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Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short

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Abstract: This Article argues that there is a fundamental mismatch between the nature of finance and current approaches to financial regulation. Today’s financial system is a dynamic and complex ecosystem. For these and other reasons, policymakers and market actors regularly have only a fraction of the information that may be pertinent to decisions they are making. The processes governing financial regulation, however, implicitly assume a high degree of knowability, stability, and predictability. Through two case studies and other examples, this Article examines how this mismatch undermines financial stability and other policy aims. This examination further reveals that the procedural checks on lawmaking meant to promote accountability and legitimacy often fail to further either end. They result instead in excessive expenditures before new rules are adopted, counterproductive efforts to perfect ever more detailed rules, and too little re-evaluation of existing rules in light of new information or changed circumstances. The mismatch between the nature of finance and how finance is regulated helps to explain why financial regulation has failed in the past and why it will likely fail again. It also suggests the need for a new approach to financial regulation, one that acknowledges the limits of what can be known given the realities of today’s complex and constantly evolving financial ecosystem.

INTRODUCTION

The financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the devastation it wreaked on the United States and other economies triggered a global rulemaking frenzy. In the United Kingdom, the prudential rulebook for banks ballooned from roughly 400,000 words in 2007 to well over 720,000 in 2017.1 That is the equivalent of almost one hundred words of new rules per day, each and every day, for a decade. Similarly, in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act or Dodd-Frank)

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weighed in at a whopping 364,844 words, or nearly 850 pages. The Dodd-Frank Act further required eleven different federal agencies—sometimes working alone, other times in conjunction with others—to undertake 243 separate rulemaking processes and conduct sixty-seven studies. Using techniques from software programming, Andrew Lo and his co-authors have demonstrated that, while the average law may not be particularly complex, the Dodd-Frank Act most certainly is. They also found that Title XII of the United States Code (U.S. Code or the Code), which governs banks and banking, is second only to the Internal Revenue Code in its complexity. Moreover, it is complex in ways that make its failure likely, even before one moves from the Code to the dense thicket of regulations implementing the statutory scheme.

Given that almost a decade has passed since the Dodd-Frank Act and many other key post-crisis reforms were adopted, this is an opportune time to assess what we have learned about the processes governing how finance is regulated. One of the most striking features of the current landscape is just how much contestation remains. The core aim of all of this new rulemaking was to promote a more stable and resilient financial system. Yet it is far from clear whether the system is safer today than it was ten years ago. Global SRISK, a measure of systemic risk designed by Nobel Laureate Robert Engle and colleagues, is higher today than at any point in the last twenty years—including at the height of the financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. Natasha Sarin and Larry Summers have shown that an array of key metrics of bank riskiness, such as volatility and expected returns, have not declined following the adoption of post-crisis reforms. In fact, some are
even higher today. These metrics suggest that the heightened capital requirements and other reforms have not reduced “the risk of insolvency for major banks . . . as much as is generally supposed.”

More qualitative assessments of the aggregate impact of these reforms are similarly mixed. The Bipartisan Policy Center, for example, has concluded that, while the financial system is likely safer today than it was before the crisis, there are still a number of “less-than-optimal outcomes and unintended consequences of [the] post-crisis reform[s].” Echoing a similar sentiment, Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, believes that although the reforms have been helpful on a number of fronts, the post-crisis reforms targeting banks have spurred a shift in risk-taking to “less regulated, more opaque part of the financial system.” According to Zandi, it is from this “shadow” banking system that the next “crisis will likely emanate.” Richard Sylla, financial historian at New York University’s Stern School of Business, puts it even more bluntly. When asked whether the post-crisis reforms have erected the guardrails needed to protect against another crisis, he responded: “In a word, no.”

Shifting from aggregate assessments to the impact of specific reforms does not resolve this contestation. A recent report from the Congressional Research Service acknowledges that even though numerous provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act were designed to ensure that large financial institutions could be wound down without threatening the health of the broader financial system, ten years and a great deal of rulemaking later, “commentators continue to debate whether these provisions have improved the resiliency of the financial system.” The impact of a new, post-crisis requirement that all standardized derivatives be centrally cleared has been similarly mixed. The good news is that the reform seems to have had the intended beneficial effect of improving transparency in derivatives markets and facilitating multilateral netting in ways

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10 Id.
13 Stewart, supra note 11.
14 Id.
15 Id.
that might reduce contagion and uncertainty in the event that a major financial institution fails. The bad news is that the resulting concentration of market activity has had the unintended, and quite serious, consequences of creating new sources of systemic risk and reducing interbank monitoring.\textsuperscript{17} Other examples abound.\textsuperscript{18}

Our aim here is not to defend or condemn any of the specific reforms put in place in the aftermath of the crisis. We believe that many have improved the resilience of the financial system, and we are skeptical of the recent efforts to roll back the progress that has been made. That said, we see the degree of ongoing contestation about what is working, what is not, and why, as itself important. The devastation that the financial crisis wreaked on the real economy was unequivocal. In the United States alone, unemployment jumped to ten percent, major stock indices fell by half, and nearly nine million families lost their homes through foreclosure or related processes.\textsuperscript{19} The need for massive reform was uncontested, even if many of the specific reform efforts were not.

Given the immensity of the public and private resources that have been brought to bear on the problem of financial fragility, the fact that so many questions about the impact of the reforms and the health of the financial system linger is itself troubling. Our aim with this paper is to explore how this is possible. Why has this immense reform effort not produced a demonstrably more stable financial system? Answering this question not only helps to explain where we are now, but also why financial regulation has so often failed in the past.

The literature already offers a number of potential explanations for why financial regulation so often falls short. One explanation, advanced by Roberta


\footnote{\textsuperscript{18}See infra notes 124–221 and accompanying notes.}

Romano, is that regulation is too often the byproduct of an impulsive legislative response to a specific scandal or crisis.20 The net effect, in Romano’s view, is ill-conceived regulation designed more to quell public outrage than to address underlying problems. A second explanation, rooted in public choice theory, posits that banks and other regulated actors exert too much influence over the lawmaking process, producing rules that protect their narrow interests at the expense of the wider public. 21 A third, related explanation stems from the observation that public pressure to respond to financial crises is often fleeting, resulting in financial regulation that tends to weaken as the memory of a crisis fades over time.22

Each of these accounts helps to explain why financial crises recur so often and in such familiar ways. Each also sheds some light on why the current reform project has not been more successful. Yet, even collectively, these existing accounts fail to provide a complete explanation for the disconcerting state of affairs we now face. First, Romano’s account is incomplete insofar as many of the most contentious post-crisis reforms were developed and proposed not by Congress, but by far less political, and more technocratic and deliberative, organizations. Second, an account based in public choice theory does not square with the fact that many of the unintended consequences of the reforms pose greater threats to banks than to the public. Finally, the tendency for regulations to weaken over time does not explain the many questions being asked about the efficacy of the reforms themselves.

This Article expands this list of explanations to include the nature of modern finance. It shows that another reason financial regulation keeps falling short—and will again unless revamped—is that the processes through which finance is regulated are poorly suited to the realities of modern finance. Modern finance is dynamic and complex. In this environment, policymakers inevitably operate with an incomplete understanding of how the financial system works and how it will respond to regulatory intervention. Exacerbating this

20 See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) [hereinafter Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley] (attributing the shortfalls in the corporate governance reforms contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in part, to the frantic political environment that followed in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals).
22 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020–37 (2012) (establishing the idea of a “Regulatory Sine Curve,” from which it follows that the appetite for financial regulatory reform fluctuates based on temporal proximity to market crashes); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 441 (2017) (describing a revived interest in the aftermath of the financial crisis in reconstructing the structural barriers between commercial banks and capital markets erected by the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act)).
challenge is the tendency for the financial system to evolve in ways that minimize the cost of complying with the existing regime, and hence in ways that tend to involve the movement of activity outside of regulated domains. Tomorrow’s financial system will not look like today’s, and efforts to improve the stability and functioning of today’s system will be among the factors driving that change.

Despite the complex and dynamic nature of modern finance, the processes governing how finance is regulated are often rooted in trans-substantive frameworks designed to accommodate domains that operate quite differently, or that reflect the static financial systems of a bygone era. The result is processes that implicitly assume that policymakers and other stakeholders understand the system they are regulating and how that system will respond to a given intervention. The consequences of this mismatch are myriad. In addition to regulations that fail to achieve desired aims, these results include excessive expenditure of public and private resources before new rules are adopted, counterproductive efforts to perfect rules, and too little meaningful accountability. We argue that this mismatch helps to explain the ongoing contestation surrounding the impact of post-crisis regulatory reforms.

In offering a different explanation of the problem, we also advance a different approach for how to fix it. The good news—if it can be called that—is that finance is far from the only dynamic, complex, and incompletely understood ecosystem in which we are nevertheless compelled to intervene. The human body is another. Just as morbidity and mortality have declined as doctors have gone from simply treating disease to thinking more broadly about how to promote health, we suggest that the efficacy and resilience of the financial system could be enhanced by moving away from past efforts to narrowly address specific market failures and toward a more holistic and health-oriented approach to finance. We thus conclude by considering what a more holistic approach to financial regulation might entail and how it could help mitigate the mismatch that we identify as a core challenge for financial regulation today.

This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the interrelated phenomena of dynamism, complexity, and unknowns and identifies each as core features of financial markets and institutions today.23 Part II provides a stylized account of how finance is regulated, looking specifically at the core legal processes governing how financial regulation is made.24 Part III examines this mismatch in action: using two case studies—post-crisis money market mutual fund reform and the evolution of bank capital requirements—to demonstrate what actually happens when legal processes try to keep pace with the speed,

23 See infra notes 28–78 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 79–123 and accompanying text.
complexity, and opacity of modern finance.\textsuperscript{25} Part IV examines some of the recent regulatory reforms, along with proposals for further reform, that can be viewed as attempting to respond to elements of this mismatch.\textsuperscript{26} This examination suggests that although modest progress has been made, there are inherent limits in trying to use the existing regulatory framework to bridge the growing gap between finance and financial regulation. In Part V, we present our blueprint for how to start to build a more holistic approach to financial regulation.\textsuperscript{27} By recognizing the constitutive role of law in finance and embracing a more holistic mindset, we can devise new ways of analyzing how the law can best promote resilience and other aims.

I. THE NATURE OF MODERN FINANCE

Crafting effective financial regulation demands that policymakers start with an accurate understanding of the nature of the financial system and how it responds to regulation. This Part lays that foundation, demonstrating how dynamism, complexity, and unknowns are core features of finance and core challenges for financial regulation.\textsuperscript{28} To many, this might not seem controversial. Nonetheless, the current state of financial regulation suggests that this observation has not been taken to heart. Indeed, while academics, policymakers, and others often pay lip service to the idea that the financial system is characterized by complexity, dynamism, and pervasive unknowns, most still cling to regulatory frameworks and processes that look increasingly antiquated once we move these features to the center—rather than just the periphery—of finance.\textsuperscript{29} Given that it is the relative importance, not existence, of these features that remains implicitly contested, our aim here is not only to gesture at them, but to explain why they ought to front and center in any discussion about how finance is regulated.

A. Dynamism

Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve (Fed) Board of Governors, recently observed: “What almost overwhelms me in looking at the world of finance—banking and beyond banking—is how different it is from

\textsuperscript{25} See infra notes 124–222 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{26} See infra notes 223–260 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{27} See infra notes 261–268 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{28} See infra notes 28–78 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{29} See infra notes 79–123 and accompanying text (describing these views).
when I was most active.”30 This subpart explains why that is, why the financial
system is continuing to evolve, and why dynamism is endemic to finance.31

1. The Cyclical Nature of Finance

One source of constant dynamism is the cyclicality that is built into fi-
nance. Stability in finance is not a sign that things are static, but rather, an im-
portant driver of structural change. As Hyman Minsky argued nearly fifty years
ago: “[S]ustained economic growth, business cycle booms, and the accompa-
nying financial developments . . . generate conditions conducive to disaster for
the entire economic system.”32 This occurs because “the structural characteris-
tics of the financial system change during periods of prolonged [economic]
expansion.”33 Stability breeds inflated expectations that such stability will con-
tinue, which drives the very risk-taking that in time will bring it to an end.34

Economists since Minsky have formalized some of the ways that periods
of stability spur changes in behavior and pricing that contribute to the structur-
al dynamics that he viewed as core. Work on the credit cycle, for example,
shows how changes in the price of assets used as factors of production and as
collateral for loans can accelerate boom and bust cycles.35 John Geanakoplos
has shown that periods of growth lead to higher leverage, which translates into
higher asset prices, providing a distinct mechanism for built-in cyclicality.36

Economists have also started offering more institutionally nuanced accounts of
the ways that stability can breed risk-taking. Markus Brunnermeier and Lasse
Pedersen, for example, have shown how interactions between the two sides of
dealer balance sheets can exacerbate cyclicality.37 The mechanisms formalized

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31 See infra notes 32–59 and accompanying text.

32 HYMAN P. MINSKY, STEERING COMM. FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL REAPPRAISAL DISC. MECH.

33 Id. at 1–2.

34 See id.


in these accounts vary, but each show that the behavior of market participants and the structures they build are constantly changing, and changing in ways that may exacerbate fragility.

2. Regulatory Endogeneity

Regulation further contributes to the dynamism and cyclicality of finance. Most importantly, regulation spurs regulatory arbitrage. As Robin Greenwood and co-authors explain: “There is no set of ex ante rules, no matter how granular or how sophisticated, that can satisfactorily tackle the problem of regulatory arbitrage . . . .” When government introduces new regulations, the structure of the financial system will inevitably evolve to reduce the costs of compliance.

This dynamic can be observed in the repeated growth of various forms of “shadow banking.” This term grew in prominence following the crisis, as it became apparent that many of the early cracks had emanated from a network of interconnected institutions that collectively engaged in the same type of credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation as conventional banks. Like banks, this network funded mortgages and other long-term loans using short-term debt, with commercial paper, repurchase, or “repo,” agreements, and money market funds serving as substitutes for deposits. In between these two ends laid an array of institutions and relationships that functioned largely outside the perimeter of banking regulation. Given the myriad costs associated with operating a bank, from complying with activity restrictions to ongoing supervisory oversight and deposit insurance premiums, regulatory arbitrage was likely among the forces driving the rapid growth of this shadow banking system in the years leading up to the crisis.

Yet, this was not the first or only shadow banking system. Economic historian Hugh Rockoff has shown that eleven of the twelve financial panics in the United States between 1819 and 2008 emanated from that day’s version of the shadow banking system. The Panic of 1907, for example, which led to the creation of the Fed, erupted in trust companies—bank-like institutions that


40 COPING WITH FINANCIAL CRISES: SOME LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC HISTORY 77–106 (Hugh Rockoff & Isao Suto eds., 2018).
developed outside a private clearinghouse regime that helped protect banks from destabilizing runs. Like compliance with any regime—public or private—that promotes the safety and soundness of financial institutions, compliance with clearinghouse rules entailed significant regulatory costs. Those costs created opportunities for market participants who could find ways to provide bank-like services without assuming the corresponding burdens.

At least in the United States, there does not seem to be any way to escape this pattern. The regulatory burdens imposed following the crisis—no matter how justifiable—will invite yet further evolution and the migration of activity to less regulated spaces. These developments are already underway. For example, a recent report by the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center shows that most home loans are now securitized by government-affiliated entities. And as of June 2018, nonbanks originated sixty-four percent of those mortgages—a dramatic increase from the pre-crisis era. Nonbanks also provide disproportionately more credit to borrowers with lower credit scores. Other recent reports show that the same thing is happening beyond housing, and beyond the United States. The significant new regulatory burdens imposed on banks are not stopping the flow of credit; instead, the system is evolving to provide that credit outside the regulated banking sector.

3. Innovation

Another important driver of the dynamism of modern finance is innovation. These innovations include theoretical insights (like the Black-Scholes option pricing model), technological developments (like massive increases in computing power), and the emergence of new financial markets, institutions, and instruments (like derivatives and structured finance). Indeed, dramatic change in finance very often entails the combination of all three types of innovation. The almost daily pronouncements about how big data and artificial intelligence are going to “disrupt” finance are merely the most recent manifesta-

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41 Id.; see also ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 146–47, 161–62 (2007) (describing how trust companies contributed to the economic instability that led to the panic of 1907).


43 Id. at 12.

44 See id. at 13.

tions of a continual process of innovation that has been underway for decades, if not centuries. 46

Consider again the rise of the particular form of shadow banking that emerged prior to the last crisis. Depending on how one measures it, this system remains as large as the regulated banking sector. 47 Even if regulatory cost savings propelled part of its growth, shadow banking’s capacity to disperse risks once concentrated in banks across the financial system may also have had real efficiency gains, enabling homeowners and others to access more affordable credit. 48 Neither the regulatory cost savings nor those efficiency gains, however, would have been possible without the myriad of technologies enabling securitization, money market funds, and other key features of this system. These innovations included creative new uses of legal structures, new modeling techniques, and massive increases in computing power that allowed the collection and analysis of vast amounts of data about creditor and asset quality.

In the decade since the crisis, innovation has continued apace. In the past three years alone, more than $120 billion in new capital has been invested globally in fintech firms. 49 Established banks, too, are investing in innovation. A recent Citibank report shows that banks spend between 15% and 25% of their annual budgets on improvements in technology. 50 To put that in perspective, this means that the median spending on technology is higher in the banking sector than in any other single sector—including “high tech” firms. 51 Even a brief look at the technologies currently changing finance—from the use of


47 Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411, 415 (2017) [hereinafter Judge, Information Gaps] (“Recent estimates suggest that the shadow banking system in the United States is larger than the banking system and poised for further growth.”).

48 Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Innovation, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 291, 329 (2018) [hereinafter Judge, Investor-Driven Innovation] (“One of the most important benefits of investor-driven innovation is its potential to improve price efficiency and reduce the cost of capital for borrowers. For example, by expanding the types of investors who could provide capital to home loans, the innovations just described should have, and seemingly did, reduce the cost of getting a home loan.”).


50 CITI GPS, supra note 46, at 59 (“IT expenses as a percentage of revenues are notably higher in the Banking industry than any other (~9%) and almost 2[–]3 [times] those of other major industries. [Citi’s] bottom-up analysis indicates that approximately . . . 15[–]25% of banks’ annual costs are allocated to IT.”).

51 See id. (showing median IT expenses for banking at 8.7% and 5.2% for high tech).
big data and artificial intelligence in assessing creditworthiness\textsuperscript{52} to the ongo-
ing experimentation with blockchain as a means of transforming how assets are held and transferred—suggests significant changes lie ahead.\textsuperscript{53}

New technologies are already disrupting established institutions in many emerging markets. The rise of the so-called “shadow payment system”—institutions that perform core payment functions outside the regulated banking system—in Asia, Africa, and South America is just one example of how new technology is changing the face of finance.\textsuperscript{54} In China, for example, platforms such as Alipay and WeChat Pay have each attracted almost one billion users.\textsuperscript{55} In Sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, over 130 mobile money platforms have been launched in the decade since the first platform, M-Pesa, was established in Kenya.\textsuperscript{56} Only a few short years ago, technological limitations would have made these developments almost unthinkable.

4. Radical Change

Dynamism is sometimes incremental and predictable. But sometimes it is not. The relentless dynamism of the financial system may well result in changes that are hard to even imagine today. Such claims are not just the domain of technologists. In 2006, it would have likely seemed unthinkable that in a few short years, of the five leading investment banks—Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley—one would file for bankruptcy, another would be acquired on the brink of bankruptcy, a third would need to be acquired to ensure its survival, and the remaining two would both choose to become far more heavily regulated bank holding companies. Yet that is precisely what happened.

Mervyn King, former head of the Bank of England, puts the situation thusly: “The essential challenge facing everyone living in a capitalist economy


\textsuperscript{54} Dan Awrey & Kristin van Zwieten, The Shadow Payment System, 43 J. CORP. L. 775, 776–81 (2018) (“[Shadow banking] institutions perform the same core payment functions as conventional deposit-taking banks . . . [and] reside outside the perimeter of the regulated banking system.”).


is the inability to conceive of what the future may hold. The failure to incorporate radical uncertainty into economic theories was one of the factors responsible for the misjudgments that led to the crisis.\footnote{Mervyn King, The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking, and the Future of the Global Economy 9 (2016).} In King’s assessment, this is a failure that has yet to be corrected—despite the scale and scope of post-crisis reforms. Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s best-selling book on “Black Swans” makes a similar point: Our perceptions of the world are inherently limited by our experience and tendency to believe that we understand far more about how the world works and what it will look like in the future than is possible given the inherently limited data on which our current understandings are based.\footnote{Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, at xxii–xxiii (2d ed. 2010).} As he explains, “Black Swan logic makes \textit{what you don’t know} far more relevant than \textit{what you do know}.”\footnote{Id. at xxiii.} The crisis helped propel the success of his book because it was such a powerful example of the phenomenon he helps explain. That so many of the post-crisis accounts suggest believing in securitization is equivalent to believing in magic or deny that such structures can produce asset-backed securities that are of a higher quality than the underlying loans—and believe us, they can—exemplifies how core these dynamics are to finance.

B. Complexity

A second defining feature of modern finance is its ever-increasing complexity. Economists Jacopo Carmassi and Richard Herring, for example, have shown that the average number of subsidiaries controlled by the largest global banks roughly doubled—to more than one thousand—between 2002 and 2013.\footnote{See Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Corporate Structure of International Financial Conglomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Safety and Soundness, in The Oxford Handbook of Banking 195, 197–201 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2012).} Compounding matters, these subsidiaries often operated in different jurisdictions and typically engaged in a wide variety of different activities. As a result, they were often subject to oversight by different regulators who do not necessarily coordinate their regulation or supervision.\footnote{Id. at 214–16 (describing the complexity of banking regulation and how financial conglomerates might be forced to “adopt a certain amount of corporate separateness for regulatory purposes”); see also id. at 209, tbl.8.2 (showing the breakdown of subsidiaries of large complex financial institutions).} As Carmassi and Herring explain, these complex and opaque organizational structures both impeded

\footnote{Id. at 216 (“This kind of [regulatory dialectic] has undoubtedly increased the corporate complexity of [large complex financial institutions]. In the event of financial distress, however, this complexity could impede an effective regulatory response.”).}
effective ex ante oversight and greatly complicated crisis management and the resolution of failing institutions.\textsuperscript{62}

Complexity is also a key feature of many financial instruments. Using lexicographic analysis, Claire Célérié and Boris Vallée examined the term sheets of 55,000 retail structured products issued between 2002 and 2010 to study how these instruments evolved over time.\textsuperscript{63} They found that these instruments were getting more complex over time—with average complexity increasing substantially prior to the crisis, leveling off between 2007 and 2009, and then continuing to rise in 2010.\textsuperscript{64} They also found that, at least in the retail market, “[p]roduct complexity is associated with higher product profitability for banks and lower performance for investors.”\textsuperscript{65}

The proliferation of complex instruments can spur fundamental changes in the structure of the financial system. Securitization illustrates this point. Traditionally, when banks made loans, they held those loans on their balance sheets. Securitization allows banks and other originating creditors to instead bundle these loans together into newly created, bankruptcy remote vehicles. To fund the acquisition of these loans, the vehicles simultaneously issue brand new securities, such as mortgage-backed securities or collateralized debt obligations, which entitle the holder to the cash flows from the underlying loans. These rights are set forth in detailed waterfall provisions that explain how these cash flows will be distributed among the different tranches of issued securities. Because the underlying loans are inherently unique, so too are the intricate waterfall provisions. The detailed representations and warranties pursuant to which those loans are sold from the originating creditors to the securitization vehicle are also unique and can vary significantly. The aggregate impact of these contractual provisions, the creation of new legal entities, and the appointment of third parties—such as a servicer to interact with the borrowers and a trustee to accept cash flows and pay them out according to the waterfall—generates significant new complexities by introducing layers of new information that previously had not mattered to the value of the underlying instruments.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{62} Id. at 216 (“This kind of [regulatory dialectic] has undoubtedly increased the corporate complexity of [large complex financial institutions]. In the event of financial distress, however, this complexity could impede an effective regulatory response.”).


\textsuperscript{64} Id. at 38 fig.3.

\textsuperscript{65} Id. at 2.

\textsuperscript{66} See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 690–93 (2012). See generally Larry Cordell, Yilin Huang &
The final point to emphasize is that the complexity of securitization vehicles and the ways they redistributed risks mattered. The complexity also increased—by orders of magnitude—the time, effort, and other costs associated with producing information about the location, nature, and extent of the relevant risks. As then Fed Governor Randall Krosner observed during the crisis:

In the old days, we used to know where the risks were; unfortunately, we knew that they were all on the bank balance sheets. With the originate-to-distribute model and securitization, we have been able to move to a different model in which the risks are much more dispersed . . . [I]t leads to potential pockets of uncertainty, and that is exactly what has come up.

This complexity meant that neither market participants nor regulators had a good understanding of how exposures to subprime mortgages were dispersed across the financial system. Nor could they readily produce that information when it really counted. This exacerbated market dysfunction and impeded efforts to contain the growing crisis.

The fact that complexity and the resulting information gaps have only increased in the wake of the crisis speaks volumes about how finance works. The ongoing globalization of finance, the constantly shifting structure of the financial system, and the fact that market participants can often extract rents from greater opacity make complexity endemic to today’s financial system. In the view of Simon Levin and Andrew Lo, “[t]he financial system has crossed a threshold of complexity where the system is evolving faster than regulators and regulations


See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1, 55–56 (2010); Cordell, Huang & Williams, supra note 66.


This view is echoed by Professor Steven Schwarcz, who argues that complexity is “the greatest financial-market challenge of the future.”

C. Unknowns

The complexity of modern finance makes it prohibitively costly for market participants and regulators to gather, much less analyze, the entire universe of potentially relevant information. As a result, these actors almost invariably operate with only a fraction of the information that may be pertinent to the decisions they are making: relying instead on proxies—from ratings to reputation—to fill in the gaps. Dynamism accentuates this challenge. Information that is accurate at one point in time may not be accurate at another. Frictions that limit access to information further exacerbate the pervasiveness and size of information gaps. Counterparties can choose what information they will share, and what they will not. Different regulators have different jurisdictions, mandates, and objectives, limiting both the scope of their authority and their field of vision. The creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and Office of Financial Research (OFR) in the United States has helped mitigate some of these frictions but has far from eliminated them. More importantly, given the incredible complexity and dynamism of finance, together with the finite resources of regulators, high information and other costs remain a powerful constraint on who knows what at any point in time.

Apart from these large information gaps, a second factor exacerbating unknowns is uncertainty. Finance is about risk. But as Frank Knight long ago explained, not all future events can be understood in probabilistic terms. Specifically, there are categories of things that might happen—good and bad—that are simply beyond our collective imagination. These are Donald Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknowns.” These events encompass the “radical uncertainty” that Mervyn King describes. They also encompass changes that are subtler in

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73 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 232–33 (Cosimo Classics 2006) (1921); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 282 (rev. ed. 1976) (“In his seminal work, Frank Knight drew a sharp distinction between risk, as referring to events subject to a known or knowable probability distribution and uncertainty, as referring to events for which it was not possible to specify numerical probabilities.” (emphasis omitted)).
74 Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 47, at 417–18 (“The risk-uncertainty dichotomy is useful because there are tools that can be used to manage risks that are not available when one is confronting an ‘unknown unknown.’”).
75 See KING, supra note 57, at 120.
character but no less beyond our comprehension. This uncertainty opens the door to the possibility that tomorrow will look very different from today.

As if information gaps and uncertainty were not challenging enough, failures of interpretation can further undermine understanding. It is not just that dynamism renders new information stale—it also undercuts the value of the frameworks we use to interpret this information. Both policymakers and market actors often view information through a lens colored by an outdated understanding of the financial system. As explained by Richard Clarida, now Vice Chair of the Board of Governors of the Fed: “it would seem that the supervision and regulation of [U.S.] investment and commercial banks during the great moderation was based on an assumption about how the financial system was supposed to work, not upon sufficient knowledge about how the financial system actually worked.”76 Prior to 2008, policymakers and academics alike were fooled into believing that the system had become more stable at the precise moment that massive new forms of systemic risk were growing unchecked. Banks looked well capitalized, and while regulators were well aware of each of the component parts of the shadow banking system, no one seemed to fully appreciate how the complex interdependencies between these parts exposed them to the same type of destabilizing runs as conventional banks.77

The point here is not only that dynamism and complexity create unknowns; it is that economists, policymakers, and others are often ill-equipped to assess what they know and what they do not. This is not a challenge specific to these groups, but rather one common to all experts—and one they regularly fail to appreciate. As Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardiner explain, “absence of doubt” can be detrimental to good decision making, particularly in complex and changing environments.78 By failing to appreciate the limits of what is and can be known, current approaches to financial regulation may be discounting the most important features of modern finance.

II. HOW FINANCE IS REGULATED

So how do the complexity, dynamism, and unknowns of modern finance compare with the current processes through which finance is regulated? This Part presents a highly simplified, and in many ways stylized, account of these

77 See GARY GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM COMING 3–4 (2012); POSZAR ET AL., supra note 39, at 1–2.
processes. In this respect, our aim is to capture the essence of these processes, rather than their technical nuance.

A. International Financial Regulation

Financial regulation frequently starts at the international level. Beginning in the 1970s, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the increasing globalization of finance spurred the creation of several international organizations designed to foster greater cross-border regulatory coordination. These organizations included the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions. In recent decades, these organizations have come to play an important role in setting international standards in areas such as bank capital, liquidity, and supervision, payment infrastructure, and securities regulation and enforcement. In the wake of the financial crisis, these organizations, alongside the G20 and Financial Stability Board, have often taken the lead in setting the global regulatory agenda.

The Basel Committee, created in 1974, is among the most influential of these international organizations and embodies the way international financial regulation works today. Members of the Basel Committee include the central bank governors and national bank supervisors of the G20 member states. Its “mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability.” Although it purports to provide a three-pillar approach focused on bank capital, supervision, and market discipline, its rules regarding capital and liquidity are probably the most important in shaping and constraining lawmaking at the national level. The first Basel standards (Basel I) were published in 1988, after almost a

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79 See infra notes 79–123 and accompanying text.
80 The Bretton Woods System was based on an international agreement between states that regulated the international monetary system.
82 Id. at 259.
83 In total, the Basel Committee currently has forty-five members from twenty-eight jurisdictions. The Committee also has nine “observers” drawn from central banks, supervisory groups, and other international organizations. Basel Committee Membership, BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENTS [BIS], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm [https://perma.cc/PKW2-RL6N] (last updated Dec. 30, 2016).
decade of protracted negotiations among its ten original member states.\textsuperscript{85} These were followed by a series of technical amendments leading to the publication of Basel II in 2004.\textsuperscript{86} Basel II was itself still being implemented when the crisis of 2007–2009 prompted a fundamental overhaul of the Basel framework under what would become known as Basel III.\textsuperscript{87} Published in 2010, Basel III was intended to be fully implemented by January 1, 2019.\textsuperscript{88}

The Basel Committee’s role in developing global banking standards reflects the work of other international organizations in several key respects. First, these organizations typically enjoy few, if any, formal legal powers, relying instead on negotiation and consensus to develop and promote the adoption of non-binding standards.\textsuperscript{89} Second, while politics plays a role in shaping their agenda and setting their standards, the process by which these organizations develop and refine these standards is highly technocratic.\textsuperscript{90} Third, reflecting both the political and technocratic nature of these organizations, the development of these standards is often a slow, deliberative, and incremental process. Finally, despite the absence of formal legal power—or perhaps because of it—these organizations have been relatively successful in promoting the adoption of international standards in a number of important areas.\textsuperscript{91} By 2015, for example, over eighty jurisdictions—including the United States—had announced their intentions to adopt one or more of the core elements of Basel II.\textsuperscript{92} Ultimately, of course, the power to incorporate these international standards into law still rests in the hands of domestic policymakers.


\textsuperscript{88} See BCBS, BASEL III GLOBAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 69 annex 4.

\textsuperscript{89} See Brummer, supra note 81, at 261 (noting that international financial rules are largely created through agreements that are not legally binding).

\textsuperscript{90} See id. at 279.

\textsuperscript{91} Viewed from this perspective, the fact that these standards are non-binding makes the resulting commitments less costly from the perspective of jurisdictions contemplating their adoption, thereby increasingly the likelihood that they will be adopted. See id. at 284.

\textsuperscript{92} See BIS, FIN. STABILITY INST., FSI SURVEY—BASEL II, 2.5 AND III IMPLEMENTATION (June 29, 2015), https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsiop2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NB2-VYY3].
B. Statutes

In the United States, the backbone of all financial regulation is the U.S. Code. The U.S. Code consists of all the statutes ever adopted by Congress, including any amendments or modifications to earlier statutes. Title XII of the Code addresses banks and banking, while other core elements of financial regulation, like securities regulation, are codified elsewhere.93

The process of making new laws, or modifying existing ones, begins when a member of Congress introduces a bill with her proposed changes to the law. That bill is then referred to a specialized committee, and perhaps from there to a subcommittee. The committee may then hold hearings and discuss the bill, along with other bills on related matters. A small subset of the bills introduced emerge from this process, and those that do are often modified in the process. A bill that is approved by a majority of committee members is then slated for consideration by the full body. The processes are somewhat different in the House and Senate, but both generally involve further debate and hearings that are possibly followed by a vote. When both chambers manage to approve similar bills—they usually approve different versions—the next stage involves reconciliation hearings and a compromise text that must again be approved by a majority of voting members of both houses of Congress. That bill must then be signed into law by the President or, if he vetoes the bill, approved by two-thirds of the voting members of each house.94

The aims of these procedures are myriad. The overarching aim of the requirement that laws be passed by democratically elected officials is to promote accountability and responsiveness to the public. The unique form of republican governance embodied in the Constitution then seeks to accommodate the many practical challenges that arise in trying to serve the will of the people. The requirements of bicameral approval and presentment set forth in the Constitution are among the checks and balances that help address the fact that government officials are fallible.95 The use of committees and other procedural rules also serve a number of other aims: from allowing Congress to more effectively manage the many issues subject to federal regulation, to enabling some degree


95 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) ("In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.").
of specialization among members.96 Lawmaking has never been about a first-best process, but one that entails a range of tradeoffs.

The frictions that arise from these checks and balances are considerable and, in practice, have grown in recent years.97 These frictions are exacerbated by the use of committees and other procedures. Political scientists have conceptualized the process using a “vetogate model” that highlights the numerous points at which a potential bill can be derailed.98 Unorthodox legislation, from emergency legislation passed with far less process or debate to “long and messy” omnibus bills, is increasingly common.99 By the same token, legislative vetoes in which Congress effectively overrides the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a statute—a sign that Congress is functioning effectively—are on the decline.100 And perhaps most discussed, though still contested, is the way increased partisanship may be hampering Congress’s capacity to get anything done.101 Nonetheless, these processes remain deeply embedded and recent developments seem more likely to exacerbate than reduce these tensions.

C. Rulemaking

Today, most statutes are not complete or self-executing proclamations of the law. Instead, they delegate significant authority to administrative agencies to make rules and otherwise implement the regimes set forth in statute. The Dodd-Frank Act, a detailed, prescriptive piece of legislation totaling 849 pages, is a case in point.102 Within that text, Congress explicitly requires eleven different agencies to produce, collectively, 243 new rules, sixty-seven one-time reports, and twenty-two new periodic reports.103 Among the reasons for this delegation is the desire to harness the technocratic expertise housed within the

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96 Herbert B. Asher, Committees and the Norm of Specialization, 411 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 63, 63 (1974).
103 DAVIS POLK & WARDELL LLP, supra note 3, at ii.
federal agencies responsible for administering, monitoring, and enforcing financial regulation.

Like statutory law, the process of introducing or modifying regulations involves numerous procedural requirements. Most of the default procedures that agencies must follow are set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA requires that before implementing or modifying a regulation, an agency generally must publish its proposed rule, along with background and explanatory materials, and invite public comment on that proposal. For matters of financial regulation, the most thorough and relevant letters are often provided by banks and other financial market participants who will be subject to the regulation. The agency will then respond to the substantive issues raised in those comment letters when issuing its final, often revised, rule.

Like statutory lawmaking, these processes serve numerous purposes. As explained by Cass Sunstein, “[d]emocratization of the regulatory process, through public comment, has an epistemic value.” According to Sunstein, the public comment requirement “helps to collect dispersed knowledge and to bring it to bear on official choices.” In addition to being aimed at improving the quality of the rules finally issued, this extensive and resource-intensive process is also designed to enhance transparency and accountability, allowing the public to participate in and understand the reasons behind agency rulemaking.

Just as with legislation, there is evidence that the regulatory state often deviates from this stylized model. Indeed, there is a growing chorus of administrative law scholars drawing attention to the ways these procedures may actually inhibit effective regulation. Perhaps most importantly, adherence to strict procedural rules ostensibly designed to confer legitimacy and improve substantive rulemaking may exhibit a pronounced status quo bias. Compliance with procedural requirements almost by necessity involves delaying regulatory action. It also saps agency resources, making it more difficult for agencies to take the initiative and respond to new developments. When combined with the nature and pace of change in fields such as finance, this status quo bias is not

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108 Id. (quoting Sunstein, supra note 107).
politically neutral. Rather, these procedural requirements can tip the political scales in favor of those who wish to limit state intervention—undercutting the legitimacy of the regulatory process and foreclosing potentially desirable policy alternatives. As Nicholas Bagley argues, the procedural “fetish” in U.S. administrative law may thus undermine the very aims it was designed to achieve.\(^{109}\) In part because of these concerns, other administrative law scholars are laying a critical foundation for thinking more broadly about the type and site of procedures that can confer the needed accountability.\(^{110}\) Nevertheless, this procedural framework remains mandatory and entrenched.\(^{111}\)

Compounding matters, financial regulators often do, and sometimes must, undertake cost-benefit analyses (CBA) of proposed regulations.\(^ {112}\) In addition to shaping the nature of an agency’s deliberations, CBA can add significant costs and introduce other impediments to the rulemaking process.\(^ {113}\) Even where it is not strictly followed, CBA also reflect an extreme version of the assumption underlying so many of the procedural rules used in financial regulation: that it is possible to know, or at least make reasonably well-informed assessments of, the myriad effects a regulatory intervention will have on financial markets and institutions. That leading academics in the law and economics movement have decried CBA as counterproductive in the domain of financial regulation suggests that processes that may sound reasonable and helpful in the abstract can be misguided when applied formulaically in the process of regulating finance.\(^ {114}\) Again, however, those processes remain entrenched and are widely supported.

A final source of friction that is particularly pressing in finance arises from the architecture of the regulatory system.\(^ {115}\) In the United States, this ar-

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112 The White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs oversees the CBA for rules issued by executive agencies before the agencies submit them the public for comment. Exec. Order. No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Most financial regulators are independent and hence not subject to this requirement, but some commentators and courts take the position that certain financial regulators are required to undertake quantified, judicially reviewable CBA when promulgating new rules. John Coates provides helpful background and a very useful critique of such requirements. See generally John C. Coates, IV, *Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications*, 124 Yale L.J. 882 (2015).


chitecture is a byproduct of a time when banking, capital markets, and insurance were largely distinct. This historical anachronism has left the United States with two federal market regulators, three federal bank regulators, and no federal regulation of insurance, which instead is overseen primarily by the fifty states. There are also a number of specialized regulators, such as the Federal Housing Finance Agency, that oversee the government-sponsored entities that provide support to U.S. housing markets. Sometimes, new rules are promulgated by multiple agencies working together. The Volcker Rule, for example, required coordination among five different agencies and moved forward more slowly as a result. More often, each agency continues to shape how it perceives and addresses challenges, and most agencies remain focused on problems that fall clearly within their jurisdiction, thereby reducing the amount of attention paid to developments within the financial system as a whole, or the ways actions by one agency may cause problems under the domain of others.

D. Supervision

In addition to being subject to the many rules promulgated through the processes described above, banks and many other financial institutions are subject to ongoing supervision. Supervisors assess compliance with applicable regulations, but they have also long enjoyed a broader mandate to promote the “safety and soundness” of supervised entities. This seemingly broad authority is justified both on the grounds that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures deposits at all regulated banks and that bank failures have adverse spillover effects. After the recent crisis, there have also been efforts, most notably through regular stress testing, to make bank oversight and the rules to which banks are subject more dynamic and forward looking. These are important components of financial regulation, and ones that can help mitigate the mismatch between the dynamism of finance and the efforts to govern it using static rules.

Despite its seeming breadth and flexibility, supervision is mentioned last and only briefly because, in practice, it serves more to implement than complement current regulatory frameworks. As the trajectory of financial regulation in the United States has been one of ever more finely tuned rules through

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117 See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 47, at 427–35 (explaining the differences between prudential and market regulators and how the lenses used by each tend to limit the types of challenges they see and the tools they bring to bear). Notably, these divisions and biases can persist through personnel and intra-organizational design, even when the regulatory architecture is redesigned to try to address these dynamics. See generally Dan Awrey, The FSA, Integrated Regulation, and the Curious Case of OTC Derivatives, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1 (2010).
the processes just described, supervision has evolved from a tool that gave
regulators broad discretion to identify emerging problems to a process that is
too often focused on ensuring the trees are in order without much attention to
the broader forest of which they are a part.118 This was all too clear both before
and after the recent crisis. And supervisors are among the most likely to use
outmoded frames for understanding the risks before them, thus limiting the po-
tential practical benefits of broad supervision right when it is most needed.119

E. Where Does This Leave Us?

Two key policy objectives underpin the costly, complex, and lengthy pro-
cesses governing how financial regulation is currently made in the United
States. The first is to promote legitimacy and accountability. The second is to
ensure that new rules will be effective: that they will achieve a desired aim,
and, ideally, that they are well-tailored to that aim.

Moving the dynamism, complexity, and unknowns of modern finance
center stage, however, reveals how ill-suited these processes are to achieve
those aims. As a threshold matter, these processes are only triggered when
there is a perceived problem. Sometimes this is a shortcoming exposed by a
scandal or crisis, and other times it is regulated actors or other affected parties
advocating for a change.120 Economists, together with the more technocratic
policymakers they seek to inform, use different language, but often similarly
focus on problems in isolation. “Market failures” are their diagnostic tool of
choice: placing problems into established frameworks such as agency costs,
information asymmetries, coordination problems, or externalities.121

118 See infra notes 223–257 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons that rules are used so
extensively despite known weaknesses in their efficacy).

119 See CLARIDA, supra note 76, at 23 (explaining the problems arising from “the pre–crisis con-
sensus for the supervision and regulation of financial markets by the Fed, . . . the SEC, FDIC, Comp-
troller of the Currency, [and] FHFA” (emphasis omitted)).

120 Whether and to what extent financial crises drive regulation is a matter of contestation. Com-
pare Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment of the Iron Law of Finan-
cial Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25, 25 (2014) (arguing that “foundational financial legislation
tends to be enacted in a crisis setting”), with Peter Conti-Brown & Michael Ohlrogge, Testing the
Crisis-Legislation Hypothesis: Citation Indexing and the Measurement of Legislative Importance, J.
FIN. CRISIES (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5) (empirically challenging Romano’s assessment
and showing that a significant portion of banking regulation is in fact enacted outside of crisis periods).

121 These market failures are the subject of an enormous body of economic scholarship. See, e.g.,
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (describing information and adverse selection problems); R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (explaining the concepts of public goods and exter-
nalities); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (detailing agency problems in the
context of firms); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Ex-
By focusing on specific market failures or other perceived flaws, this approach often results in discussions of issues divorced from the broader ecosystem within which they are situated. The net result is a policy process that too often ignores the complex interconnections between financial markets and institutions, the potential second, third, and fourth order effects of regulatory intervention, and the limits of what policymakers can know and understand. In short, current processes do not encourage, and may well discourage, attention to the bigger picture.

Accentuating the challenge, the collective inertia generated by these procedural requirements introduces a significant status quo bias into the policy process. Finance moves faster than financial regulation, and the procedural requirements meant to promote the public interest can be used by regulated actors to influence the direction of the policy process in self-serving ways. The status quo bias generated by these procedural requirements thus typically has a decidedly deregulatory impact.

Lastly, where the policy process does result in the introduction of new rules, current processes envision that these rules will remain in place even if the specific problems they were designed to address no longer exist. And where new problems do emerge, they are typically addressed through new interventions—that is, new rules. Importantly, the resulting accretion of rules can even be observed during periods of supposed “deregulation.” Indeed, as Helen Garten has documented, much of the deregulation that occurred in banking in the 1980s took the form of increasingly detailed and more expansive rules, each permitting banks to do a little more than they were previously able to do, subject to yet additional restrictions on where within their organizations they could undertake new activities.122 Paradoxically, deregulation has thus increased the complexity of both financial institutions and financial regulation.123

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change, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (describing asset-specific investment and the resulting hold-up problems).


123 This trend is not unique to finance. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (1998) (arguing that “the changes taking place in regulated industries law” during the 1980s and 1990s are better understood as a change of paradigm than “in terms of ‘regulation’ versus ‘deregulation’”). Much of the supposed deregulation, like the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which included more than “100 pages of new regulatory requirements [and] directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to commence more than a dozen rulemaking proceedings,” did not result in less regulation in the colloquial sense of the term. Id.
III. FINANCIAL REGULATION IN PRACTICE

Our discussion thus far has taken place at a fairly high level of abstraction. Yet even at this level, there appears to be a meaningful tension—a mismatch—between the core features of the financial system as a domain characterized by complexity, change, and pervasive unknowns, and regulatory processes that assume a high degree of knowability, stability, and predictability in designing rules that are both effective and legitimate in the eyes of the public.

This Part moves us closer to the ground in order to demonstrate that this mismatch is not just some theoretical problem, but a concrete and pressing challenge. It begins with two case studies. The first involves rulemaking by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in response to the runs on money market mutual funds at the height of the financial crisis. The second involves the sweeping post-crisis reforms to the international capital and liquidity rules for banks spearheaded by the Basel Committee. To address any concern that we have cherry-picked these examples, this Part concludes by looking at how similar challenges are afflicting other post-crisis reforms. The aim is not to critique any individual reform, but to assess the extent to which the extensive processes through which they were developed achieved their desired aims.

A. Money Market Mutual Fund Reform

Money market mutual funds—or simply “money market funds”—are investment funds that invest in cash and other money market instruments. As the name suggests, these funds provide investors with a “money-like” investment: one that is safe and can be relied on to hold its value. The existence of these funds is a byproduct of idiosyncrasies in how the United States historically regulated banks and markets. Following the Great Depression, Congress introduced deposit insurance for banks, while also imposing significant restrictions on what banks could do and how they could do it. This included restrictions, embodied in Regulation Q, on the interest rates that banks could pay depositors. This system worked well for several decades. When interest rates rose significantly in the 1970s, however, depositors were less content accept-
ing little or no interest in exchange for the safety and liquidity that bank deposits promised. Money market funds emerged to fill this gap. A product of both private creativity and an accommodating regulatory environment, money market funds offered higher returns than bank deposits. They grew quickly—to the detriment of banks’ liquidity positions—leading in turn to the demise of Regulation Q. Nonetheless, because banks were still subject to costly regulation, demand for money market funds continued to grow. Throughout, money market funds were aided by SEC regulations that permitted them to use a fixed $1.00 net asset value (NAV) in exchange for abiding by significant restrictions on the duration and quality of the assets they were allowed to hold.

Over time, money market funds’ growth changed how banks and other firms funded themselves, as highly rated issuers came to rely on them as ready buyers of any short-term debt they might issue. All seemed well enough until the failure of Lehman Brothers (Lehman) in September 2008. Lehman’s collapse caused one of the oldest money market funds to “break that buck,” redeeming some of its shares at less than the expected $1.00. Within a week, investors had withdrawn approximately $300 billion from non-government, or “prime,” money market funds, leading to massive disruptions in the short-term funding markets.

The Fed and Treasury Department quickly intervened, with each creatively stretching their legal authority to do so. These interventions, particularly the guarantees provided by Treasury, had the desired effect of restoring faith in money market funds and restoring functionality to short-term funding markets. That the government had to take such extreme action, however, suggested the need for reform.

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129 Mahoney, supra note 128, at 289.
130 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (1984). NAV represents the value of the assets in a fund’s portfolio divided by the number of outstanding shares or units.
131 Mahoney, supra note 128, at 236.
The Dodd-Frank Act did not address money market funds, as the SEC already had sufficient authority to address the challenges revealed during the crisis. When the SEC failed to take meaningful action, the FSOC took the unusual step of seeking public comment on ways to reform money market funds.\textsuperscript{135} This move was designed to, and had the effect of, prompting the SEC to pursue more substantive reforms.

In June 2013, nearly five years after the 2008 run on money market funds—and after policymakers had expended significant resources assessing how best to proceed—the SEC issued a proposed notice of rulemaking. The proposal was 693 pages and included 1,248 footnotes.\textsuperscript{136} Its focus was on how to reform the prime money market funds held by large institutional investors.\textsuperscript{137} The SEC received 1,400 comment letters and engaged in numerous meetings with industry and other stakeholders over the following year. Although 1,200 of those letters were form letters, the remainder were individualized, and often exceptionally detailed.\textsuperscript{138} They included letters from industry participants, trade groups, and law firms, as well as nonfinancial firms, academics, and others. Public records reveal 108 separate meetings or phone calls between SEC commissioners or staff, on the one hand, and stakeholders, including SIFMA, Goldman Sachs, Vanguard, Blackrock, the AFL-CIO, Better Markets, and UPS, on the other.\textsuperscript{139} In short, substantial effort was invested in this process.

The SEC issued its final rule just over a year later. The final rule, together with supporting material, was 893 pages long and included 2,530 footnotes.\textsuperscript{140} It was detailed and, in some regards, exceptionally thorough. In the process of explaining its reasons for the final rule, the SEC addressed the myriad and of-
ten conflicting views that had been expressed in the comment letters received regarding the probable effects of the reforms.\textsuperscript{141}

In the Final Release, the culmination of years of effort and analysis, the SEC stated its belief that the reforms would reduce money market funds’ susceptibility to heavy redemptions, improve their ability to manage contagion, and increase the transparency of their risks, while preserving, as much as possible, their benefits.\textsuperscript{142} The SEC then went on to explain why. “Market discipline” received significant attention, including 17 separate mentions.\textsuperscript{143} The SEC agreed with many commenters “that daily disclosure [that is, a floating NAV] will increase market discipline, which could ultimately deter situations that could lead to heavy redemptions.”\textsuperscript{144} The hope was that if money market funds provide more detailed information about the value of their assets, and that even small value changes affect the price investors receive when redeeming their shares, those investors would pressure mutual fund managers to be more conservative in their holdings, reducing the risk and the likelihood of future runs.

The SEC and numerous letter writers also acknowledged the possibility of broader, systemic ramifications. One big question was whether institutional investors would continue to hold prime money market funds once the changes, like floating NAVs, were implemented. The SEC identified more than a dozen alternative instruments that institutional investors might choose instead of money market funds. It ultimately concluded that “some outflow” was likely but that it was “not able to estimate” how much. The SEC said that “[g]iven the heterogeneity of investors’ preferences and investment objectives and constraints,” there was no expectation that investors would relocate their assets in the same alternative instrument.\textsuperscript{145} In short, they expected that the changes would cause some investors to seek out substitutes, but they could not hazard a guess as to how many, and they thought that different investors would seek different alternatives. They reached an even more equivocal non-conclusion regarding the macroeconomic effects of the reforms.\textsuperscript{146}

In hindsight, it is notable that the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) were mentioned only once in the entire Release.\textsuperscript{147} Specifically, the FHLBanks were mentioned in a footnote identifying the various types of securities in

\textsuperscript{141} 79 Fed. Reg. at 47,736–47,982.
\textsuperscript{142} Id. at 47,739.
\textsuperscript{143} Id. at 47,736–47,982.
\textsuperscript{144} Id. at 47,828.
\textsuperscript{145} Id. at 47,911.
\textsuperscript{146} Id. at 47,910 (“[W]e acknowledge changes in the market arising from the reforms may have macroeconomic effects in the future” but “[b]ecause we cannot foresee all of the ways markets will evolve, we cannot predict [those] . . . effects.”).
\textsuperscript{147} See id. at 47,904 n.1893.
which government money market funds—not “prime” funds—are permitted to invest.” The FHLBanks, like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are government-sponsored enterprises created after the Depression to facilitate home ownership. Today, the primary way that the FHLBanks purport to do this is by making loans to member banks and insurance companies collateralized by mortgage-related assets. The FHLBanks fund these loans by issuing debt through the FHLBank Office of Finance, for which all of the FHLBanks are jointly liable. The federal government does not explicitly guarantee the debt they issue, but it is widely believed that the government would step in to protect that debt if needed. Because investors had run into—rather than out of—government money market funds in 2008, the SEC had not seen any reason to revise the rules governing those funds, which could still use the $1.00 fixed NAV. This was the product of years of dialogue and input from government bodies, industry, think tanks, and academics. This was the process that was meant to improve the quality of the final rule and ensure its legitimacy by allowing robust and public discussion of the issues at stake.

The new rules became effective two years after being finalized, in October 2016. The response of investors was immediate and unequivocal. At the beginning of 2014, before the reforms were finalized, there was nearly $950 billion invested in the prime money market fund affected by the reforms. By the time the rule was fully implemented that number had plummeted to just over $120 billion. It turns out that the features the SEC identified as making money market funds vulnerable were ones that most investors were not willing to forego. Rather than turning to a diverse array of alternatives as the SEC had predicted, however, investors moved virtually all of those funds into the exact same alternative: government money market funds not subject to the new

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148 Id.
150 Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. at 47,736.
152 Data, Investment Company Institute, supra note 151.
rules. The total assets invested in money market funds thus remained fairly constant; it was the allocation of these assets among those funds that changed dramatically.

The spike in flows into government money market funds was made possible by a dramatic increase in the issuance of short-term debt instruments by the FHLBanks. Between the end of 2015 and the end of 2017, the value of short-term floating notes issued by the FHLBank system increased from $80 billion, or 8.9% of total bonds and notes outstanding, to $297 billion, or 29.2%. In other words, the FHLBanks more than tripled their reliance on the type of short-term debt most useful to money market funds. Because most of the loans they issue are of a longer duration, the reliance exposed FHLBanks to a greater maturity mismatch on their balance sheets. The size of their balance sheets also grew. This was in part a response to the increased demand for FHLBank debt arising out of spurred reforms, but also to new liquidity requirements imposed on banks that increased their demand for longer term funding of the kind the FHLBanks can provide. There was thus an interaction between, on the one hand, the SEC’s reforms, and on the other, the new rules promulgated by the Basel Committee and implemented by the Fed, that collectively brought about changes on both sides of the balance sheet of the FHLBank system. Needless to say, the FHLBanks are overseen by the Federal Housing Finance Authority, thus falling outside the jurisdiction of both the SEC and the bank regulators responsible for implementing the new liquidity rules.

Putting these pieces together, the net effect of the SEC’s reforms has thus far been to position the FHLBanks between banks and money market funds. Instead of raising capital by issuing short-term debt that was then held by money market funds, banks today borrow more from FHLBanks, which then loan the money onto banks. Thus, rather than increasing market discipline, the reforms seem to have reduced it. Additionally, the reforms have contributed to a FHLBank system that is both larger and—owing to the greater maturity

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155 Id.

156 Id. at 18.

157 Banks’ increased demand for FHLBank advances came, in part, from large banks now having to comply with new liquidity requirements. The two outcomes are codetermined, however, in the sense that the increased demand for FHLBank liabilities reduces their funding costs, enabling them to provide advances to banks on more attractive terms. See id. at 17.
mismatch—more fragile. Institutional investors now generally hold government money market funds instead of prime funds, but otherwise hold effectively the same product as they did before the reforms.\textsuperscript{158}

The effects of the SEC’s reforms are thus mixed. Money market funds probably are more stable. Yet this has happened in significant part by increasing the government footprint. Government guarantees, even if implicit, often help enhance stability. But they can also undermine market discipline and increase the likelihood of taxpayer losses. The increased size and fragility of the FHLBanks also raise a host of questions about their oversight and operations.\textsuperscript{159}

Our aim here is not to resolve these policy questions, but to point out that these are among the most important—and contestable—questions raised by the actual effect of the SEC’s reforms. Nonetheless, they were not among the numerous issues debated by policymakers, industry participants, and other stakeholders before the reforms were adopted. Despite the years of study and debate, the possibility that the FHLBank system would grow, evolve, and assume additional risks to satisfy new demand for government money market funds was not even mentioned in the nearly 900 pages and more than 2,500 footnotes of the Final Release.

It would be easy to fault the SEC for this, but the SEC was not alone in its failure.\textsuperscript{160} One aim of the lengthy, resource-intensive process that the SEC undertook before adopting the reforms was to glean insights from market participants, academics, and other stakeholders. The materials these stakeholders provided were voluminous and detailed, and yet they too seem to have missed the mark. The lack of discussion of these ultimately pivotal issues is thus a failure of the processes meant to inform the SEC, not one specific to the institutional competence of the SEC itself.

\textsuperscript{158} The magnitude of the decline has been moderated both by the fact that most have shifted into government funds that are relatively riskier (those holding agency debt like that issued by the FHLBanks rather than just Treasuries), and by the way the FHLBanks’ increased issuance of short-term instruments may have helped mute a decline in the return on eligible instruments as a result of the increased demand. Stefan Gissler & Borghan Narajabad, The Increased Role of the Federal Home Loan Bank System in Funding Markets, Part 2: Recent Trends and Potential Drivers, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS.: FEDS NOTES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-increased-role-of-the-federal-home-loan-bank-system-in-funding-markets-part-2-20171018.htm [https://perma.cc/8EJK-EUDE].


\textsuperscript{160} In particular, the SEC seems to have viewed the situation as a market regulator without an adequate appreciation of why and how much some investors value “money-like” claims. See Judge, Investor-Driven Innovation, supra note 48, at 307–12.
Also noteworthy is the fact that, now that we have high-quality, accurate information about the impact of these reforms, the window for discussion is largely closed. Some policymakers, researchers, and think tanks have drawn attention to these dynamics, but there is little concerted discussion of whether the changes wrought by the SEC’s reforms are desirable—let alone whether they demand a further regulatory response. The frictions that would impede any change to the new rules, along with exhaustion from the effort already expended, are likely among the factors contributing to this inertia.

Before leaving this case study, it is worth emphasizing the relevance of the events leading up to the crisis to our analysis. Money market funds were a core component of the shadow banking system and enabled that system to use short-term money-like liabilities to fund longer term illiquid assets like home loans. They did not grow in the “shadows” in the sense of being out of sight. Their growth was widely observed, discussed, and facilitated by SEC regulations. They were in the shadows only in the limited, albeit very important, sense of being outside the perimeter of the prudential regulatory regime governing banks and other institutions known to pose systemic risks. This was both because of, and a contributing factor to, the failure of policymakers to appreciate their systemic significance.

B. The Basel Capital and Liquidity Requirements

Shifting from shadow banks to banks provides further insight into how dynamism, complexity, and unknowns contribute to a fundamental mismatch between finance and financial regulation. Capital requirements—rules governing how banks finance their activities—have long been a cornerstone of bank regulation. The basic function of these requirements is simple. Because equity can absorb losses, utilizing more equity makes banks better able to withstand declining asset prices, thus reducing both the probability and potential impact of bank failure. Thicker capital cushions may also help to assure depositors and other short-term creditors of a bank’s health, thereby reducing the probability of a run.

In practice, however, there are several reasons why shareholders and managers may prefer debt over equity. First, issuing short-term debt-like deposits is not just how banks fund themselves, it is their product—it is what

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161 See Mahoney, supra note 128, at 238.
163 See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (rev. ed. 2013) (comprehensively analyzing why bank shareholders and managers may prefer debt to equity).
they are designed to do. Second, debt often enjoys certain tax advantages. Third, shareholders may seek to use debt—and short-term debt in particular—as a commitment mechanism to help address potential agency problems vis-à-vis bank managers. Fourth, bank managers may prefer debt because it mechanically increases a bank’s return on equity, a common metric for performance-based compensation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, explicit and implicit government backing for the debt that banks issue lowers the cost of debt relative to equity. Viewed from this perspective, minimum capital requirements serve as a counterweight to the incentives of shareholders, managers, and creditors to operate with dangerously low levels of loss-absorbing capital. They also mitigate the moral hazard generated by the expectation of government support and help address the fact that the government can never credibly commit to not support banks given the massive costs that banking panics can impose on the real economy.

The Basel Committee published the first international capital standards in 1988. The U.S. government then incorporated the standards into federal law, phasing them in between 1989 and 1992. Even before the ink was dry, observers were pointing out flaws in the Basel framework. In particular, Basel I adopted a crude approach to risk-weighting bank assets for the purposes of calculating minimum capital requirements, one that essentially divided the entire universe of financial assets into four categories—or “buckets”—based on their perceived riskiness. This presented banks with a relatively straightforward arbitrage opportunity. Specifically, by investing in the riskiest assets in any given bucket, banks could take more risks, and presumably generate more profits, while being required to hold the exact same amount of capital.

Introduced in 2004, Basel II sought to eliminate this arbitrage opportunity by permitting larger and more sophisticated banks to calculate their own risk
weights under the “internal ratings-based” (or IRB) approach. In a nutshell, the IRB approach enabled banks to use their own internal computer models, historical default rates, and other market data to generate the key input variables necessary to calculate minimum capital requirements for both their loan and trading books. 170 In addition to eliminating the arbitrage opportunities presented by Basel I, the introduction of the IRB approach appears to have been motivated by a desire on the part of bank regulators to ensure that capital requirements were as “accurate” as possible, i.e., that they reflected institutional and market-based assessments of credit, market, and other risks. 171

The Basel II implementation coincided with the outbreak of the 2007–2009 crisis, which in turn exposed the flaws in the IRB approach. As a preliminary matter, the crisis demonstrated that financial models based on historical data are vulnerable to small sample errors and the under-estimation of so-called “tail” risks. 172 The wide variance in risk-weighting methodologies also stoked concerns that banks were using their discretion over important input variables to reduce their capital requirements. 173 And most importantly, the crisis demonstrated that market-based measures of credit, market, and other risks cannot capture the systemic risks arising from the various complex, opaque, and interconnected activities undertaken by banks and other financial institutions. 174 Banks’ risk-management systems and the regulatory schemes relying on them failed, in part because the world was complicated and dynamic in ways their models could not capture.


170 The IRB approach is itself divided into two subcategories: foundational and advanced IRB. In connection with a bank’s loan book, for example, the foundational approach would permit the bank to calculate a loan’s probability of default (PD). Under the advanced approach, meanwhile, the bank would be permitted to calculate PD, loss given default (LGD), and exposure at default (EAD).

171 See GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 38, at 36.


174 See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 172, at 301.
and 2017—Basel III introduces a number of significant reforms. In the realm of bank capital, these reforms include refinements to the definition and categories of capital, new countercyclical capital and capital conservation buffers, and a capital surcharge for global systemically important banks. The Basel Committee has also responded to the threat that banks might manipulate the IRB approach by introducing a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio and, more recently, risk-weight floors for credit, market, and operational risks. The target date for full implementation of Basel III was originally January 1, 2019—almost a full decade after these new standards were first published. Many of the more recent reforms, including the new risk-weight floors, are not scheduled for full implementation until 2027.

The first thing that the thirty-year arc between Basel I and III makes clear is the pervasive and unpredictable impact of regulatory arbitrage. Despite the time, effort, and other resources committed to designing and refining the Basel framework, each iteration has been undercut by banks’ efforts to limit its impact and effectiveness. Much of the evolution of the Basel framework could be cast as a process of policymakers’ ongoing—and often unsuccessful—attempts to curb regulatory arbitrage. Given the time lag between the publication of new Basel standards and their implementation into domestic law, banks will likely find new ways of arbitraging Basel III long before these reforms come into full force and effect. On our present course, it is therefore only a matter of time before we see another round of fundamental capital reforms. There are very good reasons to regulate bank capital, and having better capitalized banks should enhance systemic stability. Additionally, reforms like the simple leverage ratio are meant to address the dynamism and unknowns identified here to be a core challenge for financial regulation. Nonetheless, the specific processes that the Basel Committee has employed to try to improve capital regulation have consistently generated unintended consequences, while often leaving banks undercapitalized when it matters most.

Crucially, regulatory arbitrage of the Basel framework has been an important driver of both dynamism and complexity. The development of structured finance provides an illustrative example. Among the many reasons for

175 See BCBS, BASEL III GLOBAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 87 (containing a history of the revisions to this framework); BCBS, FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS, supra note 87.
176 See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 172, at ch. 13 (summarizing these reforms).
177 See BCBS, FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS, supra note 87, at 137–58.
178 See BCBS, BASEL III GLOBAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 87, at 69 annex 4.
179 BCBS, FINALISING POST-CRISIS REFORMS, supra note 87, at 8, 139.
the rise of structured finance during the 1990s was the fact that selling mortgages and other loans into bankruptcy-remote entities provided sponsoring banks with relief from capital requirements.\textsuperscript{181} The forces of regulatory arbitrage thus contributed to the emergence and development of a complex financial ecosystem within which risks were often highly fragmented, but where—sometimes unbeknownst to regulators—contingent obligations buried deep within the documentation exposed sponsoring banks to the risk of widespread market disruption.\textsuperscript{182} Perversely, then, the very rules designed to ensure the stability of banks helped spur the creation of new markets, institutions, and instruments that made it more difficult for regulators to detect the build-up of potential systemic risks within the banking system.

How policymakers have responded to the threat of regulatory arbitrage has also contributed to the complexity of banking regulation. Historically, the Basel Committee has responded to this threat by writing detailed rules designed to close the gaps exploited by banks for the purposes of reducing their capital requirements.\textsuperscript{183} The resulting rulification is reflected in the ever increasing length of the Basel framework: while Basel I was articulated in a crisp 30 pages, Basel II ran to 347 pages, and Basel III came out at a staggering 616 pages.\textsuperscript{184} In the United States, the legislation and regulations implementing Basel III came out at over 1,000 pages.\textsuperscript{185} The problem is that adopting new, more detailed, and more complex rules invites banks to find new, more bespoke, and more complex ways of getting around them.\textsuperscript{186} It is therefore unsurprising that attempts to combat regulatory arbitrage with yet more detailed regulation have led to an exponential increase in the size and complexity of the Basel rulebook without necessarily yielding any commensurate increase in its effectiveness. As Andy Haldane and Vasileios Madouros have observed: “the regulatory response to the crisis has largely been based on the level of thinking


\textsuperscript{182} See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 172, at 465–66.

\textsuperscript{183} See GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 38, at 3.


\textsuperscript{185} Id. at 10.

\textsuperscript{186} See Charles Goodhart, Problems of Monetary Management: The UK Experience, in MONETARY THEORY AND PRACTICE: THE UK EXPERIENCE 91, 96 (1984) (encapsulating this observation by predicting “that any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes”).
that created it.”\textsuperscript{187} Thus, “[t]he Tower of Basel, like its near-namesake the Tower of Babel, continues to rise.”\textsuperscript{188}

The rulification of the Basel framework has also increased the probability that rules will interact in unexpected and potentially harmful ways.\textsuperscript{189} Economists Robin Greenwood and coauthors, for example, have demonstrated how the combination of market-based risk-weighting methodologies (introduced under Basel II) with a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio (introduced under Basel III) can incentivize banks to shift into lines of business where they are less competitive and, conversely, lead them to eschew lines of business where they possess a comparative advantage.\textsuperscript{190} Greenwood and his coauthors see two reasons to be worried about these findings. First, the interaction between these different regulatory requirements may spur banks to enter businesses where they have little historical expertise, existing capabilities, or risk-management infrastructure.\textsuperscript{191} Second, insofar as these requirements drive banks to adopt similar business models, this could increase the risk of correlated undercapitalization during periods of market turmoil.\textsuperscript{192} In this way, the incremental build-up of well-intentioned rules can both engender significant changes within the financial system and potentially sow the seeds of future instability.

Lastly, the Basel framework has contributed to the cyclicality of finance. Perhaps the best example is the introduction of a risk-weighting methodology under Basel II.\textsuperscript{193} As described above, Basel II tied the amount of capital that banks must hold to the riskiness of the assets in their portfolios. Under the IRB approach, banks could then calculate the riskiness of these assets using their own data on historical default rates and market volatility. During periods of economic expansion, the relatively low level of defaults and muted volatility would translate into lower capital requirements—enabling banks to extend

\textsuperscript{187} Haldane & Madouros, \textit{supra} note 184, at 18.

\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{190} GREENWOOD ET AL., \textit{supra} note 38, at 18–19.

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Id.} at 27.

\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Id.}

more credit on the basis of the same level of capital. In this way, capital requirements would reinforce economic booms and, potentially, contribute to the formation of asset and credit bubbles. When these bubbles burst, risk-weighted capital requirements would also reinforce the resulting economic contraction, thus forcing banks to raise more capital during periods of relatively high volatility, reduce lending, or sell portfolio assets to shore up their balance sheets.

Many of these same challenges can also be observed in connection with new liquidity rules introduced under Basel III. Many view the acute liquidity problems that banks and other financial institutions experienced as the root of the crisis. In response, the Basel Committee introduced two new liquidity rules: the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR). The LCR is designed to ensure that banks have a sufficient stock of high-quality liquid assets to survive a hypothetical thirty-day stress scenario. The NSFR, meanwhile, is designed to constrain the reliance of banks on unstable, short-term sources of wholesale funding.

While the rationale for both the LCR and NSFR may seem relatively straightforward, their design and implementation have proven to be challenging. The OFR, for example, has suggested that the complexity of the LCR, at least as adopted in the United States, serves to undermine its utility as a benchmark for evaluating a bank’s liquidity position. There is also some evidence, and much concern, that the LCR may be reducing the amount of liquidity creation and transformation being performed by banks and other financial institutions. And as noted above, the LCR is among the forces interacting with recent money market mutual fund reforms to spur the growth of the

198 Cetina & Gleason, supra note 196, at 2.
FHLBank system.\textsuperscript{200} It is also changing the types of banks that are borrowing from FHLBanks, leading to more borrowing by the largest banks, and thus potentially engendering competition among them.\textsuperscript{201} Meanwhile, full implementation has been delayed in part based on concerns about potential unintended consequences, along with its possible impact on bank profitability.\textsuperscript{202} Thus, despite the best of intentions, it is still far from clear whether the new Basel liquidity rules will ultimately have the desired impact.

Just how little we know about the potential impact of the new Basel liquidity rules is evident from the debate surrounding the causes of recent instability in the U.S. “repo” market. For several days in September 2019, interest rates within short-term “repo” markets experienced a short, sharp spike—from roughly 2% to a high of 10%.\textsuperscript{203} This spike coincided with both the end of the corporate tax year and a significant new issuance of U.S. government debt, both foreseeable events that the Fed should have been able to manage. Observers have advanced a number of different explanations for this spike. One explanation is that new capital and liquidity rules may have made banks more hesitant to engage in the arbitrage that should have normally moderated this type of instability.\textsuperscript{204} Others have blamed the Fed’s policy of paying banks’ interest on excess reserves.\textsuperscript{205} Whatever the explanation, this instability ultimately ended with the Fed injecting over one hundred billion dollars into the market. We do not have any deep insight into the actual causes, but the Fed’s inability to predict and avoid a spike of this magnitude and the degree of contestation over the reasons for it are themselves indications of just how complex and costly the current regime is, both in terms of outcomes and accountability.

The dynamism and complexity of modern finance, together with the poorly understood feedback effects between capital requirements and bank behavior, generate significant unknowns. Indeed, for all the technocratic expertise that has gone into the design of the Basel framework—including several at-
tempts to empirically quantify its costs and benefits—there is still remarkably little agreement around many seemingly basic questions. Perhaps most importantly, while something of a consensus has started to emerge around the need for stringent capital requirements, there is considerably less agreement around the precise benefits and costs of imposing higher capital requirements on banks and other large financial institutions, the tradeoffs of having multiple different constraints, and the value of having liquidity constraints alongside the capital requirements.206

The ongoing evolution of the Basel capital requirements demonstrates, yet again, just how much faster finance moves relative to financial regulation. More importantly, it demonstrates how conventional approaches to financial regulation are poorly equipped to address the challenges stemming from the dynamism, complexity and unknowns of the financial system. Although capital can help protect against unknowns and uncertainty, layered capital requirements can exacerbate those very dynamics. Examining the history of capital requirements—how they have evolved and how banks have responded to them—reveals significant failings in the processes through which these requirements are promulgated, enforced, and revised.

C. Broadening the Lens

Taking a step back from our two case studies reveals that this mismatch between finance and financial regulation is not an isolated phenomenon. In fact, we could have just as easily picked any number of post-crisis reforms. The details inevitably vary, but these reforms have almost universally generated effects—some positive, others less so—that, despite the breadth and depth of the policy process leading up to their adoption, were unforeseen. Take, for example, mandatory central clearing of derivatives. To facilitate netting and promote transparency, the United States and other countries now require standardized derivatives to be cleared through centralized clearinghouses.207 To be sure, mandatory clearing may have yielded many of the expected gains, but it has simultaneously increased the size and systemic importance of clearinghouses, thus effectively creating new nodes of systemic risk.208 It has also contributed to the massive growth and concentration of the largest clearinghouses and reduced market discipline among clearing members, who now have less
direct exposure to the default of other clearing members. These and other developments raise real questions about the authority and role of regulators should something go wrong.

Another example is the controversial Volcker Rule, a provision of the Dodd-Frank Act that prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading. From the outset, commentators questioned whether activities that were not obviously tied to the causes of the crisis should be targeted for reform. The rule took years to finalize, is massively complex, and imposes significant compliance costs on banks. Indeed, Volcker himself has lamented its complexity. Initially viewed by its sponsors as a modern-day version of the (initially far simpler) separation of commercial and investment banking under the Glass-Steagall Act, the rule ultimately morphed into something nobody in Congress had envisioned. There have also been fears, and mixed evidence, that the rule may be adversely affecting liquidity in the bond market. At the same time, others now see benefits of the rule that they did not anticipate in advance. For example, the rule may have a greater capacity to change who wants to work at a bank and to alter the overall risk-taking culture of banks than initial-

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ly appreciated.216 Just as we saw in the case of capital requirements, it often takes time to understand why a rule is working even when it yields real benefits. Even then, the longer term consequences of reform remain difficult to assess.

Going back to the original Glass-Steagall separation between commercial and investment banks reveals a similar learning curve. According to Senator Glass, one of the rationales for the separation stemmed from the conflicts of interest arising from allowing commercial banks to underwrite corporate securities.217 Not until much later did empirical investigation of the quality of pre-Glass-Steagall securities issued by universal banks cast doubt on this rationale—helping fuel the case for its repeal.218 After the recent crisis, however, academics began looking for better explanations of why the United States’ financial system had been so stable for the fifty years following the Great Depression. This re-examination produced an array of credible, alternative rationales for why Glass-Steagall may have been very helpful in promoting financial stability. Professor Adam Levitin, for example, has suggested that the “unintended genius of Glass-Steagall” was that the structural separation of commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies broke up the political power of the financial services industry.219 Glass-Steagall, in other words, created sophisticated, informed, and well-funded industry participants on both sides of many regulatory debates, forming a more balanced and productive setup for future lawmaking. Economist Joseph Stiglitz later argued that “[t]he most important consequence of the repeal of Glass–Steagall was . . . the way repeal changed an entire culture.”220 In his assessment, the unappreciated benefit of Glass-Steagall was that it made commercial banks more boring—and thereby more stable—by making them unattractive places for risk-seeking financiers.221 Professor Arthur Wilmarth, who has advocated for the return to Glass-Steagall, has similarly suggested that the competitive pressures that push financiers toward greater risk-taking are exacerbated by the universal banking model.222

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221 Stiglitz, Capitalist Fools, supra note 220.
The aim here is not to seek answers to these difficult questions or to weigh in on any particular policy issue. Rather, these examples highlight the existence of meaningful gaps between the discourse around these rules when they were first adopted and the effect of these rules once in place. Time and again, the processes designed to encourage informed debate, enhance the quality of adopted rules, and promote buy-in from stakeholders have failed to reveal what has later proved to be among the most critical issues. This is important not only because it means excessive resources are being invested ex ante, or that potentially counterproductive frictions are imposed on changing existing rules, but because it means there is in practice often no process allowing for meaningful discussion of the actual issues at stake. Hence those laudatory aims, from efficacy to legitimacy, too often go unfulfilled.

IV. SOME PROGRESS

We are far from the first to observe that dynamism, complexity, and unknowns are core features of modern financial systems. Nor are we the first to raise concerns about the many challenges they create for financial regulation. This Part briefly surveys some of the post-crisis reforms and other efforts underway to address these dynamics. It then considers some of the proposals and models already on the table for addressing these challenges. The focus here is on why our central claim—that the mismatch between finance and financial regulation helps to explain why financial regulation so often has failed in the past and will likely fail again in the years ahead—remains pressing despite these developments. On both fronts, we engage with a thin but hopefully representative slice of the relevant activity and ideas. This analysis suggests that despite some progress, both analytically and on the ground, the core mismatch remains and the challenges it imposes are as great, if not greater, than ever.

A. Reforms Underway

1. Harnessing New Technology and Data Standardization

One way to tackle the challenges posed by dynamism, complexity, and unknowns is for policymakers to take better advantage of technological advancements in the realm of data collection and analysis. These approaches have the potential to reduce the effective unknowns and make complexity and dynamism more manageable by enhancing market participants’ and regulators’ abilities to monitor developments and the systemic implications of changes in a more timely and comprehensive fashion. Closer examination of the post-

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223 See infra notes 223–260 and accompanying text.
crisis efforts to develop and ensure widespread use of well-designed data standards supports this promise, but also brings to the fore the pragmatic challenges and current limits of using technology to tackle these challenges.

The good news is that in the wake of the crisis, there have been a number of initiatives designed to leverage new technologies to collect and analyze data and to standardize data to make it more usable. A prominent example is the legal entity identifier (LEI) initiative. An LEI is a twenty-character, alphanumeric code that connects to key reference information about legal entities participating in financial transactions.224 Each LEI contains information about an entity’s ownership structure and thus answers the questions of “who is who” and “who owns whom.” Over a longer time horizon, this information could be integrated with unique product identifiers (UPIs) linked to key reference information about individual financial products—from basic equity and debt to derivatives and other more exotic instruments—thus answering the question of “who owns what.”225 LEIs and UPIs would then work together—with LEIs gathering information about the parties and UPIs recording the relevant specifics of the transactions.226

In theory, these types of developments, particularly if used in conjunction with other new technologies, hold out a number of potentially significant benefits. More granular and standardized data can help regulators aggregate, manipulate, and compare firm-level data with the objective of identifying potential microprudential risks. This data can also be aggregated to help regulators identify and monitor risks across sectors and over time, thus potentially becoming a critical first step to more effective macroprudential oversight. More effective use of new technologies, along with more comprehensive data standardization, would thus give regulators more lead time to design effective, efficient, and appropriately tailored ways of addressing these risks and could prove particularly useful in crisis management. Together, technology and data standards can therefore be viewed as the building blocks of a more accurate and complete map of the myriad of complex and dynamic interactions within the financial system.

Shifting from theory to practice, however, reveals a different state of affairs. There has been some progress in data standardization and related efforts to cut through the complexity of the financial system, but this progress has been “slow, hard won, and, in many areas, elusive.”227 Even low-cost im-

225 ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 172, at 629.
226 Id.
227 Berner & Judge, supra note 224, at 4.
improvements, like full adoption of the LEI, have yet to be achieved in the United States despite having been mandated throughout Europe.\textsuperscript{228} If anything, the low priority given to the basic building blocks necessary to realize the promise of new technologies, such as data standardization, reveals just how far from ideal the current regulatory process remains.\textsuperscript{229} More generally, although the “fintech” and “regtech” movements,\textsuperscript{230} as well as standardization, are likely to be critical to addressing complexity, dynamism, and unknowns, doing so will require a very different framework for congressional and public involvement. Looking at the potential here provides more reason for concern about the current processes undergirding financial regulation.

2. Stress Testing

One of the most important crisis-era regulatory innovations has been the introduction of “stress testing” for the largest banking organizations. Stress testing involves the use of hypothetical scenarios envisioning significant economic and financial shocks in order to assess how banks would fare under those conditions and, at times, to assess the robustness of the internal systems that banks use to monitor and constrain their own risk-taking. The Fed conducted the first large-scale supervisory stress tests in 2009, which proved critical to restoring the faith of market participants in the health of the largest bank holding companies. Today, stress testing involves two separate but complementary processes: the Dodd-Frank mandated stress tests (DFAST) and the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). Where these tests reveal significant weaknesses, banks may be prohibited from making distributions to shareholders, thereby increasing their capital.

The institutionalization of stress testing suggests a growing appreciation of dynamism and unknowns and the need for new tools to address these challenges. Stress tests are forward-looking exercises that, when well executed, can illuminate weaknesses in risk management systems, latent capital deficiencies, and other dynamics not readily identified under more traditional approaches to capital regulation or supervision. In many ways, they mark an important step forward. By making capital requirements more responsive to the unique risks banks are exposed to, and demonstrating how and when things can go wrong, these exercises introduce helpful dynamism into the prudential regulatory re-

\textsuperscript{228} Id. at 14.
\textsuperscript{229} Id. at 4.
\textsuperscript{230} “Fintech” refers broadly to the use of information technology to provide financial products and services. “Regtech” is a related term that refers to the use of information technology to regulate the provision of these products and services.
gime. They can also help mitigate gamesmanship of capital adequacy requirements.231

The growing gap between finance and financial regulation helps explain why stress testing is such a welcome new development and provides further support for its continued and expanded use.232 A closer examination of stress testing, however, reveals another gap—this one between theory and practice. As a preliminary matter, the DFAST and CCAR stress tests only apply to a relatively narrow subset of financial institutions, i.e., conventional deposit-taking banks. Moreover, much like data standardization, this tool’s potential to address the challenges posed by dynamism, complexity, and unknowns depends a great deal on the mindset and assumptions of the regulators involved.233 In this respect, recent statements by Fed officials are not encouraging. When announcing the results of the 2017 tests, for example, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell stated that the “results show that, even during a severe recession, our large banks would remain well capitalized” such that they are able to “lend throughout the economic cycle, and support households and businesses when times are tough.”234 In response to the 2019 tests, this view was echoed by Randal Quarles, the Vice-Chairman of the Fed in charge of banking supervision, when he stated that “the results confirm that our financial system remains resilient” and that “[t]he nation’s largest banks . . . would be well positioned to support the economy even after a severe shock.”235

Other leading figures have questioned these conclusions. Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, for example, recently observed “that recent stress tests estimate that if GDP drops 6.25[%], unemployment doubles, the stock market halves, and real estate falls by 25[%] to 30[%], then capital losses would be insufficient to trigger [regulatory intervention].”236 He went on to say that these conclusions are “more of a comment on the inadequacies of

231 See generally HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL STRESS TESTING (J. Doyne Farmer, Alissa Kleinnijenhuis, Til Schuermann & Thom Wetzer eds., forthcoming 2020).
232 Id.
stress test procedures, than on the soundness of the banks.” Summers’s comments reflect an acknowledgement of the fact that the stress tests rely heavily on models and assumptions that inevitably fail to capture the full range of dynamics that will be at play in the thick of the next recession or financial crisis.

We can frame the significance of these two competing views by considering, briefly, the role of “humility” in making accurate forecasts—including stress tests. Philip Tetlock, one of the leading scholars on forecasting, has demonstrated that experts are often exceptionally bad forecasters. His work on forecasting provides an array of relevant insights into the mindsets that enable more accurate forecasting. One of the most important of these mindsets is humility. In Tetlock’s telling, humility is not false modesty or a lack of confidence, as commonly conceived. Rather, it means understanding what one knows and what one does not.

In theory, stress testing could well foster this type of humility. One of the important features of the current stress testing process is that banks run their own independent tests alongside those conducted by the Fed itself. Disparities in the results of these could serve as a reminder of the inherent limitations of any risk management framework. This is just the type of thinking that our analysis suggests is critical. But the statements by Powell and Quarles suggest a very different mindset, one that views the results as confirmations of how good things are and how much they know—precisely the type of thinking that contributed to the failure of regulators to foresee the cracks ahead of the last crisis. Stress tests are an important new tool in helping to mitigate the challenges this paper places front and center, but untethered from an appreciation of those challenges, they could do as much harm as good in preventing the next crisis.

3. Macroprudential Policies

Another post-crisis shift that would, in theory, seem even more responsive to the challenges revealed here is the rise of a “macroprudential” tool for financial regulation. Macroprudential oversight was meant to address systemic risk

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237 Id.
239 See id. at 228.
240 Id. (“The humility required for good judgment is not self-doubt . . . . It is intellectual humility. It is a recognition that reality is profoundly complex, that seeing things clearly is a constant struggle, when it can be done at all, and that human judgment must therefore be riddled with mistakes.”).
241 See CLARIDA, supra note 76, at 9.
that could not be detected, and may be accentuated, by an excessive focus on the constitutive components of the financial system apart from the broader ecosystem in which they operate. Yet, unlike their counterparts abroad, United States policymakers have been given few of the tools needed to implement macroprudential policies. Moreover, the notion of macroprudential oversight has evolved, in many circles, from encouraging critical and creative thinking about the workings of the financial system as a whole to focusing on a narrower set of specific policies, often reducing borrower leverage. And as we have seen, these very policies are now being recognized as potential triggers of behavioral changes that have effects elsewhere in the financial system. Thus, in a manner akin to the rise of stress testing, the rise of a macroprudential approach reflects an implicit understanding that the complexity, dynamism, and unknowns that characterize finance undermine traditional approaches to financial regulation. Yet, divorced from a recognition of the need for more fundamental changes to how financial regulatory policy is made and revised, and a recognition of the core mismatch illuminated here, macroprudential policies are unlikely to achieve the ambitious aims originally envisioned for them.

B. Proposals for Further Reform

Just as we are not the first scholars to acknowledge the dynamism, complexity, and unknowns of modern finance, we are far from the first to raise concerns about the processes through which law is made. Lawmaking has always been about compromise and tradeoffs, making the process almost too easy a target. There are also numerous trans-substantive debates that bear on the questions here at stake. Nick Bagley, for example, has raised fundamental questions about whether there may be “too much” procedure in administrative law, a claim that aligns with the concerns we raise. Because of space constrosed by Chairman Bernanke: “The systemic orientation of the macroprudential approach may be contrasted with that of the traditional, or ‘microprudential,’ approach to regulation and supervision, which is concerned primarily with the safety and soundness of individual institutions, markets, or infrastructures.” Id.


246 See Bagley, supra note 109, at 346.
straints, we make little effort to cover the range of relevant ideas and proposals and focus instead on just a couple of the proposals that most clearly target the concerns we raise here. The first focuses on financial regulation in particular, and the second on a range of proposals for dealing with unknowns and related challenges in trans-substantive ways.

1. Automatic Sunset Clauses

As described in Part II, financial regulation often has the appearance of a single-shot game, with policymakers identifying a perceived market failure, going through some process of engagement and deliberation, and then designing and implementing a rule aimed at eliminating this failure.\(^{247}\) This is especially the case at the domestic level, where significant regulatory reforms are often only implemented in response to financial scandals or crises. The problem, of course, is that the dynamism of finance means that regulation adopted at any particular moment in time may not be optimal at any future point. Moreover, complexity and unknowns—together with our own prior and competing objectives—may mean that regulation fails to advance desired objectives right from the start. This is especially the case for crisis-driven regulation: where our incomplete understanding of the problem, together with the political, economic, and other exigencies of the crisis, often mean that regulation misses the intended target.\(^{248}\)

Professor Roberta Romano has written extensively about these challenges and, on some level, many of her concerns mirror our own. Paramount among these concerns is that too much financial regulation is passed in the immediate wake of crises, resulting in rules that are not adequately informed and otherwise tainted by the politics of scandal and crisis.\(^{249}\) She has argued that imposing mandatory “sunset” clauses on these rules could improve the quality of financial regulation. These clauses would result in new rules automatically expiring unless reaffirmed, thus potentially compelling lawmakers to incorporate new learning about the causes of a crisis and the consequences—intended and otherwise—of the reforms.\(^{250}\)

\(^{247}\) See supra notes 79–123 and accompanying text.


\(^{249}\) Romano, Regulating in the Dark, supra note 248, at 1.

\(^{250}\) Id. at 2; Romano, Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 20, at 1600–01 (arguing that sunsets would “mitigate the problem of quasi-permanent regulatory blunders produced by emergency legislation that burdens financial markets, thereby impeding capital development and growth, without any discernible compensating benefit”).
Yet, taking complexity, dynamism, and unknowns seriously suggests that sunsets may well be a mixed bag, with even more potential to do harm than the stress tests. While turning a single-shot game into a two-shot game may help incorporate new learning and facilitate critical reassessment, it does little to respond to the nature or pace of change within the financial system over the longer run. Nor does it address the challenges created when the unintended consequences of a new regulation—in banking, for example—are experienced in other domains, such as insurance or securities. Indeed, given the propensity for logrolling within the vetogate model, automatic sunset clauses may introduce their own adverse and unintended consequences. And, of course, while unknowns may be particularly problematic for crisis-driven regulation, they are also highly problematic for financial regulation adopted under less volatile political and economic conditions. Ultimately, however, our biggest concern is the net effect on regulation. A default rule that envisions less regulation cannot assure smarter regulation. This is not to rule out sunset clauses as a tool that may, at times, be warranted—but it does suggest that these clauses are not a sufficient response to the core challenges posed by dynamism, complexity, and pervasive unknowns.

2. Experimentalism and Experimentation

The challenges we identify as core to finance also arise, albeit in different degrees, in an array of other domains. Accordingly, there have been a number of efforts and proposals to try to address the uncertainty that so often plagues attempts to produce effective regulations and enable informed discussion. Some of these efforts have focused on experimentation, seeking to conduct rigorous experiments that can generate the missing information prior to finalizing a new regulation or to facilitate quasi-experimentation by, for example, allowing states to implement different rules. 251 There is much to commend these efforts, but they remain the exception rather than the norm, in significant part because they are feasible in only limited circumstances at this stage. There is much in this literature that might, in time, be useful in operationalizing a better way to address the challenges in finance that we identify as core. Going even further, and recognizing all regulation as experimentation, is the type of shift in mindset consistent with what we are advocating.

So far, however, advocates have tended to not embrace the experimentation approach. They remain more focused on measurable costs and benefits

251 See generally Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009); Colleen V. Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of the Law, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2313 (2019).
than the longer-term structural changes that we see as fundamental. This resistance reflects the challenge of using this type of methodology to assess the impact on an outcome like the resilience of the financial system as a whole. Even in domains where it has more obvious benefits, however, efforts to utilize formal experimentation in rulemaking, although progressing, remain marginal and have had only mixed success.\footnote{252 See Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 564 (2017) (using two examples of prominent rulemakings in the environmental space to assess the upsides and downsides of policy experimentation); see also David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Anti-poverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 546–48 (2008) (examining the inefficacy of local experimentation to generate sound policies to address poverty).}

Another approach that is working quite successfully in some domains is “experimentalism.”\footnote{253 See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 78 (2011); see also Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015); Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008).} The experimentalist framework is based on a hub-and-spoke structure that combines discretion and reporting by those on the front lines with ongoing revision of the rules by those at the center in light of new information. This type of iterative process can yield real gains in environments where detailed specification is difficult ex ante, and where there is some centralized mechanism that can collect, analyze, and revise rules in light of the insights only experience can yield.\footnote{254 Experimentalism shares a number of parallels with the work of regulatory scholars such as Robert Baldwin and Julia Black. See, e.g., Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71 MOD. L. REV. 59 (2008); Julia Black, Decentrimg Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103 (2001).}

The concerns we raise overlap with many of the concerns motivating experimentalism. Governance mechanisms designed to “compensate for the absence of ex ante knowledge” and promote “rapid, deliberate learning from parallel and collaborative exploration of new risks and possibilities” would seem to go a long way in addressing the challenges posed by the dynamism, complexity, and unknowns of modern finance.\footnote{255 HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL STRESS TESTING, supra note 231, at 2.} Moreover, by critiquing the excessive efforts to optimizing a static regime, and embracing an understanding of “[r]eliability [that] entails responsiveness, not just to strong signals like prices but also to weak signals such as small anomalies or deviances,” experimentalism reorients the regulation discussion in ways that are critical if we are to address the core challenges.\footnote{256 Sabel & Simon, supra note 253, at 61.}

Given the importance of this work, it is all the more striking that models akin to experimentalism have been deployed only on a limited basis and with
decidedly mixed results in the realm of finance. Consider, for example, the
discretion that the IRB approach under Basel II gave to the largest banks to use
their own risk management systems to calculate their regulatory capital re-
quirements. The aim of this approach, like experimentalism, was to overcome
the static, coarse, and backward-looking nature of standardized capital re-
quirements.\footnote{There are some meaningful differences in the details between how Basel II’s IRB approach worked and the functioning of the experimentalism model. Nevertheless, there was significant overlap in the spirit and design of both models. Both aimed to enable more learning and better rules through a more decentralized structure, in part to overcome difficulties of ex ante specification.} This approach also resembled the experimentalist frame in that it enabled national regulators to harness and learn from the sophisticated risk management systems banks instituted and to update their assessments across firms accordingly, creating a system that theoretically could respond to chal-
lenges that neither banks nor regulators could identify and specify ex ante. The
IRB approach, which also grew out of the premise that both banks and their
regulators wanted to minimize the possibility of bank failure, hence tried to
harness an area of common interest. The results, however, were disastrous.
Although not fully implemented when the crisis hit, many view the IRB ap-
proach as a significant contributor to its severity.\footnote{Lall, \textit{supra} note 172, at 20–21 (arguing that “[f]ar from helping to avert the crisis, the [Basel II] accord in fact directly contributed to it,” and identifying the way the IRB approach officially sanctioned flawed VaR models as a central factor behind that contribution).} The large investment and
commercial banks that were using this approach were among those who fared
the worst when conditions soured, and lawmakers have substantially scaled
back on the use of IRB in response.\footnote{BCBS, \textit{HIGH-LEVEL SUMMARY OF BASEL III REFORMS} 5 (Dec. 2017), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424 HLSUMMARY.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPY2-JH2W] (explaining that one function of Basel III—the successor to Basel II—is to remove the use of IRB for certain asset classes given the fact that “the financial crisis highlighted a number of shortcomings related to the use of internally modelled approaches for regulatory capital, including the IRB approaches to credit risk”).} The notion that shared incentives can
justify passing discretion along to those closer to the problem—whether from
international rulemaking bodies like Basel to nation states or from regulators to
banks—is among the casualties of the crisis. Whether it will be revived re-
mains to be seen.

A related challenge is that for approaches like experimentalism to suc-
cceed, the signals going from spoke to hub must be—even if noisy—probative
of the outcomes that regulation is seeking to achieve. This feedback is what
allows for refinement over time. Yet financial markets often do not work this
way. Among the reasons that the IRB approach failed so spectacularly is that
many of the indicators that banks and their regulators focused on suggested
that banks and the broader financial system were healthy when, as we know
now, they were very far from it. Just as Minsky and others predicted, periods
of stability changed behavior and the pricing of financial assets in ways that ultimately made the financial system more vulnerable.\footnote{See supra notes 80–92 and accompanying text.} The feedback, in other words, provided false signals that disguised the unhealthy system. This is part of what dooms efforts at formal experimentation, and also part of what makes experimentalism difficult.

The experimentalist framework marks an important step forward relative to the more traditional approaches that still dominate. Yet at this stage, the fact that experimentalism—an approach that has worked so well in other domains—has not been used more widely in financial regulation highlights the nature and magnitude of the underlying challenges.

V. A MORE HOLISTIC APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION

This Part complements our central claim that the mismatch between the nature of finance and the processes through which finance is regulated sets financial regulation up to fail by considering, in broad terms, how this challenge might be mitigated.\footnote{See infra notes 261–268 and accompanying text.} Our call is for a more holistic approach to financial regulation. The aim here is both to provide a glimmer of hope and to further illuminate the nature and magnitude of the challenge we now face by showing what would be needed for regulation to better accommodate the realities of modern finance.

The term “holistic” is generally defined as “relating to or concerned with wholes or with complete systems rather than with the analysis of, treatment of, or dissection into parts.”\footnote{Holistic, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/holistic [https://perma.cc/KG8A-2A5Z].} The term holism was coined by South African statesman Jan Smuts in 1926 as part of an effort to illuminate the fundamental limitations in western approaches to knowledge in domains like science. As he explained, “Analysis, abstraction and generalisation are indeed necessary as instruments of scientific understanding, but they also necessarily involve a departure from the complex concrete.”\footnote{J.C. SMUTS, HOLISM AND EVOLUTION 15 (MacMillan & Co., 3d ed., 1936) (1926), https://reflexus.org/wp-content/uploads/Smut-Holism-and-Evolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3N8-LK46].}

Shifting from abstractions to practice, we see multiple mechanisms through which a holistic approach to finance could improve regulatory processes and outcomes. One avenue is through changing the analytical frame through which policy makers and others assess the landscape and options be-
fore them. As we have seen, conventional approaches typically begin with the categorization of different species of markets and institutions. The Fed, OCC, and FDIC regulate “banks,” the SEC regulates “securities” and “investment funds,” and state insurance regulators regulate “insurance” firms. Reflecting this deeply engrained path dependence, these regulatory authorities are then charged with advancing specific objectives such as the providing for the safety and soundness of individual institutions, ensuring the informational efficiency of securities markets, and protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices. In the process, they often ignore dynamics or problems outside their direct mandate.264

Embracing a holistic mindset suggests that in adopting and revising the rules governing finance, policy makers should take a broader perspective. It would encourage regulators to see the markets and institutions they are seeking to change as part of a vast, complex, and constantly evolving financial ecosystem that is itself part of an even more vast, complex, and evolving social system. This does not mean that all of these effects would or could be addressed, but it would mean recognizing the potential for adverse ripples in other domains and coordinating with others earlier and more often.

A holistic mindset also brings to the fore the value of surveying the landscape for areas of opportunities or emerging, systemic issues that have not yet congealed enough to be salient using a more conventional lens. This could take the form of devising new ways to aggregate information currently held by different regulators to produce more complete and accurate depictions of how the financial system currently works. It could also involve developing or incorporating new metrics to assess the health of that broader ecosystem, the role and perceptions of finance within society, and other factors. Although academics have made some progress in this regard, as reflected by SRISK and other measures of systemic risk,265 regulators have not yet established mechanisms for responding to the information embedded in these signals. This information might be used to redefine the problems that financial regulation is designed to address. More importantly, this process would be motivated by and reinforce an abiding humility about how much is known and understood at any given time.266


265 See, e.g., Systemic Risk Analysis Summary, supra note 8.

266 See supra notes 223–260 and accompanying text.
In time, a more holistic approach to financial regulation could be operationalized through changes in the regulation-making processes. The conventional approaches that produced Basel III, money market regulation, and other post-crisis reforms bear all the hallmarks of a single-shot game: a malignancy is identified, alternative treatments are weighed and measured, and the most desirable treatment is enacted into law, fleshed out in regulation, supervised, and enforced. Underpinning this approach is the assumption that policymakers can and should prescribe the optimal course of treatment—that they can “get it right.” This assumption is evident in procedural rules—statutory or agency requirements for CBA being one prominent example—that are ostensibly designed to ensure a degree of certainty around the impact of new regulation. It is also evident in the absence of institutional mechanisms designed to periodically assess the impact of new regulation after it comes into force. Yet, as our case studies illustrate, policymakers almost inevitably fail to accurately predict the impact of their decisions: not simply because they “get it wrong,” but because these decisions unleash consequences that would have been almost impossible to predict at any point during the process of designing new regulation.\(^{267}\)

In contrast, a defining feature of a holistic approach is the recognition that regulation functions as a continuous game. This has two important implications. The first is the necessity of institutional mechanisms designed to facilitate the aggregation, analysis, and dissemination of information with a view to promoting ongoing learning within the regulatory community. The function of these mechanisms would not be limited to simply evaluating the costs and benefits of new regulation. Instead, these mechanisms would seek to monitor and evaluate ongoing structural changes to the financial system, assess the impact and effectiveness of new regulation, and better understand the role and perceptions of finance within wider society. This in turn leads to the second implication—the need for flexibility in the processes governing the formulation, adoption, and revision of regulation. This flexibility is essential in order to ensure that new information is incorporated into the decision-making process and, ultimately, reflected in new regulation.\(^{268}\) Together, these processes reflect the view that change is both inevitable and endogenous, and that, therefore, efforts to optimize financial regulation are akin to building castles in the sky.

Another related benefit of a more holistic approach is that, properly operationalized, it could help to address the legitimacy and accountability issues that continue to loom large in finance. The complexity of the financial system

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\(^{267}\) See *supra* notes 124–222 and accompanying text.

\(^{268}\) It is at this point that the distinction between macroprudential and holistic approaches becomes most evident. Although the creation of institutions such as the OFR and FSOC may initially appear to reflect a holistic approach, their institutional design imposes significant constraints on their ability to collect information, feed it into the policy process, and, ultimately, act on the basis of it.
not only means that rules often have unforeseen consequences, but it also means that those who are not financial experts have a marked disadvantage in regulatory debates. The result, too often, is disengagement and distrust. By compelling reconsideration of policy tradeoffs both before and after a crisis arises—when there is more meaningful information available about the actual effects of a contested rule or scheme—there is at least the possibility of broader engagement and feedback.

Lastly, a more holistic approach to financial regulation might also yield different outputs than the current regime. As vividly illustrated by the development of the Basel capital and liquidity rules, the ongoing quest for optimization has led to the adoption of an increasingly rigid and complex regulatory rulebook. This rulification is a product of pervasive regulatory arbitrage, the resulting reluctance on the part of elected officials to allocate discretion to either regulatory authorities or market participants, and the misplaced belief that—in time—policymakers will be able to strike the optimal balance between competing priorities and objectives. By abandoning the idea that this type of optimization is possible, holistic approaches would enable regulators to adopt a more pragmatic stance: one based not on the tired “rules versus discretion” debate, but on their experiences of how these different tools work (or do not) in various regulatory contexts. By the same token, knowing that regulators have the flexibility to adapt rules in response to changing circumstances may also reduce the incentives of market participants to invest significant resources in finding ways to circumvent them. In this way, more holistic approaches are arguably less likely to produce regulatory rulebooks that contribute to the dynamism and complexity of the financial system.

CONCLUSION

Examining the processes that undergird financial regulation in light of the realities of modern finance helps to explain why the resulting rules so often fail to achieve their purported aims. This mismatch also helps explain why so many Americans remain distrustful of Congress and others charged with making these rules, in addition to the financial sector they regulate. Efforts to improve financial regulation must grapple more directly with these fundamental process failures. There are no easy answers, and this Article does not purport to provide them. Nonetheless, this Article does suggest that a more holistic mindset could help mitigate many of these challenges, and that, given the sheer magnitude of the mismatch between the nature of modern finance and the processes through which it is regulated, a profound shift is needed.