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Fourteenth Amendment Originalism

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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ORIGINALISM

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INTRODUCTION

In Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court rejected a death-row inmate’s claim that a state’s use of a lethal injection protocol that carried risks of severe pain from improper administration violated the Constitution. Justice Thomas wrote a remarkable concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, in which he argued that the plurality opinion announcing the governing standard for claims of this sort was wrong, and should have heeded more closely to the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Thomas wrote that “the Framers intended to prohibit torturous modes of punishment akin to those that formed the historical backdrop of the Eighth Amendment,” referring to eighteenth-century practices such as burning a person alive, public dissection, and live disembowelment.

Yet the Thomas concurrence merits our attention less for what it says than for what it does not say. Nowhere in the opinion does Justice Thomas refer to the Fourteenth Amendment. This is so even though the Fourteenth Amendment was the constitutional provision under review in the case. For Justice Thomas, as for many academic originalists, the Eighth Amendment applies to states only to the extent that relief from cruel and unusual punishments constituted a privilege or immunity of citizenship at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Failing to mention or to offer any explicit analysis of the governing constitutional text is not unusual in Su-

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* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank participants at the Conference on Constitutional Faith/Constitutional Redemption, held at the University of Texas School of Law, and the Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Originalism Works-in-Progress Conference, held at the University of San Diego School of Law. This Essay also benefited from workshops held at Brooklyn Law School, Columbia Law School, and Northwestern Law School, and from conversations with Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Michael Stokes Paulsen, John McGinnis, and Ilya Somin. Melissa Lerner provided valuable research assistance.

2. Id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s concurrence.
3. Id. at 94–97.
4. Id. at 47 (majority opinion) (noting that the Eighth Amendment was incorporated against the states in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)).
The Fourteenth Amendment is the Mr. Cellophane of originalist writing. Judges, scholars, and ordinary citizens writing or speaking in the originalist tradition consistently ignore the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment even when that understanding should, on originalist principles, control the outcome of a case. An originalist who believes that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated against state governments some or all of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights should, in adjudicating cases under incorporated provisions, be concerned primarily (if not exclusively) with determining how the generation that ratified that amendment understood the scope and substance of the rights at issue. An originalist who believes the Constitution is “colorblind” should seek justification for that view not in general considerations of policy or fairness, but in the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause. An originalist seeking to calibrate the constitutional division of authority and responsibility between states and the national government should engage with (or expressly disclaim) changes to that division brought about by the Reconstruction Amendments generally and by the Fourteenth Amendment in particular. With limited exceptions,6 originalists do not engage in these inquiries, tending instead to focus intently on the writings and utterances of the eighteenth-century constitutional drafters. Indeed, the biographies and intentions of men like John Bingham and Jacob Howard, drafters of the most important rights-related language in the Constitution, remain unknown even to constitutional lawyers and academics, to say nothing of the average Tea Partier.

I note this tension not to create a “Gotcha!” moment for opponents of originalism—there are quite enough of those—but to report a phenomenon in need of explanation. It is true, of course, that many originalists are simp-

ly Saturday sinners, inconsistent in their devotion when it leads to outcomes that are not congenial to their political preferences or cultural values. This is not a flattering charge, but it is not unique to originalists, nor does it necessarily reflect willful hypocrisy so much as cognitive dissonance. Inconsistency in application of one’s preferred constitutional interpretive methodology is a function of the human condition, and its mere existence is barely interesting. A consistent pattern of inconsistency does, however, lead one to wonder whether originalists in practice are faithful to a coherent set of commitments that originalism in theory simply does not recognize.

The explanations this Essay proposes emerge in part from familiar places and in part from less familiar ones. Prominent originalists, Justice Scalia most famously, have conceded the need for originalism to negotiate important nonoriginalist precedents and cultural assumptions if its proponents are to remain relevant. Respect for stare decisis may in some cases rationalize the gaps in originalist analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. This may be particularly so in the case of incorporated rights. But stare decisis is only part of the story and, I will argue, a relatively small part.

The missing, and less familiar, proposition I wish to advance is that originalism in practice is not just a method of interpretation, but rather—and most persuasively—a normative claim on American identity; it is most compelling as an ethical rather than hermeneutic exercise. And for several related reasons, originalists’ ethical compass infrequently points toward the Reconstruction Era or the political work of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters.

First, the Fourteenth Amendment was a failure in its time. Akhil Amar has emphasized that the original Constitution “was not merely a text but a deed—a constituting.” The Fourteenth Amendment was designed, among other things, to “protect[] the black man in his fundamental rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws over the white man,” but to the degree its central work has been accomplished, much later generations are responsible. The Amendment’s inertia underwrites at least two expressive features of Fourteenth Amendment originalism that make it normatively unattractive to most professed originalists. For one thing, the Fourteenth Amendment is a significant resource in narratives of constitutional redemption, but a weak resource in narratives of constitutional restoration. A narrative of restoration urges us to adopt the values of the past because the past was a better time and, therefore, has a stronger normative claim on American identity. But a constitutional argument taking the form of an ethical

claim about American identity makes productive use of the Fourteenth Amendment only if the claim sounds in a redemptive register—the Amendment announces majestic principles that we must constantly strive, prospectively, to realize. Those who believe such principles to be central to constitutional interpretation neither need nor tend to use originalism as a justificatory framework. Also, the failure of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters to accomplish their ends during their lifetimes denies to them the heroic status enjoyed by Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, and Washington. That heroic status is essential to using appeals to history as persuasive authority in modern constitutional argument.

Second, across a number of domains the Fourteenth Amendment presupposes and reinforces a commitment to pluralism rather than assimilation, and originalists tend to find comfort in determinacy. Redemptive constitutionalism is attractive precisely because and to the degree that it refuses to bind modern interpretation to decisions already made, avenues already blocked, and minds already closed. Originalism is attractive precisely because and to the degree that it binds interpretation to a fixed and knowable set of meanings, so as to impede the indeterminacy and opportunity associated with open-textured constitutional construction. It is no wonder that opponents of moral relativism tend disproportionately to support originalism, or that African Americans tend overwhelmingly not to support it.¹⁰ And it is no wonder that an amendment committing the Nation in the broadest of terms to an ambiguous set of ends is an unlikely resource in originalist arguments.

Third, the Reconstruction Era is painful and embarrassing to—and therefore best forgotten by—many of those whose cultural and political commitments lead them to originalism. The promise of Reconstruction is not just, in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s memorable words, a “bad check.”¹¹ It is also a symbol of two-thirds of the country’s conquest over and occupation of the other third. While the American Revolution remains a powerful expression of unification enabling and enabled by defeat of a common external enemy, the Civil War is just that, and victory in one part of the country necessarily meant defeat in the other. This obvious difference should, in principle, have no effect on constitutional interpretation generally or on the mechanics of originalism in particular, but it is likely to diminish the role of the Reconstruction Era within a persuasive account of American ethos. It is

¹⁰. A recent survey found that only 4 percent of African Americans identified as originalists. See Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 406 tbl. 9d (2011).

particularly likely to have this effect among Southerners or among those
who sympathize with either the state-centered or the white-supremacist pol-
tical project the Confederate states were defending.

These rationales do not suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment some-
how falls outside originalists’ formal rules of engagement but rather that, in
practice, it is not a part (or is only a small part) of persuasive originalist
forms of argumentation. That being so, the project of reforming originalism
to reflect the full impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on constitutional
law is likely to resonate with a very limited audience.

I.

This Essay’s premise—that originalists devote insufficient attention to
the Fourteenth Amendment—will seem obvious to some, but it is sure to
baffle others. There is, after all, a voluminous academic literature on the
drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the specific intentions of
its authors and of the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress, and on the
purposes behind its broad provisions. The original understanding of the
Equal Protection Clause regarding racial segregation was debated exten-
sively in the briefing to Brown v. Board of Education12 and has been a cen-
tral concern of constitutional historians and theorists ever since.13 Studies
of the scope of incorporation attending intimately to the legislative debate
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment have appeared in well-known
Court opinions14 and in canonical academic works.15 The recent case of
McDonald v. City of Chicago, in which the Court found that the individual
right to possess a loaded handgun at home extends to state and local in-
fringements, featured extensive briefing addressing the original under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters as to gun rights, and led to
dueling opinions discussing and dissecting those historical arguments.16

OF THE LAW 76 (1990); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1, 4–6 (1955); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Con-
stitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1881–82 (1995);
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 952–53
14. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
15. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
181–87 (1998); RAOUl BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 155–89 (1997); CHARLES FAIRMAN & STANLEY MORRISON, THE
16. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048–50 (2010). Id. at 3086 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
rining in the judgment); id. at 3112 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 3130–36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia’s dismissive remark at oral argument in *McDonald* that grounding incorporation in the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the “darling of the professoriate” may suggest rather too much attention to the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, not too little.\(^{17}\)

Some clarification of the argument, then, is in order. Originalist neglect of the Fourteenth Amendment is selective rather than general. The debate over whether the Amendment was intended to incorporate some or all of the Bill of Rights continues to be waged among originalists,\(^{18}\) but it is not accompanied by a similarly spirited debate over the degree to which any particular right in the Bill of Rights was understood by the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters and ratifiers as it was understood in 1791. To take our earlier example, suppose that Justice Thomas is correct that the Eighth Amendment was not originally understood to forbid a particular method of punishment solely based on an unintended risk of significant pain. Suppose further that those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment believed that the Eighth Amendment in fact erected a constitutional prohibition against such a method of punishment. In a case in which the alleged infringer is a state or local rather than a federal actor, it is difficult to understand a top-down theory of interpretation under which the first view would control over the second. Indeed, for an originalist who believes *Barron v. Baltimore*\(^{19}\) was correctly decided, it is difficult to understand why the original understanding of the Bill of Rights ever should, in itself, control a constitutional case involving state and local action.

And yet, interpreting incorporated rights as if they were original rights is very much the norm among both originalists and nonoriginalists. Examples abound in both judicial opinions and scholarship. Take Justice Black’s opinion in *Everson v. Board of Education*\(^{20}\) discussing James Madison’s *Memorial and Remonstrance*\(^{21}\) as informing the correct interpretation of the Establishment Clause.\(^{22}\) Or Justice Scalia’s opinion in *Crawford v. Wash-
which lavishes attention upon the common-law background of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause but pays hardly any mind to the antebellum understanding of the right. Consider originalist scholar Michael McConnell’s exhaustive excavation of the eighteenth-century Framers’ understanding of the scope of constitutionally required religious accommodation. Once one begins to look for instances of originalists overlooking the influence of Reconstruction-Era thought on the meaning of rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, such instances appear ubiquitous.

The position that only eighteenth-century views are relevant to the original meaning of the incorporated Bill of Rights is difficult to defend, but it is not impossible to articulate. Someone could arrive at this position by arguing that all the Fourteenth Amendment generation did with respect to the Bill of Rights was to apply its first eight amendments, as originally understood, to state infringements. This is not, however, a plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor have I ever seen it articulated explicitly by any modern originalist. There is, first, a conceptual difficulty in proceeding in this way. As Barron makes clear, the ratifying generation for the Bill of Rights conceptualized the document through a federalism lens. From this vantage, one’s belief as to the scope of a right is quite unlikely to be indifferent to whether the right is asserted against the centralized federal government or against a state or local actor. The difficulty is most clear with respect to those rights that may have been originally understood as purely or mostly structural, such as the Establishment Clause or the Second Amendment, but it remains problematic even for those rights that plainly implicate individual freedoms. The fact that the federal government is one of enumerated powers might, for example, reasonably influence the sorts of regulatory practices that qualify as takings under the Fifth Amendment.

Even apart from this conceptual difficulty, there remains the problem of whose view of the Bill of Rights’ original understanding is the one that controls—that of the modern judge or that of the Fourteenth Amendment ratifying generation. That generation, broken and battered by a war that may have been precipitated in part by the Dred Scott decision, did not trust

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24. Id. at 42–50.
25. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1413–15 (1990). As Kurt Lash has written, the view that the Free Exercise Clause requires religious exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability is more plausibly attributed to the Reconstruction Republicans, who were familiar with slave-state literacy laws that prevented Bible reading, than to the eighteenth-century Framers. Lash, Free Exercise, supra note 6, at 1109–10.
federal judges.\textsuperscript{26} Nor did those Americans have the same regard many modern Americans do for the constitutional Framers—William Lloyd Garrison, who called the Constitution “a covenant with death and an agreement with hell,” was invited to raise the federal flag at Fort Sumter at the conclusion of the Civil War.\textsuperscript{27} It is unthinkable that that generation believed itself to be delegating interpretation of the Bill of Rights, as applied to states, to federal judges to determine how eighteenth-century Americans would have understood its protections (which did not at the time apply to states). If this is the view that any originalist holds, I should like to hear him advance it.

It is necessary to qualify my skepticism somewhat because one can in fact imagine a kind of fainthearted originalism that leads to the result criticized above. Consider Justice Scalia, who originated the “fainthearted” label to describe his own views in 1989.\textsuperscript{28} Justice Scalia has accepted certain aspects of the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence as settled law.\textsuperscript{29} Even though he criticizes substantive due process at every available opportunity,\textsuperscript{30} he is unwilling to reconsider whether incorporation—a form of substantive due process—is constitutionally legitimate or whether it might more faithfully be accomplished via a different doctrinal avenue.\textsuperscript{31}

There are at least three levels of generality at which we might adjudicate the meaning of an incorporated right as applied to a state or local actor. At the highest level of generality, we might consider whether the entire corpus of rights protected against federal infringement in the Bill of Rights is also protected in exactly the same way against state infringement. At a medium level of generality, we might consider whether some rights but not others are protected in exactly the same way against state as against federal infringement. At a low level of generality, we might consider the degree to which the scope and substance of rights protection is the same in the states versus in the federal context. Broadly speaking, the Court has debated whether to proceed at a high versus medium level of generality, and has set-

\textsuperscript{26} See Laurent B. Frantz, \textit{Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts}, 73 \textit{Yale} L.J. 1353, 1356 & n. 18 (1964) (“[T]he framers and backers of the fourteenth amendment were primarily interested in enlarging the powers of the Congress, not those of the federal judiciary, which was looked upon with considerable distrust”).


\textsuperscript{28} Scalia, \textit{supra} note 7, at 864.

\textsuperscript{29} See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521).

\textsuperscript{30} See, \textit{e.g.}, Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 587–92 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s decision to use substantive due process grounds to overrule earlier precedent).

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{McDonald}, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (2010) (“Despite my misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original matter, I have acquiesced in the Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights ‘because it is both long established and narrowly limited.’ This case does not require me to reconsider that view, since straightforward application of settled doctrine suffices to decide it.” (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
tled on the medium level: total incorporation has lost and selective incorporation (at a markedly low threshold) has won. With notable and criticized exceptions, the Court has focused little on the choice between a medium or low level of generality; that is, the Court has not much debated the degree to which incorporated rights should have precisely the same content at the state level versus the federal level. For most incorporated rights, the Court made no distinction at the time of incorporation and has made no distinction in subsequent cases.

Now return to our fainthearted originalist. He might believe that both the triumph of selective incorporation and the rejection of individualized consideration of the difference between state and federal rights are settled, but that the meaning of particular federal rights is not settled. Justice Scalia appears to fit this description: he rejects the Court’s evolving standards jurisprudence in considering the meaning of the Eighth Amendment but he accepts that the Eighth Amendment is incorporated and that its meaning is identical whether applied to state or to federal action. He refuses, on originalist grounds, to accept that firing (or refusing to hire) a civil servant or a public contractor based on political ideology violates the First Amendment, but he has never, to my knowledge, suggested that the rule should be different as between state and federal employers. It may be that many originalists are fainthearted in just this way, and so have little reason to consider the original understanding of particular privileges or immunities of citizenship. The McDonald majority’s extensive discussion of Reconstruction-Era views on gun rights may lend faint support to this possibility: by suggesting that the Second Amendment might protect a right against federal but not state infringements, the McDonald dissenters unsettled the otherwise settled rejection of divided incorporation.

There is reason to doubt, however, that this degree of faintheartedness is a considered choice on the part of most originalists. First, and perhaps

32. Compare, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–49 (1968) (noting that only some rights protected from federal infringement by the Bill or Rights are applicable to the states), with id. at 163 (Black, J., concurring) (suggesting that the entire Bill of Rights was incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment).

33. E.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366–67 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the incorporated Sixth Amendment, unlike the original, does not require jury unanimity in criminal cases); cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I do not understand... how [interpreting the Due Process Clause] can be short-circuited by the simple device of incorporating into due process, without critical examination, the whole body of law which surrounds a specific prohibition directed against the Federal Government. The consequence of such an approach... is inevitably disregard of all relevant differences which may exist between state and federal criminal law and its enforcement.”)


most significantly, I have never seen the just-described argument articulated in any writing, originalist or not. It is generally just assumed without discussion that originalism requires that the original understanding of federal rights determine the meaning of incorporated rights. Second, many originalists, including Justice Thomas, clearly are not fainthearted in this way, and nonetheless make the same choices as to interpretation of incorporated rights. 36 Third, unmooring the practice of originalism from an inquiry into the meaning of a politically significant text deprives the theory of its usual normative justifications. At no point in our constitutional history did any democratically responsible institution determine and embody within a text the notion that state and local actors should be bound by Justice Scalia’s considered view of the eighteenth-century meaning of the Bill of Rights. If his view as to the eighteenth-century meaning of a particular right happens to approximate the view as to its 1868 meaning held by the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is only through happenstance. And so it is not that the originalist inquiry as it is usually conducted is helpful but insufficient to decide cases involving incorporated rights; it is that the inquiry is simply the wrong one. There is little reason, in principle, for an originalist to privilege the meaning of an incorporated right circa 1791 over its meaning in any other year prior to 1868.

There are, moreover, other ways in which originalists conspicuously neglect the Fourteenth Amendment. Many, for example, are famously uninterested in the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause regarding race-conscious government action. The Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment also enacted race-conscious measures designed to ameliorate the condition of former slaves. 37 It is reasonable to suppose that an originalist would not, then, take issue with contemporary affirmative action plans aimed at inclusion rather than exclusion of racial minorities. But many originalists, including Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, object to such plans on the ground that the Equal Protection Clause requires both

36. See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 742–43 (2009) (chiding Justice Thomas for ignoring the implications of Reconstruction for the meaning of the Establishment Clause). As for McDonald, it remains to be seen whether future Courts inclined toward Second Amendment originalism will turn to the Fourteenth Amendment ratifiers for guidance as to the scope of the protected right and not merely the fact of its incorporation.

states and the federal government to be colorblind.\footnote{Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520–21 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).} To my knowledge, neither Justice has ever sought in writing to justify that reading in originalist terms (nor, incidentally, has either Justice justified application of the Equal Protection Clause to the federal government in such terms).\footnote{Justice Thomas has, in passing, suggested that race-conscious measures enacted during Reconstruction are consistent with a colorblind Constitution insofar as they were designed as remedies for past “state-sponsored discrimination.” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 772 n.19 (Thomas, J., concurring). This is not, of course, the same as affirmatively defending the colorblind view but it is something of a start. It is not clear from Justice Thomas’s brief discussion how the numerous Reconstruction-era statutes appropriating money to destitute “colored” persons were narrowly tailored remedial measures. See Rubenfeld, supra note 37, at 430–31 (describing such statutes). The most thoughtful originalist justification for a constitutional prohibition on affirmative action is offered by John Harrison, who has argued that much of what passes today for equal-protection jurisprudence is more appropriately adjudicated under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which protects against racial discrimination in positive-law rights of state citizenship. Harrison, supra note 6, at 1388–89. The legality of a particular instance of affirmative action would then depend on the nature of the deprivation at issue. Id. at 1463–64. This is not a “colorblind” view as usually understood and, in any event, is a self-consciously limited treatment of affirmative action from an originalist perspective. See id. at 1462–64.}

Another area of conspicuous inattention to the Fourteenth Amendment is federalism. Many originalists reject Justice Miller’s view (or rather, the received wisdom as to his view) in the \textit{Slaughter-House Cases} that the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states.\footnote{Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872). In my view, Justice Miller’s majority opinion does not support the anti-incorporation view (which would, in any event, be dicta), but Justice Miller later joined Chief Justice Waite’s opinion in \textit{United States v. Cruikshank}, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876), which unambiguously rejected incorporation.} The more celebrated dissenting opinions of Justice Field and Justice Bradley both emphasize, not unreasonably, that the Reconstruction Amendments were designed to effect a radical transformation in the division of authority and responsibility between states and the federal government.\footnote{6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).}

It does not take much examination of the legislative history behind the Fourteenth Amendment—and the repeated invocations therein of Justice Washington’s illustrative enumeration of privileges and immunities in \textit{Corfield v. Coryell}\footnote{See John Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 30 (1980) (describing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as “a dele-}—to conclude that many of those responsible for the Amendment’s codification believed that it empowered the federal government to guard against state infringement of a wide array of rights both encompassing and extending well beyond those enumerated in the Bill of Rights.\footnote{See John Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 30 (1980) (describing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as “a dele-} Yet it remains that in both scholarship and in Court opinions, the
texts most consistently used to reveal original understandings on federalism issues are the Federalist Papers;\textsuperscript{44} we see no effort to identify or celebrate the canonical federalism-related documents of the Reconstruction Era.

Members of the Court have on occasion engaged the history of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in cases in which the scope of that provision was directly at issue. For example, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores turned to the drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment to aid in his conclusion that the section’s purpose was “remedial” rather than substantive.\textsuperscript{45} But even in cases in which Section 5 is the very provision under review, careful attention to original understanding is the exception rather than the rule. Thus, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, when then-Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court upholding the power of Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity via Section 5, his opinion was deeply doctrinal in nature, referring only indirectly to the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.\textsuperscript{46} And in United States v. Morrison, in disclaiming application of Section 5 to an asserted pattern of state judicial underenforcement of cases involving gender-motivated violence, Rehnquist, as Chief Justice, relied on, in part, nineteenth-century cases expounding federal judges’ views of Reconstruction power, without addressing the intentions or understandings of relevant members of Congress or the public at large.\textsuperscript{47} Indeed, he wrote that viewing Section 5 as limited was “necessary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the National Government.”\textsuperscript{48}

Simply to assert the need to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from too radically altering the federal-state balance begs the question. An originalism sensitive to the whole Constitution would confront openly the degree to which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to affect that balance, and not just in cases directly implicating Section 5. In cases like Fitzpatrick and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,\textsuperscript{49} the Court treated the Fourteenth Amendment as an addendum rather than as an amendment. In the latter case, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist debated Justice Souter at

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{44} See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 914–15 (1997) (examining The Federalist Papers to decide whether the federal government may require state officials to execute federal laws); see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 39 (James Madison), NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).

\textsuperscript{45} 521 U.S. 507, 509, 520–24 (1997).


\textsuperscript{47} 529 U.S. 598, 620–27 (2000).

\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 620.

\textsuperscript{49} 517 U.S. 44 (1996).}
great length over the extent to which the eighteenth-century Framers would have intended Congress to be able to abrogate state sovereign immunity via its Article I powers.\textsuperscript{50} Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “Fitzpatrick cannot be read to justify ‘limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitution.’”\textsuperscript{51} Chief Justice Rehnquist was quoting Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in \textit{Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.}, which (like Justice Scalia’s opinions addressing incorporated rights) treats the Constitution as a linear series of provisions whose interpretation sheds no light on other provisions not specifically mentioned.\textsuperscript{52} As Charles Black writes, “in dealing with questions of constitutional law, we have preferred the method of purported explication or exegesis of the particular textual passage considered as a directive of action, as opposed to the method of inference from the structures and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some principal part.”\textsuperscript{53}

It takes some creativity to assert that the Fourteenth Amendment enlarges the scope of Congress’s Article I powers, and I do not mean to suggest that an originalist would necessarily be wrong to deny the assertion. Consider, though, the following interpretation: Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides the basis for an expansive definition of national citizenship, and Section 5 permits enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment “by appropriate legislation.”\textsuperscript{54} We might interpret “appropriate legislation” as the \textit{City of Boerne} Court did: as legislation that “enforces” judicially recognized rights.\textsuperscript{55} But we might also interpret it in less juriscentric terms, as legislation that enforces congressionally recognized rights.\textsuperscript{56} The work then done by the word “appropriate,” from the perspective of a reviewing court, would be to preserve other limitations on Congress’s legislative power imposed by the Bill of Rights, the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article I
Section 9, and the like.\textsuperscript{57} Whether or not one accepts this theory, it is reasonable to expect originalists to incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment into extant accounts of federalism. If one of the original impulses behind federalism was to ensure that “the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority,”\textsuperscript{58} it would be useful to know whether and to what degree vastly expanding congressional and judicial power to preempt state exercises of the police power renders these impulses less intelligible.

It bears mention that selective neglect of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to law professors and judges, though we need not dwell long on the point. I regard it as nearly axiomatic that, outside of courts and academic halls, most participants in public discourse who exalt originalism fail almost entirely to discuss the Fourteenth Amendment. In his book \textit{Liberty and Tyranny}, Mark Levin, a radio host and self-styled “constitutional expert” writes, “For much of American history, the balance between governmental authority and individual liberty was understood and accepted. . . . But in the 1930s, during the Great Depression, the Statists successfully launched a counterrevolution that radically and fundamentally altered the nature of American society.”\textsuperscript{59} Within that ellipsis is no reference to slavery, the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment, or anything else that might plausibly have affected the balance between governmental authority and individual liberty prior to the New Deal. Levin does discuss slavery in the book, but he insists that:

> The Constitution’s ratification by the southern states would ultimately mark the beginning of the end of slavery—coming to fruition with their defeat in the Civil War and the subsequent adoption by Congress \textit{and} the states of the Thirteenth (formally abolishing slavery), Fourteenth (prohibiting the abridgement of citizens’ rights), and Fifteenth (prohibiting race as a bar to voting) Amendments to the Constitution.\textsuperscript{60}

Levin’s narrative of continuity, in which the Fourteenth Amendment is cast as a seamless embodiment of foundational principles, is common among popular originalists. W. Cleon Skousen’s \textit{The Five Thousand Year Leap}, which has become a kind of sacred document among many Tea Par-

\textsuperscript{57} Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (“[T]he \textit{McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what constitutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{The Federalist} No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).


\textsuperscript{60} Id. at 58.
tiers, was written “to catalogue the ingredients of the Founding Fathers’ phenomenal success,” but includes a single, cursory reference to the Fourteenth Amendment. Skousen’s chapter on the principle that “All Men Are Created Equal” asserts, without referencing slavery, that “the Founders were able to establish a society of freedom and opportunity.” When Skousen does make a fleeting reference to slavery, it is in a portion of the chapter in which he says that “the blacks” soon thereafter began to receive advancement opportunities “which no doubt the Founders such as Washington, Jefferson, and Franklin would have strongly approved.” Skousen does not, of course, mention that all three men were slaveholders.

Before turning to the reasons for originalists’ selective indifference to the Fourteenth Amendment, it is worth pausing to consider the reasons for their selective cognizance. As mentioned above, there are indeed Fourteenth Amendment-related areas—namely the original understanding of the effect of the Equal Protection Clause on segregated public institutions and the legitimacy of incorporation itself—in which originalists (as much as others) have long been deeply engaged in historical and doctrinal debate. Might it be then, that their relative inattention to other ways in which the Fourteenth Amendment might influence modern interpretation is simply an oversight, to be expected in a methodology that until recently was not advanced with the analytic sophistication many of its modern proponents claim? Might it be that I have indeed identified little more than a “Gotcha!” to be corrected when Originalism 3.0 hits the law reviews?

It will be profitable to reconsider this objection once we have examined more rigorously the potential reasons for originalists’ selective neglect. For now, consider that the two areas in which originalists have most aggressively engaged the Fourteenth Amendment are areas in which nonengagement poses an existential threat to originalism. The most well-known originalist inquiries into the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause with respect to school segregation are in service of the view that originalism is not inconsistent with Brown and therefore irrelevant. Originalist resuscitations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause are necessary in order to prevent originalism from condemning all applications of the Bill of Rights to the states. Anyone who argues that the Bill of Rights should not apply to actions by state and local officials has thereby left the

63. Id. at 81.
64. Id. at 83.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 12–18.
mainstream conversation about rights. Continuing to refer to the Fourteenth Amendment’s history in these contexts is, I will argue, entirely consistent with the view that originalism owes both its legal and its broader cultural prominence less to any devotion to a consistent or even persuasive set of interpretive rules than to its role in advancing an influential normative argument about American identity.

II.

As Part I demonstrates, the curious gap between originalism in theory and originalism in practice regarding the role of the Fourteenth Amendment is not solely a feature of popular commentary. Were it so, one might easily dismiss the divergence as deriving from a lack of sophistication about constitutional theory. Just as participants in popular discourse continue to characterize originalism in terms of Framers’ intent even as many academics have shifted to original meaning, we might suppose that misunderstanding the mechanics of incorporation or the original imperatives of the Equal Protection Clause results from little more than an unwillingness or an inability to understand what it means to practice the theory of originalism. We might assume, in other words, that the practice is coarse even as (and perhaps in part because) the theory is rich and complex. But when many of the most thoughtful and influential practitioners and explicators of a theory appear to be getting the theory wrong in practice, we must consider the possibility that the theory is less interesting than the practice, or rather that the theory of interest is simply not what its practitioners say it is. Maybe, in other words, Levin has it about right.

This Part suggests reasons why originalists systematically undervalue the Fourteenth Amendment. These reasons are not derived from any extant theory of originalist interpretation; as I have argued, originalism in theory does not permit this undervaluation. Nor are these reasons derived wholly from cultural profiling, even as they draw from research that fits within anthropological methods. Rather, the reasons emerge in large measure from an assessment of the work constitutional history actually does in constitutional argument. This is lawyers’ business, inasmuch as lawyers, in excavating and describing the architecture of legal analysis, are anthropologists within their domain.

66. See supra text accompanying note 25.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
69. See Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 10, at 408–10.
Any competent taxonomist of constitutional argument must include history among the resources to be deployed, and indeed the most influential taxonomists—Philip Bobbitt and Richard Fallon—appear to give historical arguments a prominent place in their accounts. But we must be careful to distinguish, as historians are so often eager, how historians and constitutional lawyers use history. “[H]istorians[,]” Jack Rakove writes, “have little stake in ascertaining the original meaning of a clause for its own sake, or in attempting to freeze or distill its true, unadulterated meaning at some pristine moment of constitutional understanding.” By contrast, originalists are interested in using history as a form of normative democratic authority, and so the search for a single, identifiable original meaning of or intention behind a constitutional provision has high stakes indeed; the stakes increase, moreover, in proportion to the quality or narrative purchase (within the legal community) of the authority invoked. While, as Rakove writes, historians may “rest content with—even revel in—the ambiguities of the evidentiary record,” ambiguity is a potentially fatal threat to the originalist’s enterprise. It would be odd, given these constraints, if originalists regarded all equally accessible sources of meaning as equally useful to their analysis. We should instead, and appropriately, expect a vigorous contest over the meaning of particular high-reward forms of authority and relative indifference to low-reward (even if, at times, less ambiguous) forms of authority.

We should expect such a contest even among those legal academics who are fluent in historical methods (just as we should expect it among those bona fide historians who are attuned to the consequences of their work for resolution of political and legal debate). So long as the enterprise aims to endow a set of historical materials with normative authority, it necessarily must negotiate among the disparate demands of accuracy and ethos. A careful scholar must document the complexity of the historical record, but a legal advocate must emphasize sources of authority with purchase within the community of constitutional lawyers. He cannot be all sa-


72. Id.

73. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 169 (1998) (cautioning not to maintain a fastidious segregation between “lawyers’ legal history” and “historians’ legal history”).
bermetrician; he must win games and sell tickets. For a judge, who is unlikely to be an able historian and whose peer group does not demand the competence norms of professional academics, we should expect conclusions as to original meaning to be even more heavily leveraged by the need for certainty and the burdens of ethical argument.\textsuperscript{74} As Robert Cover said, “We view the acts of history as authoritative precisely because we read into that history that part of the past which we choose to make authoritative, which we wish to emulate.”\textsuperscript{75} To this the historian Laura Kalman replies, “I doubt any historian considers the past authoritative.”\textsuperscript{76}

The features of history that endow it with authority in constitutional argument cannot be adduced through historical methods and need not align with historians’ assessments of value.\textsuperscript{77} The statement that the Establishment Clause means \textit{X} because Madison had \textit{X} in mind when he wrote his \textit{Memorial and Remonstrance} derives from an account of authority, not of history. And the reasons why Madison’s actions and beliefs wield authority within arguments about the meaning of the religion clauses need not relate to Madison’s particular relationship to the First Amendment.\textsuperscript{78} Madison’s identity as a principal drafter of other constitutional provisions, his co-authorship of the Federalist Papers, his service to the country as its fourth President and as Commander in Chief during the War of 1812, and his role in contesting the Alien and Sedition Acts all contribute to the argument that we should permit his legacy to direct modern interpretation. And yet, none of those aspects of Madison’s biography are relevant to assessing the contemporaneous meaning of the \textit{Memorial and Remonstrance} or even Madison’s intentions in drafting the Establishment Clause.

For history to count as authoritative it must be prescriptive and it must be culturally resonant, but it need not, in effect, count as history. It must be prescriptive because it has a resolutive function that has little to no use for ambiguity. It must be culturally resonant because it is offered as a way out of the countermajoritarian difficulty: it is a means by which we locate our constitutive commitments in the past, and situate judges as faithful agents of those commitments. It need not count as history because, as discussed

\textsuperscript{76} KALMAN, supra note 73, at 180.
\textsuperscript{77} See Powell, supra note 74, at 662–64 (arguing that “[h]istory itself will not prove anything nonhistorical,” including whether the originalist approach is appropriate to constitutional practice).
\textsuperscript{78} Indeed, the most obvious means by which one might leverage that relationship into a claim of authority—by noting that Madison drafted the Establishment Clause—is a means expressly disclaimed by many academic originalists. See Thomas B. Colby, \textit{The Sacrifice of the New Originalism}, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 720–21 (2011) (explaining the shift among many originalists from original intent theories to original meaning theories).
above, the art of legal persuasion aligns imperfectly with the professional narration of history.

Understanding the function of history in constitutional argument enables us to make better sense of originalists’ systematic neglect of the Fourteenth Amendment. The basic contention is that, on the criteria just mentioned, Reconstruction is less usable, less mobilizable than the Founding Era for three broad reasons. First, much of Reconstruction was a failure in its time.79 Second, the Fourteenth Amendment does not easily embody settled and unambiguous constitutional propositions.80 Third, the Fourteenth Amendment occupies an awkward and contested space within our national memory.81

A. Failure

If antagonists and partisans of the Reconstruction South can agree on anything, it is that Reconstruction was a failure. For decades scholars have debated the reasons for that failure, with the so-called Dunning School pinning it on the supposed incapacity of blacks to integrate into civil society,82 and dissenters and later revisionists more inclined to blame southern recalcitrance in the form of the Compromise of 1877 and the Jim Crow era that followed.83 No one could dispute, however, that the civil and political equality the Reconstruction Amendments sought to guarantee to free blacks would not come for another century or longer. At the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1963, a black person in much of the South could not vote and was restricted in her choice of hotel, restaurant, water fountain, bathroom, theater seat, and marriage partner. Blacks remained, officially and literally, “regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race.”84

The failure of Reconstruction generally, and of the Fourteenth Amendment in particular, poses significant obstacles to the use of that Amendment’s original understanding as authority in modern cases. I focus here on two in particular. First, the Fourteenth Amendment does not figure prominently in narratives of constitutional restoration. Second, Reconstruction’s heroes sit outside the American pantheon.

79. See infra Part II.A.
80. See infra Part II.B.
81. See infra Part II.C.
82. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at xviii (2002) (writing that Dunning School scholars pushed the idea that “childlike blacks . . . were unprepared for freedom and incapable of properly exercising the political rights Northerners had thrust upon them”).
Contests over ethos conform to several dichotomies, what Jack Balkin might call “nested oppositions,” evident within U.S. constitutional argument. We debate whether our better nature is individualistic or communitarian, assimilationist or pluralistic, anchored in the past or realized continuously and prospectively into the future. The last of these dichotomies, which we may recharacterize as an opposition between narratives of restoration versus redemption, has long mapped onto the central divide between originalists and living constitutionalists. Those who affiliate with originalism tend to emphasize restorative narratives; those who affiliate with living constitutionalism tend to emphasize redemptive narratives.

When we use history in constitutional argument, the sources we emphasize reinforce the orientation of the kind of narrative we wish to deploy. Because the Fourteenth Amendment did not immediately achieve its ends—and in some ways has yet to do so—it is well-suited to redemptive narratives and ill-suited to restorative ones. As Balkin writes, “Through constitutional redemption, the Constitution becomes what it always promised it would be but never was; it changes in the direction of its correct interpretation and application; it responds appropriately to alterations in time and circumstance.” Fidelity to the broad principles of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not and cannot comfortably be framed as fidelity to the world the Fourteenth Amendment actually created; all participants in modern constitutional argument agree that that world was deeply inconsistent with the Amendment’s promise. Robert Cover writes that “[r]edemption takes place within an eschatological schema that postulates: (1) the unredeemed character of reality as we know it, (2) the fundamentally different reality that should take its place, and (3) the replacement of the one with the other.” The unfortunate reality of Reconstruction means that in order to be a Fourteenth Amendment originalist, one must be telling a redemptive narrative. But the more one focuses on redemption, the less one believes in originalism.

A second obstacle to Fourteenth Amendment originalism that arises out of the failure of its drafters is, quite simply, that its drafters were fail-

85. J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671 (1990) (reviewing JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989)) (defining nested oppositions as those “which also involve a relation of dependence, similarity, or containment between the opposed concepts”).

86. Indeed, controlling for demographic variables, issue positions, and other ideological variables, an individual’s relative level of moral traditionalism—her relative suspicion of “newer lifestyles” and embrace of tradition—is among the most robust predictors of her relative affinity for originalism. Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 10, at 408–10.

87. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 6 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION].

Consider the dissenting opinion of then-Justice Rehnquist in *Wallace v. Jaffree*, in which the Court invalidated an Alabama statute that required a moment of silence for “meditation or voluntary prayer” in public schools. 89 The last piece of evidence Justice Rehnquist marshals in support of the view that the Establishment Clause was not originally understood to prohibit a legislature from encouraging prayer is the fact that “George Washington himself . . . proclaimed a day of ‘public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God.’” 90 Justice Rehnquist added the following coda: “History must judge whether it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a majority of the Court today, which has strayed from the meaning of the Establishment Clause.” 91

Justice Rehnquist’s invocation of Washington in this way is interesting for several reasons. First, like many originalist opinions already mentioned, it uses eighteenth-century history to yield the “true meaning” 92 of the Bill of Rights as applied to state practices—in this case endorsement of institutional prayer—without acknowledging the potential relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment to the substantive inquiry. Whether or not Washington or the *Wallace* majority strayed from the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, at a minimum the Fourteenth Amendment strayed from that meaning, and yet it is treated as a technicality. 93 Second, Washington is not invoked merely as an example of a reasonable contemporaneous reader of the Constitution. His authority derives from, and is reinforced by, his status as “Father of his Country.” 94 The honorific is particularly apt here because Washington is the Nation’s father in multiple ways: the prevailing general in its war for independence; the presiding officer at its constitutional convention; and its first President, responsible for countless decisions (including the decision to step down after two terms) that would set significant and ultimately constitutive precedents. Washington is the punctuation mark on Justice Rehnquist’s dissent because Washington is the Greatest American Hero. Third, Justice Rehnquist contrasts Washington the hero

90. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 49 (majority opinion) (invoking the Fourteenth Amendment merely as a vehicle for incorporation).
94. It is a common nickname for Washington, and indeed has been used before in the Supreme Court. Justice Frankfurter called Washington “the Father of his Country” in his concurring opinions in *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and *United States v. Cong. of Indus. Organizations*, 335 U.S. 106, 124 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The title has also been conferred on Cicero, Julius and Augustus Caesar, Andrea Doria, and Andronikus Paleologus. E. COBHAM BREWER, BREWER’S DICTIONARY OF PHRASE & FABLE 411 (Ivor H. Evans ed., 14th ed. 1989).
with “a majority of the Court today.” The reference announces an affinity both with those who harbor an anti-elite bias and with those who are inclined to think it self-evident that Washington’s example must prevail over the views of “today.”

It is impossible to imagine a judge using John Bingham in a similar way. Bingham was a skilled orator, an outspoken abolitionist, a prosecutor of Lincoln’s assassins, and the most significant drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, but as a descriptive matter, he is not a national hero. In Cadiz, Ohio, where Bingham spent most of his life, the main road out of town once bore Bingham’s name, but it is now called East Market Street. The local elementary school used to be called Bingham Grammar School, but is now called Harrison Westgate Elementary School. Efforts in recent years by the Harrison County (Ohio) Historical Society to have the U.S. Postal Service issue a commemorative stamp in Bingham’s honor have been unsuccessful. The Wikipedia page for Mercer, Pennsylvania, where Bingham was born, does not mention the father of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it notes that the town is the birthplace of “the 19th century painter Samuel Waugh, actor and impresario J C Williamson, and] Trent Reznor, creator of the band Nine Inch Nails.” There are many reasons why Bingham is not memorialized, some of which I discuss elsewhere in this section, but one of those reasons is surely that his singular accomplishment was a failure in his lifetime.

B. Determinacy

The chief aim of much originalist constitutional interpretation is settlement. H. Jefferson Powell writes that “[o]riginalism’s attractiveness, for

97. Bingham was demonized in the Fourteenth Amendment account of Charles Fairman, whose conclusion that incorporation was not intended had to confront Bingham’s explicit statements to the contrary. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 135–37 (1949) (contextualizing Bingham’s statements regarding incorporation and arguing that the debates reflect a different understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment). Pamela Brandwein writes that the “conceptual apparatus” that shaped the debate between Fairman and William Crosskey “linked the production of institutionally ‘credible’ representations of Fourteenth Amendment history to political distributions that were harmful to blacks.” PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION 97 (1999). Educated in the heyday of the Dunning School, Fairman called the Joint Committee on Reconstruction a “conspiracy,” and portrayed Bingham as unsophisticated and “confused” by Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Id. at 115–16. Fairman was also a Harvard Law School professor during Justice Scalia’s matriculation. Without veering too far toward psychoanalysis, it seems reasonable to suppose that anyone persuaded to take a dim view of incorporation and of Bingham would be unlikely, in later life, to take incorporation seriously even after grudging acceptance.
the most part, lies in the possibility it seems to offer the judicial interpreter of an escape from personal responsibility;”\(^9^8\) it is a delegation, that is, to a source of authority that is sufficiently objective to enable consensus around the answers to difficult constitutional questions. The “great appeal” of originalism, Michael McConnell writes, is that it draws on “the foundational principles of the American Republic—principles we can all perceive for ourselves and that have shaped our Nation’s political character—and not the political-moral principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.”\(^9^9\) It is not that originalism must necessarily employ transparent—and thereby debate-stifling—criteria of adjudication, but, as Powell and McConnell imply, disaggregating modern interpretation from modern thinking would be considerably less attractive without this feature.\(^1^0^0\)

The Fourteenth Amendment tends away from settlement. This is perhaps a partial restatement of the earlier claim that the Fourteenth Amendment better enables redemptive than restorative constitutional narratives, but the open-ended nature of Fourteenth Amendment interpretation in no way depends on its historical failures. The Amendment represents a commitment to a series of principles rather than rules or even standards, and principles often do not lend themselves to definitive application. Balkin, defending the notion that living constitutionalism is not inconsistent with constitutional fidelity, writes:

The words “equal protection of the laws” mean pretty much the same as they did in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. However, the best way to apply these words today may be very different from the way that the generation that adopted this text would have expected or even desired.\(^1^0^1\)

Ronald Dworkin has long made a similar point, that the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment “must be understood in the way their language most naturally suggests: they refer to abstract moral principles and incorporate these by reference, as limits on government’s power.”\(^1^0^2\) And, Dworkin continues, “Very different, even contrary, conceptions of a constitutional principle . . . will often fit language, precedent, and practice[,] . . . and thoughtful judges must then decide on their own which conception does most credit to the nation.”\(^1^0^3\) The problem is that original understanding is

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98. Powell, supra note 74, at 659–60.
100. See Colby, supra note 78, at 714–15.
103. Id. at 11.
ineffective as constitutional authority approximately to the degree that its yield may fairly be described as incommensurable visions of the good.\textsuperscript{104} Originalists seek answers from the “Father of his Nation,” not from thoughtful judges.

Originalism is most persuasive when it is, to borrow from Cover, “jurispathic.”\textsuperscript{105} Cover worried that law may too easily be conceived narrowly as the search for the uniquely correct application of a norm. Rather, the law always states a concept of which there are multiple competing conceptions, distributed across diverse normative communities. If Balkin and Dworkin are correct, then the Fourteenth Amendment is fundamentally jurisgenerative: fidelity to the Amendment precisely requires a judge to recognize the instability of legal norms over time and across communities. This attribute endows the Fourteenth Amendment with a pluralistic character—the Nation’s marginalized persons may hold out hope of redeeming its offers of citizenship, of equality, of due process, without contesting the legitimacy of prevailing doctrine and without sacrificing fidelity to the Constitution. By contrast, originalism in its jurispathic form denies not just the normative correctness but the very legitimacy of alternative readings of the text. Its aim is to assimilate competing normative visions into a single descriptive reality. To apply effectively to the Fourteenth Amendment, this form of originalism must deny the Amendment’s basic character.

C. Memory

The Iraqi scholar Kanan Makiya has observed that “[r]emembering is a choice we make . . . , a political act.”\textsuperscript{106} The cultural and historical treatment of Bingham is perhaps a testament to the truth of the observation. The contours of American memories of the Civil War and of Reconstruction have long been shaped both by the need of southerners at least to justify and at best to glorify the actions of their forebears and the need of both North and South to reconstitute themselves as a united state. In telling the story of

\textsuperscript{104} In recent work, originalists John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport resist this claim, arguing that it rests on a “fallacy” that conflates abstract language with abstract meaning. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959668. McGinnis and Rappaport observe, correctly, that a text may employ abstract language that would have been interpreted contemporaneously as having a well-known meaning. See id. at 7. This possibility speaks to the viability of a merger between originalism and living constitutionalism, but it does nothing to diminish the observation that broad language is susceptible to competing and incompatible applications even if its semantic meaning is well understood.

\textsuperscript{105} While jurisgenerative law arises from communities supplying legal meaning through distinctive cultural norms, jurispathic law “imposes a hierarchy” on diverse interpretations of the law. See Cover, supra note 88, at 40.

the significance within the Nation’s collective memory of the war and its aftermath, David Blight reminds us that the twin ends of Reconstruction were fundamentally at odds: “Americans faced an overwhelming task after the Civil War and emancipation: how to understand the tangled relationship between two profound ideas—healing and justice.”

Healing seemed to require acts and omissions of memory that justice did not permit.

The blood was barely dry at Appomattox when the central themes of the Lost Cause movement began to take hold in the South. In its first postbellum editorial after reopening in December 1865, the Richmond Dispatch maintained that the war was fought over states’ rights; that Confederate soldiers had fought with “courage and constancy;” and that the Grays’ fate was sealed by “superior numbers and resources.” The editorial did not mention slavery or emancipation.

Deep into the last century, the Lost Cause movement told the dominant story of the Civil War in the South: slavery was not the cause of the war; most slaves had a benevolent relationship with their masters; Robert E. Lee was a gentlemanly, near saintly hero; and the failure of Reconstruction owed to corrupt northern “carpetbaggers” who imposed graft and subjugation, preventing the civil South from achieving reconciliation in its own way.

The United Confederate Veterans and the United Daughters of the Confederacy (“UDC”) formed history committees devoted to rebutting alleged biases of northern historians’ telling of the war and Reconstruction. The leaders of the UDC gave speeches, wrote editorials, and endorsed southern-friendly schoolbooks (while condemning all others), leading Blight to conclude that “[o]n a popular level [the UDC] may have accomplished more than professional historians in laying down for decades (within families and schools) a conception of a victimized South, fighting nobly for high Constitutional principles, and defending a civilization of benevolent white masters and contented African slaves.”

UDC-approved histories emphasizing, among other things, that “Reconstruction was the vicious oppression of an innocent South and the exploitation of ignorant blacks,” became the received common wisdom in the South, eventually promoted not just by explicitly partisan organizations but by state departments of education.

108. Id. at 37–38.
109. Id. at 38.
111. Id. at 277.
112. Id. at 278, 282.
113. Id. at 282–83.
The continuing influence of this intellectual history is reflected in recent controversies over the commemoration of Confederate History Month. From 1995 to 1997, Virginia Governor George Allen issued a proclamation in connection with the commemoration in which he referred to the Civil War as “a four-year struggle for independence and sovereign rights;” to “the honorable sacrifices of [Virginia’s] leaders, soldiers and citizens to the cause of liberty[;]” and to the soldiers who were “overwhelmed by insurmountable numbers and resources of their determined opponents, . . . [who] returned to their homes and families to rebuild their communities in peace . . .”\(^{114}\) The proclamation did not mention race or slavery, nor (needless to say) did it refer to Black Codes or the Ku Klux Klan, which was founded by Confederate veterans at the start of Reconstruction. Allen’s successor, Jim Gilmore, responding to criticisms of Allen’s proclamation, issued a less hagiographic proclamation for a “Month for Remembrance of the Sacrifices and Honor of All Virginians Who Served in the Civil War,” in which slavery was explicitly cited as a but-for cause of the war.\(^{115}\) In response, the Virginia chapter of the Sons of Confederate Veterans issued a competing proclamation defending Virginia’s participation in the war; referring to federal troops as “an invading army”; referring to Richmond as “the wartime home of our beloved President Jefferson Davis”; and rededicating itself to “teach[ing] the true history of the South to future generations.”\(^{116}\) Two successive Democratic administrations refused to issue any proclamations, but Republican Governor Bob McDonnell revived the practice in 2010, issuing a proclamation that, like Allen’s, made no mention of slavery.\(^{117}\)

The footprint of the Lost Cause version of the war and Reconstruction was not limited to the South. Amid the cottage industry in Civil War reenactments and histories, it is easy to overlook the absence of similar recognition of Reconstruction. Reconstruction entailed military occupation of the South, coerced political communion between former masters and former slaves, and the enactment, under duress, of a fundamental reordering of the Constitution. Blight writes that “[d]uring Reconstruction, many Americans increasingly realized that remembering the war . . . became, with time, easier than struggling over the enduring ideas for which [its] battles had been

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115. Id. at 323–24.
116. Id. at 326–27.
117. In response to the controversy, McDonnell later revised the proclamation to include a discussion of slavery. He initially defended his omission by saying that he had “focused on the [issues he] thought were most significant for Virginia.” Anita Kumar & Rosalind S. Helderman, McDonnell Revives Storm Over Va.’s Confederate Past, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2010, at A1.
fought.”

At a ceremony commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg, President Woodrow Wilson, flanked by a U.S. flag to his right and a Confederate flag to his left, delivered the following address:

How wholesome and healing the peace has been! We have found one another again as brothers and comrades, in arms, enemies no longer, generous friends rather, our battles long past, the quarrel forgotten—except that we shall not forget the splendid valor, the manly devotion of the men then arrayed against one another, now grasping hands and smiling into each other’s eyes. How complete the union has become and how dear to all of us, how unquestioned, how benign and majestic, as state after state has been added to this, our great family of free men!

The demands of national reconciliation required, at the expense of justice, a retelling of Reconstruction that regarded its costly and failed effort to achieve substantive emancipation for millions of former slaves as an arrogant mistake.

Through the middle of the twentieth century, the dominant narrative of Reconstruction was supplied by denizens of the Dunning School, after William Dunning, whose Reconstruction, Political and Economic 1865-1877 tells a story of peace delayed by “radicals and carpet-baggers.”

We get a glimpse of the tenor of Dunning School Reconstruction history in the writings of the influential historian and native Alabamian Walter Fleming. On Fleming’s telling, the Black Codes in southern states and the federal government’s Freedmen’s Bureau represented two “proposed solutions” to “the same problem” of “guiding the freedmen into a place in the social order,” and the Black Codes “might have succeeded if [they] had been given a fair trial.”

The Bureau itself was largely populated by “men of inferior ability and character, either blind partisans of the negro or corrupt and subject to purchase by the whites.” Fleming was deeply dismissive of the radical Republican leadership in Congress. Thaddeus Stevens was “vindictive and unscrupulous;” Charles Sumner “unpractical, theoretical, and not troubled by constitutional scruples”; Senators Oliver P. Morton of Indiana and Benjamin Wade of Ohio “bluff, coarse, and ungenerous”;

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118. BLIGHT, supra note 107, at 31.
119. Id. at 10–11.
120. WILLIAM A. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 1865–1877, at 341 (1907).
122. Id. at 115.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 99.
125. Id. at 122.
126. Id. at 123.
Senator George Boutwell of Massachusetts “fanatical and mediocre”; and Massachusetts Congressman Benjamin Butler “a charlatan and demagogue.”

The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, made “[n]o serious effort . . . to ascertain the actual conditions in the South.”

Due in large part to failures of character among Republicans, “[s]carcely a measure of Congress during reconstruction was designed or received in a conciliatory spirit.”

Fleming says that Reconstruction wreaked havoc on the South, especially in states with large black populations; these states felt the brunt of the failed policies because occupation meant their governments were controlled by “ignorant” and “corrupt” carpetbaggers and scalawags who retained power solely due to black enfranchisement and “could secure no support from the respectable elements of the electorate.”

Conditions for emancipated blacks in these and other southern states declined because “[t]he serious matter of looking out for himself and his family and of making a living dampened the negro’s cheerful spirits.”

Ignorant, dispossessed, and vindictive, many blacks were led to violence, Fleming writes, leading whites with little choice but to found Ku Klux Klan orders. Fleming adds:

The Ku Klux movement . . . grew out of a general conviction among the whites that the reconstruction policies were impossible and not to be endured. . . . The people of the South were by law helpless to take steps towards setting up any kind of government in a land infested by a vicious element—Federal and Confederate deserters, bushwhackers, outlaws of every description, and negroes, some of whom proved insolent and violent in their newly found freedom.

Fleming writes that the Klan was simply a “primitive method[] of justice,” motivated by “[t]he lawlessness of the negroes . . . and the disturbing influences of the black troops, of some officials of the [Freedmen’s] Bureau, and of some of the missionary teachers and preachers, [who] caused the whites to fear insurrections and to take measures for protection.”

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127. Id. at 125.
128. Id. at 126.
129. Id. at 280.
130. Id. at 220–21.
131. Id. at 274.
132. Id. at 243–44.
133. Id. at 264.
134. Id. at 48. Woodrow Wilson offers a similar explanation for the rise of the Ku Klux Klan in Woodrow Wilson, A History of the American People 58 (1931) (“The white men of the South were aroused by the mere instinct of self-preservation to rid themselves, by fair means or foul, of the intolerable burdens of governments sustained by the votes of ignorant negroes . . . .”).
The memory of slavery, emancipation, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments never fit well into a developing narrative in which the Old and New South were romanticized and welcomed back to a new nationalism, and in which devotion alone made everyone right, and no one truly wrong, in the remembered Civil War.

The Fourteenth Amendment is a central player in a drama the Nation has chosen to forget. This status cripples the Amendment’s capacity to do the work asked of originalist history. Largely absent from or rendered in diminished form within the narratives we have long told about our national identity, the Fourteenth Amendment cannot derive authority from any status as a shared point of reference. We do not regard its moment of creation as ethically unambiguous, and so it is disabled in resolving the ethical ambiguity that is the stuff of hard cases. Indeed, to the extent that the Fourteenth Amendment is viewed differently in the North and in the South, its expressive tendency is to reinforce rather than resolve cultural division.

In diagnosing the absence of originalist arguments in affirmative action cases,
for example, we might note that originalists often oppose affirmative action as a policy matter, but a more complete story would recall that the Freedmen’s Bureau—the prime exemplar of race-conscious governmental action during Reconstruction—was despised in the South.\textsuperscript{142} For southerners and for those educated within the Lost Cause tradition, the Bureau evokes illegality. Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment itself, forced down the throat of the southern political establishment, is neither a moment of pride nor of identity-formation for subsequent generations of white southerners. The Fourteenth Amendment is unlikely to resonate with many such people, and they are unlikely to claim it, or even to recognize it, as ethical authority.

III.

There are many varieties of originalism in the legal academy, and not all treat the Fourteenth Amendment with disproportionate neglect. The theoretical integrity reflected in some of those varieties is symptomatic, however, of the missing elements in their projects—the authoritarianism and narrative force that has enabled originalism to narrow the divide between professional and public constitutional discourse. Self-described originalists who give appropriate regard to the redemptive potential of the Fourteenth Amendment are not wrong as to hermeneutics, and they are often persuasive as to the best understanding of Fourteenth Amendment principles. Where they fail, and where I fear they must fail, is in articulating a basis for Fourteenth Amendment authority that is capable of bridging the gap between originalists and nonoriginalists.

It is fitting to begin with Balkin, as his provocative work inspires this Essay and the Symposium of which it is part. Balkin has proposed what he calls “framework originalism,”\textsuperscript{143} under which modern interpreters are bound to the semantic meanings of the Constitution’s text and to the Constitution’s choice of rules, standards, and principles, but are not bound by the original intentions or original expected applications of its drafters or ratifiers.\textsuperscript{144} According to Balkin, framework originalism fully embraces both originalism and living constitutionalism because “[f]idelity to original semantic meaning is consistent with a wide range of possible future constitutional constructions that implement the original meaning and that add new institutional structures and political practices that do not conflict with it.”\textsuperscript{145} Framework originalism “allows individuals in every generation to invoke the Constitution’s text and principles and call upon the American people to

\textsuperscript{142} FLEMING, supra note 121, at 89. Mississippi Governor Benjamin Humphreys called the Freedmen’s Bureau “a hideous curse.” Id. at 90.
\textsuperscript{143} BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 87, at 228.
\textsuperscript{144} Id. at 228–29.
\textsuperscript{145} Id. at 231–32.
For Balkin, originalism is in effect the practice of constitutional fidelity, and so rightly exercised, originalism serves both redemptive and restorative narratives.

Balkin is dealing in semantics. He implicitly concedes that most originalists are not framework originalists and he explicitly states that “[m]ost living constitutionalists are framework originalists, even if they do not realize it.” This is no less than an admission from Balkin that he is speaking Esperanto while the rest of us are speaking English. That is not to say that Balkin does not offer valuable insights that undermine many of the basic theoretical assumptions of both originalists and living constitutionalists—perhaps we should all speak Esperanto—but it does mean that his message is likely to be lost in translation. The dichotomy between living constitutionalists and originalists is a fact about the world that cannot be understood in isolation from other ways in which people divide themselves ideologically and culturally. I do not take Balkin’s intervention necessarily to conflict with the point that the choice between living constitutionalism and originalism as it exists in the (English-speaking) world reflects divergent understandings of American identity, and that constitutional method can serve as a language through which those understandings are coded into legal argument.

Akhil Amar is only occasionally described as an originalist, and that is so in large measure because his work is not susceptible to the charges described in this Essay. Indeed, his most celebrated work, *The Bill of Rights*, is precisely a call for modern Americans to understand the ways in which the first ten amendments must be understood through the lens of the Civil War and Reconstruction. The book is best known for its articulation of Amar’s theory of “refined incorporation,” under which the fact of incorporation is determined by the extent to which a right may be conceived in terms of the privileges or immunities of citizenship. It has been less appreciated that the book also means to advocate that the meaning and scope of an incorporated right be understood with reference to the concerns that animated the Reconstruction generation. Amar suggests, for example, that “the very meaning of freedom of speech, press, petition, and assembly was subtly redefined in the process of being incorporated,” so that the paradigm case shifted from people like John Peter Zenger to people like Harriet Beecher Stowe (or, he might have said, Hinton Helper).

146. *Id.* at 235.
147. *Id.* at 230–31.
148. *Id.* at 234.
149. AMAR, *supra* note 15, at 221.
150. *Id.* at 236.
Amar has gone further, though, to suggest that modern doctrine implicitly recognizes the subtle transformative work performed by incorporation even as the rhetoric of such doctrine cites the eighteenth-century Framers. Thus, the significance of the abolitionist cause to Reconstruction understandings of free speech argues for a greater role for federal judges relative to juries in protecting First Amendment rights, and modern doctrine has evolved in this direction. To the extent Amar is correct, his observations provide even greater support for the incongruity of originalist neglect of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the extent that he is correct, originalists interpreting incorporated rights not only work with a text crafted during Reconstruction but they often advance “originalist” claims that, in fact but not in rhetoric, are deeply affected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Amar is often described as a structuralist or a textualist rather than as an originalist, and Amar has not otherwise promoted himself. It should be clear that this labeling impulse is itself a symptom of the problem this Essay identifies: those who take the Fourteenth Amendment seriously, and who (as a consequence) disclaim the kind of clause-bound interpretation described in Part I, are not coded as actual originalists. It is worthwhile, however, to consider two additional examples of conservative originalist scholars who in recent years have engaged in inquiries that do not fit neatly into the patterns this Essay has described: Kurt Lash and Randy Barnett. Lash has devoted considerable attention to the drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in a series of articles in the 1990s he sought expressly to demonstrate that the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause were understood quite differently by the Fourteenth Amendment ratifying generation than by the eighteenth-century ratifiers. More recently, he has emphasized that when we discuss “incorporated” rights, “what we are after is not the incorporation of 1787 texts, but the public understanding of 1868 texts—in particular the meaning of Privileges or Immunities and the scope of congressional power to enforce these newly constitutionalized rights.”

151. Id. at 242. Amar notes, for example, that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), relies on the (judge-empowering) Sedition Act as its paradigm negative precedent even as it announces a rule of decision—in a civil rights case, no less—that empowers judges rather than juries. Id. at 243.


153. See Lash, Free Exercise, supra note 6; Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6. Specifically, according to Lash, the Reconstruction-era ratifiers believed that the Free Exercise Clause required accommodations from neutral laws of general applicability and that the Establishment Clause came to be viewed in individual rights terms, and not merely as a federalism provision.

154. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, supra note 6, at 449.
Barnett, who has been in the vanguard of so-called “new” originalists, has only recently begun to devote attention to Fourteenth Amendment interpretation. In an article published in 2011, Barnett canvassed abolitionist writings for evidence of the origins of Section 1 of the Amendment. He did so, however, not in the service of the view that many significant constitutional rights casually grounded in the Founding must instead (or in addition) be viewed in light of the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather to demonstrate that sophisticated antislavery constitutional arguments were advanced by nineteenth century abolitionists. Barnett’s recent work is therefore consistent with my earlier insinuation that originalist attention to the Fourteenth Amendment is a matter of self-preservation: it aids the originalist cause to demonstrate that anti-Garrisonian arguments against a pro-slavery Constitution were well-grounded.

Still, Barnett’s shift in focus may be viewed more charitably as a recognition of his own previously stated view that “[d]iscerning and applying the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a tricky business.” His recent work may be but a preliminary and incremental step towards a bolder set of arguments.

I do not doubt the sincerity of either Barnett or Lash (nor, indeed, of Justice Scalia), and it is possible that their work is in the vanguard of a “new, new originalism” that takes the Fourteenth Amendment much more seriously. It is indeed in the interest of new originalists, many of whom have a libertarian bent, to revitalize the Fourteenth Amendment as a significant site for anti-state arguments, particularly in the economic realm. If this Essay’s claims are correct, however, any scholar’s success at advancing a new version of originalism along these lines is likely thereby to render her framework less identifiably originalist. The best either Lash or Balkin can expect is that current originalists will concede the label but find another more compelling means of self-identification that better resonates with their

156. Id. at 173–74.
157. See supra note 100.
159. Indeed, the fact that younger originalists tend to adopt a different posture toward the Fourteenth Amendment might reflect important generational shifts in the politics of opposition that characterize originalism. See Bobbitt, supra note 70, at 24 (arguing that historical arguments are often “better for dissent than for the Court”). Older originalists, educated by Fairman and his contemporaries, accepted the New Deal settlement but rejected Warren Court liberalism, which is typified by a generous attitude towards incorporation. By contrast, many modern originalists accept much of the Warren Court’s corpus but are comfortable revisiting the New Deal settlement, which tended to rein in the Fourteenth Amendment’s jurisgenerative capacity. I thank Jack Balkin for suggesting this point.
ethics. Those whose interests tend toward the actual rather than merely the theoretical divides in constitutional argument will then, I predict, lose interest in writing about “originalism.”

IV. CONCLUSION

In one of the 2012 Republican presidential primary debates, the audience at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, cheered when questioner Brian Williams noted to Rick Perry that he had overseen 234 executions as Texas governor. The crowd reaction was much criticized, but it broadly reflects a cultural divide that exaggerates policy differences. Even as strong majorities support both capital punishment and high standards of review for capital cases, a hierarchical, law-and-order orientation is, as Balkin would say, “nested in opposition” to an egalitarian, rights-focused orientation. Cheering executions does not so much engage a policy debate as announce a cultural affinity.

There may likewise be only marginal “policy” differences between the hermeneutic practices of originalism and living constitutionalism. But originalism does much more than assist in textual analysis; it, too, announces a cultural affinity. Those sharing that affinity are suspicious rather than solicitous of Reconstruction and the work of the Reconstruction-era Republicans. For Justice Thomas’s opinion in Baze to have addressed that era rather than the Founding would have sacrificed a significant measure of authority for his opinion. It also would have denied him the chance to give that era’s approach to law and order a resounding cheer.

160. There is evidence that something like this has already happened. Thomas Colby has argued that originalism has become intellectually respectable among academics only at the expense of the claims to judicial restraint that make it respectable among members of the public. See generally Colby, supra note 78. Divorcing original meaning from the original intent of the drafters, which is the major innovation of “new originalism,” made some theoretical and strategic sense but it made constitutional interpretation far more open-ended. It also separated originalism from the authority of the individuals most directly responsible for the American Revolution and the original Constitution. A quarter century after this innovation was announced by Justice Scalia, it remains rare for members of the public to substitute original meaning for original intent.


163. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.