Freedom, Choice, and Contracts

Hanoch Dagan
Tel Aviv University, daganh@post.tau.ac.il

Michael A. Heller
Columbia Law School, mheller@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship

Part of the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2330

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu.
FREEDOM, CHOICE, AND CONTRACTS

Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller

Hanoch Dagan
Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law
daganh@post.tau.ac.il
(972) 52-879-7383

Michael Heller
Columbia Law School
mhelle@law.columbia.edu
212-854-9763

June 18, 2018

© Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, 2018
FREEDOM, CHOICE, AND CONTRACTS

Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller

ABSTRACT

In The Choice Theory of Contracts, we explain contractual freedom and celebrate contract types. This Issue offers penetrating critiques. Here, we reply by refining choice theory and showing how it fits and shapes the contract canon.

I. Freedom. (1) Charles Fried challenges our account of Kantian autonomy, but his views, we show, largely converge with choice theory. (2) Nathan Oman argues for a commerce-enhancing account of autonomy. We counter that he arbitrarily slights noncommercial spheres central to human interaction. (3) Yitzhak Benbaji suggests that choice theory’s commitment to autonomy is overly perfectionist. Happily, in reply to Benbaji, we can cite with approval Charles Fried’s point that contract types are “enabling our liberties.”

II. Choice. (4) Aditi Bagchi criticizes our inattention to impediments to choice. We show how choice theory’s commitments to both multiplicity and relational justice ameliorate these impediments. (5) Gregory Klass explores parol evidence to highlight the mechanics of choice. We substantially concur and show how such mechanisms can ensure voluntariness, an essential element of choice. (6) Oren Bar-Gill and Clayton Gillette question the institutional capacity of existing legal actors to implement choice theory. Working from the example of cohabitation, we offer a somewhat more optimistic view.

III. Contracts. (7) Peter Benson argues our focus on the rational slights the reasonable. Although we did not use this Rawlsian vocabulary, choice theory complies with its strictures, more so than transfer theory. (8) Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz argue provocatively that contract theory must capitulate before pluralism (as they endorse), leverage it, or fall victim to an embracing approach (their charge against us). We reject the charge choice theory is foundationally value pluralist. Instead, we cabin pluralism and put it to work. (9) The Contract Canon starts on the next big step for choice theory by explaining existing doctrine (rebutting Benson on lack of fit) and helping adjudicate contract practice (countering Markovits and Schwartz on the vices of our pluralism). Choice theory fits and shapes the contract canon.

Each paper in this Issue advances the field; each prompts us to refine choice theory – all steps we hope toward a more just and justified law of contract.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1

I. FREEDOM: AUTONOMY, NOTHING LESS ........................................................... 2

1. Charles Fried.................................................................................................... 2
2. Nathan Oman ................................................................................................ 5
3. Yitzhak Benbaji ............................................................................................ 7

II. CHOICE: CHALLENGING, BUT REAL .............................................................. 10

4. Aditi Bagchi .................................................................................................. 10
5. Gregory Klass .............................................................................................. 13
6. Oren Bar-Gill and Clayton Gillette ............................................................. 16

III. CONTRACTS: CHOICE THEORY AND THE CANON ......................................... 19

7. Peter Benson .................................................................................................. 19
8. Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz ......................................................... 21
9. The Contract Canon ........................................................................................ 27

CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................... 32
INTRODUCTION

In The Choice Theory of Contracts,¹ we advance a liberal approach to contract that celebrates contract types and justifies contractual freedom. Here, we reply to critics.

First, in Choice Theory, we reject the universalizing tendency of the Willistonian project and instead highlights contract’s *multiplicity*. We shift emphasis from “general” contract law to (or rather, back to) particular contract types. Contract types – including the residual type of “freestanding contracting” – are the proper categories for law design. We are not the first to warn against the flattening effects of contract monism and the unprincipled multiplicity of the common law (and European civil law) that Williston hoped to systematize. But unlike other critiques, choice theory offers a *principled* account of contract’s multiplicity. The principle that grounds contract law is autonomy.

Our second departure concerns the meaning and role of freedom in contract. Liberal theories of contract typically aim at distilling an autonomy-based account purged of any teleological foundation. Our account is diametrically opposed: choice theory embraces autonomy’s role as the *telos* of contract. Contract, we argue, is a valuable convention – indeed, a convention that any liberal polity must enact – because, and to the extent, it proactively enhances individual autonomy, defined as people’s self-determination or self-authorship, that is, as our right to write and re-write the story of our lives.

A key takeaway of choice theory lies at the juncture of types and freedom. Our teleological theory reveals contract to be essentially a power-conferring institution, not a duty-imposing one. Contract law offers people a new power, the ability to make their lives meaningfully their own by legitimately enlisting others to their most important projects. In turn, this insight implies that one of the most fundamental contributions contract can, does, and should make to liberal societies is to ensure an adequate range of meaningfully-

* Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Legal Theory and Innovation & Director of the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Tel-Aviv University.
** Lawrence A. Wien Professor of Real Estate Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Roy Kreitner for his helpful comments.
available, normatively-attractive contract types in each important sphere of human interaction.

This Issue offers penetrating critiques of choice theory. We are indebted to Charles Fried, Nathan Oman, Yitzhak Benbaji, Aditi Bagchi, Gregory Klass, Oren Bar-Gill and Clayton Gillette, Peter Benson, and Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz for their thoughtful and generous discussions. Our Response cannot address all their points nor do justice to all their subtleties, so we have confined our comments to the three main themes of this Issue: Freedom, Choice, and Contracts. Each of their papers advances the field; and in turn, each helps us to refine and extend choice theory, a step we hope toward a more just and justified law of contract.

I. FREEDOM: AUTONOMY, NOTHING LESS

Charles Fried, Nathan Oman, and Yitzhak Benbaji take issue with the liberal foundations of choice theory. Fried argues that choice theory mistakenly disavows the Kantian approach to contracts. Oman takes a diametrically opposite view: he opposes choice theory’s reliance on autonomy as unacceptable to religious believers, and suggests that the only legitimate telos of contract is to serve commerce. Echoing Oman’s critique of neutrality, Benbaji claims that choice theory relies on an overly robust account of autonomy and offers a Rawlsian alternative, one not inflicted with the difficulties of what he views as choice theory’s excessive perfectionism.

1. Charles Fried. We begin with Fried due to his canonical status as the founding father of modern liberal theories of contract. Surprisingly, our positions largely converge with his.

At first, Fried rejects the adjective “teleological” (or “instrumental”) and he refuses to renounce the Kantian premise of his promise theory (8-10). But it is, we think, no coincidence that he ultimately embraces choice theory and graciously describes it as an “account of contract as the facilitating framework of human collaboration under our shared master norm of autonomy [that] is richer, more useful, and truer than my own account in

Explaining why Fried is able to subscribe to choice theory helps clarify both what we claim and what we do not.

Consider first our critique of modern Kantian approaches to contract, which are a genus of the “transfer theory” we detail in Chapter 3 of Choice Theory, in which a promise makes the promisee the sole and despotic owner of the jointly created right (however qualified it may be) vis-à-vis the promisor. The ambition of transfer theory, as we explain there, is to show why breach of contract is tantamount to conversion, so that the enforcement of wholly-executory contracts is justified even absent detrimental reliance by the promisee, although the only interpersonal obligation law can justifiably enforce is (in this view) solely negative, namely: to respect each other’s independence. But transfer theory, we argue, fails because it unnecessarily assumes an unqualified right to the promisor’s performance and because it is insufficiently attuned to the implications of contract’s nature as a power-conferring institution.

There is no need for us to reiterate and further defend this critique here (we do so elsewhere, in response to Arthur Ripstein’s review of our book3). Why not? It turns out Fried interprets Kant’s view on contracts in a manner consistent with choice theory.4 His restatement of promise theory happily (albeit implicitly) joins much of our critique of transfer theory.

We criticized transfer theory to show that reciprocal respect to independence cannot plausible justify recruitment of the coercive power of the state for enforcing (wholly-executory) contracts. But law, we further argued, is nonetheless justified in enforcing contracts thanks to contract’s important contribution to people’s self-authorship. As an essentially power-conferring legal device, contract allows people legitimately to recruit others to their goals. The word “legitimately” is key. Contract is a convention that offers this service of autonomy-enhancement, but it can work only if its invocation implies that the parties submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the convention it entrenches into the law. In a liberal polity, we claimed, people are justifiably expected to pay this (modest) price for the benefit of others, because our interpersonal relationships are governed by a reciprocal duty to respect each other’s right of self-determination (or self-authorship).5

---

3 See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, [title], *L. & PHIL. * (2019). That piece thus also addresses Peter Benson’s claim that “a transfer conception of contract may be theoretically indispensable” (3).

4 The question whether Fried misstates Kant’s position on contracts or is it Ripstein who mischaracterizes Kant’s theory is not for us to resolve.

5 The text implicitly responds to Yitzhak Benbaji’s claim that “autonomy as self-determination does not justify the basic distinction between unenforceable informal promises and enforceable formal contracts” (2). Indeed, appreciating the autonomy-based justification for contract enforcement as a form of (quite minimal) affirmative interpersonal duty, which is necessary for other people’s ability to resort to contract’s autonomy-enhancing potential, implies that where the law is unnecessary for this or where resort to the law might even be counter-productive, forcible enforcement should not
On its face, this response might seem to aggravate, rather than relieve, the legitimacy challenge because it openly admits that enforcing contracts even where nonperformance generates no harm is tantamount to prescribing an affirmative duty to assist others in pursuing self-determination. This proposition is indeed devastating to the (Kantian) view of private law as a stronghold of reciprocal respect for interpersonal independence. But this view, we insisted, is wrong.

Independence is an intrinsic value, not an instrumental value and not, we argued, our ultimate value. Rather, it is a constitutive part – an essential ingredient – of the ultimate value of self-determination. This is why liberals like H.L.A. Hart are correct in insisting that not every infringement of independence ignores “the moral importance of the division of humanity into separate individuals and threatens the proper inviolability of persons.” Therefore, with Hart, liberals recognize the significance of the “unexciting but indispensable chore” of distinguishing “between the gravity of the different restrictions on different specific liberties and their importance for the conduct of a meaningful life.”

Fried’s contribution to this Issue largely reaffirms these claims, in which the legitimacy of contract enforcement depends upon a modest affirmative interpersonal duty. Fried explains that promise theory is preoccupied not only with the exercise of our freedom, but also with its enlargement (8). He thus claims that we have “a duty of virtue” (6) to enlarge each other’s freedom, which in its turn is the premise of “the rightness, the justice, of state compulsion in certain circumstances to keep faith with the promise, now called a contract” (5). These propositions are congruent with Choice Theory. They are not a challenge, but an affirmation.

Also, Fried’s contribution helps clarify the limited sense in which our account is teleological. Nothing in our view embraces a teleological approach to morality. We tried to be precise on this point in the book. Perhaps we should state it more forcefully: choice theory insists that contract should be analyzed in terms of its autonomy-enhancing telos; not that this is the proper way to analyze morality in general. With Fried, we treat individual autonomy as an end, rather than a means; and like Fried, we celebrate contract’s contribution to this end.

Choice theory’s claim, in Fried’s terms, is that the “second-order” promises that constitute the “convention or practice” of promise cannot be simply assumed (as transfer theory does). Rather – and we concur in this view – they should be prescribed so that they indeed enlarge our freedom. This lesson will be our starting point of Part III.


2. Nathan Oman. Nathan Oman fiercely objects to this “grandiose vision of liberalism that places at its center a strong vision of autonomous choosing individuals” (34). Autonomy, he argues, cannot plausibly justify contract once “alternative moral stances, such as those informed by monotheistic religions, are seriously considered” (3). The reason is that for most religious believers “there are moral principles whose validity does not rest on their contribution to the quality of human life” (14); indeed, for many “morality consists not in the affirmation of the self but rather in forgetfulness of the self” (15), and self-authorship is a sheer “myth” since by the time we reach adulthood we are “already infected by a life time of unchosen commitments and influences” (17). Because choice theory rests on “highly contestable moral premises that are rejected by many reasonable citizens” it cannot “generate either practical or theoretical legitimacy” (12), and should thus be rejected.

Instead of autonomy, contract’s legitimacy relies, in Oman’s view, on “more modest and thus more widely acceptable premises” (12), namely, its role as “a midwife to commerce” (35). Contract law is legitimate, in this account, because it is “a mechanism for enhancing well-functioning markets” (32), which in turn “mediate the peaceful co-existence of those with incommensurable moral commitments” (4). Promoting autonomy may still be important, not as “a primary normative ideal,” but rather as an instrumental value, which helps fostering this “modus vivendi vision of liberalism,” in which “[m]arket exchange provides an institutional framework for cooperation among those with incommensurable worldviews” (26). This means that, pace our critique, “Williston got it right” in perceiving contract law as “a framework of relatively abstract rules that have little if any substantive content,” and in presenting “the commercial contract [as] the core case of contract law” (29).

Oman raises important concerns. But his critique is exaggerated and, insofar as it is not, must be rejected.8 We begin by refining his concern. Oman does not dispute our claim that “our approach seems to score quite high on the neutrality test” insofar as it refers to “concrete neutrality” (CTC, 88-89), but argues that it fails the test of “neutrality of grounds” given that many people do not accept the prescriptions of autonomy. This failure, he seems to suggest, is troublesome because it implies disrespect to alternative, reasonable moral stances that discount the possibility or the value of individual self-authorship.9

---

8 Moreover, the alternative justificatory premise Oman proposes is at best question-begging. The market, which for Oman is contract’s master, is not self-defining; quite the contrary: its design necessarily reflects value choices. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare, Autonomy, and The Just Society, 117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).

9 It is possible to read Oman’s complaints in a broader way, as raising neutrality concerns regarding the use of self-authorship as the polity’s ultimate value. Exploring these critiques of perfectionist liberalism (or rather the very thin version of it we endorse), or the sustainability of the alternative position – political liberalism – advocated by the critics, surely exceeds the scope of the present
Religious believers certainly deserve equal concern and respect and resorting to justifications that undermine such respect is, thus, at least *a priori* troublesome. But it is hard to see how treating self-authorship as contract’s *telos* can be offensive in this way. One reason for this is that while people who identify themselves as religious believers in the ways Oman typifies may not subscribe to the ideal of self-authorship, the ideal cannot be as alien to them as he postulates. As Leslie Green explains, the position that grounds freedom in self-authorship and the view (which Oman represents) that the value of freedom is founded on authenticity “are not completely distinct,” because the former must recognize the significance of the “unchosen features of life” that “friends of authenticity” emphasize as “means to, or constituent parts of, various life plans,” whereas the latter must recognize the significance of choice associated with “friends of autonomy,” if not “in order to *choose* one’s path in life, then in order to discover it.”

Furthermore, Oman’s critique disregards the nature of contract as a *voluntary* undertaking and of contract law a power-conferring body of law. Let’s assume, with Oman, that religious believers have no difficulty in recruiting contract law to facilitate commerce, but object to its use for facilitating voluntary undertakings in other spheres of interpersonal interaction consistent with interpreting, developing, and reforming contract law so it better serves self-authorship. When people object to expanding contract’s empowering potential to the spheres of work, housing, or intimacy, they do not imply there should be no interpersonal interactions in these spheres, of course. Rather, they signal the acceptability – to them – of the currently dominant form of such interactions and resist the notion that law should *also* facilitate other forms.

The crucial point is that making contract law more autonomy-enhancing does not affect objectors’ ability to pursue their conception of the good. Objectors need not invoke or use these additional contract types and can limit their interpersonal interactions in these noncommercial spheres to the currently dominant form (say, traditional marriage). This means that, insofar as religious believers are offended by the notion that contract law should be autonomy-enhancing, their affront is not based on an objection that they themselves will be guided by it (guidance they are free to reject).

Rather, their affront must be premised (assuming that there are no external effects) on their objection to *allow others* to benefit from such empowerment. This observation implies that Oman’s critique of grounding contract in autonomy is premised on a demand inquiry. For a persuasive critique, see David Enoch, *Against Public Reason*, 1 OXFORD STUD. POL. 112 (2015). For our purposes, it suffices to note that the most significant critique of perfectionist liberalism as a form of disrespectful paternalism – see JONATHAN QUONG, *LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION* 85-96 (2011) – is inapplicable to choice theory which concerns the state’s obligation in contract law specifically.

that law respects those people’s “external preferences,” namely, their views as to the proper “assignment of goods and opportunities to others.” As Ronald Dworkin argued, taking this type of preferences seriously violates, rather than vindicates, “the right of everyone to be treated with equal concern and respect.”

Indeed, the practical implication of Oman’s celebration of relatively contentless contract rules that cater to facilitating commerce is to delimit the range of contract’s empowerment potential to the commercial sphere. Oman may be correct in saying that this understanding of contract reflects the status quo – it reifies the Willistonian paradigm that is blind, as choice theory demonstrates, to the tilted way in which contract’s empowering potential is distributed; and it thus marginalizes the urgency of our reform proposals for enriching the repertoire of contract types in the spheres of home, work, and intimacy. But this quietism is far from neutral. Quite the contrary: it arbitrarily disfavors these noncommercial spheres of human interaction that are for many (most?) people at least as significant as commerce.

We do not deny that some of our autonomy-enhancing reform proposals that expand the empowering potential of contracts to noncommercial spheres are controversial. But controversy in and of itself is not a principled objection; and because no credible vision of liberalism – as modest as it may be – can discard the injunction of respecting all persons equally, no credible version of liberalism can downgrade people’s equal right to choose – or, indeed, to discover – their own path (or, for that matter, authorize their systemic subordination, a point we discuss later).

* * *

3. Yitzhak Benbaji. Yitzhak Benbaji’s essay implies that these responses may not be subtle enough. Benbaji helpfully highlights the distance between choice theory’s normative commitment to self-determination “as its basic, organizing, value” and Millean perfectionism, whose ultimate value is “the quality of life of humans” (8, 3). But he still thinks that a commitment to autonomy is overly perfectionist and is thus unqualified to serve as contract’s telos. Benbaji claims that only “universal morality and instrumental

---

12 Id.
13 Oman invokes the inapplicability of choice theory to the discussions about same-sex marriage as evidence to “the difficulty of defending . . . liberal institutions . . . using autonomy” (11). Choice theory is indeed orthogonal for this discussion, not for the reason Oman mentions, but rather because the issue there is that a liberal state must make the (autonomy-enhancing) institution (or contract-type) of marriage equally available to everyone.
14 It is thus no surprise that even harsh critics of perfectionist liberalism sanction legal practices that combat practices of (women) subordination and ensure people’s ability “to leave one view and opt for another.” Martha C. Nussbaum, Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 29, 36 (2011).
rationality” should “inform the provision of contract types” (19). This means that contract law should “empower[] individuals to act together” in order either to secure their ability “to abide by their universal moral duties” or to ensure to them the provision of resources – “stable income and wealth” – that are needed “in order to form and pursue a conception of the good life, whatever this conception of the good might be” (20, 22).

His approach to contract is “inspired by Rawlsian neutralism” (20). This inspiration offers a non-perfectionist contract law, one that insists that “the duty of states to provide contract types” is analogous to their duty to provide roads (16). The core idea is that, pace choice theory’s injunction to ensure “demand-insensitive diversity,” contract law should be guided only “by people’s pre-existing needs and preferences,” and therefore its supply of contract types “must be dictated by demand” (17). Focusing solely on demand allows this strategy to uproot choice theory’s perfectionism because it implies that law refrains from “shaping and imposing contract types” by reference to “worthy life plans and choice” (16). It thus ensures that the state does not engage in forming “value judgements about the worthiness of the options” that it offers to its citizens, thereby securing contract law’s legitimacy (4).

Benbaji presents this program as “a teleological understanding of contract types,” which is “an attractive alternative to the way choice theory understands them” (21). However, clarifying the very modest sense of choice theory’s perfectionism and the important way in which contract types are different from roads implies that Rawlsian neutralism must subscribe to choice theory rather than challenging it.

It is no coincidence that Choice Theory does not use the adjective “perfectionist” to describe choice theory. This omission reflects the important gap, mentioned by Benbaji, between the views of Mill (and Joseph Raz) and ours. While we indeed rely on the robust understanding of freedom as autonomy (or self-determination or self-authorship, terms we use interchangeably), for us, as Benbaji notes, autonomy is an ultimate value, rather than a means for securing a “rich and satisfying . . . life in terms of human perfections and excellences,” as it is in the Mill/Raz view (4). This is why our approach to paternalism is very different from that of Millean perfectionists, as Benbaji acknowledges. But it is also why choice theory does not include an account of “human perfections and excellences,” and is not implicated in troublesome perfectionism.

The distance of choice theory from perfectionist views that adjudicate the worthiness of people’s conceptions of the good is evident in its prescriptions as to both the formation of the inventory of contract types and the reasons that “limit unworthy contractual relations” (12). Thus, choice theory prescribes that law’s repertoire of contract types for each sphere of human interaction must include a sufficient number of partial functional substitutes, so that it offers people alternatives; and one of the ways in which such a meaningful choice can be secured, we have argued, is by enriching this repertoire
by investing in minoritarian or utopian contract types. Hence, the demand-insensitivity of choice theory involves neither censorship nor worth-ranking.

Note, choice theory does not embrace every type of contractual relation. But it is important to precisely define its reasons for limiting the repertoire of contract types. Like most (if not all) contract theories, it pays attention to – and would recommend limiting – systemic externalities. To this banal limitation, choice theory adds two important autonomy-based limits, which we introduce now and discuss in (a bit) more detail below:

1. Choice theory takes seriously contract’s role in facilitating autonomy, and thus requires contract law to always beware of the possible detrimental implications of its operations for the autonomy of the parties’ future self.

2. Choice theory implies that people’s use of law’s coercive power be limited to interactions that comply with its ultimate justification of reciprocal respect to self-determination, so that relational justice must serve as the floor of legitimate interactions eligible for law’s support.

It seems to us that the Rawlsian minimalist position, which Benbaji develops, would concur, or at least not object to, these positions. Benbaji does not challenge – indeed, he embraces (14) – choice theory’s critique of the “Kantian minimalist” position (as he calls it) in which the enforcement of contracts can be justified by reference only to people’s duty of reciprocal respect to independence. Furthermore, and unlike Oman, Benbaji does not repudiate the liberal commitment to facilitate people’s pursuit of their own life plans; indeed, he argues that Rawls’s first principle of justice, which ensures people “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties” is the premise of “empower[ing] individuals to act together by entering a contract that determines the terms of their collaboration” (20).

This means, we think, that Benbaji must acknowledge the ineradicable autonomy-enhancing role of contract in a liberal polity as well as its implications noted in the previous two paragraphs.

Benbaji’s “contracts/roads analogy” need not undermine this conclusion – and the happy convergence between his position and choice theory – because alongside the important similarities between contract types and roads, there are also significant differences. As Benbaji notes, contracts, and thus also contract types, indeed piggyback on people’s preexisting goals and obligations. But contract types are nonetheless very different from roads, at least if roads are understood, as Benbaji presents them, in the (almost) strictly instrumental way of getting to a destination, which implies that other types of roads – say, scenic roads – are rare and indeed esoteric exceptions. The reason for this is that insofar as contracts are concerned, the way in which we achieve these preexisting

---

15 The cautionary language of the text is not coincidental. With Benbaji, we assume that “regular” roads are by and large demand-sensitive, setting aside further contexts in which states build roads to create demand, for instance when they plan to establish new communities.
goals does matter; and at times it matters a lot. This is exactly our point in emphasizing the importance of intra-sphere multiplicity and the empowerment it confers on people.

We are not saying that there are no cases in which we would be indifferent between contract types as long as they get us there. But more often than not – even in commerce, the seemingly-classic instrumental sphere – people are not indifferent. While contracts, like roads, are somewhat constrained by preexisting goals, in contract-land the significance of multiplicity is not esoteric.

To circle back, Fried’s articulation (in his contribution to this Issue) of the value of distinct contract types captures the justification for expecting law proactively to enrich our repertoire of such types. Contract types, he writes, “offer parties a menu of possible interactions,” that are crucial for “party autonomy and self-fulfillment . . . because human interactions and legal interventions are hardly imaginable without them.” Just like “language that enables thought[,] without types, our minds would be blank.” In reply to Benbaji, then we cite with approval Fried’s point that contract types are “enabling our liberties” (19, 17, 16).

II. CHOICE: CHALLENGING, BUT REAL

We turn now from freedom to choice, which stands at the center of three other articles in this Issue, by Aditi Bagchi, Gregory Klass, and Oren Bar-Gill and Clayton Gillette. Bagchi is concerned that we overstate the work of choice theory in enhancing autonomy and understate (and maybe even obscure) the most important obstacles to people’s autonomous choice. Klass and Bar-Gill and Gillette turn the focus inwards, asking (respectively) how can choice – and thus autonomy – be enhanced via the attention to and development of contract types, and which legal actors, if any, can perform this task.16

4. Aditi Bagchi. Aditi Bagchi criticizes our focus on contract types and our inattention to more important impediments to choice. She argues that because oftentimes “the point of contracting” is simply to assure promisees “that they will get something in return for conferring something of benefit on the promisor” (or to comply with their preexisting moral duty), the fact that an obligation was “assumed voluntarily does not tell us how important the agent was to the fact of its adoption, let alone its form or content,” and “it does not answer how much of a voluntary obligation is explained by the moral make-up of its author” (13, 14, 3). This observation implies, Bagchi claims, that while the exercise of the normative power to promise tells us that the promisor is “the kind of person who others regard as capable of authoring obligation,” it “does not tell us much more than that” (3). This means that “[m]any contractual promises poorly reflect the moral agency of

16 Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz also address this question. But because their institutional critique is entailed by their substantive one, we address them below together.
contracting parties,” which makes our focus on “the kinds of contract forms recognized or enabled by the state” unexplained (16, 4).

Moreover, Bagchi contends that “[e]xpanding the menu of contract types would do little to expand more salient choices,” and might even deflect our attention from these more important constraints that inhibit people’s choices (2, 4). Thus, she maintains that “it is not clear how expanding the menu of contract types in [the employment] sphere importantly advances employees’ interests – from the standpoint of autonomy,” because “for the array of employment types to be relevant, employees need to be in a position . . . to trade off income in exchange for a contractual relationship that suits them in other respects” (4). Furthermore, Bagchi argues that we are “wrong to focus on the state as a direct regulator of individual transactions . . . as opposed to its broader role as a regulator and participant in the market,” because it is “in the latter role that it has the capacity to affect the material conditions under which parties make contract choices” (4).

We agree with Bagchi’s claim that it is important to “unpack the moral significance of promising and assess” how well different promises “serve the underlying values which cause us to value promises as such,” and that there may well be “normatively significant variation among promises” (9). But this proposition does not imply that “market-constrained promises” are the least “valuable or morally significant” ones (10), or that expanding the range of contract types entails only marginal normative value.

To start with, even regarding the most extreme examples – of promises that are aimed at satisfying the promisor’s decision “to eat, live in housing rather than on the street, obtain medical care, etc.” (14) – the more options she has among contract types (or among providers), the better it is from autonomy’s standpoint. Moreover, Bagchi overly discounts contract’s contribution to autonomy even where it is made under substantial material or moral constraints. She defines this value as a function of what it reveals “about an agent and her moral capacities” (3). But she unduly discounts the significance of “future-oriented revelations.” Because contract – for both the haves and the have nots – is a future-oriented device, expanding the range of contract types is, other things being equal, autonomy-enhancing.

Consider the employment sphere. Bagchi agrees with our critique of “the stark choice between the status of employee and independent contractor,” but insists that “the vast majority of people do not make any such choice,” because “they take what is available, or maximizes their income,” so it “would not help them if there were intermediate categories recognized in employment law” (4). But would enriching the existing employment landscape, along the lines we suggest in Choice Theory, be of only marginal significance? Wouldn’t (potential) employees be better-off (autonomy-wise) if law would have facilitated, for example, job-sharing arrangement? Or if states promulgated two or more employment types, so that employers would need to elect one visibly (instead of the “at will” regime mandated everywhere, but Montana with its “for cause” regime)? And –
turning from employment to the housing sphere – wouldn’t the predicament of middle and lower income households (respectively) be improved if law followed our recommendations proactively to facilitate home equity insurance and shared equity types?

Bagchi may not dispute that these would be improvements, but still insist that the more pressing difficulty for choice and thus for autonomy is in the material conditions under which parties make contract choices and that choice theory may deflect attention from these concerns given that addressing them seems to be beyond the “institutional capacity of contract law” (4). This is an important concern, especially given the significant wealth and power disparities of contemporary societies. So if indeed choice theory might have had such disturbing consequences, it would have justifiably undermined its credibility. Fortunately, this isn’t the case.

We do not deny that background distributive injustices limit the ability of contract law, and thus of choice theory, to enhance autonomy. In fact, one implication of our claim that a power-conferring institution such as contract (or property) relies for its legitimacy on a commitment to self-determination is that this legitimacy in turn cannot be plausibly freestanding, but it rather depends upon a robust background regime that guarantees everyone the material preconditions needed for self-authorship.17 This is an important lesson that we should have clarified in Choice Theory. But the point does not undermine the important autonomy-enhancing role of contract law (properly understood to apply to all contractual spheres and encompass rules originating from courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies).

To see why, recall that choice theory entails a commitment to relational justice as the floor of legitimate interactions eligible for law’s support. Now, consider the implications of this commitment to employment and labor law. As we argued in Choice Theory, relational equality underlies labor law’s (far from sufficient) facilitation of workers’ unionization and collective bargaining. Moreover, the hierarchical organization that typifies the workplace explains employment law’s insistence on an inalienable infrastructure of just relationships, dealing with topics like workplace safety and nondiscrimination.18 It may well justify further reinforcement of workers’ autonomy by entrenching a workplace bill of rights that would protect them against managers’ arbitrary and unaccountable authority, particularly insofar as they purport to regulate workers’ off-hour lives.19 Finally, appreciating the role of reciprocal respect to self-determination as

contract’s normative foundation implies that contract law cannot legitimately instrumentalize people to such an extent that might efface their humanity by erasing their ability to self-determine. This prescription applies to employment settings, such as sweatshops, in which workers are arguably dehumanized and treated as disposable commodities.20

There are, of course, also other justifications for these propositions. But grounding them on the autonomy-based foundations of choice theory is nonetheless important, because it implies that friends of contract and champions of individual autonomy cannot but support the existing implications of choice theory that we have just mentioned and should work to eradicate the autonomy-reducing conditions choice theory’s reformist takeaways seek to transform.

* * *

5. Gregory Klass. Gregory Klass embraces – or at least accepts – choice theory’s claim as to the significance of “both a choice among contract types, and the power to choose to alter individual terms of a type” (5) and his extended discussion of the differences between parol evidence rules that apply – and should apply – to different contract types importantly supports choice theory’s emphasis on contract law’s multiplicity. But he is critical of Choice Theory’s neglect of “the mechanics of choice,” namely: the question of “how contracting parties make choices,” and of the “legal mechanisms for choosing,” that is, the question of “how the law determines the choices they have made” (1).

Thus, Klass’ careful and interesting account of the parol evidence rule adds an important example to choice theory’s prescription for tailoring contract rules to the contract type, rather than imposing a set of one-size-fits-all rules on the entire inventory of contract types. While it is “widely recognized that different U.S. jurisdictions employ different parol evidence rules,” most accounts of those rules “describe each as a single rule for all contracts” (7). Klass studies two contract types – negotiated contracts between firms and consumer contracts – which both respond, in his view, to the same normative (welfarist) concerns (30), and his analysis “suggests parol evidence rules for these spheres that significantly differ from the common, generic formulations of the rule, and from each other” (16). In line with choice’s theory’s “more vulpine perspective,” Klass concludes that “there is not, or [at least] should not be, one big parol evidence rule, but local parol evidence rules for distinct spheres of contracting” (7). This multiplicity, Klass further argues, brings home his more critical lesson for choice theory: that it must pay “greater attention to both the mechanics of choice and the available mechanisms of choice” (32).

Klass’ claim that the two contract types he investigated allow him to “hold normative concerns constant” (3), is exaggerated in our view. We surely agree that negotiated contracts between firms should be analyzed, by and large, as means for

maximizing the parties’ gains from trade, and that the welfare gains to both parties are also critical for consumer contracts. But we think that Klass’ claim that “the values at stake are similar” and that therefore the goal of contract law in this type as well should simply be “to help both sides maximize the gains of trade” (24) is overstated. Indeed, our “errand conception” of consumer contracts (which Klass mentions) implies that this contract type scores best at the autonomy-enhancement test if it is designed so that “law helps people make such transactions quickly, anonymously, and securely so they can focus their time and attention instead on other – more valuable (for them) – projects,” which means that “the non-bargained terms correspond to (or exceed) consumers’ typical expectations” (CTC, 81, 83).

With that caveat, we agree with Klass’ claim that the (existing and desirable) differences between the parol evidence rule, which is indeed “one of the most important mechanisms of choice in U.S. contract law,” follows from the “important differences between the mechanics of choice in consumer contracts and those negotiated contracts between firms” (23). This is an important refinement of choice theory: the design of contract types “should reflect not only the values at stake, but also the mechanics of choice in each sphere” (7).

In Choice Theory, we acknowledged the significance of studying what Klass aptly terms “the mechanics of choice,” namely, the “parties’ preexisting abilities to choose, and the conditions under which they are able to make informed, autonomous and therefore valuable choices” (5). But Klass must be right that in addition to insights from cognitive psychology, choice theory must resort to some good old work of doctrinal technique. To develop a truly autonomy-enhancing contract law, great attention needs to be given to what he terms “the mechanisms of choice,” including “the tools that the law gives [or can give] parties for exercising their power to choose” (5).

Klass is also correct that the mechanics of choice are relevant not only to “parties’ ability to choose contract terms,” but also to “their choice among pre-established contract-types,” because “party choice can operate to enhance autonomy and resolve competing values only when parties are willing and able to choose” (31-32). Klass focuses in this context on the practical viability of the mechanisms that may enable workers’ and consumers’ choice among contract types, as in the choice between being employees and being independent contractors or between purchasing a good with the protections of consumer protection law or by using sales law (31, 5-6). But in fact the significance of the mechanics of choice to choice theory goes even deeper than that.

In addressing the challenge of ex post boundary disputes among contract types, we noted in Choice Theory that such “boundary arbitrage concerns may justify heightened formalities for entry – and such formalities should be refined with an eye to ensuring that both parties have the same contract type in mind” (129). But Klass’ justified focus on the role of the mechanics of choice implies that these formalities are much more important to
choice theory than we appreciated. This is because viable formalities that improve contract law’s mechanics of choice among contract types help minimize the inevitable “independence costs” that a properly autonomy-enhancing contract law inevitably entails.

Recall that one of the most fundamental claims of choice theory (endorsed by Fried) is that law needs to proactively generate robust contractual conventions to expand the scope of people’s voluntary obligations, which in turn empowers their self-determination. But as the legal infrastructure becomes increasingly elaborate – which it is in modern contract law, as we show in Part III – the risk that it will apply not only to fully voluntary obligations becomes increasingly real. Involuntariness is a problem that an autonomy-enhancing contract law must take seriously because it infringes the promisor’s independence, which is, as noted, intrinsically valuable.21 To some extent, this risk can – and again is – reduced by making the conventions of contract prevalent. Like other major legal constructs (especially of private law), contract tends to become part of the backdrop of our lives and blend into our natural environment (CTC, 76). But an autonomy-enhancing contract law should not be content with this partial safeguard to the risk of involuntariness.

Two features of contract law proactively respond to this risk. The first is straightforward: familiar doctrines – notably duress and misrepresentation – delimit the scope of enforceable promises to those that are not the product of the promisee’s manipulation of the promisor’s free will. The second important feature deals with contract law’s “entry rules” and was highlighted by Lon Fuller’s classic account of the functions performed by legal formalities. As Fuller noted, the significance of form in law goes beyond its evidentiary function. A formality, such as the requirement of writing, also performs channeling and cautionary (or deterrent) functions by offering “channels for the legally effective expression of intention” and by “acting as a check against inconsiderate action.”22

While safe “in the hands of those who are familiar with their effects,” legal forms – like any other forms (Fuller, like Fried in his account of choice theory, used an analogy to language) – are not risk-free, but rather contain “dangers for the uninitiated.”23 This means that the performance of legal forms in minimizing the risk of involuntariness depends on their proper refinement and advertisement. By crystalizing, as choice theory prescribes, a stable set of contract types, each of which with its own animating principle, and by carefully adjusting – as per Klass’ important prescription – their entry rules to the

21 In other words, while Peter Benson is wrong to attribute to us the view that “the power-conferring character of contract law [implies] recognizing party capacity to effectuate legal changes that they deliberately undertake and purposively seek to achieve” (Benson, 7-8; the emphasis is ours), choice theory does aim at shaping a contract regime that optimally empowers people to cooperate through voluntary undertakings.

22 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1941).

23 Id., at 802.
pertinent mechanism of choice with an eye to these channeling and deterrent functions, a robust contract law performs better than a thinner one. Having in mind a salient model (or a few salient models) of the intended transaction likely reduces the probability of misunderstandings and thus involuntariness – at least by comparison with the alternative of contracting through the necessarily vague open-ended contract law.\(^{24}\)

* * *

6. Oren Bar-Gill and Clayton Gillette. But who can undertake the task of crafting contract types so that they indeed fulfill contract’s promise of enhancing our autonomy? In *Choice Theory*, we raised this institutional question in connection with familiar concerns about the capacities of legal institutions – notably, generalist courts – to create good rules for sophisticated commercial parties. We did not doubt that such private parties are more competent for the task than are competing legal institutions. We argued, however, that there is no reason to extrapolate more devastating conclusions from the commercial context, that is, to imply no legal institutions are sufficiently competent to implement choice theory. Rather, “implementing choice theory is a matter of comparative institutional competence,” so that while “in the commercial sphere . . . private parties [are likely] to dominate contract type creation . . . in the family and employment spheres, other, more public actors, may take the lead.” Even in these spheres, legal institutions are surely not perfect for the task. But they are, or at least likely to be, better suited than the contracting parties (128, 131).

*Choice Theory* offers some preliminary thoughts on possible strategies for coping with concerns of institutional competence – referring to what we call the comparative, the experimental, and the incremental strategies – alongside some examples, such as the judicial recognition of cohabitation which shows “the significant compliance (though imperfect and insufficient) of evolving contract law with the obligation to support multiplicity.” We acknowledged that much more work needs to be done on this front, noting that “full answers will inevitably be linked to a particular contract type or a specific state or national institutional design” (15, 132).

Bar-Gill and Gillette add an important dimension to this institutional analysis by focusing on political economy.\(^{25}\) They are justifiably concerned with the “traditional rosy story of government,” which “treats government actors as cognizant of and motivated by

\(^{24}\) *Cf.* BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 57 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that because French lawyers are conscious of the traits of different *contrats nommés*, contracting parties can intentionally attempt to choose their preferred contract type).

\(^{25}\) Bar-Gill and Gillette also address the issue of competence, arguing that “government would generally lack the access to information necessary to identify the optimal number of contract types” (*). We do not underestimate the significance of this task, but the evident undersupply of contract types in the non-commercial spheres of contracting – on which choice theory’s prescription focuses – makes this concern premature. Another concern they raise relates to the imprecision of the distinction between different terms and different types. We discuss this matter in Section 8 below.
(1) a widely shared view of the public interest, (2) the extent to which market failures inhibit achievement of that public interest, and (3) the tools and political will necessary to implement policies that align with that interest.” Bar-Gill and Gillette conclude that “Dagan and Heller’s faith in governmental processes to develop contract types is overstated,” since we are not sufficiently sensitive to “the public good nature of governance,” which implies the endemic collective action problems of government intervention (*).

At times, these problems imply that government might undersupply contract types by either “affirmatively suppressing contract types that the market would create” or failing “to produce a contract type that the market fails to generate, and that government is uniquely positioned to produce.” A parallel, and for Bar-Gill and Gillette “greater concern,” is one of oversupply of contract types either “because interest groups with disproportionate access to the [pertinent] agency . . . lobby for an excessive number of types” or because “individuals in those agencies have incentives to create them in order to demonstrate to clients (congressmen, interest groups) or to superiors within the agency that they are performing their assigned function.” Finally, even if government actors may produce contract types optimal in quantity, “government intervention could cause suboptimal terms to be part of a contract type” (*).

Bar-Gill and Gillette do not ignore that institutional inquiries are always comparative. They fully realize that the alternative to government involvement is leaving the task to the market and that this alternative is also far from perfect. Indeed, Bar-Gill and Gillette agree with choice theory’s premise that “standard market failures might cause markets to produce a suboptimal number of contract types,” although they also show that these failures at times may push in the opposite direction resulting in the provision of too many contract types. But Bar-Gill and Gillette are still worried that the political economy consideration they highlight may suggest that government involvement “might do more harm than good.” Thus, they conclude that whereas the lack of an “ideal mechanism” for implementing choice theory “does not deny [its] efficacy,” we need to be careful not to replace “market failure with government failure” that “replicate[s], rather than cure[s], the shortcomings of markets” (*).

Point well taken. Adding political economy considerations to the comparative analysis of the expected performance of the pertinent institutions is surely important and there may well be contexts in which the expected shortcomings of government agencies would imply that we may be better off leaving the task to the market, notwithstanding its deficiencies. This conclusion justifies Bar-Gill and Gillette’s “cautionary note” (*). But nothing in this note is different from parallel concerns of “government failure” regarding

---

26 Bar-Gill and Gillette are worried about over-supply because an “excessively large number of contract types” is inefficient as it tends to reduce the positive externality of comparison-shopping and thus to dilute the forces of competition (*). Oversupply may also undermine autonomy given people’s cognitive constraints.
the numerous contexts in which agencies are currently involved. And yet, the least controversial set of justifications for regulation by governmental agencies includes various types of market failures, that is: cases in which for reasons like monopolies or anti-competitive behavior, externalities or public goods, or informational inadequacies, an “uncontrolled marketplace” is likely to “fail to produce behavior or results in accordance with the public interest.” Yes, a rosy story of government must be rejected, but is no reason to choose instead a particularly gloomy story on the supply of contract types.

Further, when we referred to the responsibility of legal institutions to contract’s autonomy-enhancing telos, we did not limit our account to agencies. Quite the contrary, we mentioned a long list of pertinent legal actors, highlighting “courts or legislatures – the ordinary contract lawmakers in liberal societies.” One (relatively) happy story we noted is the judicial creation of the law of cohabitation that structures “a distinct contract type which helps stabilize relationships of long-term informal intimacy between marriage and, say, roommates.” Courts’ responsiveness to “an emerging – albeit minoritarian – innovation,” we argued, is laudable from an autonomy-enhancing perspective especially given the “failure of cohabitants to gain legislative recognition,” which “may be best explained by a collective action and political economy story” (130, 132).

The case of cohabitation may suggest a surprising but potentially important conclusion. Recall that our engagement with the institutional question in Choice Theory was aimed at limiting the incompetence critique of legal actors – in particular, judges – to the commercial context. Bar-Gill and Gillette’s focus on political economy implies that, at least in contexts where generalist judges do not suffer from this difficulty – that is, in the contracting spheres of work, housing, and intimacy where the injunction to proactively facilitate multiplicity applies most strongly (ch. 11) – courts should play a particularly important role in implementing choice theory. This conclusion nicely fits the common law tradition in which much of private law is the result the continuous law-making through judicial activity. It also fortifies the claim that, notwithstanding Bar-Gill and Gillette’s important cautionary note, “[t]here is room to implement choice theory such that contract law does a better job than the status quo in enhancing people’s self-determination” (15).

---


28 We do not deny that even in these spheres, the private law of contract types may require regulatory support. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 1, at 76-78.

III. CONTRACTS: CHOICE THEORY AND THE CANON

We conclude this short Response by engaging with important concerns regarding our understanding of contract. The first two are raised by Peter Benson, who argues that “choice theory does not seem to articulate a satisfactory conception of the reasonable for contract,” and that it fails “when assessed both as an interpretation of the law and also as a justification of its coercive character” (3). Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz, in turn, argue that choice theory embrace of multiplicity comes “at the cost of abandoning theoretical depth and coherence,” which is not ameliorated by our appeal to autonomy as contract’s “mater value” (16). This difficulty is profound, because it means that either choice theory cannot plausibly guide decisionmakers or that its guidance is so cumbersome so as to make its implementation unlikely, if not strictly implausible.

7. Peter Benson. Benson appreciates our invocation of John Rawls’ “account of the moral powers of free and equal citizens,” which “gives center-place to the moral power to form and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s own good” (10). But he reads choice theory as solely obsessed with this “idea of the ‘rational’,” while totally neglecting the other basic component of Rawls’ theory, namely: “the reasonable,” which is “an intrinsically moral idea involving moral sensibility in general and a sense of justice in particular.” The reasonable is important – both in general and for contract – because it requires persons to “act from fair principles for social interaction and cooperation,” and thus to respect “the equality and independent claims of others and expect[] the same in return from them.” It thus imposes “genuine obligations toward others and, where justified, these obligations can be coercively enforceable” (11).

A second, and somewhat related, complaint Benson raises is that despite our ambition “to provide an interpretative framework for presenting contract law in [its] best light,” our book fails “to show with the needed detail that [choice theory] is reflected even in the main contract doctrines” (9-10). Benson believes that “this cannot be done,” making reference in this context to the doctrines governing contract formation, the objective standard, as well as to “the whole implied dimension of a contract (including implied terms, obligations, impossibility, mistake etc.) and the entire range of remedies for breach” (8-9).

Furthermore, Benson argues that, without the component of reasonableness, choice theory cannot account for “the requisite nexus between promisor and promisee” (13) – linking here the “question of interpretative fit” with the requirement to “justify the basic moral fact that contractual duties are coercively enforceable.” Choice theory, Benson concedes, may imply that “[o]ne who voluntarily recruits another or accepts being recruited

---

30 As the text hints, Benson’s complaint of fit is only somewhat related to his reading of choice theory as lacking the component of reasonableness, because part of the difficulty he sees in choice theory as an interpretive account of contract derives from the extreme and unnecessarily demanding understanding of “power-conferring character” he attributes to choice theory. See supra note 21.
by another through such a device is required to perform what she has promised in order to
fulfill this duty.” But this duty, he insists, is only “some sort of general positive duty” to
“support and further a regime of voluntary contracts” that “enables individuals to advance
their ends – hence their autonomy,” so “the most plausible obligee” is not the promisee,
but rather “the community of present and future transactors or perhaps the body that is
responsible for maintaining the regime of cooperation.” “To establish the requisite nexus
between promisor and promisee, it is essential to show that there is a requirement of
reasonableness that holds as between them,” which, and this is the key for Benson, “choice
theory fails to do” (13-14).

Benson is right to insist that a Rawlsian component of reasonableness is necessary
to justify contract enforcement and this dimension is core for accounting for the status of
the promisee as the right-holder authorized to invoke enforcement proceedings. But the
fact that Choice Theory did not employ Rawls’ vocabulary of the rational and the
reasonable, does not mean choice theory does not appreciate the role of reciprocal respect
to the equal claims of others as a necessary foundation for the legitimacy of contract and
its interpersonal character. Quite the contrary. While choice theory celebrates the
autonomy-enhancing role of contracts, it explicitly recognizes that the legitimacy of
recruiting law’s coercive power for its entrenchment – and thus the scope of contract law’s
legitimate power – depend upon a prior interpersonal obligation.

Much of Part I of Choice Theory argues that earlier attempts to face this legitimacy
challenge, including Benson’s, predictably fail because they ask the wrong question. They
seek to justify the duty contract imposes even though people’s interpersonal obligations
are exhausted by reciprocal respect for each other’s independence. But starting from “the
obligation of reciprocal respect for self-determination that underlies private law” shows
that “there is nothing mysterious in the duty to perform” (42). Our reference to private law
here was not accidental, as we demonstrated in the following pages in Choice Theory
referring to the (modest) affirmative interpersonal duties private law imposes.

As one of us argued in detail elsewhere, these affirmative duties are not a blemish
on a liberal private law. Quite the contrary: the facts of interdependence and personal
difference – and thus the vulnerability and the valuable options to which these social
conditions give rise – imply that the liberal commitment to individual self-determination
cannot be excluded from the law governing horizontal relationships.31 This means that
although private law should take seriously the typically excessive interference with
people’s autonomy which affirmative interpersonal duties to aid others entail, it need not –

---

31 See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (2016);
indeed should not – subscribe to a blanket rejection of affirmative duties in private law, which prior formulations of contract legitimacy challenge.

This cautionary note explains the suspicion of liberal law towards affirmative duties (a point which we come back to when we explain and justify the common law’s preference for pecuniary remedies). It also explains the actual workings of private law, namely, the many affirmative duties it does acknowledge, which typically involve – in line with Hart’s dictum\(^{32}\) – an infringement of independence that does not seriously jeopardize self-determination. And it is exactly this point that provides the key to the legitimacy of contract enforcement. If affirmative interpersonal duties are categorically excluded from private law, it is indeed hard to explain how the autonomy-enhancing implications of contract can legitimate its legal form. But once the spurious, blanket rejection of affirmative duties from private law is rejected, *Choice Theory* argues, the mystery of contract enforcement dissolves.

Indeed, private law’s *grundnorm* of reciprocal respect to self-determination, which governs people’s interpersonal relationships in a liberal polity, implies that there is neither a way nor a reason to bypass the modest *interpersonal* burden that law imposes on a promisor who voluntarily invokes the contract convention while engaging with the promisee. As Benson puts this very same point in a Rawlsian vocabulary, “Because each side has chosen to do something which brings into play the other as a co-equal participant with separate and independent interests, each has chosen to enter a relation which is subject to interpersonal norms and standards: each party, as a reasonable person, must therefore recognize the fair and reasonable meaning of their interaction as a transaction between two” (30).

We will shortly address Benson’s second critique, regarding the challenge of fit. But because part of our response to Markovits and Schwartz overlaps with our response to this challenge, we will take both at our last section and turn now to Markovits and Schwartz’s critique in which choice theory ends up in the unhappy predicament of the pre-Willistonian *unprincipled multiplicity*.

* * *

8. *Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz*. The focus of Markovits and Schwartz’s penetrating inquiry is the plurality of values “that are openly and notoriously at play in contract practice,” that renders, for them, “the life of the law too unruly to confine within any single logic” (2). Markovits and Schwartz accept that philosophers might be able to show that efficiency, autonomy, equality, and community (the four values they mention) “cohere in a single framework or arise from a single basic source” (3). But they believe

---

\(^{32}\) See *supra* text accompanying note 7.
that lawyers and judges necessarily resist any such philosophical framework because it is unlikely to address the more concrete concerns to which law must account (3-4).

This limitation leaves contract theorists with three strategies to avoid the perils of pluralism, and each with its own virtues and vices. First, they can resort to capitulation, which “involves seeking domains that are insulated from pluralism, because only one value governs them” (9). They illustrate this strategy by reference to their own prior work, explaining business transactions through an efficiency lens (Schwartz and Scott) and agreements regarding professional services through a community one (Markovits). They candidly admit their own work illustrates the hazards resulting from the artificial delimitation of contract’s domain and from the resulting distortion that it inevitably generates (5-7).

The second strategy to avoid pluralism “flees in opposite direction” by leveraging, which “involves seeking domains to which pluralism applies but only to create redundancies, because all values recommend the same result” (9). This strategy seeks to identify a pockets of contract practices where “irreducibly plural” values converge around a specific reformist argument. Leveraging necessarily has “only a very narrow scope of application” (7-9).

Markovits and Schwartz also identify a third and “very different” approach: embracing value pluralism, which “does not flee from but rather embraces the diversity of values at play in contract practice and also the varieties of practice that arise in the shadow of these values” (4, 9). This approach, Markovits and Schwartz argue, typically requires the theorist to “abandon or at least retreat from theory’s conventional simplifying ambitions in favor of interpreting and displaying the complexity that practice unavoidably presents” (4). Choice Theory, in their view, exemplifies this embracing strategy (5, 9) as is most clearly demonstrated by our taxonomy of contract’s domain. The taxonomy seeks to “track lived experience,” and thus construct contract spheres and contract types “out of the intuitive, pre-theoretical categories,” namely: “out of the materials that parties, lawyers, and judges first look to when considering drafting, litigating, or adjudicating contracts” (10).

For Markovits and Schwartz, Choice Theory involves a tradeoff. They acknowledge that embracing multiplicity has some virtues: choice theory may avoid both the incompleteness and “the distortions that arise from viewing a multifaceted practice through a single lens” (16). But this virtue entails a significant theoretical cost, because it leaves “the disorder associated with accommodating too many values” intact, thus undermining “the point of a theory, which is to explain something by organizing otherwise

---

33 The other is our attempt to “highlight backwaters,” such as bailment, to illustrate both “how fine-grained the taxonomy of contracts might become” and how even relatively obscure doctrines can demonstrate our theory (9-10).
unruly considerations into patterns that are simpler and more general than the pre-theoretical practice to be explained” (4). This vice, they insist, cannot be avoided by our resort to autonomy as contract’s ultimate value: any attempt to really subordinate choice theory’s pluralism to autonomy, they suggest, is bound to be self-defeating. Why? Because it inevitably collapses choice theory’s pluralism down to the capitulating strategy. In the end, they argue, we are left with an account that is both too capacious, and at the same time unstructured and indeed uninformative (9, 11, 16).

As a result, choice theory cannot help with concrete legal practice. Markovits and Schwartz argue, for example, that an open-ended embrace of pluralism cannot arbitrate between an employment contract type that minimizes a typical dyad’s contracting costs and one that generates a smaller expected economic surplus because it “includes hiring disadvantaged persons” (14). This indeterminacy implies that choice theory sets a task that “no institution could do” (13).

How did we go so far astray? Markovits and Schwartz suggest that the source of our error lies in our background as property scholars. We were (mis)led to analyze contract as if it was property, where “the state specifies the forms that agents must use in order to hold property” (1, 12). But contract rules are dramatically different because they function largely as implied terms. If choice theory embraces value pluralism and seeks to avoid illegitimate state impositions, then it must, in Markovits and Schwartz’ account, require contract law to offer an implausibly large number of contract types, so as to fit every possible value ranking respecting the (huge) range of possible project descriptions, sets of goals, and sets of actions needed to achieve them (12-15).34

These are heavy charges. We discuss them in reverse order because our answers to Markovits and Schwartz’s practical questions also jumpstart our responses to their theoretical challenge.

To begin, we reject the sharp dichotomy between contract and property. The categories are, in large measure, artificial silos. The continuities between property and contract are quite significant – notwithstanding some differences that derive mostly from property’s in rem character. Property law increasingly recognizes – as it should, in a

---

34 This difficulty is exacerbated once we consider the heterogeneity of the utility functions of parties to contracts outside the commercial spheres (14).

35 One seemingly categorical difference derives from property’s numerus clausus. But even strict adherence to this principle does not practically undermine parties’ choice; moreover, we think that a liberal property system must follow the rule in Spain (among other countries) which recognizes – alongside the state-supported property types – the option of “tailor-made” property rights. See, respectively, Thomas W. Merrill and Henry Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: the Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, * (2000); Dagan, supra note 17, at *. 
liberal polity – the possibility of contracting around property rules. But this trend does not negate the significance of law’s facilitation of property types. When, for example, property law entrenched common-interest-communities as a property type, it saved on transaction costs involved in tailoring this type from scratch and – even more significantly – added a salient option to the housing market. Common-interest-communities vary widely, and thus require further refinement, but this does not denigrate from the empowering effect of adding this type to our property inventory.

The exact same reasoning applies to the relationship between contract types and the possible project descriptions, sets of goals, and sets of actions of specific parties who resort to a given contract type. Choice theory requires that, for every sphere of contracting, law should provide a variety of sufficiently distinctive contract types – a bounded variety, not an infinite mishmash as Markovits and Schwartz would have it. For this bounded variety to be autonomy-enhancing, as choice theory prescribes, these types need to be partial functional substitutes for each other: “They need to be substitutes because choice is not enhanced with alternatives that are orthogonal to each other; and their substitutability should not be too complete because types that are too similar also do not offer meaningful choice” (106-107).

This understanding of types implies an important, even if imprecise, distinction between different types and different terms. It also clarifies that choice theory does not expect legal institutions to tailor precise scripts for every contract-dyad; its autonomy-enhancing telos does not, in other words, necessitate the degree of granularity ascribed to it by Markovits and Schwartz. Rather, for contract law to perform its autonomy-enhancing work, it is enough for it to construct a repertoire of contract types, each suited to a paradigmatic category of projects, a typical set of goals, and a corresponding typical set of actions, that can be thus structured around a distinct (and robust) animating principle.

There is no reason to think that the number of such categories of contract types is dramatically different from the number of property types. Either way, our claim does not rely on answering that question. We make a more limited observation: in the commercial sphere, contracting parties seem to like having choice, and when they find their choices insufficient, they seem able to catalyze new types and manage the resulting multiplicity. Private actors and legal institutions have created a robust repertoire of commercial contract types. If they are up to this task in the commercial sphere, perhaps they are as well in other contracting spheres.

Markovits and Schwartz maintain choice theory would be reluctant to “simplify its type creation task by limiting types to reasonable or appropriately balanced value

36 This trend is manifested most significantly in the traditionally immutable areas of marital property and of servitudes. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 7 (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SERVITUDES §§2.1, 2.4, 2.6, 3.2 (2000).
judgments; for to do that is to impose an evaluative frame,” because such limits would undermine its commitment to pluralism (15). But choice theory is not neutral when it comes to contract types that involve relational injustice (as we clarified in our response to Bagchi37). Let’s return to the employment contract dilemma that Markovits and Schwartz raised. If the conflict involves a type that complies with relational justice (by proscribing discrimination) and one that authorizes relational injustice (by allowing contract practices that undermine its own telos of reciprocal respect to self-determination), then choice theory would not hesitate to opt for the former.

We do not deny, of course, that this “floor” of relational justice would still leave a huge set of options, which means that only a fraction of potential alternatives become actual contract types. That’s fine. Relational justice excludes bad types. For the rest, judgment should be guided not by normative evaluation, but by commitment to ensuring partial functional equivalents and by attention to pragmatic considerations, relating notably to what Klass dubs as “the mechanics of choice.”

Choice Theory’s discussion of these matters (106-07) is admittedly preliminary, partly because it requires social scientific skills that we lack.38 But this task is not impossible: it does not implicate overly-perfectionist value judgments nor does it require unbounded multiplicity of contract types.

These responses to Markovits and Schwartz’s implementation challenge also help clarify how, specifically, choice theory is pluralist (and how it isn’t). And they begin to explain how our reliance on “autonomy as self-determination” structures contract’s seemingly conflicting values. Let us now make these lessons more explicit.

Markovits and Schwartz believe there is a deep, indeed irreconcilable, tension between choice theory’s commitment to autonomy and its embrace of pluralism. For them, this tension pushes choice theory to employ an uninformative conception of autonomy. In this reading, a seemingly-charitable reading of choice theory would understand autonomy not as contract’s “master value,” but rather as merely “one value among many” (16, 11).

We agree that an account of contract that relied on such foundational value pluralism would be vulnerable the critique of indeterminacy and it may end up failing in its aspiration for guidance or evaluation. But choice theory is not foundationally pluralist.39 This may be hard to explain, but it is central to our argument.

---

37 See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.

38 We do not imply that the work of social science here should, or can, supplant legal theory, but rather that it is a necessary input for its further development.

39 For the distinction between foundational pluralism and autonomy-based pluralism, see HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 171-73 (2013).
As we tried to clarify in Chapters 5 and 6 of *Choice Theory*, choice theory’s normative pluralism is limited to the *goods* of contracts – utility and community. This domain of normative pluralism is circumscribed due to our understanding of utility and community (respectively) as instrumental and intrinsic values. But they are in turn subordinate to autonomy, contract’s ultimate value. Choice theory is not pluralist all the way up.

Because utility and community typify the goods people seek when resorting to contracts, accommodating them under autonomy’s ultimate rule allows choice theory to avoid the pitfalls of capitulation that are indeed endemic to accounts – such as Schwartz’s and Markovits’ – that situate utility or community at the core of their theories. Our account also avoids the capitulation costs of previous autonomy-based accounts that fail to appreciate the significance of multiplicity to autonomy. Choice theory embraces the complexity of contract practice, but rejects foundational value pluralism.

Choice theory is *insistently agnostic* regarding the various combinations of “dosages” of community and utility that a society chooses in its contract types – so long as they are above the relational justice floor, so long as there are enough partial functional substitutes, and so long as the range of types attends to the mechanics of choice – as we clarified in Part I of this Response.

At the same time, choice theory is *adamantly opinionated* in its commitment to the parties’ autonomy. Thus, choice theory rejects attempts to use contract for – let alone claims that contract law should actively facilitate – practices that are autonomy-reducing. Because reciprocal respect to self-determination is the foundation of contract law’s legitimacy, its implications for contract law design are not optional. In other words, while choice theory embraces the plurality of contract types, its value pluralism is emphatically not foundational, but rather autonomy-based. And Markovits and Schwartz’s skepticism notwithstanding, we argue that this combination – foundational autonomy with pluralist types – does generate sufficiently determinate prescriptions to make it a theory properly-so-called.

We admittedly addressed only some of these points in *Choice Theory* and added a few more in the previous section. There is much more to be said on this front. Happily, much of this unfinished business converges with our debt to Benson’s critique. As may be recalled, we still need to respond to Benson’s second complaint – regarding choice theory’s fit with the existing contract canon. Benson is correct in claiming that an important dimension in assessing a theory of contract law is the degree to which it actually accounts for existing doctrine. Sharpening the prescriptions of choice theory’s autonomy-based foundation allows us to demonstrate choice theory’s explanatory power – and put to rest

---

40 This may explain, of course, Fried’s embrace of choice theory, discussed in Section 1.
Markovitz and Schwartz’s concerns about the vices of our embracing approach. This is the task of the last section of this Response.

* * *

9. The Contract Canon. We hoped, in Choice Theory, to highlight the underappreciated potential contribution of contract types to our autonomy and to push theorists and policymakers to consider expanding the inventory of contract types for work, home, and intimacy. In focusing on this goal – and with the aim of writing a short book – we indeed paid too little attention to demonstrating the broader implications of choice theory to contract law. In the book, we emphasized the hitherto marginalized significance of the intra-sphere multiplicity of contract types by celebrating contract’s autonomy-enhancing telos and through its claim that the legitimacy of contract law is grounded in private law’s foundational prescription of reciprocal respect to self-determination. But, in addition to this lesson, choice theory also fits and elucidates the fabric of the existing canon of contract law. In other words, choice theory better explains the most salient rules, doctrines, and cases that currently predominate in contracts casebooks and scholarship.

Reconstructing the contract canon in the mold of choice theory is an important and formidable task that we are undertaking in future work.41 For our current purposes, a quick roadmap should (hopefully) suffice. Our response to Benbaji previews such an exercise. Choice theory implies, we’ve argued, that contract law in a liberal society must follow three guiding principles:

(1) Law should proactively facilitate contracts.

(2) Law should take seriously the autonomy of the parties’ future self.

(3) Relational justice must serve as the floor of legitimate contractual interactions eligible for law’s support.

While we discussed each of these principles in Choice Theory, we realize now that we did so in an ad hoc manner, with the building blocks scattered through Part II. There is more to say on their interrelationships, particularly in the context of the existing contract canon. A broad set of actually-existing contract rules nicely respond to, and are in fact entailed by, these three principles; indeed, we claim they play a key role in the legal constitution of contract from inception to breakdown.

Core rules that govern the life of contracts all partake of the same autonomy-enhancing mission and thus necessarily follow the principles it entails. Such rules include those that regulate the bargaining process and formation of contracts; determine the parties’ obligations by identifying and interpreting their agreement, filling gaps, and setting up norms for performance and excuse; and finally define the consequences of breach by

prescribing the type and scope of available remedies. It is impossible properly to discuss this vast terrain in the little space left for this Response. So here is a snapshot, taking the three principles in turn (and reserving detailed case citation and analysis till later).

(1) **Proactive Facilitation.** The objective theory of contract is a good first example for the principle of active facilitation. While many theories of contract (including Benson’s) support the objective approach, choice theory provides a particularly-secure justification for its role in modern contract law. Indeed, we believe the contemporary status of the objective theory is best explained by the qualitative difference between the rather limited autonomy-enhancing potential of a subjective theory of contract and the far more impressive potential of its objective counterpart. We think that this explanation can also helpfully re-channel and clarify some of the most contentious issues of contract doctrine dealing with the parol evidence rule and with contract interpretation.

Taking seriously contract’s autonomy-enhancing *telos* not only justifies the widespread endorsement the objective theory, but also justifies and explains further doctrinal features of contract law. First, consider incomplete agreements. While the traditional common law was hesitant to enforce incomplete agreements, modern law takes a diametrically opposite attitude. Contemporary contract law is no longer satisfied with providing enforcement services to parties who fully specify the terms of their engagement. To be sure, where the parties “intentionally and deliberately” do not “incorporate in their agreements readily available, verifiable measures of performance,” courts correctly infer that they do not intend legal enforcement. But beyond this category, current law—both the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts—goes out of its way to facilitate transactions by offering defaults that can fill gaps, even regarding crucial aspects of a transaction, like price. A significant subset of the current contract law canon belongs to this category.

Making gap-filling a core function of contract law quickly necessitates a significant degree of variation among contract types. In other words, expanding the facilitative ambition of contract law requires it to adjust the means with which it can identify mutually beneficial interactions worthy of its support as well as the rules that can best support them. This devotion to contract’s autonomy-enhancement *telos* can explain and justify the development of promissory estoppel and of the material benefit rule as contracts’ additional gatekeeping doctrines alongside the traditional consideration doctrine. It likewise accounts for the gradual recognition that other rules which are at times presented as part of contract

---

44 See U.C.C. § 2-204(3); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981).
45 See U.C.C. § 2-305.
law’s signature core – like the mirror image rule for offer and acceptance, the standard of performance of perfect tender, the promisor’s strict liability, or the dominance of expectation damages – all in fact prevail only in certain contract types, and not in others.

The step we have emphasized most in *Choice Theory* – ensuring sufficient contract types and securing intra-sphere multiplicity – is indeed a necessary feature of a liberal contract law that takes seriously its commitment proactively to facilitate contract’s autonomy-enhancing potential. While we identified an important reformist agenda in the book, we should also highlight the substantial steps contract law has already taken to implement choice theory. Think, for example, of contract-type innovations – exclusive dealings, outputs, and requirement contracts – that nicely follow choice theory’s prescription of intra-sphere multiplicity and are by now part of the canon.46

(2) Autonomy of the Future Self. Bolstering the facilitative effect of contract law in these ways makes the second principle noted above – dealing with the need to consider the autonomy of the parties’ future self – particularly significant. But its normative power need not rely on this additional urgency. Rather, it derives immediately from contract’s autonomy-enhancing telos: A law that confers upon people the normative power to commit themselves through contracts in the name of enhancing their self-determination cannot ignore the impact of such contracts on their future selves. Self-authorship, after all, stands for our right to write and re-write the story of our life. Appreciating this tension, which is inherent in contract’s raison d’être (any act of self-authorship constrains the future self), implies that contract law needs to be particularly careful in defining the scope of the obligations it enforces and in circumscribing their implications.

The main doctrinal manifestations of this principle can be divided into four sets of rules. The first set – the rules dealing with mutual mistake and with impossibility, impracticability and frustration47 – is straightforward. These doctrines delimit the parties’ obligations by reference to their shared basic assumptions with regard to facts or to the occurrence of a future contingency material to their agreement.48 Risks that fall outside of this domain, and not allocated to the adversely affected party, should not encumber his or her future self. Applying this rule may be difficult – and its details vary across contract types – but its autonomy-enhancing rationale is straightforward: there is no “autonomy gain” in enforcing contracts that go beyond the parties’ own basic assumptions.

46 See U.C.C. § 2-306. As the text (and *Choice Theory*) suggests, pace Benson’s claim (37-40), judges’ situation sense, their development of modes of currency, and their recognition of legal formalities cannot plausibly suffice for properly facilitating transaction types, and so existing law goes well beyond these modest means.

47 This paragraph provides a preliminary response to Markovits and Schwartz’s reference to the excuse rule (11) as an example of a contract doctrine that may seem unrelated to choice theory and thus unaffected by its prescriptions.

48 See *Restatement (Second) of Contracts* § 152-52 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-615.
Second, and on the other side of the spectrum, we observed in *Choice Theory* a set of rules that prescribe the outer limits of people’s power to commit, such as restrictions on the enforceability of employee non-compete agreements, limits on the advance sale of future wages, and the semi-inalienability of the unilateral right of termination of long-term contracts. In many of these cases, the parties’ intention to commit is clear. But even when this is the case, an autonomy-enhancing contract law must be careful not to undermine people’s mobility in a way that ends up being detrimental to their self-determination. In other words, a liberal contract law must acknowledge the possibility of regret, which these rules indeed enshrine, not only as a response to rationality deficiencies or market failures, but rather as an inherent entailment of our most fundamental commitment to people’s right to (re)invent themselves.

Third, consider remedies. These rules are guided by an effort to minimize the future autonomy-constraining effects of a present autonomy-enhancing commitment. Many limitations on remedies for breach of contract nicely belong to this category. The most salient rule here deals with the severe limitations on specific performance (and its cognates) in the common law tradition. This traditional strong preference for monetary recovery is not, as mistakenly presented by some critics, an embarrassment to contract law, but rather a salutary testament to contract law’s underlying liberal commitments.

Finally, situating the parties’ self-determination at the core of contract’s normative infrastructure nicely accounts for the subtle, yet at times significant, difference between the pertinent rules of contract types that involve people’s self-identity and those that are only about material concerns. The prime example here again comes from the law of specific performance typified by a rigid resistance against awarding such a remedy in service contracts. The same sensitivity to the difference between “me” and “mine” explains and indeed justifies the inapplicability of any reasonableness inquiry regarding refusals to accept a different or inferior position in mitigation of breach of a personal service contract.

(3) *Relational Justice.* The final guiding principle begins with choice theory’s proposition, noted repeatedly in these pages, in which the legitimacy of enforcing contracts – even wholly executory contracts – necessarily relies on the most fundamental foundation of a liberal private law of reciprocal respect for self-determination, which includes (modest) affirmative interpersonal obligations. Once we appreciate that reciprocal respect for self-determination is the premise of contract’s own legitimacy, it becomes evident that any attempt to recruit the law in the service of an agreement that defies this premise must be treated as *ultra vires*: an abuse of the idea of contract, that is, use of contract law for a purpose that contravenes its *telos*.50

---


50 We again find ourselves here in agreement with Benson’s “Rawlsian” proposition that “at every step in the argument contract law must specify principles and rules that reflect the requirements of
There is again a long set of doctrinal rules that secure contract law’s integrity by guaranteeing its compliance with this prescription of relational justice. Some of these rules are products of adjudication; others were enacted by legislatures and regulatory agencies, oftentimes after the common law has set a vague standard which legislators and regulators are better suited to pin down. We can identify four sets of contract rules that robustly vindicate contract law’s requirement of relational justice as the “admission criterion” for recruiting its support.

Consider first rules that regulate the parties’ bargaining process in a way that goes beyond the traditional *laissez faire* mode of proscribing the *active* interference of one party with the other’s free will. These rules expand the set of vitiating factors by prescribing affirmative interpersonal obligations. This category includes cases that apply the doctrine of duress even where the promisee did not cause the promisor’s distress and the similarly motivated and more general anti-price-gouging and anti-profiteering laws. Also, admiralty rules of salvage.

Concern for relational justice likewise accounts for the expansion of the law of fraud beyond the traditional categories of misrepresentation and concealment to include also – notably in real estate and securities transactions – disclosure duties. This conceptual expansion also underlies the doctrine of unilateral mistake. Finally, a charitable reading of unconscionability doctrine and some of its regulatory cognates nicely fits a regime which is careful to ensure that contract is used only in settings that comply with the minimal requirements of reciprocal respect to self-determination.

A parallel group of quite diverse rules includes moderate duties to assist in promoting each other’s self-determination which together solidify a cooperative conception of contract performance. An important member of this group is the duty of good faith and fair dealing which sets up the contractual rules of the game. But it is not the only one. The substantial performance doctrine in service contracts, the role of the principle against forfeiture in applying the condition/promises distinction, the modern tendency to expand the excuses for nonperformance and to validate contract modifications due to changed circumstances, as well as the veteran burden to mitigate and the choice of the expectation interest as the default measure of recovery can all be interpreted as belonging to this cooperative framework.

The last two sub-categories of doctrines that vindicate contract law’s compliance with relational justice are not part of the conventional canon of contract law, but are increasingly part of the actual life of contract. Highlighting the continuity between these doctrines and the more canonical manifestations of relational justice in contract law noted above can thus help to demonstrate the prevalence of relational justice in existing doctrine.

the reasonable and so can legitimately constrain parties through the coercive enforcement of legal duties and rights” (33).
One subcategory mandates the minimal level of interpersonal decency contract law is willing to accept regarding contract types that significantly affect the personhood of one of the parties – regarding for example, minimum wages, safety in the workplace, and the habitability of homes. Relational justice is the most plausible foundation for this group of immutable contract rules, which are by now entrenched, but whose grounding is nonetheless still tormented as a matter of contract theory. The other subcategory concerns duties to respect the contractual party as the person she actually is, and thus accommodate her constitutive features such as race, gender, nationality, religion, disability, familial status, and sexual orientation. At times, these duties are relevant to the content of the parties’ obligations. More often, however, they serve as “gatekeepers” to ensure that parties who make systemic use of contract – by becoming employers, landlords, or owners of public accommodations that offer services to the public – do not apply discriminatory practices in their choice of contractual counterparts and thus contravene the requirement of reciprocal respect to self-determination on which contract is founded.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Choice Theory advances a claim about the centrality of freedom to contract. In the book we situate efficiency-based and community-based accounts of contract as building blocks of an autonomy-enhancing contract law. We argue that a liberal and general theory requires the state proactively to ensure availability of a diverse range of normatively-attractive contract types in the key spheres of contract: commerce, work, home, and intimacy. This is a provocative position. Does it hold up?

Our goal with Choice Theory was, in part, to trigger debate among the world’s leading contract scholars regarding contract’s role in securing freedom and facilitating choice – and to move thinking forward on fundamental questions in the field: Does contract serve freedom and choice, and if so, how? Who should make the choices that contract law facilitates, and how should they do so? And what is the proper relationship between contract law and contract types?

Each paper in this Issue advances the field. Reflecting on them has forced us to adjust, clarify, and refine choice theory. On balance, choice theory holds up well. It comes out stronger, and to our minds, more persuasive. But there is much more work to be done. Together, we continue on a mutual path toward a more just and justified law of contract.