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Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance

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For decades there has been substantial uncertainty regarding when the law will impose precontractual liability. The confusion is partly attributable to the unfortunate case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and to the unusual degree of scholarly attention that it has attracted. A careful examination of the record of the Hoffman case reveals facts that are much different from conventional understanding. The disagreement between Joseph Hoffman and Red Owl Stores resulted from a fundamental misunderstanding between the parties regarding the terms of Hoffman's capital contribution to the franchise. The misunderstanding was largely a product of Hoffman's penchant for moving assets around during the negotiation period, his failure to clarify the terms of his $18,000 capital investment, and the "no debt" condition attached to loans from his father-in-law. These facts show that neither promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, or a failure to negotiate in good faith would have been a proper ground for imposing liability on Red Owl Stores. This result is consistent with a systematic survey of the case law showing that courts overwhelmingly decline to impose liability for representations made during preliminary negotiations. The preoccupation with reliance on preliminary negotiations has led scholars to ignore an important recent development in the law. A number of modern courts now impose a duty to bargain in good faith when parties make reliance investments following a "preliminary agreement" in which the parties agree to some terms but leave others open for further negotiation. Professor Scott argues that lawyers and academic commentators should turn their attention away from the Hoffman paradigm and instead focus on key issues that the contemporary cases have yet to resolve: when have parties reached sufficient agreement to trigger the duty to negotiate further in good faith, and precisely what does that duty entail?

I. INTRODUCTION

The conventional wisdom among contemporary scholars is that courts sometimes will impose promissory estoppel liability for reliance investments undertaken prior to any agreement between commercial parties.1 Evidence of


1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1981) ("Bad faith in negotiations . . . may be subject to sanctions."); RALPH B. LAKE & UGO DRAETTA, LETTERS
promises made and relied upon during the negotiation process together with a "general obligation arising out of the negotiations themselves" are the supposed grounds for imposing liability even for preliminary negotiations that ultimately break down. But even a casual survey of contemporary case law casts significant doubt on the accuracy of the conventional view. Courts actually make some form of agreement a necessary pre-condition to a promisee's recovery. The real issues are: When will a preliminary agreement be found? And how does the nature of such agreement determine when and how a promisee can recover?

These questions have generated a literal flood of litigation that has been virtually ignored in contemporary contract and commercial law courses. The reason that this question is ignored in commercial law is that commercial law courses only teach cases that are decided under one or more provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and yet many commercial law issues, such as this one, require one to exit the Code via section 1-103 and invoke the common law of contracts. One reason that this question is ignored in Contracts classes is because of the misplaced attention given to the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. As a consequence of a fundamental misunderstanding of the law in action, lawyers bring suits claiming reliance on preliminary negotiations and, to their surprise and that of their clients, they lose. Meanwhile, an entire new body of law enforcing certain preliminary agreements has emerged unbeknownst to most lawyers (and legal academics).

The story of this misunderstanding of the law of precontractual liability begins with Hoffman. In Hoffman, the court held that even if two parties had never reached agreement on essential factors necessary to establish a contract, a party who relied on representations made during the negotiations could recover sunk costs based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel as expressed in Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts. Under this doctrine, the court held that a "promise"—here Red Owl's representation that $18,000 was
sufficient capital to secure a franchise—need not be as definite in its terms as a promise that is the basis of a traditional bargain contract.⁵

Putting aside for the moment the dubious accuracy of that holding as a matter of contract doctrine, one fact has become clear in the intervening years during which time Hoffman has been ensconced as a favorite in Contracts casebooks⁶ and analyzed in numerous law review articles:⁷ Hoffman is an outlier; the case has not been followed in its own or other jurisdictions.⁸ Indeed, a recent case applying the Wisconsin law that governed Hoffman refused to award reliance damages on a promissory estoppel claim under similar facts.⁹ Courts in other jurisdictions have established strict limitations

⁵ Id.
⁸ Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 237–38.
⁹ Beer Capitol Distrib., Inc. v. Guinness Bass Imp. Co., 290 F.3d 877, 880–81 (7th Cir. 2002). The court denied both promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims based on the plaintiff’s reliance on defendant’s representation during the negotiations that he would
for imposing promissory liability based on representations made during the negotiation process.\textsuperscript{10}

All of this begs for answers to several key questions: How could the court in \textit{Hoffman} find liability where so many other courts could not? And, what exactly is the law of contracts in the muddy area of precontractual liability? In this essay, I begin with a close look at the \textit{Hoffman} case. The transcript of the trial reveals a story far different from the conventional understanding of the dispute between Joseph Hoffman and the representatives of Red Owl Stores.\textsuperscript{11} The truth suggests an important lesson for law teachers (and law students): It is dangerous to draw inferences about emerging doctrine from isolated cases, and it helps to read cases systematically if one wishes to recover the law in action. By setting the record straight on what really happened in \textit{Hoffman} and pointing where the legal rules governing preliminary agreements have evolved in the years since the case was decided, I hope to encourage a more systematic approach to the "discovery" of new legal doctrines.

\section{The True Facts of \textit{Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores}}

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin relied on an edited transcript of the trial as the basis for its decision.\textsuperscript{12} But the complete trial transcript of the case\textsuperscript{13} paints a very different picture of the relationship between Joseph Hoffman\textsuperscript{14} and Edward Lukowitz. 133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (No. 147) [hereinafter "Appellant's Brief"].

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\textsuperscript{11} Commentators have been virtually unanimous in accepting the story, as told by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, that Red Owl’s escalating financial demands were the proximate cause of the breakdown in negotiations between the parties. Marvin Chirelstein is a notable exception to this uncritical view of the case in suggesting that there is a plausible alternative story to tell about \textit{Hoffman}. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 57–58 (5th ed. 2006); see also Johnston, supra note 7, at 496–99.

\textsuperscript{12} See Brief of the Appellants, Appendix at 101–241, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. and Edward Lukowitz, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (No. 147) [hereinafter "Appellant’s Brief"].

\textsuperscript{13} Transcript of Record at 77, Joseph and Shirley Hoffmann v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. and Edward Lukowitz (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (No. 14954) (A.W. Parnell, J.) [hereinafter Record].

\textsuperscript{14} Joseph Hoffmann in fact spelled his name with two "N"s, thus "Hoffmann," and it was so spelled in the trial transcript and in respondents' brief to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. See Record, supra note 13, at 77 ("Your name is Joseph Hoffmann, is that correct?" Answer: "That's right, sir." Question: "Spelled Hoffmann?" Answer: "Two
and Edward Lukowitz and the other Red Owl agents headquartered in Minneapolis. This is true even if one endeavors to interpret all facts in the light most favorable to Hoffman, as the appellee holding a jury verdict.

The key to unraveling the true story behind Hoffman is to ignore the red herring. Specifically, let’s put to one side a consideration of the various actions taken by Hoffman in reliance on statements made by Lukowitz and the other Red Owl representatives during the negotiation process. Rather, let’s focus on a single fact. Hoffman claimed to have “about $18,000” available to be set up in a Red Owl franchise. This much is conceded by all. These, then, are the pertinent questions: What was the understanding as to the composition of the $18,000? Was it supposed to be all equity, or was it to be cash composed of some equity and some debt? If the latter, from what sources was Hoffman to obtain his encumbered cash? Finally, how reasonable was Red Owl’s reaction to the changing sources of Hoffman’s prospective $18,000 contribution as he moved his assets around between September 1961 and January 1962? While these financing questions are complex, they contain the answer to the puzzle that has perplexed students and commentators for years: What explains the behavior of Red Owl officials who, according to the court, repeatedly increased Hoffman’s minimum capital requirements, first from $18,000 to $24,000, then to $26,000, and ultimately to $34,000?

A. The Purchase and Sale of the Wautoma Grocery Store and the $18,000 “Assurance”

In the fall of 1959, Joseph Hoffman was restless. He had operated a bakery in Wautoma, Wisconsin since 1956, but he wanted to do more. So, in November 1959, Hoffman contacted Sid Jansen, the Division Manager of Red Owl stores, and inquired about the possibility of acquiring a Red Owl

‘N’s.”). The majority opinion of Justice Currie in the Supreme Court misspelled his name and the misspelling has remained ever since. See Record, supra note 13, at 78.

As I suggest in this essay, the misunderstanding between the parties that led to the dispute cannot be appreciated if one merely reads the edited transcript. Moreover, Red Owl’s attorneys did a poor job of highlighting the key facts and their legal relevance either at trial or on appeal.

Record, supra note 13, at 86.

Hoffman had done well in this business and, in February 1959, he had bought the building in which the bakery was located for $10,000 under an installment land contract ($100 down and $100 per month). See Record, supra note 13, at 79–81. By September 1961, when he paid off this mortgage, he had paid down the principal liability to about $7500. See infra note 39.

Jansen’s responsibilities included “future development” (finding new franchisees and facilitating the process by which they could begin operations as a Red Owl franchisee).
franchise store. Informal discussions continued but without much progress and, by the fall of 1960, Edward Lukowitz had taken over for Jansen as Division Manager. Around Christmas that year Hoffman had an idea. He thought “it might be a good idea to get a little experience in the grocery business before I go into a bigger store.”

A friend in Wautoma who was running such a store had suffered a heart attack and the store was available. He called Lukowitz who looked into it and advised him to go ahead.

Hoffman bought the Wautoma grocery store business from his friend for $16,000 in February 1961 and assumed the lease on the building. Things went well even though Hoffman was stretched thin in managing both the bakery and the grocery business at the same time. In May, Lukowitz and another Red Owl employee came to the store to conduct an inventory, and they concluded that the store was running a three to four percent profit, which they judged as pretty good under the circumstances. Lukowitz thereupon urged Hoffman to sell the business to his assistant, Edward Wrysinski, in order to free up his equity for the larger Red Owl store. Hoffman was reluctant to sell in June because the summer business in the lake country was historically very brisk (an estimated 5000 tourists would increase the summer population significantly).

At this meeting in May 1961, Hoffman said to Lukowitz and his colleague, “Fellows, you know how much money I got—about $18,000. Will this put me in a bigger operation or won’t it?” Lukowitz replied that there would be no problem with that level of investment. There was, however, no discussion then (or at any time thereafter) as to the nature of the $18,000 investment. Was it to be all equity, or was it to be part equity and part borrowed cash?

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19 Record, supra note 13, at 84.
20 Id.
21 Hoffman paid $7000 for the business and $9000 for the inventory, and leased the store building for $175 per month. Record, supra note 13, at 89. Hoffman’s cost in acquiring and operating the grocery business in Wautoma was $18,000. Id. at 90. He financed this transaction in part by borrowing $9500 from the Union State Bank of Wautoma and giving the bank a chattel mortgage on his bakery equipment. Exhibit 41, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.).
22 Record, supra note 13, at 85, 95.
23 Id. at 87–88.
24 Id. at 86.
25 There also was evidence that Hoffman and Wrysinski were not working well together and that this might have been a contributing factor in the decision to sell. Id. at 119. Though conflicting, the evidence is sufficient to find that Lukowitz urged this move so as to “set Hoffman up” in a bigger Red Owl store.
26 On cross-examination, Hoffman was asked, “Was there any discussion at any time
Hoffman clearly assumed it was the latter. He had no intention of selling his bakery business in order to free up equity for the new franchise. Rather, he hoped to continue that business and operate the new Red Owl Store at the same time. He was thinking of putting together $18,000 in cash consisting of his current banked savings of about $10,500 and a $7500 loan from his father-in-law, Simon Vanden Heuvel, a prosperous local farmer.

Red Owl, on the other hand, regarded a substantial equity contribution from Hoffman as the key to a successful franchise. Indeed, Red Owl officials had reason to believe that Hoffman had more than enough equity to establish a franchise. On September 11, 1961, Hoffman had provided a financial statement to Lukowitz that was passed on to the home office in Minneapolis. This statement represented that Hoffman had business equity of at least $28,000, consisting of $10,000 in cash, $1500 in inventory in the bakery, $4500 equity in the bakery building, and $12,000 equity in his bakery equipment. Thus, from Red Owl’s perspective, Hoffman would have ample equity, provided he liquidated his bakery business.

The Wautoma grocery store was sold to Ed Wrysinski on June 6, 1961 for $18,000. At the time he sold in June, many details about establishing Hoffman in a bigger store were unresolved, including which town would be the best location for the new store, the size and site of the store building, fixtures needed for a store, etc. Shortly afterward, Lukowitz suggested as to how this $18,000 was to be made up? That is, was it all unencumbered cash or partly to be borrowed cash?” Hoffman answered: “I don’t believe there was any discussion on that.” Id. at 167.

Equity participation helps to align the interests of a franchisee with those of the franchisor. See infra text accompanying notes 88–89.

Hoffman testified that it was his decision to sell the store business but that he acted on Lukowitz’s advice that he should sell before the summer tourist season in order to prepare for the new store. Hoffman testified: “I told Ed that the fellow that was working for me was interested in the business. Ed says: Let’s sell it to him now and go into a bigger operation.” Record, supra note 13, at 94.

On cross-examination Hoffman was asked, “Didn’t you know at this time that in [selling the Wautoma store and] establishing a bigger store there would be a lot of things to be worked out?” “That’s right,” Hoffman replied. Id. at 171.
alternative locations for the new store—Lake Mills, Clintonville, Kewaunee, and Chilton. The two of them traveled around looking at these places and finally settled on a lot in Chilton. On August 3, Hoffman acquired a thirty-day option to purchase the Chilton lot for a price of $6000 with $1000 down on exercise of the option. The plan was that Hoffman would purchase the lot and then resell it at a profit to the contractor who was building the new store, taking back a lease at a rental that reflected the enhanced price the builder agreed to pay. In essence, the sale/leaseback was designed both to capture equity in the lot and to serve as an indirect loan from the builder to Hoffman. The goal was to open the new store by December 1.

B. The September 27 Proposed Financing Plan

Based on Hoffman’s September 11, 1961 financial statement, it appeared to Red Owl officials that, by selling the bakery building and business and combining the proceeds with cash on hand, Hoffman would have $26,500 in liquid assets, more than enough to make his equity contribution to the franchise operation. Hoffman, as we have seen, had much different intentions, however. He did not intend to sell the equipment or the bakery building. Rather, he wanted to lease the building and business to someone else and take some of the equipment to operate a bakery in the new store. Hoffman saw the bakery business as his livelihood, available to support his wife and six children while getting started in the new store.

On September 13, acting on Lukowitz’s advice, Hoffman paid the $1000 and exercised his option on the Chilton lot. Hoffman was eager to do so in any event because he had heard of the possibility of an A&P acquiring the same property for a store in Chilton. The next day, Hoffman paid off the $7500 mortgage on the bakery building, reducing his cash on hand in the bank to $2500. On September 27, Lukowitz called Hoffman and arranged for him to meet two people from the Red Owl home office—Herman Carlson, the future development manager, and Walter Hall, the credit manager—at the lot in

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33 Id. at 97–98.
34 The option was subsequently extended to September 15. Id. at 104.
35 Id. at 100.
36 The statement showed $10,000 cash in the bank and additional equity in the bakery business of $16,500, consisting of the bakery building (worth $12,000 with a $7500 mortgage) and equipment (worth $19,500 subject to a chattel mortgage of $7500). See Exhibit 40, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.). Apparently, this financial statement was prepared at Lukowitz’s request.
37 Record, supra note 13, at 117.
Chilton. During that meeting, Hoffman gave Carlson a second financial statement which listed the bakery building as worth $12,000 and clear of liens together with cash in hand of $2500. Based on that statement, the parties prepared the first "proposed financing plan." It showed Hoffman making an $18,600 equity contribution, consisting of $3600 cash, $12,000 from the sale of the bakery building, and $3000 from the resale of the lot to the builder. Also listed under "Other trade payables" was a loan from Hoffman’s father-in-law of $7500, designated as “pay interest only at 5%.” Hoffman’s equity interest in the bakery equipment and the bakery merchandise was indicated in a note on the proposal under “Bakery” but these assets were not part of Hoffman’s proposed equity contribution for the new store. It thus appears from this first proposed plan that Red Owl assumed that the bakery would be a separate operation run by Hoffman out of the franchise store.

At the end of this meeting, someone said: “There seems to be no hitch,” and the parties left in an optimistic frame of mind. Several days later, Lukowitz called Hoffman, telling him to “get your money together.” During this phone conversation, Lukowitz reiterated that the only remaining issue was the sale of the bakery business and building (presumably to realize the $12,000 in cash as per the September 27 financing plan). While Hoffman had preferred

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38 One reason to meet at the lot was to examine the map of the site and gauge its relationship to “downtown” Chilton. Exhibit 29, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J).

39 Recall that on September 14, Hoffman had paid off the $7500 mortgage on the bakery building. This reduced his cash in the bank from $10,000 to $2500. Exhibit 38, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J).


41 Hoffman’s contribution to the business was designated on the statement as “Equity capital: Amount owner has to invest.” Exhibit 39, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.). Based on this first financial proposal, it appears that both Red Owl and Hoffman understood that Hoffman would put in $18,600 of his own cash exclusive of any borrowed funds from his father-in-law.

42 A key question, of course, was whether Hoffman mentioned during this meeting with Carlson and Hall his understanding that $18,000 was a sufficient contribution to establish a franchise and his understanding that he could make this contribution partly with cash and partly with borrowed money from his father-in-law. During cross-examination Hoffman was asked: “Did you mention your $18,000 understanding to Carlson and Hall when filling out your financial statement?” He answered, “I can’t recall.” Record, supra note 13, at 179.

43 Id. at 109.

44 Id. at 230.
to lease the business minus enough equipment to have a bakery in the new store, he nonetheless agreed to sell the business if that was a necessary condition to obtaining the franchise.

C. The November 22 Proposed Financing Plan

On October 11, 1961 Hoffman returned to the Union State Bank and borrowed $13,500 secured by a further $6000 chattel mortgage on the bakery equipment and a $7500 mortgage on the bakery building. Thus Hoffman left the bank with $13,500 in cash. This amount was augmented a month later when Hoffman sold the bakery building for $10,000, using $7500 of the proceeds to retire the mortgage and retaining $2500 in cash. Thus, as of November 6, Hoffman had over $18,000 in cash equity although his net worth had declined slightly given the lower than expected sale price for the bakery building. Most of his cash ($13,500) was borrowed against his equity in the bakery equipment. Thereafter, Hoffman took a job working nights at the Elm Tree Bakery.

Just before Thanksgiving, Lukowitz called to invite Hoffman to Minneapolis to iron out final details with the home office financial folks so as to get the store in operation after the first of the year. Hoffman met with Lukowitz, Carlson, Hall, and their boss, Frank Walker, in Minneapolis around November 22. At that meeting, the parties prepared a new financing proposal based on a new financial statement that Hoffman prepared and signed. This new plan provided that Hoffman would contribute about $22,000 in equity consisting of $12,500 in cash ($4500 in savings plus $8000 from the Chilton Bank secured by the bakery equipment) together with the bakery equipment. Because the equipment was worth $18,000, it represented an in-kind capital.

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45 Exhibit 42, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.). (There is no copy of this mortgage in the record).
46 Thus, as of October 11, Hoffman had $16,000 in cash equity. When asked on cross-examination about his timing in paying off the prior mortgage on the bakery building on September 14 and creating a new one less than one month later, Hoffman stated that he got the cash in response to Lukowitz's statement that he should get his money together in anticipation of consummating the deal. Record, supra note 13, at 182.
47 He also guaranteed the lease to his top baker Michael Grimm at $120 per month. Id. at 137.
48 Id. at 138. Presumably, Hoffman still had $18,000 in cash on hand at that time.
49 This new financial statement is not in the record. But based on the financing plan that the parties then concluded, it appears that Hoffman had in the interim period retired most or all of the $13,500 chattel mortgage on the bakery equipment owed to the Union State Bank, thereby reducing his cash on hand to $4500.
In essence, the deal now proposed that the residual value of the bakery equipment become a major component of his contribution to the franchise. It replaced the previous plan to raise $12,000 in cash from the sale of the bakery building; an asset that Hoffman previously had listed as free from liens.

Shortly after the meeting, Hoffman received a copy of the November financing proposal in a letter from Carlson, the credit manager. In the letter, Carlson explained the changes from the previous plan: “You will find enclosed a report indicating our capital requirements. You will recall that in your visit to the office that our original thinking on this was subsequently revised in order to properly reflect the amount of equity capital that you personally have for investment.”

The problem, in essence, was that the sale of the bakery building yielded less than was predicted and, moreover, contrary to Hoffman’s initial representations, the building had been mortgaged. When it became clear that the building was not unencumbered and thus could not provide a major portion of Hoffman’s equity contribution, the financing plan had to be revised. After some reflection, Hoffman agreed to this revised proposal.

Throughout this period, while Red Owl was interested in tying down Hoffman’s equity contribution, Hoffman was concerned about an entirely different issue. Rather than focusing on how much equity he was putting into the operation, he was focused on the amount of cash, whether encumbered or unencumbered, that he was required to “contribute.” Consequently, he considered this November proposal to require an additional $6000 in cash.
beyond his original $18,000 commitment.\textsuperscript{54} He reached that conclusion by adding together the $7500 loan from his father-in-law, plus his cash contribution of $4600, plus the $8000 loan from the Chilton bank secured by the bakery equipment, plus the $4000 profit on the lot. This conclusion reflects Hoffman’s basic misunderstanding of the economics of the transaction;\textsuperscript{55} a misunderstanding that began with the first proposed financing plan, continued through the November meeting, and ultimately was the proximate cause of the deal breaking down the following February.

In retrospect, the source of the misunderstanding following the November meeting seems clear. Hoffman believed he was making an additional $6000 cash "contribution," while the Red Owl people believed that the equity Hoffman had available to contribute was $6000 less than he had originally represented. Throughout the negotiations in Minneapolis and thereafter, Red Owl officials expressed concern that, of the $24,000 to $26,000 that Hoffman was planning to contribute, only $13,000 was equity (free cash and amounts borrowed against his equity in the bakery equipment).\textsuperscript{56} The balance was to be borrowed unsecured from Hoffman’s father-in-law and the building contractor.

D. The December Financing Proposal

Shortly after the November meeting, Lukowitz called Hoffman and asked to meet him at the Red Owl store in Appleton. Lukowitz had a wire from Carlson stating that they needed to raise an additional $2000 for marketing and promotion of the new store. Hoffman replied, "I have to find out if I can make $2000 more available."\textsuperscript{57} Several days later, Hoffman talked the situation over with his wife and his father-in-law. They hit upon a solution to Hoffman’s evident problems in coming up with the needed financing: Hoffman and

\textsuperscript{54} Id. at 141–44.

\textsuperscript{55} Hoffman was making an apples and oranges comparison. The $18,000 was his equity contribution. The amount of cash he might need to successfully start up the franchise was a different issue. Red Owl was eager to have him borrow sufficient cash to avoid a cash flow crunch in the early months. Their point to him was that he had control over this debt and if he did not need the additional cash he could retire any or all of it. See infra text accompanying notes 65–66. It wasn’t until the very end of the negotiations that Red Owl learned that Hoffman was constrained by his father-in-law from incurring any more debt. Record, supra note 13, at 141–44. Nevertheless, Hoffman’s calculation was also used by Hoffman’s lawyers, accepted implicitly by defendants’ counsel and by the trial judge. As a result, the fundamental misunderstanding between Red Owl officials and Hoffman was never made clear to the jury.

\textsuperscript{56} Record, supra note 13, at 223.

\textsuperscript{57} Id. at 145–46.
Simon Vanden Heuvel would go into the franchise as equal partners. Vanden Heuvel would contribute $13,000 in cash and Hoffman would contribute the balance.\(^5\)

Before this new scheme had been vetted with Lukowitz, the Red Owl home office people sent a third financing proposal in early December. This plan reflected the additional $2000 needed for promotion. It showed Hoffman’s equity contribution unchanged at $22,100 ($4600 in cash and $17,500 in bakery equipment).\(^5\) In order to raise additional cash to operate the store, the plan proposed a $8000 loan from the Chilton bank secured by Hoffman’s equity in the bakery equipment, a $7500 no pay, 5% interest loan from his father-in-law, and a $6000 cash “profit” from the resale of the Chilton lot to the builder.\(^6\) In short, Hoffman’s cash contribution (borrowed funds plus equity) had been increased by $2000 to $26,100 but the only change from the previous plan was to increase the “profits” from selling the lot from $4000 to $6000.

Shortly after receiving this proposal, Hoffman called Lukowitz and told him of the new arrangement he had made with Simon Vanden Heuvel to secure $13,000. Lukowitz replied, “This is good. I’m sure that we can go ahead at this point.”\(^6\) He then passed on this latest information to the Red Owl front office in Minneapolis. Two days later, Lukowitz called to arrange a meeting at the end of January with Carlson and Walker at the Red Owl store in Appleton. Prior to that meeting Lukowitz and Hoffman met to discuss the new arrangement in more detail. Upon learning of the terms for Vanden Heuvel’s contribution, Lukowitz suggested, “Let’s not go into the partnership with the front office. After it is all done, you can take your father-in-law in the way you want.”\(^6\)

E. The January 26 Financing Proposal

On January 26, 1962, Hoffman met Carlson, Walker, and Lukowitz at the Appleton store. One of the Red Owl people said, “We are ready to go forward”

\(^{58}\) Id. at 147.


\(^{60}\) Id.

\(^{61}\) Record, supra note 13, at 149.

\(^{62}\) Id. at 186. Notwithstanding his trial testimony (which we must assume that the jury believed), in deposition, Hoffman was asked: “To whom in the Red Owl organization did you tell that your father-in-law had to be a partner?” Answer: “I don’t know if I ever told anybody.” Id.
and showed Hoffman a final financing proposal,\(^\text{63}\) one that addressed Red Owl's continuing concerns about approving Hoffman for a franchise: the high debt to equity ratio reflected in Hoffman's proposed contribution to the enterprise. The solution was to have the $13,000 loan from Simon Vanden Heuvel subordinated to general creditors.\(^\text{64}\) Without a subordination agreement, the $13,000 (whether considered an unsecured debt or a contribution to equity) would have reduced Hoffman's equity contribution to $9000. But with a subordination agreement in place, Hoffman's equity would remain at $22,500 and his cash position would be significantly enhanced. The additional $6000 from Simon together with a further proposed bank loan of $2000 would increase the cash available to fund operations from $62,500 (as reflected in the previous plan) to $70,500. This latest (and last) plan listed Hoffman's equity contribution as essentially unchanged at $22,500, consisting of $5000 in cash and $17,500 in bakery equipment.\(^\text{65}\)

From Hoffman's perspective, however, this latest plan required $8000 more in borrowed funds, bringing to $34,000 the combined total of debt and equity. He had two objections to the plan. The first revealed clearly the divergence in the parties' understanding of the transaction: Hoffman felt that, with the additional cash from his father-in-law and the new bank loan of $2000, he should not be required to borrow $8000 from the Chilton Bank secured by his equity in the bakery equipment. Frank Walker, the senior Red Owl officer, attempted to reassure him that the additional $8000 in cash to begin operations was for his benefit and was not an increase in his equity contribution. After all, Hoffman had complete control over those borrowed funds. "It's your money" Walker said, "It isn't ours." He tried again: "Joe, if after a reasonable length of time these funds aren't used, pay them back to the bank."\(^\text{66}\) Hoffman was adamant in reply, "My father-in-law won't let me be in debt." That was the end of the meeting.

It seems plain, in retrospect, that Hoffman's real objection had to do with his personal relationship with his father-in-law, who appears to have been a prosperous, but stern, Calvinist. Hoffman could not borrow the $8000 from the Chilton Bank because his father-in-law didn't believe in debt. He could not propose to his father-in-law that his $13,000 contribution be subordinated to creditors and treated legally as a gift because his father-in-law was sufficiently

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\(^{64}\) Red Owl had prepared a subordination agreement that was also delivered to Hoffman to be signed by his father-in-law. See Exhibit 46, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Outagamie County, Oct. 21, 1963) (A.W. Parnell, J.).

\(^{65}\) Id.

\(^{66}\) Record, supra note 13, at 333.
skeptical about Joe's business acumen that he wanted to have some control over his money. As a consequence, despite Lukowitz' urging, Hoffman never even asked his father-in-law to sign the proposed subordination agreement. He returned home and called Walter Hall, the development officer, in Minneapolis to complain. Hall admitted "this thing has gotten a little goofed up." But when Hoffman asked "what about a smaller store," Hall replied "It's this store or none and that's it . . . ."67 Finally, on February 2, 1962, Hoffman wrote to Lukowitz:

After doing my utmost to put this together for 2 ½ years, it seems to me Red Owls'[sic] demands have gotten beyond my power to fulfill. Therefore, the only thing I can do at this time is drop the entire matter and try to make up the losses I suffered, due to your ill-advice.68

III. THE TRIAL

Joseph Hoffman's plan to "make up" for the losses he had incurred from the failed negotiations with Red Owl officials was to consult legal counsel and ultimately to sue Red Owl and Lukowitz for damages arising out of his reliance on their representations made during the negotiation process. A year and a half later, on October 21, 1963 at 9:30 a.m., trial began in the Circuit Court of Outagamie County in the City of Appleton, Wisconsin. The presiding judge was A.W. Parnell. Representing Joseph and Shirley Hoffman was G.H. Van Hoof and John Wiley of the firm of Van Hoof & Van Hoof of Little Chute, Wisconsin. Representing the defendants, Red Owl Stores, Inc. and Edward Lukowitz, was David Fulton of the firm of Benton, Bosser, Fulton, Menn and Nehs of Appleton.69

The word "promise" was not uttered during the trial. The plaintiffs' theory of the case was that a representation made by the defendants on which Hoffman reasonably relied to his detriment was actionable without more. As Hoffman's attorney argued to the court following the conclusion of the trial: "It is our position that if Mr. Hoffmann acts in reliance on any representations, statements or misconduct, we don't care if it ever results in a final contract. Our position is that they are then liable for damages, regardless, because they have jockeyed him out of position." In response, the court replied:

I don't think what you are saying makes legal sense—if you will pardon me. In other words, they had to make a material representation that if he

67 Id. at 156.
69 Record, supra note 13, at 77.
would do certain things the end result would be they would give him a store in Chilton. Unless there is a promise all the representations in the world wouldn’t make any difference.\(^{70}\) If they are dealing at arm’s length, without any eventual promise to do anything on the part of Red Owl, it doesn’t make any difference what they represented to him.\(^{71}\)

Here was the big opening for Fulton, the defendants’ lawyer, to press the point that there were no grounds for misrepresentation liability whether in tort or contract in the absence of a legal duty owed to the plaintiffs. In the absence of a promise conditioned on such a misrepresentation there was no duty in contract. Moreover, courts generally hold that there is no tort duty of care owed to a commercial party engaged in arms length negotiations.\(^{72}\) Nor have courts in the United States recognized a duty to bargain in good faith, much less a duty to bargain carefully to avoid careless but non-willful misrepresentations. Mistake, in other words, is relevant generally only if the parties have already formed a contractual relationship.\(^{73}\)

But Fulton, as he had throughout the trial, chose to rest on a single argument: The negotiations were too indefinite to form a contract and absent a contract there was no basis for liability. This might well have been true, but Fulton did not educate the court as to why it was so. Nor did he try to narrow the scope of the special verdict that permitted the jury to find liability based on innocent misrepresentations that were relied upon. Thus, the issue of mutual misunderstanding—that neither party knew or had reason to know the meaning attached by the other to the representations about Hoffman’s capital contribution—was not put before the jury.

In consequence, the court prepared a special verdict that took the contract question away from the jury but left them with the task of determining: 1) Were representations made by Red Owl officials that if Hoffman fulfilled certain conditions a deal for a franchise store would be concluded? 2) Did Hoffman reasonably rely on those representations? 3) Was it reasonable for Hoffman to so rely? 4) Did Hoffman fulfill all the conditions required by the terms of the negotiations? And 5) What sum of money would reasonably compensate Hoffman for the sale of the Wautoma store, the bakery building, the option on the lot, moving to Neenah and the rental of a house in Chilton?\(^{74}\)

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\(^{70}\) This is the only time in the entire proceedings that the word “promise” was spoken. \(Id.\) at 439–40 (emphasis added).

\(^{71}\) Id. at 439–40.

\(^{72}\) See Restatement (First) of Torts § 762 (1939).

\(^{73}\) There are exceptions, most notably the construction bid cases such as Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P. 2d 757 (Cal. 1958). See Mark P. Gergen, Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1990).

\(^{74}\) Record, supra note 13, at 26–28.
Subsequently, when instructing the jury, the court used the subjective/objective test of reasonable reliance usually reserved for fraudulent misrepresentation. Judge Parnell told the jury to determine the reasonableness of Hoffman’s reliance by taking into consideration Hoffman’s experience, his education, and all other circumstances. Thus, the question was not whether a reasonable person would have so relied, but whether a person of like business experience, knowledge, and background acting under the same circumstances would have relied.  

Following the court’s instructions, the jury retired at 12:06 p.m. to elect a foreman and have lunch. They returned with their verdict at 4:27 p.m., having eaten lunch and elected Abe Golden as foreman. The jury found for Hoffman on all the specific questions and fixed damages at $140 for the moving expenses, $125 for the house rental, $1000 for the option on the lot, $2000 for the sale of the bakery building, and $16,735 for the sale of the Wautoma store. Given that these items sum to $20,000, and given the short time for deliberation, it seems plausible that the jury decided that $20,000 would be the right amount to punish Red Owl for disrespecting one of their fellow citizens and then simply designated the balance of the “damages” to losses arising from the premature sale of the Wautoma store after making specific findings on the other items. In any event, there was no evidence introduced that would have supported the $16,735 figure reached by the jury.

Judge Parnell immediately questioned whether there was any evidentiary basis for that finding and dismissed the jury with his thanks. The defendants’ filed a motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support Red Owl’s liability and, in the alternative, to reduce the awards for losses on the sale of the store and bakery building to such sums as an unprejudiced jury could have awarded or, in the alternative, to grant defendant a new trial on the issue of damages.

On March 16, 1964, Judge Parnell entered his order on the motion for judgment. He affirmed the jury verdict in all respects save damages, in particular the claimed losses in the sale of the Wautoma store. There he found the award of $16,735 against the weight of the evidence, wholly without foundation or support and contrary to the instructions of the court. Thus, he ordered a new trial on the sole issue of damages for loss, if any, on the sale of the Wautoma inventory and fixtures. Red Owl appealed the court’s decision affirming the jury verdict to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and Hoffman

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75 Id. at 448–51.

76 There seems more than a little irony in his final statement to the jury that: “I know that it has been a long and protracted case and called for considerable patience on your part, and sacrifice and considerable effort, as is evidenced by the fact that you have been out all afternoon on the verdict.” Id. at 457.
appealed that portion of the order that reversed the verdict on damages.  

IV. THE APPEAL

A. The Appeal Briefs

Red Owl’s brief to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin raised three substantive issues. First, Red Owl argued there should be no recovery as a matter of law in contract because, as found by the trial court, the statements made by Red Owl representatives were preliminary negotiations and any statements made during the negotiations were too uncertain or indefinite to be the basis for finding an enforceable contract claim. Second, recovery could not be had under a theory of estoppel in pais because, under Wisconsin law, equitable estoppel can be used only as a shield—to prevent the defendant from denying that a particular fact is true—and not as a sword to create a right of recovery that does not exist in the first instance. Third, the plaintiff could not recover on the basis of promissory estoppel because there were no representations definite enough to qualify as “promises” within Restatement Section 90 and, in any event, plaintiff suffered no injustice because the reason the deal fell through was Hoffman’s refusal to present the subordination issue to his father-in-law.

In response, Hoffman’s lawyers primarily rested their case, as they had at trial, on the theory of equitable estoppel. They argued that, in light of the misrepresentations of its agents, Red Owl was estopped from claiming that there was no contract. They also argued for an implied-in-fact contract on the grounds that Hoffman would not have done the things he did had there not been a contract to award him the store. Finally, they claimed a right to damages on the basis of promissory estoppel, simply ignoring the appellant’s argument that promissory estoppel is available where there is a promise but no consideration, but is not available when there is no promise in the first place.

77 Red Owl perfected its appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin from the Order on Motions after Verdict on June 25, 1964.
78 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 12, at 31–52. With respect to damages, Red Owl claimed that the award of $16,735 was reached by merely subtracting awards for moving expenses, rent of a house in Neenah, sale of the bakery building, and option on the lot, from a gross figure of $20,000, demonstrating that the jury pulled the figure out of the air. There was no evidence of loss of bargain in the June sale of the grocery business and thus it was in error to remand for a new trial.
79 Brief of the Appellees, Appendix at 23, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. and Edward Lukowitz, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (No. 147).
80 Id. at 19–20.
81 With respect to the promissory estoppel claim, the appellee’s brief simply quoted
B. The Decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court

Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Currie ignored the issue of equitable estoppel and focused exclusively on the promissory estoppel argument. The Court asked: Should the doctrine of promissory estoppel as embodied in Restatement Section 90 be recognized and, if so, is it satisfied here? The court held that this issue was squarely presented since “no other possible theory has been presented to or discovered by this court which would permit plaintiffs to recover.” Promissory fraud was the only other possible theory the court could imagine might cover this case, but the court held that such action would not lie absent a present intent by Red Owl not to fulfill a promise at the time it was made. The court rejected the possibility that Red Owl had made any of its “promises” in bad faith or with a present intent not to perform.

Turning then to Section 90, the court endorsed and adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel and found ample evidence of all of its elements to support the jury verdict. Indeed, the court identified a number of “promises and assurances” made by Red Owl representatives, the foremost being the promise by Lukowitz “that for the sum of $18,000 Red Owl would establish Hoffman in a store.” The court adopted Hoffman’s claim that, after the store was sold and the lot purchased, the $18,000 figure was changed to $24,100, then increased to $26,100 with the assurance that the deal would go through, then Hoffman was induced to sell his bakery building on the assurance that this was the last necessary step but instead the figure was increased yet again to $34,000. Based on these findings, the court concluded that there was ample evidence to sustain the jury’s findings that the promissory representations made by Red Owl were reasonably relied upon by Hoffman to his detriment.

The court then turned to the central question raised by Red Owl on appeal—that the representations made by Lukowitz were simply too uncertain from RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 ill. 3 (1932) that if “A promises B that if B will go to college and complete his course he will give him $5000 and B does so: Then A’s promise is binding.” Id. at 24.

Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 273 (Wis. 1965). Given that the plaintiff’s primary theory at trial and on appeal was equitable estoppel, this is a most peculiar statement, only exceeded by the following: “the trial court frame[d] the special verdict on the theory of sec. 90 of the Restatement.” Id. In fact, the word “promise” was never uttered during the trial testimony or in the court’s instructions to the jury, not to mention “§ 90” or “promissory estoppel.”

Id. at 274. This statement by the court is not supported by the record, even as it was edited for the appeal. Hoffman testified only that Lukowitz assured him that $18,000 was a sufficient amount to secure a franchise. There was no testimony that Lukowitz ever said that in return for an $18,000 contribution “he would establish Hoffman in a store.”
and indefinite to form the basis of contract liability. Under the indefiniteness doctrine, a representation does not qualify as a promise if the undertaking is uncertain or unclear or if key material facts essential to that undertaking have not been specified. The court conceded that many factors were never agreed upon, including the design, layout, and cost of the store, who the builder would be, the price the builder would pay for the land and the resulting rental, the term of the franchise, and the renewal and purchase options. All of these considerations are what led the trial court to conclude as a matter of law that the parties’ negotiations were preliminary and could not form the basis for a contract. But, the appellate court held, a promise sufficient to sustain a claim in promissory estoppel need not be the equivalent of an offer that would result in a binding contract if accepted.

Finally, the court turned to the issue of damages and here it affirmed the trial court’s order of a new trial on the issue of damages for the premature sale of the Wautoma store. The court held that because recovery was had under Section 90, Hoffman’s damages should not exceed his actual reliance losses suffered by the sale and thus the evidence did not sustain the $16,735 jury award.

V. THE HOFFMAN SAGA AS A CAUTIONARY TALE

Even with the facts as found by the court, grounding Red Owl’s liability on a promissory estoppel theory is untenable as a matter of contract doctrine. There is scant support in the law of contracts for the court’s legal analysis. To the contrary, the Restatement of Contracts has only one definition of a promise, and that definition applies equally to a promise that is the product of a bargained-for-exchange and a promise for which enforcement is sought on the grounds of induced reliance. The doctrine of indefiniteness holds that, for a representation to qualify as a promise, it must be sufficiently clear and definite that it justifies the promisee in believing that a commitment has been made. If the terms of a manifestation of intent are uncertain or indefinite, then, by definition, it fails to qualify as a promise. If neither party has made a promise,

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84 Specifically, the court held that: “sec. 90 of [the] Restatement . . . does not impose the requirement that the promise giving rise to the cause of action must be so comprehensive in scope as to meet the requirements of an offer that would ripen into a contract if accepted by the promisee.” Id. at 275.

85 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 2, 90 (1981). RESTATEMENT § 2 defines a promise as a manifestation of an intention to be bound so made that it justifies the promisee in believing a commitment has been made. RESTATEMENT § 90 begins “A promise . . .” and defines it by reference to § 2. See id. § 90 reporter’s note cmt. a (emphasis added).

86 Id. § 33.
there is no claim under Section 90. Rather, the parties’ initial communications to each other fall in the category of unenforceable preliminary negotiations. Thus, if Hoffman stands for the proposition that a commitment can be binding under a theory of promissory estoppel even though it lacks the clarity and certainty required of a bargained-for promise, the case is wrong as a matter of contract doctrine.

A. Are There Any Theories on Which Liability Could Be Based?

Some scholars have suggested that the opinion in Hoffman can be grounded on a duty to negotiate in good faith.\textsuperscript{87} Putting aside the difficulties inherent in applying such a standard, there is simply no evidence of any bad faith by any of the Red Owl officials. At most, Lukowitz was careless in his initial representation because he did not inquire further as to what Hoffman meant by his statement that he had about $18,000 to contribute. But, if anything, Hoffman was much more careless. Certainly, he could see by September 1961, when he was handed a proposed financing plan, that what he was to contribute was “equity” of at least $18,000. While the proposed cash requirements for the franchise did increase over time, the equity requirements remained largely fixed and the additional proposals for cash were loans that Hoffman was free to repay if he didn’t need the cash flow for his grocery business.\textsuperscript{88}

Moreover, Red Owl’s continued insistence that Hoffman make a substantial equity contribution to the franchise reflects perfectly appropriate business judgment. The risk in any franchise contract is that the interests of the parties will be misaligned and, as a consequence, the franchisee may manage its operation in a manner inconsistent with the interests of the franchisor. A widely recognized conflict that arises with excessive debt financing is that the agent may be motivated to increase the riskiness of his management of the franchise. By “putting all his eggs in one basket,” the agent can gamble with the borrowed funds. If the venture is successful, all the returns in excess of the fixed debt accrue to the agent. But, if the venture fails, the agent shares the loss

\textsuperscript{87} See, e.g., Duhl, supra note 7, at 315–21; P. S. Atiyah, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 80–92 (1981); Knapp, supra note 7, at 686–90; Summers, supra note 7, at 225.

\textsuperscript{88} Red Owl was appropriately concerned that Hoffman have sufficient cash on hand to begin operations, because a failure of a new franchise store would adversely affect the Red Owl brand. Lukowitz testified that the proposed increase in cash reflected in the January financing plan was prompted by Red Owl’s experience in opening new franchises and finding that additional cash was often needed to “get them off the ground, especially if you are new in a location.” This additional cash was intended “for the protection of the operator.” Record, supra note 13, at 307.
with his creditors. Red Owl, therefore, was properly concerned about avoiding this problem by working toward a jointly beneficial financing plan, one that protected its brand name from the possibility that its value would be diluted by Hoffman’s risky business decisions.

Mark Gergen and others have suggested that the best theory of liability is negligent misrepresentation. But there are many problems applying this theory to arm’s length bargaining contexts. Many courts don’t recognize this tort at all and the Restatement rule requires that the party making the statement owe a duty to the plaintiff to supply correct information to him. Because casual statements and contacts are prevalent in business, under the majority rule in commercial contexts, liability for negligent misrepresentation is imposed only where the party making the statement possesses unique or specialized expertise or is in a special position of trust and confidence with the injured party such that reliance on the negligent misrepresentation is justified. It has been specifically held, for example, that a franchisee could not maintain an action for negligent misrepresentation where the franchisor was not in a business of supplying information. Moreover, a claim for negligent misrepresentation ordinarily cannot be based on unfulfilled promises or statements as to future events. Finally, recovery of purely economic loss for negligent misrepresentation is available only when there is a special relationship between the parties or when the representation is made by one in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others.

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90 See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 73, at 34–36 (Hoffman best explained as liability for negligent misrepresentation); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 24 (1981) (same).
92 Under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977), an action for negligent misrepresentation lies only against one “who, in the course of his business profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions.” Id.
93 See, e.g., Eternity Global Master Fund, Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of NY, 375 F.3d 168, 187 (2d Cir. 2004). Thus, many courts hold there is no tort of negligent misrepresentation in the vendor/purchaser context. The key to the tort is that the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff to communicate accurate information. Thus, the plaintiff must show that the defendant either was in the business of supplying information or that the defendant had a pecuniary interest in the plaintiff’s transaction with a third party. Continental Leavitt Commc’ns, Ltd. v. Paine Webber, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 63–64 (2d Cir. 1988).
95 Gebrayel v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 888 P.2d 83, 89 (Or. Ct. App. 1995);
A final theory of liability is recovery in quasi-contract for unjust enrichment. Here the argument would be that Hoffman conferred a benefit on Red Owl during the period from May through November when he purchased and then sold his grocery store, sold the bakery building, and purchased an option on the lot in Chilton. All these actions gave Red Owl some further indication of the kind of franchisee that Hoffman was likely to be—was he enterprising and resourceful or was he a bit of a doofus? Quasi-contract claims based on unjust enrichment rarely succeed, however, unless the defendant specifically and wrongfully induced the benefit. A quasi-contract claim does not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead "it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or unlawfully." This at least puts the key question to a court: Was Hoffman induced to provide information to Red Owl by trick or was he a "mere volunteer"?

The trial transcript strongly suggests that Lukowitz was trying to mediate between Hoffman's meager capital assets and the home office's capital requirements. The facts as found by the court show only that Lukowitz was eager to secure a franchise for Hoffman, no doubt because he would earn a commission if the deal went through. The steps that he urged Hoffman to take—selling the store, buying the lot, and moving to Neenah—all seem designed to accelerate the approval process, not to induce an un-bargained-for benefit for Red Owl. Under the circumstances, then, shouldn't Hoffman have been more cautious in nailing down exactly how much capital he would have to provide prior to buying the grocery store, selling the store, selling his bakery, and buying an option on a lot?

Jason Johnston has argued that Red Owl might properly be held liable if the facts showed that Red Owl had a low opinion of Hoffman's prospects as a franchisee but hid that fact from Hoffman and instead encouraged his subsequent actions to see whether—against the odds—he turned out to have better talents than they initially believed. The problem with this argument is

Continental, 857 F. Supp. at 1270.


97 Johnston, supra note 7, at 496--99 (suggesting that Red Owl should be found liable if it misrepresented its relative optimism about the deal in order to learn more about Hoffman as a potential manager). A variant of this argument is offered by Ofer Grosskopf and Barak Medina in their interesting article, Regulating Contract Formation: Precontractual Reliance, Sunk Costs, and Market Structure, 39 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). They argue that the Hoffmans, being inexperienced and naive, underappreciated the risk of failed negotiations and thus over-invested in precontractual reliance. Red Owl, as an experienced repeat player, should have been conscious of this risk
that the facts simply belie that story. The evidence shows that Red Owl officials worked hard to find a way to stretch what they discovered to be Hoffman’s meager capital so as to make the franchise deal work. The series of financial proposals from September 1961 to January 1962 were motivated less by Red Owl’s escalating financial requirement than by Hoffman’s frequent shifting of his capital. That the deal broke down is more a function of the thin margin on which Hoffman was operating than any attempt by Red Owl to disguise its pessimism about the proposed transaction.

B. What About “Fundamental Fairness”?

But, as others have noted, there is a highly salient aspect to the Hoffman story—the evident disparity in income, education, and business acumen between Joe Hoffman and the Red Owl corporate officers. Is Hoffman v. Red Owl simply a case about fundamental fairness—one where the search for a strong doctrinal justification for liability is beside the point? In Peter Linzer’s words, this may be a case for “rough justice” and not for doctrinal niceties.98 The story of the hometown “little guy” pitted against a large, impersonal, and out-of-state corporation certainly seems the best explanation for the jury verdict, but more, surely, is required from the Wisconsin Supreme Court. And, the truth is that the facts as revealed at trial simply do not support the fairness claim. Nowhere in the record, for example, is there any testimony that Lukowitz said what was attributed to him by the Wisconsin court, nor were Hoffman’s proposed equity contributions ever substantially increased as the court implied.

The testimony is that Hoffman said to Lukowitz and his associate at the May 1961 meeting, “Fellows, you know how much money I got—approximately $18,000. Will this put me in a bigger operation or won’t it?” And Lukowitz then replied, “there would be no problem.”99 At most this is a representation that $18,000 of capital is enough for one to be established in a store assuming all other details are ironed out. In addition, the capital requirements for Hoffman were not increased in the manner the court suggests. As indicated earlier, Hoffman’s proposed equity contribution changed from $18,600 in the first financial proposal in September to $22,100 in the second proposal in November. This change was apparently motivated by the fact that

and taken steps to prevent it. Holding Red Owl liable for Hoffman’s reliance costs motivates it to prevent such unwarranted investment. Id. Apart from the fact that this solution would seem to have negative effects on activity levels (such as chilling negotiations with prospective franchisees who are behaviorally impaired), as with Johnston’s argument, the theory simply doesn’t fit the facts.

98 Linzer, supra note 7, at 719–20.
99 Record, supra note 13, at 86.
the bakery building was encumbered (contrary to Hoffman's initial representation) and the resulting need to shift the focus of Hoffman's proposed equity contribution to the bakery equipment. Thereafter, Hoffman's equity contribution remained essentially unchanged through the third and fourth financing proposals in December and January.

To be sure, Lukowitz did make two subsequent assurances—that with the additional $2,000 in promotion "the deal would go through," and that the sale of the bakery building in November "was the last step." But these statements were all made after the September meeting between Hoffman and Carlson and Hall from the home office. By that time, Hoffman knew well that their approval and not Lukowitz's was the key to securing the franchise. Given these facts, the question is not whether Hoffman was exploited by corporate barons (Lukowitz, after all, had less education than he did).\textsuperscript{100} The real issue was whether Hoffman's understanding of the transaction was a reasonable one and, more importantly, was it the only reasonable one.

At the end of the day, imposing liability for precontractual reliance because one party failed to correct the other's misunderstanding has significant costs, especially if one believes that, ordinarily, precontractual negotiations are essentially truthful. Jason Johnston has argued persuasively that such "cheap talk" should not be subject to liability in the ordinary case because delay in reaching a deal is costly to the parties and thus negotiators already have incentives to communicate useful information.\textsuperscript{101} There may be sound reasons to accept the costs of chilling future negotiations in order to prevent exploitation of the weak by the strong, but there is scant evidence of any exploitation in the negotiations between Joseph Hoffman and the representatives of Red Owl Stores.

C. Lawyering Matters: Arguments That Red Owl Failed to Pursue

One lesson from a close review of the Hoffman case is that the quality of legal argument matters. The record of the case reveals much to criticize about the way Red Owl's attorneys defended their clients.\textsuperscript{102} In particular, they

\textsuperscript{100} Lukowitz had a high school degree; Hoffman had a year of business and management courses at a local business college. \textit{Id.} at 78.

\textsuperscript{101} Johnston, \textit{supra} note 7, at 407–11.

\textsuperscript{102} Among other dubious trial tactics, Red Owl's attorneys apparently responded to the plaintiffs' request to call Carlson, Hall, and Walker as adverse witnesses by instructing the Red Owl home office personnel not to be present in court during the plaintiffs' case in chief. Thus, the following colloquy occurred in the presence of the jury:

Mr. Van Hoof (Hoffman's attorney): I would like to call Mr. Carlson adversely.

Mr. Fulton (Red Owl's attorney): Carlson is not present.

Mr. Van Hoof: I would like to call Mr. Walker adversely.
failed to raise three issues, either at trial or on appeal, that seem quite cogent given the trial testimony. First, did Lukowitz have apparent authority to make financial representations? This question is particularly important once the chronology is clear. According to Hoffman, Lukowitz made his first representation in May when he assured Hoffman that $18,000 would be sufficient capital to put him in a bigger store. In September, Hoffman met with Carlson and Hall and, by then, he was aware that they were the parties who would negotiate the financial terms of the transaction. In the interim, the only actions Hoffman plausibly took in reliance on the Lukowitz assurance were the sale of the grocery business in June and the purchase of the option on the lot in Chilton in September. But the moving expenses, the house rental in Neenah, and the sale of the bakery building all occurred subsequently. There is no testimony that either Hall or Carlson made any similar representations to Hoffman. Thus, the one representation which Hoffman might reasonably assume Lukowitz was authorized to make was the initial assurance in May regarding the minimum "capital" requirements for a franchise, and, as suggested earlier, the parties attached different meanings to this assurance.

Second, was Hoffman’s reliance reasonable? At the September meeting with Hall and Carlson, and thereafter until he broke off negotiations, Hoffman never asked the Red Owl home office people to confirm his understanding about the source of funds for his contribution or to explain what Red Owl meant by its assurance that $18,000 would be a sufficient capital investment. This silence is all the more puzzling because Hoffman saw four different financing proposals, each of which specifically listed “Equity Capital (Amount owner has to invest)” as a separate line item apart from “Loans.” To be sure, the reasonableness of Hoffman’s reliance was a question of fact for

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103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 136(1) (1958) provides that an agent’s apparent authority is terminated “(a) when the principal states such a fact to the third person.” Thus, the key question was whether Hall and Carlson indicated directly or indirectly to Hoffman that Lukowitz had no authority to make financial representations on behalf of Red Owl. Clearly, Hoffman had reason to know that this was so.

the jury. But recall that the trial court instructed the jury on the subjective/objective test of reasonable reliance, one that required the jury to assess Hoffman’s behavior against the standard of a person with similar education, business experience, and acumen rather than the purely objective standard of the reasonable person. This more forgiving test of reasonable behavior is properly applied to fraud, duress, and other intentional acts, but not to a promissory estoppel or a negligence tort theory of the case. Thus, Red Owl’s attorneys had an opportunity to object to that instruction and thereby challenge the reasonableness of Hoffman’s behavior on appeal.

Third, and most important, the transcript makes clear that the parties never had a mutual understanding about the meaning of the statement: “I have approximately $18,000—will this put me in a bigger operation or won’t it?” The Red Owl representatives clearly meant that he would have to contribute equity of at least that amount and Hoffman clearly was focusing on how much cash he would put into the transaction, whether borrowed or not. Who is responsible for Hoffman’s misunderstanding about the assurance that $18,000 of capital would be sufficient? The rule in contract negotiations is that each party is responsible for clarifying his understanding of the meaning the other attaches to ambiguous words and phrases, and this rule would strongly argue against liability in this case.105 While the appellants’ brief does point out that this ambiguity was unresolved, Red Owl’s attorneys failed to tie this apparent misunderstanding to any legal conclusion and they raised the point only to show that the negotiations were ongoing and indefinite.

One shouldn’t be too hard on the attorneys for Red Owl, however. From their perspective there was no theory on which liability could properly be based as the law existed at the time. There was no justifiable claim for breach of a bargain contract because the representations were too indefinite to be a promissory commitment. For the same reason, liability could not properly be based on promissory estoppel. Equitable estoppel was inappropriate under Wisconsin law as it could not be used to create a right where none previously existed. And, there was then no cause of action in Wisconsin for negligent misrepresentation. Where Red Owl’s lawyers failed, from the outset, was to present their clients’ behavior and actions in a reasonable and defensible light. They could and should have elicited testimony about how hard everyone worked to make the negotiations succeed, and how it came to naught.

105 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20(1) (1981) provides:

There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and (a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by the other; or (b) each party knows or each party has reason to know the meaning attached by the other.

Id.
ultimately because of Hoffman's personal constraints. He needed Simon Vanden Heuvel's money to make the deal work and yet those funds came with strings attached that ultimately undermined the deal.

D. Epilogue

How was this dispute resolved and what happened to Joseph Hoffman? Professor Stewart Macaulay and his colleagues report that the parties settled the case for $10,600. Of that sum, $4000 went for attorney's fees and the Hoffmans retained the balance. Joseph Hoffman, meanwhile, became a very successful insurance salesman, winning several awards for sales volume. He and his family ultimately moved to Milwaukee where he rose through the ranks of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to become District Manager.\textsuperscript{106} Thereafter, he was transferred to Indiana and remained with the company in a managerial capacity. Finally, why was Hoffman so restless and eager to escape the bakery business in the first place? Grant Gilmore reported some years ago that Hoffman's motivations may have been largely independent of Red Owl's representations: the poor fellow, he told me, was allergic to bread!

VI. WHITHER THE LAW OF PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS AND PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS?

How do contemporary American courts actually treat reliance investments made before the parties have written a complete contract? Alan Schwartz and I report the results of a study of recent litigation in a forthcoming article.\textsuperscript{107} We began with a sample of 105 cases litigated between 1999 and 2003.\textsuperscript{108} Thirty of the cases raised the issue of reliance in the context of on-going negotiations. The underlying question in each case was whether the plaintiff could recover reliance costs if the parties had not yet reached any agreement. The courts denied liability, whether premised on promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, or negligent misrepresentation, in eighty-seven percent of these preliminary negotiation cases. The case data thus show that, absent intentional

\textsuperscript{106} MACAULAY ET AL., \textit{supra} note 6, at 403–04.


\textsuperscript{108} We examined all public databases for preliminary negotiation and preliminary agreement cases proceeding under the following theories of liability: promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, implied contract, definiteness, and intent to be bound. The final sample of 105 relevant cases represented 29 state jurisdictions, 19 federal district courts, and 7 federal courts of appeal.
misrepresentation or deceit, there is generally no liability for reliance investments made during the negotiation process.\textsuperscript{109}

In sum, courts will not grant recovery for "early reliance" unless the parties, by agreeing on something significant, have indicated their intention to be bound. Put more directly, the cases do not revolve around preliminary negotiations, but rather around preliminary agreements. Thus, for example, in the remaining seventy-five cases in our sample, the parties had agreed on at least some material terms. In twenty-seven cases, the court denied recovery, even though the parties had reached agreement on some (or even most) terms, because the parties had indicated, either expressly or by implication, that they did not yet intend to be legally bound. In thirty-six cases, the court held that the parties could have been found to have made a complete contract, even though they contemplated a further memorialization of terms, because the evidence showed that the formal writing was not essential. Finally, and most interesting, in twelve cases involving agreements to agree, the court found a binding preliminary agreement to negotiate further in good faith. These latter cases are interesting because they are at the forefront of an emerging rule governing preliminary agreements.

The common law has historically had great difficulty with preliminary agreements that expressed a mutual commitment on agreed terms but where significant additional terms remained to be negotiated. Typically, parties have agreed to negotiate further over the remaining terms. These "agreements to agree" confront the indefiniteness doctrine head on. Until recently, courts have held consistently that such "agreements to agree" were unenforceable under the common law of contracts so long as any essential term was open to negotiation.\textsuperscript{110} The cases in our sample thus reflect a major shift in doctrine involving agreements to agree where key terms remain unresolved. The modern framework for determining intent in agreements to agree (as well as cases dealing with the timing of enforcement) was first proposed by Judge Pierre Leval in \textit{Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v. Tribune Co.}\textsuperscript{111} The Leval framework has subsequently been adopted by the

\textsuperscript{109} "It is fundamental to contract law that mere participation in negotiations and discussions does not create binding obligation, even if agreement is reached on all disputed terms. More is needed than agreement on each detail, which is overall agreement . . . to enter into the binding contract." Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 1984).

\textsuperscript{110} SCOTT & KRAUS, \textit{supra} note 6, at 34-44, 322-25. Agreements to agree on the price in sales contracts are enforceable under the Uniform Commercial Code if the parties evidence an intention to be bound. See U.C.C. § 2-305(1)(b) (2003).

\textsuperscript{111} 670 F. Supp. at 491.
Second Circuit, and is now followed in at least thirteen states, sixteen federal district courts, and seven federal circuits. The framework sets out a new default rule for cases where the parties contemplate further negotiations. This rule relaxes the knife-edge character of the common law under which agreements are either fully enforceable or not enforceable at all.

Leval's framework relies on two distinct categories of preliminary agreements that will have binding force. The first (Type I) is a *fully binding preliminary agreement*. Here the parties agree on all the terms that require negotiation (including whether to be bound) but agree to memorialize their agreement in a more formal document. A Type I agreement binds both sides to their ultimate contractual objective just as if it were a formalized agreement, because the signing of a more elaborate contract is seen only as a formality. Thus, either party may demand performance of the transaction even though the parties fail to produce the more elaborate documentation of their agreement.

The second and more interesting type of preliminary agreement (Type II) is a *binding preliminary commitment* which is created when the parties have reached agreement on certain major terms of the deal but leave other terms open for further negotiation. The parties to such an understanding "accept a mutual commitment to negotiate together in good faith in an effort to reach final agreement." Neither party, however, has a right to demand performance of the transaction. Rather, they have a legal obligation to attempt to negotiate the open issues in good faith within the agreed framework. If a final contract is not agreed upon, the parties may abandon the transaction. Our sample shows that the enforcement of these binding preliminary agreements is now well-accepted. Indeed, a federal court recently declared the enforcement of such agreements as "the modern trend in contract law."

The preceding discussion demonstrates that scholars interested in commercial contracting should shift their focus from the largely irrelevant issue of precontractual reliance to the fundamental questions raised by the enforcement of these preliminary agreements. The emerging rule requires courts to resolve two key questions. When have the parties reached "an

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113 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 107, at 664.
114 Adjustrite, 145 F.3d at 548; see also R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1984).
116 Teachers, 670 F. Supp. at 498.
agreement" sufficient to impose a duty to negotiate in good faith? And, what behavior constitutes a breach of that duty? The current framework fails to provide much guidance in answering these questions.\footnote{118}{The multifactored character of the Leval test confines the court’s discretion more than a broad standard based on intent. But so long as the courts do not attach weights to the factors or otherwise specify the relationship between them, the factors may point in different directions and thus the test will lack transparency.}

Indeed, we can’t answer the legal questions until we first understand better the commercial behavior that has generated this litigation. The sheer volume of litigation over these preliminary agreements exposes a deep puzzle. Parties often write fully binding contracts before they invest in reliance. And, when they need to invest early prior to final contract they can (and do) contract directly on reliance. Yet these parties invest prior to final contract and they fail to contract specifically on reliance. Why do parties put themselves in this situation? And, finally, when negotiations break down and one party exits, when would the other party have a reasonable expectation of compensation absent an explicit promise to reimburse reliance expenditures? Schwartz and Scott provide one answer to this question,\footnote{119}{Schwartz and Scott argue that the duty to bargain in good faith arises where one party promises to make a simultaneous investment prior to negotiating the remaining terms and thereafter delays its investment strategically. Under those circumstances, they argue that the party who invested first should be entitled to recover its reliance costs and a failure by the delaying party to bargain over the amount of those costs would qualify as a breach of the duty. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 107, at 666–67.} but the academic debate over the law of preliminary agreements is only just beginning. The delay in understanding this important and heretofore largely ignored area of commercial law is attributable, at least in part, to the myth of precontractual reliance and the unfortunate case of \textit{Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.}