The Illusion of Influence: On Foucault, Nietzsche, and a Fundamental Misunderstanding

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THE ILLUSION OF INFLUENCE:
ON FOUCAULT, NIETZSCHE, AND A FUNDAMENTAL MISUNDERSTANDING

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Introduction

It is often said that Foucault was influenced by Nietzsche. Many say he was Nietzschean—one of the few “true” Nietzscheans, some suggest, alongside Gilles Deleuze (at least in the early 1960s), Sarah Kofman, who deliberately took her life on Nietzsche’s birthday, Pierre Klossowski, or a few others. Scholars often highlight Nietzsche’s shadow in Foucault’s writings or the Nietzschean roots of Foucault’s thought.1

But that gets it all wrong. Nietzsche was not an influence on Foucault. Foucault was not Nietzschean. The relationship was entirely other: Foucault plied his critical method on Nietzsche’s writings in a similar way that he studied the discourse of madness, of clinical medicine, of the human sciences, or the practices of discipline and experience of sexuality. Foucault treated Nietzsche’s texts as objects of study—at times an epistemological object, at other times a linguistic, alethurgic, or directly political object of study. He worked Nietzsche’s written words the better to understand how we think, how we know, how to act.

Foucault was often keen to say—at those junctures when he would reframe his intellectual project—that he had worked on madness, the prison, and sexuality, sometimes adding to the series, clinical medicine or the human sciences. But it would be far more accurate to say that, throughout his intellectual life, Foucault worked on Nietzsche, madness, the prison, and sexuality—perhaps in that order. Nietzsche’s writings were just as productive an object of study for Foucault as those other three discourses.

I realized this editing Foucault’s seminars and writings on Nietzsche for the forthcoming publication of his lectures on Nietzsche at the experimental university at Vincennes (winter 1969-70) and at McGill University (April 1971) and his writings on Nietzsche from 1953 to 1973, for the new series Cours et Travaux avant le Collège de France that is being published by Gallimard and Le Seuil. Foucault’s earliest experimental writings on Nietzsche from 1953-1956 are first evidence of a life-long pursuit to explore and deploy Nietzsche’s discourse. Foucault’s recurrent return to Nietzsche’s writings over the entire course of his intellectual lifetime—from his early introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, to his archeology of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics of suspicion, to his exploration of Nietzsche’s linguistics to argue for the invention of knowledge and of truth—confirm a critical method, rather than mere influence.

It is not only reductionist, but deeply misleading to portray the relationship as one of influence or borrowing—even for the most direct overlaps, for instance, for the use of the term “genealogy.” Not just because Foucault’s genealogical method is markedly different than Nietzsche’s—as Amy Allen, Colin Koopman, Daniele Lorenzini, and others demonstrate well.2 Not just because Foucault first shifted from his archeological method to “dynasty” and toward a “dynastic” method, which he only later dubbed genealogy. But because Foucault’s critical method was to treat Nietzsche’s discourse as an object of study no different than any other discourse. That has deep implications for our own work and our own critical method.
In this essay, I will demonstrate five different ways that Foucault worked Nietzsche’s writings: as a critical, epistemological, linguistic, alethurgic, and political object of study. I will not discuss the as-yet unpublished manuscripts, remarkable as they are—some of which were hand written on the back of his typed manuscript of Maladie mentale et personnalité published in 1954, others which show the clear markings of having been written in Uppsala, Sweden, or Montreal, Canada, others that traveled to Rio de Janeiro, and still others that were destined for lectures at Vincennes or pulled aside for a quick passage at the Collège de France. I prefer to leave those manuscripts aside until they are published. Instead, I will focus on those published essays and lectures that substantially engage Nietzsche’s writings, because that series of published works already dramatically illustrate the point: Foucault’s already-published works document a serial reworking of Nietzsche’s discourse as object of study. I will concentrate on five published texts, and prefigure the argument here:

- In his “Introduction” to his translation of Kant’s Anthropology (written in the period 1959-60; published in 2008⁸), Foucault uses Nietzsche’s discourse as a device to open a space beyond the recurring anthropological illusions that plague phenomenology and especially existential phenomenology. Nietzsche’s writings are, first, here, for Foucault, a critical object of study.
- In his essay “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx” (delivered at Royaumont in July 1964; published in 1967⁷), Foucault treats Nietzsche’s writings as an epistemic layer in Foucault’s archeology of knowledge—in essence, as representing an episteme of suspicion from the nineteenth century. Nietzsche’s writings serve here as an epistemological object of study.
- From an episteme, Nietzsche’s texts become a linguistic object of study for Foucault in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as illustrated in Foucault’s essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (written between 1967 and 1970; published in 1971⁶). Nietzsche’s use of origin words—Ursprung, Entstehung, Herkunft, Erfindung, and so on—is a laboratory for Foucault to develop his theory of ‘vouloir-savoir’ of the will to know.
- Foucault’s “Lecture on Nietzsche” delivered at McGill University in April 1971 (published in the Lessons on the Will to Know in 2011⁷) represents a transition from the will to know to the history of truth. Reworking the language of invention in Nietzsche’s writings, Foucault develops the idea of a history of truth and truth-telling that he will then unfold in his Collège de France lectures. “Knowledge was invented,” Foucault declares, “but truth was even more so later.”⁸ In this work, Foucault plies Nietzsche’s words into an alethurgic object of study.
- In his conferences on “Truth and Juridical Form” delivered at the Pontifical Catholic University in Rio de Janeiro in May 1973 (published in 1994⁴), Foucault then treats Nietzsche’s writings as a political object of study. Foucault, here, specifically refers to the “discourse of Nietzsche” and demonstrates how that discourse can be used as the model for a critique of knowledge-power and of the subject.

In effect, at each of these stages, Foucault takes Nietzsche’s written words to study them from a different angle, plying Nietzsche’s discourse to his intellectual pursuits as they develop over time from an epistemology, to a politics, to an alethurgy. Foucault was not merely discovering ideas in Nietzsche’s writings, or borrowing his concepts, but rather
projecting his own thinking, playing with Nietzsche’s words, as a way to make progress on his philosophical investigations. Nietzsche’s writings were an object that Foucault worked from 1951 to his death in 1984.

And let me just add. This is precisely how we should treat Foucault’s writings and, more generally, philosophical discourse: as objects of experimentation, of manipulation—of study in furtherance of our own intellectual projects. I am not here merely rehearsing Roland Barthes’ thesis on the death of the author. What I am suggesting reaches further. As critical thinkers, we need to treat written traces actively, as objects for experimentation, for interpretation, for intervention, for critical praxis. Philosophical discourse, in effect, is hardly different than those other objects—the discourse of madness, of the prison, of sexuality. For the critical actor, it does not lend itself to “borrowing” or “influence.” The very concept of “borrowing” is ass-backwards. What we do, as critical theorists and actors, always, is to pluck the written traces to our work: to put philosophical texts to work in furtherance of our own political projects.

In the end, there is no such thing as “Nietzsche.” There is no coherent meaning to that term from which we could derive the concept “Nietzschean.” There are written fragments, aphorisms, books, often times that collide and confront each other. We use the terms sloppily, in shorthand. We anthropomorphize the texts or the oeuvre, when all there is in fact are written passages on which we project meaning and which we deploy for our political purposes. As critical theorists, we should not deny that, or be embarrassed by it, we should embrace it. It forms the heart of the critical method.

The proper place to begin, then, would be with Foucault’s earliest writings on Nietzsche, which trace to about 1953 in a series of experimental essays and drafts. These writings have not yet, but will soon be published as part of the series Cours et Travaux avant le Collège de France. The manuscripts reveal clearly that Foucault was experimenting, taking up the words, expressions, and turn of phrases of Nietzsche’s writing, in an effort to think through notions of reason and madness, of repetition, of dialectic and tragedy, of will, of the dangers of knowledge. Foucault’s manuscripts, as he might have said, play with Nietzsche’s words, in the same way that young artists often work on old masters. There is far more to say about these early manuscripts, but since I will be treating only published texts, I’ll begin then with Foucault’s writings on Kant’s Anthropology.

I. “Introduction” to Kant’s Anthropology (1959-60)

In a 10-part introduction to his translation of Kant’s Anthropology—written in the period 1959-60 and accepted as his secondary doctoral thesis, but not published until long after his death in 2008—Foucault explores the relationship between Kant’s lectures on anthropology and the notion of critique.

Foucault’s introduction takes aim at phenomenology—the dominant mode of philosophical discourse on the Continent at the time. It argues that the transcendental illusion that Kant tried to resolve by means of his critique of pure reason is itself replicated by the anthropological illusion in Kant’s work and, more generally, in post-Kantian phenomenological thought. Phenomenology and existential phenomenology (Husserl, Sartre, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) simply replicate the illusion. Phenomenologists claim to analyze a subject that constructs himself and his environment, but they fall back into the trap of naturalizing the subject. Not that they believe in human nature, but that they place the human subject again at the heart of their analyses.
Late in the argument, Foucault’s introduction turns to Nietzsche’s writings, first almost ironically, but then experimentally. Foucault’s text is trying, testing, probing Nietzsche’s discourse as a potential can-opener—a device to open a space for reflection. The text first turns to Nietzsche at the end of the ninth section of the introduction, immediately after it has critiqued phenomenology. Almost ironically, Foucault’s text deploys the notion of the eternal return to describe the way in which post-Kantian philosophers always return to reflections on the a priori, the originary, and finitude—in other words, to the illusions from which philosophers have tried for centuries now to emancipate themselves. Foucault’s introduction plays with Nietzsche’s language of the eternal return, of philosophizing with a hammer, of the dawn—as a way to emphasize the recurring problem of existential and psychological phenomenologies. Foucault writes there, pointing to Nietzsche’s words and most identifying expressions, “c’est là, dans cette pensée qui pensait la fin de la philosophie, que résident la possibilité de philosopher encore, et l’injonction d’une austérité neuve.” That “new austerity” represents the quest for an end to illusions.

Then, at the bitter end of the introduction, in the final, tenth section, Foucault’s text “returns to the initial problem” of the relationship between critique and anthropology in order to highlight the problem of illusions—the transcendental and then anthropological illusions, those illusions that truffle Foucault’s pages. Foucault’s text rails that it is practically impossible to mount a “real” critique of these anthropological illusions. There is nothing but a constant and permanent circulation of the illusion in all of social science and philosophy, such that, in the end, philosophers are incapable of exercising a real critique—“l’incapacité où nous sommes d’exercer contre cette illusion anthropologique une vraie critique.”

It is here, at the very bitter end, that Foucault’s introduction deploys Nietzsche’s words to open a possible door. Here, Nietzsche stands not only for the death of God, but with it, the death of man. “L’entreprise nietzschéenne pourrait être entendue comme point d’arrêt enfin donné à la prolifération de l’interrogation sur l’homme.” With Nietzsche’s words, Foucault’s text suggests, we might finally see how the critique of finitude would circle back to the beginning of time. “La trajectoire de la question: Was ist der Mensch? dans le champ de la philosophie s’achève dans la réponse qui la récuse et la désarme: der Übermensch.”

Nietzsche’s discourse on the over-man allows philosophy to get past man and the anthropological illusion. By killing God and, with him, man, by getting beyond man, not to a super-man but to some place beyond men, it may be possible to get past the naturalized idea of man that always lurks in the background. Foucault’s text experiments with Nietzsche’s words to create a space, an opening. It treats Nietzsche’s writings as an object of study—a critical object of study. And when you think about it, it is not entirely surprising that Foucault apparently did not want his introduction published as is. It was an experiment with Nietzsche’s discourse—very much like the earliest manuscripts. An experiment in the critical deployment of Nietzsche’s writings.

II. “Nietzsche, Marx, Freud” (1964)

Foucault delivers his paper “Nietzsche, Marx, Freud” at a colloquium on Nietzsche that Gilles Deleuze organized at Royaumont in July 1964. At the time that Foucault was writing his essay, he is immersed also in writing and thinking The Order of Things, which was published nineteen months later in April 1966. Foucault had already finished a first version of the book manuscript by December 1964, and thus was at the tail end of the composition of this first version when he gave his conference in Royaumont. Shortly after the conference,
in April 1965, Foucault rewrites another three-hundred-page-long version of The Order of Things. When the Royaumont colloquium takes place, Foucault is truly in the midst of writing his “book on signs” and, while fully immersed in this book, Foucault’s essay tackles Nietzsche’s writings as an epistemological object worthy of analysis.

If his introduction took aim at phenomenology (and Jean-Paul Sartre among others), this essay takes aim at semiology and semiotics (and Roland Barthes among others). In this project, Nietzsche’s writings, as well as those of Freud and Marx, become the specimen of an episteme. The three œuvres, as representatives of a hermeneutics of suspicion, become an archaeological layer in the historical ways of knowing. Nietzsche’s texts become the illustration of an episteme from the nineteenth century, key to understanding our way of thinking in the modern age.

Nietzsche’s writings are an epistemological object of study: an exemplary, paradigmatic discourse representing a certain mindset and logic of the nineteenth century. They are a specimen, an archaeological layer that reflects on our times. The 1964 essay uses a slightly different terminology than The Order of Things: it describes the layers of knowledge in terms of “systems of interpretation.” Nietzsche’s writings, then, represent a system of interpretation, certain techniques, methods, modes of interpretation, the purpose of which was to resolve age-old suspicions on the subject of language and the effects of language. These suspicions, Foucault’s text suggests, had always existed. Two great suspicions, in fact, first the suspicion that language does not work, does not say exactly what it is supposed to say, and, second, that there are things in the world which speak in ways we had not previously suspected.21

These two great suspicions, Foucault’s essay argues, have always been around, and in a certain way, systems of interpretation have always targeted these suspicions. The episteme of the Renaissance from the sixteenth century, based on resemblance, took aim at the same suspicions regarding language. Foucault’s discussion in 1964 of convention, of sympathy, of emulation, of the signature, of analogy, of techniques of identity and resemblance, is fully immersed in the second chapter of The Order of Things, in “The Prose of the World,” the book chapter on the episteme of the Renaissance: there is a very similar discussion in the 1964 essay of the techniques, the convenentia,22 “emulation,”23 and “analogy,”24 and of course the “signature.”24 All the terms, all the techniques of interpretation that Foucault’s essay discusses and summarizes at the very beginning of the text are there too in The Order of Things.25

So we are clearly immersed in the first of the three epistemes that are presented and disarticulated in The Order of Things, the first characterized by resemblance and similitude. The following layer, in both the essay and the third chapter of the book, is representation, the system of interpretation from the age of Reason (l’âge classique)—the relationship between identity and difference, the application of a certain order, the categorizations and taxonomies that are characteristic of the age of Reason. And then comes the modern age.

It is this third period that Foucault’s 1964 essay attempts to decipher with what it calls a “new possibility of interpretation.” The writings of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud founded anew; so the essay claims, the possibility of a hermeneutics, a system of interpretation, techniques of interpretation, interpretive techniques. What then is new in the writings of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud? Foucault’s text proposes several theses. First and foremost, these writings modified the space of distribution within which signs are signs.
means that they changed the spatial relations inherent in the interpretations of signs. There is in fact a certain aporia of depth in their work. There is both a movement of interpretation that goes into the depths—for example, in Nietzsche’s work, where we find a verticality of metaphors and analogies. A depth perhaps, but also the understanding that all depth leads us to the conclusion that what exists deep down is simply another game, another interpretation; that, in fact, depth is but a game, no more than a fold in the surface, “a surface fold.”

Hence a certain aporia, that we are always attempting to go deeper in our search—as a technique of interpretation—but that we finds ourselves always, in fact, at the surface.

The second principal intervention of this 1964 text is that interpretation is an infinite task and that everything is interpretation. Every sign is but an interpretation of another sign. The essay reads: “There is absolutely nothing primary to interpret, because ultimately, everything is already interpretation. Every sign is in itself, not the thing that offers itself up to interpretation, but the interpretation of other signs.” In other words, there is no originary source, there is no original signified to which one can return. There are only acts of interpretation: “There is no original signified for Nietzsche,” and everything that one must interpret is already an interpretation of signs imposed by a will. We find impositions of interpretation, but no original source.

“There is never, if you like, an interpretandum that is not already interpretans, so that it is as much a relationship of violence as of elucidation that is established in interpretation.” This violence arises from the obligation to reinterpret everything, to test everything. There is only interpretation, and every interpretation “must overthrow, inverse, shatter with the blow of a hammer.” What is this violence, you may ask? The answer is that, instead of posing the question of interpretation in order to arrive at an original sign, we are simply reinterpreting interpretations. And those interpretations are not themselves reliable. In Twilight of the Idols, there is violence as we are confronted with critiques of Socrates, of Plato, of Kant, of Christianity. Nietzsche’s Twilight attacks Rousseau, Sand, Zola, so many respectable figures, and in opposition, and this is surely violent, it applauds Caesar, Napoleon, Dostoyevsky, Goethe, as men of stronger, healthier character. This notion of violence consists in attacking interpretations, in imposing interpretations, but also in posing the question, does this interpretation hold? And in that sense, one must test these interpretations, and one way of thinking about the question of philosophizing with a hammer, is precisely to think of the physician’s hammer used to sound the abdomen, to listen and to diagnose abdominal tympanism. The percussion hammer is used to hit against an interpretation, to hear if it is void or if there is a void behind it. Of course, this notion of verifying the tenability, the durability of an interpretation, that never ends, is taken up in Deleuze’s Nietzsche and philosophy which states: “The philosophy of values, as envisaged and established by [Nietzsche], is the true realization of critique and the only way in which a total critique may be realized, the only way to ‘philosophize with a hammer.’” In Foucault’s 1964 essay, “philosophizing with a hammer” consists in ceaselessly posing the question of interpretation.

The last paragraph of the 1964 essay ends with a comparison between semiology and Nietzsche, and in this last paragraph one begins to see another political project emerge: we had been studying a nineteenth century epistemology, but here all of a sudden we are in the process of discovering a more contemporary model. The essay emphasizes that semiology is completely different than this nineteenth century hermeneutics: “It seems to me necessary to understand what too many of our contemporaries forget, that hermeneutics and semiology are two fierce enemies.” We are now, here, in the present, and, in speaking of semiology,
the text takes aim at Barthes. It argues that semiologists (and academic Marxists as well) retain too much stock in the idea of signification or interpretations that they can apply. They retain a preconception concerning the force of interpretations. They have stopped applying percussion on their own theories of semiology or dialectical materialism. They are too comfortable that their method of interpretation, their theory of interpretation can operate in all contexts, that theirs is an originary that works.

We have gone from an archéological analysis of the modern age to an analysis of Nietzsche’s writings for the present. We are now situated in the political debates of the mid-1960s. The 1964 essay marshals the hermeneutics of Nietzsche, Freud and Marx from the nineteenth century to contest those who have not fully understood or appreciated the infinity of interpretation: “To the contrary, a hermeneutic that wraps itself in itself enters the domain of languages which do not cease to implicate themselves, that intermediate region of madness and pure language. It is there that we recognize Nietzsche.” The final word of the text is “Nietzsche,” a word that stands in for a meaning projected onto a text. Foucault’s text deploys the full force of the illusion of influence.

We see this as well two years later in The Order of Things. “This arrangement maintained its firm grip on thought for a long while; and Nietzsche, at the end of the nineteenth century, made it glow into brightness again for the last time […] we see the emergence of what may perhaps be the space of contemporary thought. It was Nietzsche, in any case, who burned for us, even before we were born, the intermingled promises of the dialectic and anthropology.” So, it is “Nietzsche,” or to be more precise Nietzsche’s discourse that, here, opens another critical space for contemporary thought. It is Nietzsche’s writing that “marks the threshold beyond which contemporary philosophy can begin thinking again.” This is the Nietzsche of the death of God, but through the death of God, of the death of man. And as you know well, that is where The Order of Things will end.

The 1964 essay, in the end, does more than discern a way of thinking proper to the nineteenth century. It opens a space for critical thought at the furthest limits of the imagination—where the infinite task of interpretation may produce a point of rupture, or even drive us mad. It is the space that may come closest to the experience of madness—or, in the words of Foucault, that “could well be something like the experience of madness.”

In this gesture, the essay returns, to reinterpret, once again, a fragment from § 39 of Nietzsche’s book Beyond Good and Evil, a fragment that Foucault had labored as early as 1953 and to which he would return again and again: “To perish by absolute knowledge could well be part of the foundation of being.”

III. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971)

If it is productive to read “Nietzsche, Marx, Freud” in conversation with The Order of Things to see how Foucault’s essay works Nietzsche’s words, then the next published essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” could be read in the run up to Foucault’s first course at the Collège de France, originally named The Will to Know and published in 2011 under the title Lessons on the Will to Know (in order to differentiate it from the first volume of the History of Sexuality). Whereas Foucault’s earlier texts took aim at phenomenology and semiotics, this one points forward to the theory of “vouloir-savoir,” of the will to know, that will lead, a few years later, to “savoir-pouvoir”—knowledge/power. In this essay, Nietzsche’s words become a linguistic object of study in furtherance of the invention of knowledge.
The essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” was published in 1971 in a *festschrift* to Jean Hyppolite, a volume entitled *Hommage à Jean Hyppolite* published by the Presses Universitaires de France, and reprinted in *Dits & Écrits* in 1994. According to notes by Daniel Defert located in the Fonds Michel Foucault at the BnF, the essay arises from a rereading of Nietzsche that Foucault undertakes in the summer of 1967. In the files containing the draft manuscript, Defert notes: “Nietzsche 1967-1970: rereading of Nietzsche, Summer 1967” and in his chronology, Defert writes: “July 1967: return to Vandœuvre [from Tunis],” followed by the following entry from a letter Foucault wrote to Defert on 16 July 1967:

*Je lizzard Nietzsche; je crois commencer à m’apercevoir pourquoi ça me toujours fasciné.*

*Une morphologie de la volonté de savoir dans une civilisation européenne qu’on a laissée de côté en faveur d’une analyse de la volonté de puissance.*

I am perusing/lizarding/cracking Nietzsche; I think I am beginning to see why his work always fascinated me. A morphology of the will to knowledge in European civilization that we left to the side in favor of an analysis of the will to power.”

So, in the summer of 1967, Foucault returns to his recurring object of study—not madness, not yet the prison, but Nietzsche’s writings. But this time, Foucault will work the texts in another direction: “a morphology of the will to knowledge.”

Morphology is a study of forms. In biology, morphology is the study of the external forms and of the structure of living beings. In linguistics, morphology is the study of different categories of words and forms that are present in a language. Here, then, morphology would be the study of the forms that the will to knowledge might take, and, Foucault’s letter suggests, it is in fact this very study that was left aside in our readings of Nietzsche in favor of the will to power. The notion of the will to knowledge, Foucault’s letter suggests—a letter written at the completion of *The Order of Things* while Foucault is drafting *The Archeology of Knowledge*—is perhaps more important. This theme will guide both Foucault’s lectures of 1970-71 at the Collège de France and the first volume of his *History of Sexuality, The Will to Know*, published in 1976.

In July 1967, then, Foucault writes to Defert that he is “cracking” Nietzsche, and a month later, in late August, he finishes writing *The Archeology of Knowledge*. Immersed in the final stages of drafting that book, Foucault now seems to have found, in Nietzsche’s writings, what has fascinated him most with his object of study: the words “origin,” “birth,” “beginning.” Foucault’s 1971 essay plays with those words in Nietzsche’s vocabulary to develop the argument that *knowledge is invented*, and so, we must study this will to know.

Foucault’s publications had already and would again use these words. *The Birth of the Clinic. The Birth of the Prison*. But the words, “birth” or “origin,” raised more questions than they resolved. We saw this in the 1964 essay, which was careful to note the distinction between beginning and origin. It turns out that language here is only partly helpful; there are so many words to reference origins in French, in German, in English. In French: *origine, provenance, commencement, souche, cause, naissance*. There is an entire “word-cloud” in linguistics, a large cluster of words that can be used to designate the word “origin” and that might be of interest to us in French and in German. So Foucault’s text goes back to all the German words used in Nietzsche’s writings:
• *Ursprung*, in a sense closest to the word “origin,” but which must be distinguished from the word *Herkunft*, signifying “provenance.”
• *Entstehung* - creation, emergence, birth, apparition.
• *Herkunft* - origin, provenance, filiation, stem.
• *Abkunft* - familial origin.
• *Geburt* - birth, childbirth.
• *Erfindung* - invention, a word to which Foucault’s writings return to at length in this 1971 essay, as well as in the 1971 McGill lecture on Nietzsche.
• *Kunststück* - artifice.
• *Erbschaft* - heritage, succession, legacy.

Nietzsche’s language is Foucault’s laboratory. Nietzsche’s discourse, once again, is Foucault’s object of study—but this time to analyze the “origin” of knowledge. The words are legion, but what Foucault’s essay attempts to show is that Nietzsche’s texts sometimes use the notion of origin, *Ursprung*, in an unmarked sense, without trying to distinguish one usage from the other—but not always. (Not surprisingly, we could say the same of Foucault’s texts—especially, for instance, “Truth and Juridical Forms,” to which we will come to shortly, that opens with Foucault alternatively deploying the terms “appearance,” “invention,” “birth,” “origin,” “formation,” “emergence,” and “stabilization.”)

The distinction between *Ursprung*, origin, and *Herkunft*, provenance, ultimately favors a notion of invention, *Erfindung*, particularly in the opening paragraph of Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Falsity in an Extra-Moral Sense.” This notion of invention is what the 1971 essay is ultimately after.

In Foucault’s 1971 text—imagined and composed over the period 1967 to 1970—then, it is apparent that Foucault has shifted from treating Nietzsche as an *epistemological* object to treating him as a *linguistic* object. The goal, ultimately, is to locate the imposition of meanings: “to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents. This is undoubtedly why every origin of morality from the moment it stops being pious—and *Herkunft* can never be pious—has value as a critique.”

The object study clarifies the vocabulary. The 1971 essay uses the notion of *provenance*, of descent, the word *Herkunft*, because the idea of *provenance*, of descent, comprises and contains in part elements of race, social type, and social effects. By using this concept rather than others, Foucault’s text pushes us to reflect more on the context of social struggle, and racial struggle. He text begins using the words “heritage,” “succession,” and in German *Erbschaft*. Once again, the notion of heritage is something that comes with a sense of contestation, of distribution of wealth, of familial disputes over heritage and succession. The third term used frequently is “emergence,” “apparition,” in German *Entstehung*. This notion of emergence, irruption even, appears on page 144 (English, page 84) of the text: “Emergence is thus the entry of forces; it is their eruption, the leap from the wings to center stage, each in its youthful strength.” At this point we are lurching toward political combat, but we have not yet reached the question of power-knowledge that emerges later on. Here, we are still immersed in the concept of a will to knowledge: “The analysis of this great *vouloir-savoir* that runs through humanity.”
It is particularly interesting to note that the text ends once more on these dual themes: first, the notion of the dangerousness of this will to knowledge, and of its companion, the will to truth (which will emerge in the next stage of development of Foucault’s writings). This is the danger, the peril of absolute knowledge—the idea that the infiniteness of interpretation may lead to madness. And second, the notion of critique, so central to Foucault’s writings on Kant and so important in Deleuze’s writings on Nietzsche.


Foucault’s “Lesson on Nietzsche,” delivered at McGill University in April 1971, then uses Nietzsche’s texts to push his theory of the will to know toward a larger thesis on the will to truth and the writing of a history of truth-telling. The broader thesis represents the guiding thread of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France. Those thirteen years of lectures are best understood as a thirteen-year study in “forms of truth”: Truth and juridical forms first, then truth and historical forms, followed by truth and political-economic forms, and finally, truth and forms of subjectivity. The entire sequence amounts to a remarkable and novel history of how truth is produced: the techniques, the devices, the measures, the models of truth. At the University of McGill in 1971, at the very beginning of this series, what we witness is the transformation of the concept of vouloir-savoir into that history of truth. Once again, it is Nietzsche’s discourse that serves as the key—as object study—of the rearticulation.

A year earlier, in the winter 1969-70, Foucault had delivered lectures on Nietzsche at the experimental university at Vincennes. He subsequently reworked those manuscripts for other lectures, notably his three conferences at McGill (including this “Lesson on Nietzsche”), his later lectures in Rio in 1973, as well as portions of his Collège de France lectures on *Penal Theories and Institutions* in 1972.41

From the beginning of the lecture in Montreal in 1971, we can hear continuity. It is almost as if the text flows directly from “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” The 1971 lecture begins precisely with the passage from Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Falsity” published in 1873. It begins with the language of *Erfindung*, invention. Nietzsche’s passage will be reworked, in the lecture, from the idea of the invention of knowledge to the invention of truth. Without doubt, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” is a preparatory work that leads to this “Lesson on Nietzsche.” The enterprise that consisted in understanding which word to use is completed here. The linguistic study gives place to an *alethungy*—a term Foucault coined using the ancient Greek root *alēthes*, that which is true.42 The lecture opens: “The term *Erfindung*, invention, harks back to many other texts. Everywhere this term is opposed to the origin. But it is not synonymous with beginning.”43

We begin then with a synthesis, a concept that will guide so many of Foucault’s writings from this moment on: the idea of invention. The lecture proceeds to provide a summary of the elements contained in the concept of invention—what knowledge is, and what it is not: “Knowledge is the result of a complex operation […] that is not noble […] It is akin first to malice […] to laugh, to despise, to hate […] malice toward the one that knows.” The lecture takes up, once again—as in the 1964 essay—the notion of the lowliness of knowledge, gesturing also to the murderousness and relentlessness of knowledge. Here we find also, again, the idea that knowledge is perilous and dangerous. But what is new in the 1971 lecture is the relationship between knowledge and truth. In a section of four to five pages, approximately a third of the way into the lesson, the lecture begins to work the
difference between the invention of knowledge, the emergence of knowledge, and the invention of truth. This is the double movement: “Knowledge was invented, but truth was invented later still.”

The idea of invention is the key that will run through not only Foucault’s epistemological writings on the will to know, and his alethurgical writings on the will to truth, but also the later writings on subjectivity and care of self—what we used to refer to as Foucault’s third period, his “ethical” writings—where Nietzsche is sometimes less present. The notion of invention is tied there to that of peripeteia, which is central to Foucault’s interpretations of Oedipus and of the different ways in which truth is said and produced. With this notion of peripeteia we find, in the context of Foucault’s “Lesson on Nietzsche,” the seeds of his thought on the way in which avowal can produce truth, or at least produce what we think might be truthful. These are also the seeds of his lectures at Louvain in 1981, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, and of the final courses at the Collège de France, on the relationship between jurisdiction and veridiction, and on parrhesia. The same type of peripeteia can be found, for example, in Foucault’s discussion of the chariot race between Antilochus and Menelaus in book twenty-three of Homer’s Iliad.

In his “Lesson on Nietzsche,” this same conception of peripeteia and reversal is the basis for an invention and a rerouting of knowledge. This entails that we must place at the heart of the notion of truth, not a historical unfolding that would emerge through knowledge, but rather a will, once again, a will to truth. This represents a radical and violent break with philosophical tradition, since the will to truth is not the will to follow knowledge wherever it leads us, but rather the will to fight in a struggle for the production of truth. If the will to truth had always been important in the philosophical tradition, its character changes completely here. Foucault delivers his lessons on Nietzsche almost at the same time that he delivered his first set of lectures at the Collège de France, and the whole project of those lectures at the Collège is audible here: “From there, we see the Nietzschean task: to think the history of truth without relying on truth. In a context in which truth does not exist: the context of appearance.”

V. “Truth and Juridical Form,” Rio de Janeiro (May 1973)

This brings us to May 1973. Foucault has just completed his lectures on The Punitive Society at the Collège de France—his third lecture series, after Lessons on the Will to Know and Penal Theories and Institutions. Having just completed the third series, Foucault travels to Rio de Janeiro to deliver conferences at the Pontifical Catholic University under the title “Truth and Juridical Form.” The first opens with a treatment of Nietzsche’s writings.

From the very first conference in Rio, it is clear that we are witnessing a passage from the notion of vouloir-savoir to the theory of savoir-pouvoir. The emerging construct of knowledge-power will ground Foucault’s intervention in Discipline and Punish and represents the culmination of his genealogical critique of the early 1970s. We witness this clearly, for example, at the end of the first Rio conference, which performs the main intervention: namely a critique of knowledge and of truth to show that the human subject that we think is at the foundation of knowledge, that we think is stabilized, and which purportedly receives and gives form to knowledge, is in fact itself invented. It is not only, then, that knowledge is an invention, it is also that the human subject is an invention. And it is in this invention of the subject that we can locate the relations of power and all the forces that produce the conception of a subject.
“In Nietzsche, one finds a type of discourse,” Foucault writes, “that undertakes a historical analysis of the formation of the subject itself, a historical analysis of the birth of a certain type of knowledge—without ever granting the preexistence of a subject of knowledge.” Notice, and this is key: “a type of discourse.” Yes, Nietzsche’s writing is an object of study for Foucault, here now a directly political object of study. An object study that shows us that our own subjectivity is shaped by the interpretations that we embrace and that we impose—in a vertiginous cycle or circle of meaning making, one in which there is no preexisting subject. And this, Foucault says, “can serve as a model for us in our analyses.”

The conferences in Rio set out to do two things: first a history of the subject, and second a history of truth. Both are linked. One produces the other or, let’s say, the two merge around the same political intervention. The history of the subject is fundamental, and I would venture to say that it constitutes the most radical part of this work. It undoes the idea of a definitively given subject and shows how the subject of knowledge is historically constructed and constituted: it reveals, on the one hand, the historical constitution of the subject, and on the other hand, the history of truth. This represents a culmination of writings that began at least with Foucault’s introduction to Kant’s Anthropology.

The Rio conferences develop five points. The first is that knowledge was invented. This follows directly from the linguistic use of the “invention” of knowledge discussed earlier. Once again, there is no origin, knowledge is not part of human nature, it is not about instincts either, it is rather a struggle. This leads to the second point, namely the philosophically radical conclusion that, as a result, knowledge possesses no relation of similitude, representation, affinity: it has no resemblance to things. There is a complete rupture between knowledge and things. The Rio conferences state: “Knowledge has no relation of affinity with the world to be known.” So, we are in a world in which our knowledge is invented and completely separated from things in the world—a radical vision of our situation that constitutes a sharp break with philosophical tradition. The lectures explain why in the third point: because this philosophical tradition has always needed a conception of the divine, an idea of God, to make the connection between knowledge and the world, things, the world that we perceive. If one returns to Descartes, or even to Kant, one sees the need for a conception of the divine in order for there to be such an affinity between knowledge and the perceived world. But given this rupture between knowledge and the world, we no longer need God. Hence, the death of God. And not only the death of God—and this is the fourth point—but also the death of the subject, at least the possible death of the subject, even though now we really don’t need a unified and sovereign subject anymore. The subject can thus disappear, or at least we are faced with a situation in which it could well be that the subject no longer exists. This leads to the final, fifth, point: that we are left in a situation in which “at the root of knowledge, Nietzsche places something like hatred, struggle, power relations.”

We are thus brought to the will to power, to relations of power, to Nietzsche’s writings from 1888, which bring us much closer to politics than to philosophy, which place us in relations of struggle and relations of power rather than relations of science. The Rio conferences state: “What we need then, is not to turn to the philosophers who think that the production of knowledge can be harmonious, pacific or something of the sort; politicians know full well that what is needed is civil war.” This is Nietzsche as political object of knowledge. And at that time, in 1973, in Rio, the place of Nietzsche’s discourse as a directly political object of study is at its apex.
It would have been possible, and perhaps more honest, to cite only one name, that of Nietzsche, because what I say here won’t mean anything if it isn’t connected to Nietzsche’s work, which seems to me to be the best, the most effective, the most pertinent of the models that one can draw upon.\footnote{48}

In Nietzsche, one finds a type of discourse that undertakes a historical analysis of the formation of the subject itself, a historical analysis of the birth of a certain type of knowledge—without ever granting the preexistence of a subject of knowledge.\footnote{49}

At the end of the passage on Nietzsche, Foucault declares that he is studying certain passages of Nietzsche, but not Nietzscheanism. This too is key. The method stays focused on the words, on the discourse, not on the anthropomorphized object. And this makes Foucault’s work on Nietzsche different, for example, from the work that Derridadevotes to Nietzsche. The contrast with Derrida is clear when Foucault responds to his critics—who might accuse him of picking and choosing, of cherry picking passages that relate to power simply because he wants to find relations of power everywhere. Foucault’s response: “First, I took up this text in function of my interests, not to show that this was the Nietzschean conception of knowledge,” not because Foucault wants to say that this is a systematic and coherent conception of Nietzsche etc., “since there are innumerable and often mutually contradictory texts on this topic.” Foucault is not interested in the contradictions: among mutually contradictory texts, he sets aside those that are of no interest to him, he turns to those that interest him and finds there, and only there, something which is useful to him in Nietzsche: “A certain number of elements which provide us with a model for a historical analysis of what I would call the politics of truth. It is a model that one does find in Nietzsche, and I even think that it is one of the most important models to be found in Nietzsche’s work, in order to understand some apparently contradictory elements in his conception of knowledge.”\footnote{50}

Foucault is working on Nietzsche’s texts, selecting, finding those which allow him to discern a model that works for him. This model is only one of many possible Nietzschean models, but for Foucault it is the one, the use of which will make it possible to construct a history of truth. Foucault himself admitted as much in an interview in 1977—although we should be wary of attributing too much to his own self-assessments. Foucault remarked, “For myself, I prefer to utilise the writers I like. The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if then the commentators say that I am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest.”\footnote{51}

Conclusion

The broader point is this: if we approach philosophical discourse critically, there is no such thing as “Nietzsche.” There is no “Nietzsche” that one could be faithful to. There are passages, texts, books, writings that at times contradict each other. “Nietzsche” does not constitute a coherent whole, so one could not even be “Nietzschean” if one tried. There are just written traces that lend themselves to interpretation and manipulation—to infinite interpretation. In other methodological traditions, to be sure, writers may conceive of themselves as inscribed and influenced by a thinker. They may even self-identify as, say, “Marxian.”\footnote{52} But to speak of being “Nietzschean,” by contrast, would make no sense.
Informed by this critical method, we should perhaps approach Foucault’s texts in a similar manner—as object study. The series of his published essays and lectures—let alone the voluminous unpublished manuscripts—offer a remarkable trajectory of ideas, a changing sequence of appropriations, each of which displaces others, replacing, rethinking, remaking.

This raises an interesting question to end on: Did Foucault need Nietzsche? Or, more relevant to us, do we, critical thinkers, need Nietzsche—or, for that matter, Foucault? Some have already responded no—as evidenced by a book published by Grasset in 1991 under the title *Why we are not Nietzschean*. The volume includes a number of French philosophers, including my colleague Vincent Descombes, as well as Luc Ferry, Philippe Raynaut, Alain Renaut and others—it was a collective effort to repudiate Nietzsche, as so many had done before and will no doubt continue to do. Nietzsche’s way of thinking, they tell us, relativizes values, glorifies a deconstruction of discourse and can lead, ultimately, to nihilism. Others disagree and claim Nietzsche. Most recently, Dorian Astor, a biographer of Nietzsche, and Alain Jugnon, edited a collection published in 2016 entitle *Why we are Nietzschean*.

I hope to have shown that the question itself is not the right question to ask. It has little meaning and is methodologically demeaning. What we do with texts and ideas, as critical theorists and practitioners, is not to follow or apply them, but to interpret, test, and deploy them in pursuit of our own political projects. We often refer to “Nietzsche” or “Foucault,” but those terms do not have coherent meaning. They are shorthand for written traces. It may well be that we anthropomorphize philosophers, books, and their *oeuvre*, but that is just our human weakness, not a critical method. The only way to do justice to our critical task of writing, theorizing, and again, more importantly, engaging in critical praxis, is precisely to put these critical traces to work in furtherance of our own political project.
NOTES

1 Columbia and EHESS. Special thanks to Daniele Lorenzini for comments on this first draft and suggested readings; to Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and Henri-Paul Fruchaud for ongoing collaboration on the Foucault-Nietzsche manuscripts; to Sabina Bremner for insightful conversations on Foucault’s introduction to Kant’s Anthropology; to Raphaël Burns for assistance translating portions of this draft; and many others. All errors are my own; please send me comments and reactions at beh2139@columbia.edu so that I can correct them.


In line with this draft, recent work has begun to complexify the relationship between Foucault and Nietzsche, see especially Daniele Lorenzini, La Force du vrai. De Foucault à Austin (Le Bord de l’eau, Lormont, 2017); Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Stuart Elden, Foucault: The Birth of Power (Polity, 2017); Amy Allen, see infra; the contributors to Alan Rosenberg and Joseph Westfall’s edited volume, Foucault and Nietzsche: A Critical Encounter (2018); Tuomo Tiisala, supra; and of course Daniel Defert’s “Situation du cours” in Foucault, Leçons sur la Volonté de savoir. Cours au Collège de France, 1970-1971 (Paris: Gallimard/Le Seuil, 2011).

3 In a draft article titled “On Possibilising Genealogy,” Daniele Lorenzini argues for a unique notion of genealogy that he calls the “possibilising” dimension of genealogical inquiry and locates in Foucault’s writings, especially on the notion of counter-conduct and of the critical attitude. This possibilising form of genealogy, which is different from the two classic ways of thinking about genealogy—as vindication of core concepts or as a way to unmask or debunk—clearly distinguishes Foucault’s conception from Nietzsche’s. See Daniele Lorenzini, “On Possibilising Genealogy,” draft presented at CCCCT’s “Critical Work” workshop on April 19, 2019 (draft on file with author). Amy Allen and Colin Koopman have identified a form of genealogy they call “problematizing genealogies” that they associate with Foucault, by contrast to the debunking genealogical approach of Nietzsche and the vindicatory approach of Bernard Williams. See Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), p. 60; Amy Allen, “Beyond Kant Versus Hegel: An Alternative Strategy for Grounding the Normativity of


10 This is not to suggest that there are no biographical connections we can draw between written texts and their authors. Objects of study do not spring out of nowhere—and neither do political projects. It is always possible to find biographical moments to contextualize philosophical discourse or to give it meaning.

So, for instance, Foucault’s fascination with the discourse of madness did not spring out of nowhere. Foucault began working at a psychiatric hospital, Sainte-Anne in Paris, at an early age, when he was 25 years old, in October 1951—after having attempted to take his own life in June 1950 and considered committing himself to that very hospital in July of that year. See Daniel Defert, «Chronologie», in Pléiade Volume I, p. xxxviii-xl. Foucault tutored psychology at the École Normale Supérieure beginning in October 1951, having received a bachelors in psychology two years earlier in 1949, and his first academic appointment was as assistant professor of psychology at Clermont-Ferrand in 1960. Id. at xxxix and xxxviii. The discourse on madness, as object of study for Foucault, did not spring out of nowhere. He returned to it throughout his intellectual life—from the very first book he published in 1954 on “Mental Illness and Personality,” to his course and writings on Ludwig Binswanger and his visit to the patient festival at the Swiss asylum in Münsterlingen in 1953, to his dissertation on “Madness and Unreason,” to his lectures on psychiatric power at the Collège de France in 1973-74, to his analysis of the ancient method of the interpretation of dreams in the third volume of The History of Sexuality published shortly before his death in 1984.

In the same way, the discourse of sexuality did not spring out of nowhere as an object of study. For his master class during his agregation examination in philosophy in 1951, Foucault was assigned, by lot, the topic of “sexuality,” a new topic that had been proposed for the first time by Georges Canguilhem. Id. at xxxix. The multiple biographical connections, too, would initiate a life-long interest in the concept of sexuality—from his
course on sexuality at the University of Clermont-Ferrand in 1964, to his course on the
discourse of sexuality at the experimental university of Vincennes in 1969, to his inaugural
lecture “The Order of Discourse” at the Collège de France in 1971, to his four published
volumes, the last posthumously, on The History of Sexuality.

This is true as well for Foucault’s other life-long object of study: Nietzsche’s
discourse. Foucault often recounted that he was introduced to Nietzsche through the
writings of Georges Bataille, and to Bataille by Blachot. At other times, Foucault said he
came to Nietzsche through Heidegger. The archives suggest that Foucault first encountered
Nietzsche’s writings in about 1951, while a student at the École Normale Supérieure; a few
years later, in August 1953, Foucault delved into Nietzsche’s writings on history, especially
the untimely meditations. *Id.* at xxxix and xli. Foucault dedicated a course to Nietzsche in
October 1953. It was at about that time that he started writing (still today unpublished)
manuscripts on Nietzsche. The earliest unpublished manuscripts seem to date from about
1953, and, according to Gérard Lebrun, Foucault began writing a text on Nietzsche in
November 1954. *Id.* at xlii. His interest in Nietzsche’s texts would extend to his very last
lecture in *The Courage of Truth* on March 28, 1984, a few months before his death. See Michel
see also p. 164 and 178 for a more extensive discussion of Nietzsche’s cynicism, as well as p.
89-94 on *The Gay Science*.

It is always possible to draw biographical connections and find meanings; but those
are secondary, and often misleading to the critical task of working writings for our political
investigations.

11 Foucault published his translation of Kant’s *Anthropology* in 1964 at Vrin, but did
not include his introduction for reasons discussed by Defert, Ewald, and Gros in their
presentation, see pages 8-9.

12 This is at page 68 of Foucault’s introduction. Much of the preceding analysis
demonstrates how Kant’s anthropology simply repeats the critique. *See, e.g., id.*, p. 52. The
three questions of critique (what can I know, what should I do, what can I hope) becomes
“*source, domaine, limite*” (p. 53); the three questions of logic (p. 51), etc. There is repetition.
(Perhaps relate to Deleuze, *Différence et répétition*, 1968).

13 Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols or how to philosophize with a hammer* (1888; published
1889); “*Götzen-Dämmerung oder wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert.*”


15 See ibid., at 76-78.

16 Ibid., p. 78.

17 Ibid., p. 78.

18 Ibid., p. 79.

19 See “*Présentation*” by Defert, Ewald, and Gros in Foucault, *Introduction à

20 Foucault’s essay is published, alongside the contributions of Deleuze, Pierre
Klossowski, Karl Löwith, Jean Wahl and others, in the 1967 collection titled “Nietzsche.

21 Foucault writes in this text from 1964, for example on page 572 (English, page 269), that the techniques of the Renaissance were also techniques to eradicate suspicion: “one can say that allegoria and hyponoia are at the bottom of language and before it, not just what slipped after the fact from beneath words in order to displace them and make them vibrate, but what gave birth to words, what makes them glitter with a luster that is never fixed.” Here we see clearly that the different epistemological layers were always in a relationship with this question of the suspicion of truth.


23 Ibid., page 34 (English, page 19)

24 Ibid., page 36 (English, page 21-22).

25 One could also say, conversely, that if in “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx” we are deeply in The Order of Things, in The Order of Things we are deeply in “Nietzsche, Marx, Freud.” We see this clearly on page 311 (page 298) of The Order of Things, for example, when Foucault discusses the modern episteme: “The first book of Capital is an exegesis of value, all of Nietzsche is an exegesis of a few Greek words, Freud is an exegesis of the silent phrases that underpin…”


27 Ibid., page 571 (English, page 275)

28 Foucault observes that, to understand this, one need only look at the etymology of agathos in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. When Nietzsche tells us that words have always been invented by superior classes, he is not pointing to a signified, he is imposing an interpretation. The model for understanding these hermeneutics, then, can be found in paragraphs four and five of the first essay of the Genealogy of Morals, where Nietzsche develops an analysis of the word “good” and shows that the meaning of the word is linked to the group that is speaking, in different historical, cultural and geographical periods. What is important here, is not so much the fact of doing philology, of using a classical philological technique that seeks to find the meaning of words through filiation so as to return to a form of original signified. Rather, it is to show at every little stage, in all these different contexts, how those who are speaking use the word and thereby impose meanings on the word, how they create signs in temporal and political contexts, in the context of their own group. It is there that Nietzsche finds, for example, the notion of nobility, of superiority. He finds that the contingent political attachments inherent to the way in which we use a word in one culture or another evoke something like nobility: “With regard to a moral genealogy, this seems to me a fundamental insight; that it has been arrived at so late is the fault of the retarding influence exercised by the democratic prejudice of the modern world toward all questions of origin.” (Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, paragraph four, p. 28). So, it is necessary to travel through history to find the way in which these significeds have been
steeped in certain conceptions of race, and we see the importance of race in the fifth paragraph of this text: “the rich,’ ‘the possessors,’ (this is the meaning of ary; and of corresponding words in Iranian and Slavic).” (Ibid p. 29) We find the notion of race, notion of nobility, notion of force, of the blonde head in opposition to the dark native with black hair. “The Celts, by the way, were definitely a blonde race; it is wrong to associate traces of an essentially dark-haired people which appear on the more careful ethnographic maps of Germany, with any sort of Celtic origin or blood-mixture.” (Genealogy of Morals, First Essay, paragraph five, p. 30). The aryan notion itself is imposed on the notion of “good” and “evil.” For Foucault, this is an example of this imposition of interpretation that one finds in Nietzsche and that would thus give us the infinite task of trying to understand how different meanings have been imposed through time. (English translation references in parentheses drawn from Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the genealogy of morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale; Ecce homo. Trans. Walter Kaufmann; Ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books. 1989, c1967).

29 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Marx, Freud,” at page 571; English, p. 275.

30 Ibid.


32 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Marx, Freud,” at page 574 (English, p. 278).


34 Ibid., page 353 (English, p. 342).

35 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Marx, Freud,” at page 571 (English, p. 275).

36 Foucault’s writings would return to this theme not only in the 1964 text, but also in The Order of Things, which underscores that “Thought […] is a perilous act. Sade, Nietzsche, Artaud and Bataille have understood this on behalf of all those who tried to ignore it.” See Les Mots et les choses, page 339 (English, p. 328).


39 This notion of irruption will be important for Sarah Kofman as the inspiration for certain titles that she will use to speak about Ecce Homo and about Nietzsche’s work. The notion of irruption lends itself to the task of detecting different relations of force, relations of power, domination. We see this on page 145 (English, page 85) where Foucault speaks precisely of dominators and dominated.

40 Foucault, “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire,” at p. 155; official English translation at page 85: “The historical analysis of this rancorous will to knowledge…”

41 In comparison to the lectures at the Collège de France or other earlier lectures that are currently being prepared for publication, those that Foucault delivered on Nietzsche at Vincennes have been somewhat scattered. We find pieces of them in different texts and in
other writings, but it may not be possible to reconstitute them with the same degree of continuity as other lectures. In any case, they served as the basis of the lectures at McGill.


44 *Leçon sur Nietzsche*, p. 199.


46 Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms,” p. 5-6.

47 Ibid., p. 6.

48 Ibid., p. 5.

49 Ibid., p. 6.

50 My translation.


52 Without wanting to revive old and worn rivalries, thinkers who genuinely believed in scientific Marxism would typically have conceived of themselves as laboring within a Marxian tradition. This explains how a thinker like Eduard Bernstein could write that he was “well aware” that his argument for reform and parliamentary Social Democracy “deviates in several important particulars from the views to be found in the theory of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels—whose writings have exercised the greatest influence on my views as a socialist” Eduard Bernstein, *The Preconditions of Socialism* (Cambridge University Press, ), p. 7; or that a thinker like Rosa Luxemburg could write that “Marxian doctrine” is “the most stupendous product of the human mind in the century.” Rosa Luxemburg, *Reform or Revolution and Other Writings* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc.), p. 5. The self-conception as a “Marxian” thinker requires a positivist conception of scientific Marxism, entirely alien to what a critical theorist does when she takes philosophical discourse as object study (which would represent a very different approach to Marx’s texts as well).

53 In this essay, I have focused only on published essays and lectures, and I have not analyzed closely the eight monographs Foucault published during his lifetime. This is not an accident. These essays, lectures, and conferences on Nietzsche surely, and explicitly, took Nietzsche’s writings as object of study. But the eight monographs that resulted, those eight works that Foucault allowed to go to press—and recall, he willed no posthumous publications—those eight formidable books bear a different relation to Nietzsche’s work, I believe: The products of object studies on the discourses of madness, of the prison, of sexuality, informed by an object study of Nietzsche and perhaps a few others. Kant. Bataille. Blanchot. We could debate these latter. We could also confront the importance of Kant’s versus Nietzsche’s writings. Compare Michel Foucault, “Foucault,” in *Dits & Ecrits*, Vol. IV, text #345, 631-636, p. 631 (1994). But Nietzsche’s words are not on the table in the eight books in the way in which they are explicit object studies in these essays and lecture. They
recede somewhat to the background in the books. A silent engagement. A more subtle deployment.