’re telling me this is not relevant?143

Townville Judge 1

Judge: This is a court of limited jurisdiction.

....

Judge: This is not criminal court. It’s civil. So, the standard is preponder-
ance of the evidence, not reasonable doubt.144

A longer example from Townville Judge 4 further illustrates judges’ lack of explanations and use of jargon. In the excerpt, the judge makes a proce-
dural decision without explanation in the face of an unrepresented defend-
ant’s clear attempt to advocate for himself by making an argument against admitting a photograph. In response, the judge seems to express frustration, uses jargon, and then simply admits the evidence without acknowledging the defendant’s argument:

Judge: Do you object [to these photographs being introduced]? 
Defendant: Yes.
Judge: On what basis? [The judge does not give the defendant time to respond before turning to the petitioner, who offered the evidence, and asking:] Petitioner, do these photographs accurately reflect the condition of you? 
Petitioner: Yes.
Judge [to the Defendant]: Why do you object? 
Defendant: On May 13th, I did not touch her.
Judge: [Sounding frustrated.] No, no. The photo. That’s not the question. She’s saying they show her condition. The question is are they admissible.

142. Id.
143. Court Observation with Plainville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
144. Court Observation with Townville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
Defendant: She said November 2016. She’s talking about May.

Judge: [Ignores the defendant and turns to the clerk.] That should be marked as Petitioner #1.145

We observed that even when judges seemed to make more significant attempts to offer information and explanations, they still consistently fell back on using technical language. In the next excerpt, Centerville Judge 1 explains the protective order trial process to an unrepresented petitioner who is facing a lawyer on the other side of the case:

Judge: This is a trial. Petitioner, you have the burden of proving your case under the [state statute] and you have to do so by what’s called a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means more than 50/50. So, you tell me what happened to you, why do you think it [violates the law]. Then the defendant will get a chance to present his case through cross-examination or just explaining his version of what happened. And I will hear brief closing arguments if either party has them. Begin when you’re ready.

Petitioner: Ok, I am not a lawyer, so I don’t know all the things that they may know [laughs nervously].146

Judges’ explanations of trial process tended to follow the pattern in the excerpt above. Judges would name component parts of the trial process but without defining terms or explaining the legal standard and the type of facts that might be relevant.

c. Refusing to Explain

In interviews, most judges expressed awareness and empathy regarding how little the average person who appears in court knows about law and litigation processes. For example, Centerville Judge 2 spoke of litigants’ general reluctance to ask questions and talked about the human tendency to be embarrassed when we do not understand something:

I think you want it to be fair, particularly if one side is represented. It’s not that you’re helping them win, but you’re explaining things slowly and carefully. Pro se litigants often act like they know the law or the procedures, and they do not. They are embarrassed to say they don’t know what is going on, or for example, a word you use. They won’t ask what it means.

. . . .

I try to explain how my courtroom operates. I try to give the lay of the land.

. . . .

145. Court Observation with Townville Judge 4 (on file with authors).
146. Court Observation with Centerville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
Maybe not every judge wants to explain things. In my experience it is just worth the time to explain it. One who works with pro se litigants has to be very, very patient.\textsuperscript{147}

But contrary to this expressed intention, we observed that when litigants did find the courage to ask questions, judges most often explicitly refused to answer. Litigants asked judges to define terms, explain court processes, or explain legal standards. Judges most often responded to litigants’ questions by, at a minimum, ignoring the question or, at worst, criticizing the litigant for asking the question.

Different phrases in the vein of, “I’m not your lawyer,”\textsuperscript{148} were a common refrain in Centerville and Townville, in particular. We also observed numerous examples of judges saying things like, “I can’t try the case for you,”\textsuperscript{149} or, “I can’t be your attorney, buddy.”\textsuperscript{150} Such phrases were often followed by an admonition to seek a lawyer’s advice, something that is far outside the financial ability of most litigants. Judges made such dismissive statements the most when litigants appeared to be struggling to understand a legal concept, term, or procedural step.

In the example below, Centerville Judge 2 ridiculed a defendant for not knowing a legal term and rebuffed his questions about the terms of a court order. This case involved a represented petitioner and an unrepresented, incarcerated defendant:

Judge: You heard the [request for a] continuance – do you oppose it?
Defendant: No, I am fine going ahead with that.
Judge: Are you saying you are consenting to the protective order?
Defendant: No, no. I am just not sure what you mean when you say oppose.
Judge: Are you seriously telling me you don’t know what the word “oppose” means?
Defendant: Yes ma’am, I am sorry.
Judge: Oppose means you are against it.
Defendant: Oh, no, I am not against it. We can do it when she wants to.
Judge: So, that’s with consent of Defendant . . . just make sure you have vacated the residence.
Defendant: What? Where did that come from?
Judge: This order has been in effect since October 26.
Defendant: Well, how can I vacate the residence if I am in jail?

Judge: You were served with it. Did you read the order?
Defendant: That just doesn’t make sense. So, you are telling me I can’t talk to my mother?

\textsuperscript{147} Interview with Centerville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{148} Court Observation with Centerville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{149} Court Observation with Townville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{150} Id.
Judge: That’s all in the order.
Defendant: I never had the order read to me. I am not sure why I am even in jail. I haven’t been able to cut my hair in jail. I am embarrassed to be outside like this.¹⁵¹

In another example, Townville Judge 1 attempted to reschedule a hearing. In the process, the judge faces a series of questions from both parties. Some questions were related to the case while some were not. The judge resisted offering information, even when the defendant asked about terms of the court’s temporary order and seemingly did not know what document to review to find those terms. Instead, the judge referred the defendant to an attorney:

Judge: How do you want to proceed?
Defendant: I don’t want to lose seeing my kids or my job.
Judge: Do you want an attorney?
Defendant: I guess.
Judge: I will postpone to a date certain. With or without an attorney, we will try the case. The protective order is in full effect until then.
Judge [to Petitioner]: Do you have anything to add?
Petitioner: I’m sorry about the phone.
Judge: It’s okay.
Petitioner: I want to say that when I filed for a temporary protective order I was revictimized by the hearing officer, [name]. I want a permanent protective order until I’m confident about lifting it. I’m okay with sharing custody. I want to fire my attorney. [The petitioner mentions having an attorney, but there was no attorney present in court during this hearing].
Judge: I’ll break it down. I can’t make it final until a trial. If it’s granted, there’s always a way for you to lift it.
Petitioner: That’s what I want.
Judge: That’s what the hearing is about. I don’t get involved with your attorney. You can do what you want in two weeks. We’ll deal with custody at the hearing.
Defendant: Can you explain what you said? A lot just happened.
Judge: She wants an order until she feels safe.
Defendant: I don’t want to lose the kids.
Judge: So, you have time to talk to an attorney. Whether you hire an attorney or not, I can explain things. I can’t give legal advice.
Defendant: I’m not a bad guy.
Judge: I don’t judge good guy or bad guy. I judge the facts. Talk to a lawyer before the hearing in two weeks.
Defendant: Can I see the kids?

¹⁵¹. Court Observation with Centerville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
Judge: It’s in the temporary protective order.
Defendant: Which one?
Judge: It says, “Friday supervised.”
Petitioner: It was modified.
Judge: What is it?
Petitioner: Supervised in his home on weekends, with curbside pickup. And they can’t be with their granddad until there’s a psych eval or a hearing.
Defendant: I’m confused. We were going to do something with holidays.
Petitioner: Can I speak to that? I’m firing my attorney because I was revictimized and got bad information. I was told by attorney and hearing officer that the case would be beat because I didn’t have pictures of the harm he did and that the protective order would be lifted and not extended.
Judge: I know here at the beginning when we said we’re having a trial. I won’t comment on what the attorney and hearing officer said. I hear the evidence and decide. I will give you 2 weeks and you can get an attorney.
Defendant: If I have supervised visits, how does she drop them off?
Judge: Curbside. She drops the kids at the curb. The 8-year-old takes the 5-year-old to the front door. You don’t come out.
Petitioner: My concern is not [defendant] and the kids. My concern is [defendant] and me.
Judge: Right. The final protective order will consider the kids’ interests and that parents are involved.
Petitioner: It’s just me. Everything is in place.
Defendant: I don’t want to lose my job and my kids.
Judge: We are adjourned.152

A final example of judges’ resistance to offering explanations involves Townville Judge 2 and an incarcerated defendant. During the hearing, the petitioner mentioned another case she had with the defendant and stated that there would be a hearing in that case later in the week. The incarcerated defendant then asked how he can get to the hearing. The judge responded: “That’s not my concern.”153 A moment later, the defendant asked, “What am I in jail for?”154 The judge responded, “I didn’t arrest you. I don’t know.”155 Moments later, law enforcement removed the defendant from the courtroom.

In contrast to the reform vision of a helpful judge who carefully explains law, process, and the language of the courtroom for people without legal training, the proceedings we observed lacked transparency and judges’ behavior upheld court complexity. Rather than offering information or explanations, all judges in our sample consistently controlled and limited access to information, used legal jargon, and resisted direct questions. Occasionally, seemingly frustrated judges

152. Court Observation with Townville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
153. Court Observation with Townville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
154. Id.
155. Id.
criticized litigants for asking questions and exhibiting a lack of knowledge about the legal system. In these ways, judicial behavior kept the dockets we observed lawyer-centric and legalistic as opposed to pro se friendly.

2. Controlling and Constraining Evidence Presentation

In lawyerless courts, getting facts on the record inevitably requires deviations from traditional witness examination and evidence presentation, including narrative testimony and questioning by the judge, given that there are no lawyers to run the evidence presentation process. Guidance materials suggest judges should allow parties to offer narrative testimony, listen patiently, and ask neutral, non-leading questions. While we found that all judges engaged in eliciting behavior, the way they elicited information was in sharp contrast to the guidance: judges limited narrative testimony, constrained parties’ efforts to offer evidence, and relied heavily on the petition (the only pleading filed by either party) to determine what evidence they would consider.

In this Section, we draw on examples from the data to show how judges tightly controlled and constrained evidence presentation. We first discuss how judges’ approach was ultimately imbalanced in favor of petitioners because they relied heavily on the facts and legal claims in petitioners’ pleadings to drive their questions. Second, we describe how judges consistently posed leading questions to develop facts and legal issues and constrained the amount of information parties were allowed to present, particularly defendants.

a. Relying on the Petition

In the protective order cases we observed, only one party made legal and factual claims through pleadings—the petitioner, through standardized court forms. The petitioner is the only party who can put their claims in front of the judge prior to and during the hearing. Given that all petitioners use standardized forms, the claims are presented in a way that is consistently organized and predictable across cases. By comparison, defendants must make their claims through verbal testimony, which is inevitably less clear, organized, and cognizable than claims made via written pleadings. Petitions played a pivotal role in shaping the legal and factual claims judges considered during hearings.

In all three jurisdictions at the time of our study, most petitioners received extensive pre-hearing legal assistance from court-connected domestic violence agencies. The assistance domestic violence agencies offered included meeting with potential petitioners to discuss facts, identify potential legal claims, and draft their petitions. As a result, many petitioners’ cases were relatively well-developed before any hearing. All petitioners, regardless of whether they received individualized assistance or not, had the benefit of court-provided, standardized forms complete with checkboxes

156. For a robust description of the assistance available to petitioners, see Steinberg et al., supra note 125, at 1342.
for legal claims, lists of possible forms of relief with fill-in-the-blank options, and definitions of legal terms. There were no similar services or standardized forms for defendants.

Judges consistently and routinely referred to dates or events alleged in petitions at the beginning of and throughout the course of hearings. All judges in our study had the opportunity to review the petition in advance of and during every hearing, and they often relied on petitions to shape the scope and depth of evidence presentation, including the questions they asked litigants and scope of testimony they were willing to entertain. We consistently observed judges reading petitions and explicitly referring to these pleadings during hearings. We offer a few examples below:

Townville Judge 2

Judge: There are a bunch of allegations in the petition. Can you put them on the record? This incident, the daughter told school and [a child welfare agency] opened an investigation. Can you tell me some of the incidents?

....

Judge: Has she hit you before?
Petitioner: Yes.
Judge: It says in the petition there’s no history.157

Townville Judge 4

Judge: What occurred May 7 at 10:00 p.m. that caused you to get a protective order? [The judge says “get” a protective order but this is a hearing on the merits of that order being granted.]
Petitioner: You said May 7?
Judge: Your petition says May 7.158

Plainville Judge 1

Judge: Ready to go? Let me look at your filing. [Reads petition then swears parties in.]
Judge to Petitioner: She’s your former daughter in law, related by marriage, you filed a police report, you live in [Plainville], facts occurred in [Plainville]. Is everything in this petition true and correct?

* * *

157. Court Observation with Townville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
158. Court Observation with Townville Judge 4 (on file with authors).
Judge to Petitioner: [The defendant] is your aunt, you both reside in Plainville, the facts happened here, and July 25 is the date. Tell me why you need a protective order.

Petitioner: I need a protective order because on July 25, I was being picked up from my ex’s house, and she called me and told me I’m going to end up in the hospital and she’s going to end up in jail. And my worker heard her say it on the phone.

Judge: She used to yell at you in the morning every day? You feel she will make good on the threat and you don’t feel safe? [Doesn’t wait for answer.]

Judge to Witness: Are you the co-worker who heard the call? Tell me what you heard.159

At the time of our study, none of the jurisdictions offered standardized pleading forms or any systematic, court-based assistance for defendants. A defendant’s only opportunity to raise defenses or counterclaims is in live court, where the judge is often the only lawyer in the courtroom. We did not observe judges making any efforts to guide defendants in understanding the possible range and nature of their defenses. Across our observations, judges did not appear to take steps to account for defendants’ lack of opportunity to answer allegations in writing or address the fact that many petitioners, and few defendants received substantial legal assistance from nonlawyer advocates.

In most evidentiary hearings, after taking testimony from the petitioner—guided by the petition—judges simply asked defendants a brief, open-ended question. We did not observe judges explaining legal or procedural issues to defendants, such as the burden of proof, the potential for incriminating themselves, or the legal elements at issue, as in the examples that follow:

Plainville Judge 1

Judge to Defendant: What do you need to tell me?160

Townville Judge 2

Judge to Defendant: Anything you want to tell me?161

... .

Judge to Defendant: What would you like to tell me?162

Centerville Judge 1

159. Court Observation with Plainville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
160. Id.
161. Court Observation with Townville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
162. Id.
Judge to Defendant: All right, you can ask him questions or tell your side of the story.\(^{163}\)

....

Judge to Defendant: Do you want to state your case then you can call your witnesses?\(^{164}\)

b. Tightly Controlling Evidence Presentation

Across the data, judges exerted tight control over evidence presentation by asking leading questions—including questions based on the petition—and constricting parties’ opportunities to present testimony, particularly narrative testimony. In the most common eliciting pattern we observed, judges would ask a litigant a relatively open-ended question to begin testimony, sometimes by referencing the date or description of an event in the petition. The judge would then allow the party a short narrative, often just a sentence or two. Beyond this point, judges showed little interest in or patience for narrative testimony or party control over the presentation of evidence. Judges tightly controlled most testimony via restrictive, leading questions and often shut down parties’ attempts to offer evidence if judges perceived that they were not, as one judge said, “getting to the point.”\(^{165}\)

Sometimes, judges decided cases after allowing one or both parties to say no more than a few sentences, as we illustrate with some striking examples below.

In interviews, most judges described confidence in their ability to get relevant facts on the record via questions, as well as their legal authorization to do so. In fact, more than one judge expressed a sentiment that what the literature suggests is common among judges in lawyerless courts: the idea that lawyers make cases and hearings more complicated and time-consuming given that judges know how to obtain the information they need without lawyers’ maneuvering.\(^{166}\) As Plainville Judge 2 said:

If there are two lawyers, then it’s gonna be a formal hearing, and it takes for-friggin’-ever, which is fine, but I can get to the truth . . . . I can get to the facts . . . .

....

I read the petition, and then I ask ‘em questions. I don’t just say, “Tell me your story,” which is why, those protective order hearings, years ago, could take forever . . . . because the pro se [litigants] aren’t good at getting to the

\(^{163}\) Court Observation with Centerville Judge 1 (on file with authors).

\(^{164}\) Id.

\(^{165}\) Court Observation with Plainville Judge 2 (on file with authors).

\(^{166}\) CTR. FOR FAMS., CHILD. & THE CTS., supra note 72, at ix.
point. They wanna talk about how the person treated them, stole their money, things that are irrelevant in my court.\textsuperscript{167}

Plainville Judge 1 expressed slightly less comfort with the role of an active questioner, describing it as a matter of necessity and efficiency:

\begin{quote}
I developed a learning curve advantage being on the protective order docket because you learn how vital it is to be fair. . . . As a protective order judge, I had to examine them. I didn’t want to have to, and the other attorneys don’t like it because I’m in their business, but I always give the other attorney more time on direct. But you have to be efficient. You couldn’t coddle people, but you have to get the facts.\textsuperscript{168}
\end{quote}

Some judges made statements about the importance of letting litigants present their case and suggested that they tried to do so in the courtroom. As Plainville Judge 1 put it: “[I ask] [w]hy do you need the protective order? And then I let them tell their story.”\textsuperscript{169} Centerville Judge 2 said, “Oftentimes respondents will say ‘hey, they got to talk for ten minutes, can I?’ And sure. That’s some people’s idea of fairness.”\textsuperscript{170}

However, in contrast to the last two statements above, court observations showed most judges did not afford parties significant opportunities to give narrative testimony or shape the order and scope of evidence presentation. This was particularly true for defendants. Plainville Judge 2’s perspective above about limiting “irrelevant”\textsuperscript{171} testimony and Plainville Judge 1’s statement about efficiency and not coddling\textsuperscript{172} people are much more consistent with the approach we observed across judges. Indeed, in another part of the interview, Centerville Judge 2 acknowledged managing testimony when parties were saying “irrelevant or nonsensical”\textsuperscript{173} things: “You have good witnesses, you have very poor witnesses. . . . They say things that are irrelevant or nonsensical. I try to get them on track because I know my job is to get enough facts to make the right decision.”\textsuperscript{174}

During hearings, we commonly heard judges say things akin to Townville Judge 4’s statement when he told a litigant, “You have to follow my questions.”\textsuperscript{175} In the example below, Centerville Judge 4 opened a hearing with a statement that appears designed to prepare parties for being directed and redirected: “Now, the way this hearing will be conducted because you don’t have attorneys is I will ask the questions. Don’t talk to each other. Everything you

\textsuperscript{167}. Interview with Plainville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{168}. Interview with Plainville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{169}. Id.
\textsuperscript{170}. Interview with Centerville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{171}. Id.
\textsuperscript{172}. Interview with Plainville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{173}. Interview with Plainville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
\textsuperscript{174}. Id.
\textsuperscript{175}. Court Observation with Townville Judge 4 (on file with authors).
Another example of a judge controlling evidence presentation and limiting the evidence comes from another hearing conducted by Centerville Judge 4. In this case, the defendant had filed a motion for civil contempt alleging that the petitioner had not been bringing their child to a visitation exchange point as required by the court’s order. In a hearing that lasted only a few minutes, the judge suggested the parties were not answering the judge’s questions but then gave them almost no opportunity to speak. The judge then asserted that the issue the defendant has raised—enforcement of a visitation order—did not belong in court at all. The judge then quickly decided the case, telling the parties to “follow the order”:

Judge to Petitioner: This provision is for your protection. Can you tell me what happened?
Petitioner: The paper says—
Judge: I don’t care what the paper says. The question is are you bringing the child to the station as the order requires.
Petitioner: They said if he doesn’t text, I don’t have to bring my son.
Defendant: I have texts in my phone.
Judge: You think I’m going to take all this time with all these people here to go through that. You are both adults. [Both parties start to speak.] I don’t want to get in the middle of hearing you guys argue. You don’t come here to the court to have your little disagreement. You don’t answer my questions and you won’t get heard at all.
Judge to Petitioner: So, you’re telling me he doesn’t text you.
Petitioner: Certain days he does text me.
Judge: Well, I’m denying your motion and everything stays as it is. Go home and follow the order. 177

In another example, Centerville Judge 1 presided over a hearing where both parties had filed petitions against one another. After hearing just a few minutes of testimony, the judge suddenly decided to dismiss both cases without hearing the facts that one of the litigants (Litigant 2) might have offered to support his claims. In the hearing, the judge first allowed Litigant 1 to offer some evidence to meet her burden of proof. She alleged serious physical abuse. She also appeared to be experiencing mental illness:

Litigant 1: He is compulsive and abusive mentally and physically toward my son and I. He has been raping, abusing, manipulating, terrorizing. What are the words I’m looking for?
Judge: Words are important, but actions are more important.

176. Court Observation with Centerville Judge 4 (on file with authors).
177. Id.
Litigant 1: I’m not sure how this man can physically abuse me all these years and get away with it.

Judge: Whether the criminal justice system works is not at issue here. What’s at issue is whether he committed an intrafamily offense.¹⁷⁸

The judge appears to assume the litigant knows the difference between the criminal and civil systems. He then asks if she has pictures, which she produces on a phone and hands to the judge’s clerk. It is unclear what role the photos played in the judge’s final decision as he did not mention them again. Next, Litigant 1 began to discuss her son and the judge responded, “Your relationship with your son has nothing to do with this case,” and shut down Litigant 1’s testimony on this topic.¹⁷⁹

After the judge’s exchange with Litigant 1, Litigant 2 had only a limited opportunity to speak and no real opportunity to offer facts to support his petition. He only had a chance to deny, as a general matter, Litigant 1’s allegations and assert that she was mentally ill. Soon after, the judge suddenly said to Litigant 2, “You also filed a case. Why don’t you present it?”¹⁸⁰ Litigant 2’s subsequent testimony was brief, only a few sentences, including two statements alluding to his claims: “[H]er behavior became unmanageable. Police had been called, there were family disturbances. I’ve had them come to remove her.”¹⁸¹ After this statement, Litigant 1 interrupted, saying “lies.”¹⁸² The exchange below followed:

Judge: All right, I think I heard enough.

Judge to Litigant 1: Your affect and interruptions suggest to me that you’re not mentally in a position to go forward with this case. Based on this, I don’t find your testimony credible. Although I appreciate your apologies, they come with continued ill behavior. There’s also constant murmuring.

Litigant 1: Really your honor? When your son has been raped by your baby dad, and when this man is getting away with it, I could care less what you think about me, but you may go on.

Judge: Accordingly, I am going to dismiss your case and hope you will seek medical attention.

Litigant 1: Thank you. I will. Thank you.

Judge to Litigant 2: I am also going to dismiss your petition. I don’t think issuing a protective order is going to make things better. And I don’t see enough evidence.

Litigant 2: What am I supposed to do? Keep calling the police?

¹⁷⁸. Court Observation with Centerville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
¹⁷⁹. Id.
¹⁸⁰. Id.
¹⁸¹. Id.
¹⁸². Id.
Judge: Do the same thing you would do with or without a protection order. I understand, sir, but I don’t think a protective order is the appropriate remedy.\(^\text{183}\)

In announcing a sudden dismissal of both cases, the judge cited Litigant 1’s courtroom behavior, “affect,” and mental condition as the reason for dismissing her case. The judge did not address Litigant 1’s claims of serious physical abuse. And while the judge told Litigant 2 that the judge did not “see enough violence” to support Litigant 2’s claims, Litigant 2 did not have an opportunity to say more than a few sentences. Judge 1 never heard the facts Litigant 2 might have offered. The choice to bar Litigant 2 from offering evidence and argument in his case appeared to be based not on anything the judge learned from Litigant 2 himself but only on what the judge learned from Litigant 1 when she presented her case.\(^\text{184}\)

Judges often seemed to have specific ideas about the type of testimony they wanted to hear. Sometimes judges appeared to be searching for confirmation of the kind of facts they thought might be relevant in a given case, as the examples below illustrate:

Plainville Judge 1

Judge: [Reading petition.] All of these events occurred in front of children?

Petitioner: They were upstairs.

Judge: But they were present in the house and probably heard?\(^\text{185}\)

Townville Judge 2

Judge: Were there marks on your neck?

Petitioner: No.

Judge: She just grabbed you by the neck and pushed you?

Petitioner: Yes.\(^\text{186}\)

Centerville Judge 2

Judge: And what was [her] condition emotionally? And physically? Torn clothing, anything like that?\(^\text{187}\)

Townville Judge 4

Judge: He was throwing things. He kicked in the door. He’s the owner of the house? He didn’t really beat you up, did he?

\(^{183}\) Id.

\(^{184}\) Id.

\(^{185}\) Court Observation with Plainville Judge 1 (on file with authors).

\(^{186}\) Court Observation with Townville Judge 2 (on file with authors).

\(^{187}\) Court Observation with Centerville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
Judge: Did you listen to the question? Focus. You go there, you see his truck. He’s in jail. They don’t take your vehicle. Did you open the door?
Defendant: His truck was there. The police came. [Name] was not there. [Name] answered. The police said there was a protective order and he had to leave.
Judge: Did you break the door?
Defendant: No, the cops let me in.188

Without knowing each case’s underlying facts, we cannot say how often judges’ controlling approach to hearing management caused them to miss critical information. However, it is undeniable that many litigants in our data, particularly defendants, had limited opportunities to offer narrative testimony and have their arguments fully heard by the court. In the absence of counsel, litigants did not have the opportunity for anyone acting in their interests to do fact investigation that might produce evidence supportive of their case—evidence that they did not consider to be supportive of their case given their lack of legal training. The lack of opportunity for narrative and the tendency to ask leading questions cut against recommendations in guidance literature, which urges judges to allow parties to be fully heard and encourages them to ask neutral questions.

IV. WHY DO JUDGES BEHAVE SIMILARLY?

This study reveals surprisingly homogeneous behavior by judges in lawyerless courts across three diverse jurisdictions, behavior that bears little resemblance to the vision for judicial role reform. Rather than offering the accommodation and assistance that guidance suggests, judges maintained legal complexity and exercised tight control over hearings and party testimony.

Why did the judges in our study behave in similar ways? Why did they resist offering explanations and information to litigants and refuse to answer questions? Why did they use so much jargon? Why did they limit the evidence they were willing to hear and consistently use leading questions to shape testimony? Why did they rely so heavily on petitions to drive information gathering? In this Part, we suggest three possible explanations for judges’ similar behavioral choices.

Critically, we note that each of the factors we describe below are symptoms of the fundamental problem in lawyerless courts: civil justice system design.189

188. Court Observation with Townville Judge 4 (on file with authors).
189. In previous and ongoing work, we examine broader structural perspectives on this issue. See Carpenter et al., supra note 3 (identifying four novel assumptions to guide future research on pro se cases in state civil court); Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 11; Colleen F. Shanahan, Alyx Mark, Jessica K. Steinberg & Anna E. Carpenter, Essay, Covid, Crisis, and Courts, 99 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 10 (2020); Steinberg, supra note 9 (noting that the systemic lack of counsel, among other conditions, renders the civil justice system predictably ineffective); Steinberg, supra note 14 (calling attention to the breakdown of the adversary system in ordinary two-party cases); Carpenter, supra note 14 (describing
American civil trial courts were designed for adversarial, procedural contests driven by lawyers on both sides of a case. These courts were not designed to be navigated by users who lack legal training and must advocate for themselves while facing potentially life-altering consequences based on the outcome of their cases. The judicial behavior we observed is rooted, more than anything else, in the core design and purpose of civil courts and the roles judges and lawyers are expected to play in this system. The existing incentives for judges to behave in new ways that are helpful to both sides of a pro se case are much weaker than judges’ incentives to behave in ways that are more consistent with their historical role in civil litigation.

With the backdrop of a civil justice system that was not designed for people without counsel, we suggest three factors that may shape the behavior we observed. First and most important is the interaction between sparse formal law and judges’ traditional assumptions about their role. This interaction creates an ethical trap. Judges in our study consistently reported that they were unclear about the ethical bounds of their role. In the face of this ambiguity, they appeared to fall back on commonly shared assumptions about how a civil judge should behave, assumptions likely shaped by their acculturation and training in the legal profession.

Second, judges were under pressure to decide cases quickly in their high-volume dockets, which limited the amount of time they could spend offering pro se assistance. In addition, the incentives to “move” cases along appeared stronger and more concrete than the incentive to help people without counsel, incentives that included feedback from court administrators about docket management but not about pro se assistance.

Third, imbalanced pre-hearing legal assistance in protective order cases resulted in petitioners’ having factually and legally well-developed cases while defendants did not. Judges’ reliance on petitioners’ pleadings, whether consciously or unconsciously, may have been influenced by docket pressure and seemed to limit the universe of facts judges were willing to consider. These three factors may have exerted independent pressure that shaped particular aspects of judges’ behavior and also may have acted in concert to influence how judges operationalize their role in lawyerless courts. We discuss each of these factors in more detail below.

A. ETHICAL AMBIGUITY AND JUDICIAL ROLE ASSUMPTIONS

Previous research has suggested that state trial court judges face ethical ambiguity regarding the proper scope and nature of their role in lawyerless cases. In prior studies, judges have described a process of on-the-job role development and
a lack of clarity about implementing ethical standards.\textsuperscript{191} In interviews, the judges in our study confirmed their struggles to balance duties of impartiality and fairness with the practical task of assisting pro se parties in a system not designed for litigants without lawyers. In fact, despite the lack of assistance judges offered to litigants in the courts we observed, we show below that judges believed they were doing all that they could to assist people without counsel within the bounds of their role.

In the face of ethical ambiguity, judges may have defaulted to their original training as lawyers in an adversarial system, including baseline assumptions about the appropriate judicial role such as the importance of appearing impartial and unbiased. The judges in our study were all lawyers before they took the bench.\textsuperscript{192} All were trained in a relatively homogenous legal education system.\textsuperscript{193} The norms of the adversary process and the tracks worn by years of legal training and practice may ultimately be far too ingrained in judges’ minds to be overcome merely by permissive ethical rules or admonishments from judicial training programs.

In interviews, when we asked judges how they think about and approach their role in pro se cases, they described fairness as their touchstone principle and how this principle required them to intervene in and manage pro se cases, a finding consistent with previous research.\textsuperscript{194} However, the judges also described their struggles with the ethical bounds of their role, articulating that they had to find their own, individualized approach to ensuring fairness in the courtroom, or as one judge put it, “going rogue.”\textsuperscript{195} Notably, judges in Centerville, who were required to attend regular training programs about running dockets, described similar challenges as judges in Plainville, who received no such training.

\textsuperscript{191} Carpenter, \textit{supra} note 14, at 663–64.

\textsuperscript{192} See Benjamin H. Barton, \textit{The Lawyer–Judge Bias in the American Legal System} 14–15 (2011) (noting that judges have a shared background as lawyers and “tend to come from a very select group of individuals who have thrived within the institution of legal thought”). We note, though, the phenomenon of nonlawyer judges in the also under-researched field of municipal courts, which serve both criminal and civil functions. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, \textit{Criminal Municipal Courts}, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 964 (2021) (discussing the criminal law functions of municipal courts).


\textsuperscript{194} See Carpenter, \textit{supra} note 14, at 685.

\textsuperscript{195} Interview with Centerville Judge 1 (on file with authors). For a discussion of similar findings from previous research, see Steinberg, \textit{supra} note 14.
Plainville Judge 1 said, “I did look at the canons, but I did not find that it was helpful. I developed a ‘smell test.’” Judges in Centerville expressed similar ideas. Centerville Judge 1, for example, articulated a lack of sufficient guidance and did not think the judicial role in pro se courts was “particularly codified.” Judge 1 added, “I don’t see it as a developed jurisprudence . . . I think dealing with pro se litigants is in its nascent phase.” Centerville Judge 1 also said it is important to be “tethered . . . by the law” and then went on to say:

I’m good at violating—that’s not the right word—I’m good at going rogue. The ends justify the means kind of thing . . . So I have to push hard on myself to say, “what are the rules, what am I allowed to do.” The rules say I can’t speak with [unrepresented people] for a particular reason, but I’ve always pushed that. I won’t do things I can’t do, but otherwise I’ll push. I’m not saying other judges are wrong, but they’ll say, “I can’t help you I’ve got my rules.”

. . .

Natural inclination is to help the side that is unrepresented, but you are still cabined by judicial ethics.

. . .

In a few cases I think I made a difference. That’s what I want anyway, to make a difference for people. But it is so hard just to be the referee but also want to get involved.

Plainville Judge 2 also expressed the sense that a judge had to “bend” the rules or approach a “limit” to help unrepresented people:

I’ll help [unrepresented people] out more than I should, and I know that. I bend over backwards to help them as much as I can, but, boy, there’s a limit to it. Technically, they’re supposed to be held to the same level. It’s kinda hard to do that and still believe that you’re running a fair court, ‘cause they don’t know how, so I bend it, and I shouldn’t. I know I shouldn’t, every time I do it, but I still do it.

To the extent judges fell back on traditional judicial behavior, they may have had good reason. Matthew Tokson’s empirical research on judicial

196. Interview with Plainville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
197. Interview with Centerville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Interview with Plainville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
decisionmaking draws on cognitive psychology to explain how unconscious biases, including preferences for the status quo, shape judges’ behavior. Tokson suggests that judges may resist changes that increase the cost of their own decisionmaking, for example, by “increasing the time and effort necessary to address a legal issue or by increasing the cognitive difficulty of decisionmaking.” Tokson also suggests judges may develop “biases in favor of laws that they have repeatedly applied and justified in the past” along with “preferences for familiar doctrines and an aversion to any departure from a long-standing status quo.”

As we described in detail in Part I, although many court systems and access to justice advocates have recommended ways judges can help people without counsel, this guidance material is merely advisory and the gap between such recommendations and formal law is massive. Even in Centerville, which has gone farther than most other jurisdictions in the country, specific forms of assistance are merely encouraged—not required—and those encouraged behaviors are discussed in the most summary and general terms. The shared ethical confusion across judges in this study suggests that efforts like Centerville’s, which are among the strongest in the county, are still not sufficient to ensure judges implement recommended pro se assistance. Without more scaffolding to support the new judicial role, judges appear to fall back on their legal training and acculturation, which includes the historical role of judicial passivity as a marker of impartiality and judicial assistance for litigants as a marker of bias. These findings suggest future research drawing on fields including cognitive psychology and behavioral economics could develop our understanding of the role culture, cognition, and other mechanisms in creating and influencing judges’ behavior in lawyerless courts.

202. Id. at 903.
203. Id.
204. Examples include Thaler and Sunstein’s work on behavioral “nudges,” see generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); and Lessig’s work on how architecture shapes behavior, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006). A recent paper by Martha Gayoye makes vital methodological and substantive points relevant to the future study of civil trial court judges. Martha Gayoye, Why Women Judges Really Matter: The Impact of Women Judges on Property Law Outcomes in Kenya, 27 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 1 (2021). First, Gayoye notes that many existing studies of judges use a lens of “methodological individualism” as opposed to “collectivism”—a critique deeply relevant to the U.S. context—and articulates how a focus on individual judges can obscure the “collective efforts, actions, and processes” of groups of judges, such as women. Id. at 1–2 (emphases omitted). Second, she shows how women judges in Kenya collaborated to advance feminist jurisprudence in property disputes through informal interactions and training of their male colleagues and argues for the potential of networks of judges to bring about institutional change. Id.
B. DOCKET PRESSURE

A very pragmatic factor might have shaped the behavior we observed: time. The recommendations for judicial role reform and pro se assistance are inherently time-consuming. The judges we observed may have had, or perceived that they had, very little time to spare. Judges in most lawyerless courts, like those in our study, face massive docket pressure from high-volume court calendars. In fact, commentators have drawn an analogy between lawyerless civil courts and emergency rooms. Like the emergency department of a hospital, civil courts have no choice but to process the cases brought before them, no matter the resource constraints they might face. These pressures flow downstream and shape the day-to-day work of trial judges.

In interviews, judges discussed feeling time pressure from litigants—many of whom had to wait for long periods, sometimes hours, to have their cases called—and from court administrators who wanted to keep court calendars moving. The high-volume and high-pressure nature of the dockets we observed may influence the extent to which judges are willing to take time to offer individualized explanations or to give every single litigant the chance to offer lengthy testimony. As a matter of incentives, the judges in our study faced more external pressure to call and decide cases quickly than to offer pro se assistance.

Given the number of cases calendared each day, judges faced daily time pressure to call the case of every litigant waiting in the courtroom. They also faced longer-term time pressure to ensure cases did not linger on court calendars. In all three jurisdictions we observed that dozens of protective order cases were calendared for a morning time block, typically between nine and early afternoon. The courtrooms were often too small for all litigants to sit down, which meant courtrooms could be standing room only, particularly at the beginning of a docket call in the morning. Some cases, such as those without service on the defendant, could be resolved in less than a minute. Evidentiary hearings took much more time.

205. See Tokson, supra note 201, at 912 (discussing judicial resistance to time and effort costs).
207. See Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 11, at 129 (noting that courts have “no choice” but to serve litigants and handle cases “despite the mismatch between design and reality”); see also Shanahan et al., supra note 189 (describing the historical challenges of state civil courts and the pandemic-related intensification of these challenges and resulting innovation); Andrew Hammond, Ariel Jurow Kleiman & Gabriel Scheffler, Essay, How the COVID-19 Pandemic Has and Should Reshape the American Safety Net, 105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 154 (2020) (showing how lack of government assistance has exacerbated economic and racial inequality historically and how these negative consequences have and will continue to increase in the face of the pandemic).
208. As an analogy, one study of federal courts found that increased caseloads led to less scrutiny by appellate courts. See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011).
In Centerville, judges described significant time pressure from court administrators. Judge 1 said, “In busy courthouses like this there’s always tension between justice and moving the calendar. There’s pressure from the—we call them the suits—to move the cases.”

This judge went on to describe how this pressure was systematic, with judges throughout the courthouse receiving statistics about docket management: “Yeah, we get these statistics about who’s moving cases, how we’re moving cases. We see stats every month, how many trials we’ve done. And it’s particular to judges, so you know how you’re doing. We’d always have these meetings about moving cases . . .”

Centerville Judge 2 expressed similar sentiments about pressure from court administrators and also described a perception of impatience from litigants:

We are under a lot of pressure to get cases resolved. My own approach is to manage the issues of moving the case along but feeling I have given enough time to the case that I can make a good ruling. . . . The litigants even are impatient. I tell them, think about this like going to the doctor. You can’t predict when you’ll get out. You have to wait sometimes.

Plainville Judge 1 described “a huge pressure” to ensure parties had a swift resolution to their case and described starting dockets at nine in the morning and often staying on the bench until the afternoon to ensure all of the day’s cases were handled.

The baseline reality of constant pressure to resolve cases may play a key role in preventing judges from even attempting to offer pro se assistance. This may be particularly true where institutional pressure to close cases—such as the pressure placed on judges by court administrators in the form of regular reports on case statistics—is stronger, more systematic, and contains more feedback loops than any pressure they might face to offer assistance to pro se litigants. After all, while some of the judges in our study were trained on judicial role reform, none of them received routine feedback on how they performed in helping people without counsel. In contrast, they did receive feedback on how they were managing their busy, crowded dockets.

C. LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR PETITIONERS ONLY

Some of the behavior we observed, particularly judges’ tight control over evidence presentation and the constraints they placed on party testimony, could be shaped by differences in case development between petitioners and defendants. In the courts we studied, only petitioners received robust,

209. Interview with Centerville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
210. Id.
211. Interview with Centerville Judge 2 (on file with authors).
212. Interview with Plainville Judge 1 (on file with authors).
systematic, pre-hearing case development assistance. Defendants did not. As a result, petitioners’ pleadings were the only written articulation of factual and legal allegations in any given case. Judges leaned heavily on these pleadings to shape how they controlled and managed evidence presentation.

Petitioners’ cases were succinctly and predictably presented in a form pleading, which may have, unconsciously or consciously, led judges to rely on them and constrained their thinking about the possible universe of claims or defenses in a given case. This possibility, combined with docket pressure, may have influenced judges to take the most straightforward, efficient route to put facts on the record: relying on the petition, asking leading questions, and limiting party narrative. While that behavior may not be ideal from a pro se assistance or due process perspective, it is consistent with the tangible pressures that judges face.

Even as judges relied on pre-hearing case development for petitioners to share hearings, they did not offer counter-balancing assistance to defendants in developing defenses during hearings. A possible reason is that judges did not believe they were permitted to provide such support in their role as judges. Ethical confusion, assumptions about the judges’ proper role, and lack of clarity about acceptable behavior may have stood in the way of judges offering case development support to defendants.

CONCLUSION

This Article highlights a key symptom of what ails lawyerless courts: the judicial role’s failings. Both the vision for judicial role reform and the pragmatic, day-to-day reality of lawyerless courts ask state civil court judges to maintain fidelity to impartiality and adversarial procedures and deliver substantive justice while simultaneously assisting parties with no training in law and deep personal interests in litigation outcomes. Today’s judges are asked to navigate this ethical trap in the context of a system designed for lawyers to drive all aspects of litigation from the most mundane document filings and the development of a factual record and legal arguments to the drafting, entering, and enforcement of a final order. In this

213. For a complete discussion of petitioner assistance and the lack of defendant assistance in the courts we studied, as well as the implications of this imbalance, see Steinberg et al., supra note 125. In addition, the limited appellate case law on protective orders in our study has been powerfully shaped by the small group of legal services lawyers who systematically advocate for petitioners. Defendants have no such systematic advocacy.

214. For a fuller discussion of due process issues for defendants in this study, see id.; and see also supra Section III.A.2.

215. Shanahan & Carpenter, supra note 11, at 134. The failure is embedded in the role and how it fits within the legal framework and culture of adversarial civil litigation. Our data do not suggest that any one individual judge is personally to blame or that our study reveals “bad apples” behavior. In fact, exactly the opposite. The similarity of judge behavior across three jurisdictions point to a systemic—not individual or personality-based—diagnosis for the problems we observed.
context, it is no wonder that any judge would fail to deliver accommodation, information, and simplification—along with procedural and substantive justice—for all parties on a thirty-case lawyerless docket that must be cleared in a single morning. The principles are conflicting, the rules are designed for a different purpose, and beyond closing cases, the goals are fuzzy at best. Today, state civil trial judges are being asked to do something that may not be possible given the facts, rules, cultural context, and structural incentives that currently shape their role.

Civil trial courts’ troubles run much deeper than the symptoms of judicial role failure this Article reveals. The core problem in state civil trial courts is the disconnect between what state civil courts were designed to do—solve legal disputes through lawyer-driven, adversarial litigation—and what these courts are asked to do—help people without lawyers navigate complex social, economic, and interpersonal challenges, most of which are deeply tied to systemic economic, gender, and racial inequality. As we have argued in the past, there is a fundamental, unresolved mismatch between civil courts’ adversarial, litigation-based dispute resolution design (which the principle of judicial impartiality was designed to support) and the nature, scope, and depth of the actual problems litigants bring to the courthouse door.

Based on our previous research and the findings of this study, we see multiple paths forward, including many important questions for future research and possibilities for reform.

The first is a long-term path that considers the broader structural challenges facing state civil courts as institutions within a democratic system of governance. This is a radical project of rethinking state civil courts’ role. It requires reconsidering which problems belong in courts, which should be prevented or mitigated through upstream solutions and interventions, and which require new problem-solving frameworks.

The second is a more immediate path that focuses on judges. Here, researchers, policymakers, and court leaders can explore questions about how best to influence and shape the future of judging. For example, future work could explore and test the relationship between formal legal and ethical guidance aimed at compelling behavior change, training that increases capacity for new or different behaviors, and resources that help other, non-judge actors play a role in supporting a changed role for judges and better experiences for litigants. Such work is necessarily empirical and grounded in

216. Id. at 129–31. For a critical view of the role lawyers and courts play in perpetuating inequality, including a critical analysis of the extent to which market power shapes how law is developed and deployed, and by whom, see Sabbeth, supra note 22.
real-world, real-time experimentation. Fortunately, state courts have never been more motivated or invested in experimentation to improve civil justice systems. The time is ripe for researchers, including socio-legal scholars, to partner with courts in this work.

218. See, e.g., Bridget Mary McCormack, Essay, Staying Off the Sidelines: Judges as Agents for Justice System Reform, 131 YALE L.J.F. 175 (2021) (arguing judges are obligated to engage in efforts to improve justice systems); see also Shanahan et al., supra note 189, at 11–12.
APPENDIX A: SURVEY OF STATE JUDICIAL CANONS

Definitions

Silent: States where judicial ethics rules or comments to the rules have not been amended to add any language clarifying that assisting or accommodating people without counsel is not a violation of a judge’s duty of impartiality.

Permissive: States that follow the formula laid out by the ABA’s amendments to Rule 2.2 by adding language clarifying that “reasonable accommodations” do not violate impartiality.

Encouraging: States with ethical rules that urge judges to consider offering accommodations and assistance by outlining specific actions a judge may take and explicitly urging judges to consider taking such actions.

Listing of States

Silent: 11 States
Permissive: 29 States
Encouraging: 11 States

Alabama ———————————————————— Silent
Alaska ———————————————————— Silent
Arizona ———————————————————— Permissive
Arkansas ———————————————————— Encouraging
California ———————————————————— Permissive
Colorado ———————————————————— Encouraging
Connecticut ———————————————————— Permissive
Delaware ———————————————————— Silent
District of Colombia ———————————————————— Encouraging
Florida ———————————————————— Silent
Georgia ———————————————————— Permissive
Hawaii ———————————————————— Permissive
Idaho ———————————————————— Permissive
Illinois ———————————————————— Permissive
Indiana ———————————————————— Encouraging
Iowa ———————————————————— Encouraging
Kansas ———————————————————— Permissive
Kentucky ———————————————————— Permissive
Louisiana ———————————————————— Encouraging
Maine ———————————————————— Encouraging
Maryland ———————————————————— Permissive
Massachusetts ———————————————————— Encouraging

219. For a discussion of these categories, see supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
220. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.2 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
221. These data were gathered over a period of several weeks from August 2021 to October 2021 using information from state court websites.
Michigan — Silent
Minnesota — Permissive
Mississippi — Silent
Missouri — Encouraging
Montana — Permissive
Nebraska — Permissive
Nevada — Permissive
New Hampshire — Permissive
New Jersey — Permissive
New Mexico — Permissive
New York — Permissive
North Carolina — Silent
North Dakota — Permissive
Ohio — Encouraging
Oklahoma — Permissive
Oregon — Silent
Pennsylvania — Permissive
Rhode Island — Permissive
South Carolina — Silent
South Dakota — Silent
Tennessee — Permissive
Texas — Silent
Utah — Permissive
Vermont — Permissive
Virginia — Permissive
Washington — Permissive
West Virginia — Permissive
Wisconsin — Encouraging
Wyoming — Permissive